{"id":69934,"date":"2001-08-16T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2001-08-15T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/jasbir-singh-vs-vipin-kumar-jaggi-and-ors-on-16-august-2001"},"modified":"2015-06-25T16:07:21","modified_gmt":"2015-06-25T10:37:21","slug":"jasbir-singh-vs-vipin-kumar-jaggi-and-ors-on-16-august-2001","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/jasbir-singh-vs-vipin-kumar-jaggi-and-ors-on-16-august-2001","title":{"rendered":"Jasbir Singh vs Vipin Kumar Jaggi And Ors on 16 August, 2001"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Jasbir Singh vs Vipin Kumar Jaggi And Ors on 16 August, 2001<\/div>\n
Bench: G.B. Pattana1K, Ruma Pal<\/div>\n
           CASE NO.:\nAppeal (crl.)  826-827 of 2001\n\nPETITIONER:\nJASBIR SINGH\n\nRESPONDENT:\nVIPIN KUMAR JAGGI AND ORS.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT: 16\/08\/2001\n\nBENCH:\nG.B. PATTANA1K & RUMA PAL\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
JUDGMENT<\/p>\n
2001 Supp(1) SCR 598<\/p>\n
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RUMA PAL, J. Leave granted.\n<\/p>\n
The appellant is under trial for offences alleged to have been committed
\nunder Sections 21, 23 and 29 of the Narcoitc Drugs and Psychotropic
\nSubstances Act, 1985 (referred to hereafter as the ‘Act’). The respondent
\nNo. 1. was a co-accused. The appellant has challenged an order dated
\n31.1.2000 by which the High Court upheld an order of the Central Government
\ngranting the respondent No. 1 immunity from prosecution under Section 64 of
\nthe Act. In this appeal, we arc concerned with the scope of the power under
\nSection 64 of the Act and whether it can be exercised by the Central
\nGovernment in favour of a person after the Sessions Judge has rejected an
\napplication by such person for pardon under Section 307 of the Code of
\nCriminal Procedure, 1973.\n<\/p>\n
Proceedings under the Act were intiated against inter alia the appellant
\nand the respondent No. 1 on two separate complaints of the Narcotics
\nControl Bureau (briefly referred to as ‘NCB’) being SC No. 136\/89 and SC
\nNo. 2337 88. The appellanat is the principal accused in both cases. The
\nallegation is that he was the kingpin of an international net-work of drug
\nsmugglers. According to the prosecution, the evidence against the appellant
\nincluded ‘chits’ recording some details regarding the smuggling of drugs
\nand contacts in the United States of America and a tape recording of a
\nconversation between the appellant and the respondent No. 1 relating to the
\nsmuggling of drugs to the USA.\n<\/p>\n
On 23rd November, 1989 the respondent No. 1 applied to the NCB to be made
\nan approver as he was willing to co-operate with the NCB in securing a
\nconviction of the appellant. While this application was pending, the
\nrespondent No. I filed two identical applications on 19.4.1990 in the two
\ncases before the Additional Sessions Judge New Delhi, for grant of pardon
\nunder Section 307 Cr.P.C. in return for making a full disclosure of the
\ntransactions relating to the drug smuggling in both cases. The applications
\nwere supported by the Special Public Prosecutor and arguments were advanced
\nby the Special Public Prosecutor in support of the applications urging that
\nin keeping with the provisions of Section 307 Cr.P.C. the grant of pardon
\nto the respondent No. 1 would enable the prosecution to obtain the evidence
\nof the respondent No. I which would strengthen the case of the prosecution
\nagainst the appellant. The appellant opposed the applications before the
\nSessions Judge.\n<\/p>\n
The Sessions Judge by his order dated 4th October, 1990 rejected the
\napplications of the respondent No. 1 after assessing the evidence sought to
\nbe adduced against the appellant in some detail. It was held that the
\nevidence of the respondent No. 1 was not necessary to bring home the guilt
\nof the appellant. It was also held that any evidence given by the
\nrespondent No. I would be weak evidence not only because the respondent No.
\nI would be an approver but also because the respondent No. I was a
\nconvicted offender and had been released on parole because of mental
\nsickness. The Sessions Judge concluded that no purpose would be served at
\nall in granting pardon to the respondent No. 1.\n<\/p>\n
After this, the application made by the respondent No. 1 praying for
\nimmunity from prosecution from the offences with which he was charged was
\nconsidered by NCB. The transcript supplied by the respondent No. 1 of the
\ntelephonic conversation with the appellant, the original tape-recorded
\nversion of which was with the prosecution, was also considered. The
\nrespondent No. 1 stated that he was willing to identify the appellant’s
\nvoice in the tape-recorded conversation. The application was allowed by the
\nNCB and immunity was granted to the respondent No. 1 under Section 64 of
\nthe Act after recording the reasons in writing on 18th August 1992. It was
\nnoted that the appellant was a “big time drug trafficker and main organiser
\nof the syndicate. He operates very cleverly avoiding direct exposure. The
\navailable evidence against him is the ‘Chits’ recovered from his house. The
\nother evidence is his intercepted telephonic conversation with Shri Vipin
\nJaggi” (namely the respondent No. I herein). The order took note of the
\nrejection of the respondent No. 1’s application for pardon by the Sessions
\nJudge but went on to state that the powers under Section 64 of the Act were
\nindependent of and did not conflict with the powers conferred on the Court
\nunder Section 306 and 307 Cr.P.C. The NCB was of the opinion that the
\nevidence which would be rendered by the respondent No. 1 was “mainly the
\nidentification of the voice and corroboration and explanation of recorded
\nconversation” between the respondent No. 1 and the appellant which was
\n“crucial” for the prosecution of the appellant. It was also recorded in the
\norder that the respondent No. I had been medically examined on 24.4.1992 by
\nthe Associate Professor, Department of Psychiatry. All India Institute of
\nMedical Sciences and found to be normal. The immunity which was granted to
\nthe Respondent No. 1 from prosecution in the pending case was made subject
\nto the withdrawal of such immunity under Section 64(3), if the respondent
\nNo. 1 did not render the evidence or wilfully concealed anything or gave
\nfalse evidence.\n<\/p>\n
On 24th February. 1993 the prosecution applied under Section 311 Cr. P.C.
\nbefore the Sessions Judge for leave to examine the respondent No. 1 as
\nwitness in the pending cases. This was opposed by the accused. The Sessions
\nJudge found that the application under Section 311 was a “misuse of process
\nof Court and was without any substance” essentially on the ground that once
\nprosecution had been launched against accused persons and they were
\nundergoing trial, powers under Section 64 of the Act could not be exercised
\nfor changing the status of an accused into that of a witness. It was held
\nthat the grant of immunity under Section 64 to an accused who was facing
\ntrial before the Court would amount to vesting the power of judicial
\nauthority in the Government. According to the Sessions Judge, if the
\nprosecution wished to seek pardon for any accused from the court to
\nstrengthen its case against the other accused, the prosecution should have
\nmoved an appropriate application before the Court either under Section 307
\nor under Section 321 Cr.P.C. neither of which had been done. The
\nprosecution’s applications under Section 311 Cr.P.C. were accordingly
\nrejected by a composite order on 24th November 1995.\n<\/p>\n
The decision of the Sessions Judge was challenged by the Respondent No. 1
\nunder Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court at Delhi The
\nappellant was not made a party. He filed an application for being added as
\na party. This was disallowed by the High Court on 21st September 1999. The
\nappellant has not challenged this order before us.\n<\/p>\n
The writ application was finally allowed by the High Court by the order
\ndated 3 1.1.2000. It was held by the High Court that the Sessions Judge was
\nwrong in limiting the power under Section 64 to a stage before the
\nprosecution was commenced. According to the High Court, neither the
\nlanguage of Section 64 of the Act nor of Sections 306 and 307 Cr.P.C. could
\nbe construed in a manner so as to hold that the power under Section 64 came
\nto an end on the taking of cognizance of the offence by the Trial court.
\nThe High Court also relied upon the decisions i.e. Sardar Iqbal singh v.
\nState (Delhi Admin),AIR (1977) SC 2437, Sanjay Gandhi v. Union of India &
\nOrs. AIR<\/a> ( 1978) SC 514. State  (Delhi Admn.) v. .Jagat Singh AIR ( 1989)
\nSC 598, .Suresh Chandra Bahri and Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR<\/a> (1994) SC
\n2420, to hold that immediately upon the tendering of immunity to the
\nrespondent No. 1 under Section 64, the respondent No. I would stand
\ndischarged whereupon he ceased to be an accused and could be examined as a
\nwitness.\n<\/p>\n
The appellant then filed an application under Article 215 of the
\nConstitution read with Section 482 Cr.P.C. for recalling the order dated
\n31.1.2000. This was rejected by the High Court on 18.8.2000. In this
\nappeal, the appellant has challenged both the orders dated 31.1.2000 as
\nwell as 18.8.2000.\n<\/p>\n
At the outset a preliminary objection raised by the respondent No. 1 is
\ndealt with. According to the respondent No. 1 this appeal has been
\npreferred from an order passed in proceedings to which the appellant was
\nnot a party and the appellant has not challenged the order by which his
\napplication for intervention was rejected. It is contended that in the
\ncircumstances, the appeal preferred before us is not maintainable. The
\nobjection, assuming that it had some force, does not survive the order
\npassed by this Court on 3rd November 2000 granting permission to the
\nappellant to file the special petition.\n<\/p>\n
The appellant’s arguments on the merits were to some extent a reiteration
\nof the views expressed by the Sessions Judge, namely, that the power under
\nSection 64 of the Act could only be exercised before the commencement of
\nthe trial. It has been contended that this was clear from the language of
\nthe section itself. The second submission is that once the Court had
\nrejected the respondent No. I ‘ s application for pardon under Section 307,
\nit was not open to the Government to grant immunity to the respondent under
\nSection 64 of the Act on the same facts. According to the appellant by so
\ndoing, the Government had encroached upon an area which was exclusively
\nwithin the jurisdiction of the Court.\n<\/p>\n
The submissions appear to us to proceed on a misunderstanding of the role
\nof the Court, the prosecutor and of the NCB in the granting of pardon in
\ntrials for offences under the Act and a misreading of the provisions of
\nSection 64.\n<\/p>\n
The grant of pardon by Court is rooted in the premise that most criminals
\ntry to avoid detection. Crimes like smuggling, by definition are carried on
\nsecretively. The persons involved in such criminal activity would obviously
\ntry to conceal and hide any evidence of their activities in as many ways as
\nhuman ingenuity can devise. That is why the prosecution is often compelled
\nto rely on the evidence of an accomplice to bring the most serious
\noffenders to book. Besides “…..to keep the sword hanging over the head of<\/p>\n
an accomplice and to examine him as a witness is to encourage perjury.”\n<\/p>\n
It was in recognition of this need that the Code of Criminal Procedure,
\n1898 contained provisions like Sections 337 and 338 under which the
\nDistrict Magistrate, a Presidency Magistrate, a Sub Divisional Magistrate
\nor any Magistrate of the first class at the stage of inquiry and the Trial
\nCourt, after commitment and before judgment, could gram pardon to a co-
\naccused. The pardon was made conditional upon the person making “a full and
\ntrue disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge
\nrelative to the offence, and to every other person concerned, whether as
\nprincipal or abettor, in the commission thereof”.\n<\/p>\n
The issue has to be weighed in the balance so that at the cost of not
\nbringing one of the offenders to book, the others or at least the principal
\noffender can be convicted. “…..The basis of the tender of pardon is not
\nthe extent of the culpability of the person to whom pardon is granted, but
\nthe principal is to prevent the escape of the offenders from punishment in
\nheinous offences for lack of evidence.”\n<\/p>\n
The provisions of Sections 337 and 338 of the 1898 Cr.P.C. have been
\nsubstantially re-enacted as Sections 306 and 307 of the present Cr.P.C For
\nthe purposes of this case, however, we are concerned only with Section 307
\nwhich provides :\n<\/p>\n
“307. Power to direct tender of pardon-At any time after commitment of a
\ncase but before judgment is passed, the Court to which the commitment is
\nmade may, with a view to obtaining at the trial the evidence of any person
\nsupposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to, any
\nsuch offence, tender a pardon on the same condition to such person”.\n<\/p>\n
Although the power to actually grant the pardon is vested in the Court,
\nobviously the Court can have no interest whatsoever in the outcome nor can
\nit decide for the prosecution whether particular evidence is required or
\nnot to ensure the conviction of the accused. That is the prosecution’s job.
\nThis was the view expressed in Lt. Commander Pascal Fernandes v. State of
\nMaharashtra<\/a> where it was said :\n<\/p>\n
I    Laxmipat  Choraria v.    State of  Maharashtra.   AIR<\/a>   (1968)  SC\n<\/p>\n
938.<\/p>\n
2.   Suresh  Chandra   Bahir   v. State of  Bihar,   [1995]   Supp.  I
\nSCC   80. 106<\/p>\n
3.   AIR.   (1968)   SC 594  at  599<\/p>\n
“…….Ordinarily it is for the prosecution to ask that a particular
\naccused, out of several, may be tendered pardon. But even where the accused
\ndirectly applies to the Special Judges he must first refer the request to
\nthe prosecuting agency. It is not for the Special Judge to enter the ring
\nas a veritable director of prosecution. The power which the Special Judge
\nexercises is not on his own behalf but on behalf of the prosecuting agency,
\nand must, therefore, be exercised only when the prosecution joins in the
\nrequest. The State may not desire that any accused be tendered pardon
\nbecause it does not need approver’s testimony. It may also not like the
\ntender of pardon to the particular accused because he may be the brain
\nbehind the crime or the worst offender. The proper course for the Special
\nJudge is to ask for a statement from the prosecution on the request of the
\nprisoner. If the prosecution thinks that the tender of pardon will be in
\nthe interests of a successful prosecution of the other offenders whose
\nconviction is not easy without the approver’s testimony, it will
\nindubitably agree to the tendering of pardon. The Special Judge (or the
\nMagistrate) must not take on himself the task of determining the propriety
\nof tendering pardon in the circumstances of the case.”\n<\/p>\n
(emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
Judged by this standard, the first order of the Sessions Judge refusing
\npardon to the respondent No. I even though it was actively convassed for by
\nthe Special Public Prosecutor, was wrong. It was not for the Sessions Judge
\nto have considered the possible weight of the approvers evidence, even
\nbefore it was given. In any case, the evidence of an approver does not
\ndiffer from the evidence of any other witness except that his evidence is
\nlooked upon with great suspicion. But the suspicion may be removed and if
\nthe evidence of an approver is found to be trustworthy and acceptable then
\nthat evidence might well be decisive in securing a conviction4. The
\nSessions Judge could not and indeed should not have assessed the probable
\nvalue of the possible evidence of the respondent No. 1 in anticipation and
\nwholly in the abstract.\n<\/p>\n
The role of the prosecutor under Section 307 is distinct and different from
\nthe part he is called on to play under the provisions of Section 321
\nCr.P.C. Under Section 321, the Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public
\nProsecutor in charge of a case may, with the consent of the Court, at any
\ntime before the judgment is pronounced, withdraw from the prosecution of
\nany<\/p>\n
4.   See  Suresh  Chandra  Bahri  v.  State of  Bihar<\/a> (supra). person
\neither generally or in respect of any one or more of the offences for which
\nhe is tried. The most noticeable difference between this Section and
\nSection 307 of the Act is that unlike the grant of pardon under Section
\n307, withdrawal from prosecution under Section 321 Cr P.C. is unconditional
\nalthough it does provide for the express permission of the Central
\nGovernment in specified cases. Section 321 also does not spell out the
\ncircumstances under which the power may be exercised, either by the
\nprosecution or by the Court in granting consent, However, it has been
\njudicially recognised that “implicit in the grant of the power is that it
\nshould be in the interest of administration of justice which may be either
\nthat it will not be able to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the
\ncharge or that subsequent information before prosecuting agency would
\nfalsify the prosecution evidence or any other similar circumstances”” or it
\nmay be that “broader considerations of public peaces, larger considerations
\nof public justice and even deeper considerations of promotion of long-
\nlasting security in a locality; or order in a disorderly situation of
\nharmony in a faction milieu, or halting a false and vexatious prosecution
\nin a Court, may persuade the Executive, probono publico, to sacrifice a
\npending case for a wider benefit”.6<\/p>\n
In contrast the power of tendering pardon under Section 307 is restricted
\nto one consideration alone namely the obtaining of evidence from the person
\nto whom pardon is granted relating to the offences being tried. But it
\nneeds to be noted at this stage that the power under Section 321 not only
\nemphasises the role of the Executive in the trial of offences but also that
\nthe Executive can exercise the power at any time during the trial but
\nbefore the judgment is delivered. This will be relevant in construing the
\nlanguage of Section 64 of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
The Act consolidated and amended earlier laws relating to narcotic-drugs,
\nnamely, the Opium Act, 1857, the Opium Act, 1878 and the Dangerous Drugs
\nAct, 1930. In the Act’s Statement of Objects and Reasons, it was noted that
\nthe earlier Acts were not sufficiently deterrent to deal with the challenge
\nof well organised gangs of smugglers. It was necessary to make special
\nprovisions for exercising effective control not only of neurotic drugs but
\nalso of psychotropic substances particularly when “the country has for the
\nlast few years been increasingly facing the problem of transit traffic of
\ndrugs coming mainly from some of our neighbouring countries and destined
\nmainly to Western countries.”\n<\/p>\n
5.   Subhash Chander  v.  The   State  (Chandigarh Admn. AIR<\/a>  (1980)  SC\n<\/p>\n
423.<\/p>\n
6.   M.N.  Sankaranarayanan Nair   v.   P.V.  Balakrishnan.     AIR<\/a>  (1972)
\nSC  496 The concern which motivated the enactment of the Act was echoed by
\nthis Court in Durand Didier v. Chief Secretary, Union Territory of God<\/a> when
\nit said :\n<\/p>\n
“With deep concern, we may point out that the organised activities of the
\nunderworld and the clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic
\nsubstances……..has assumed serious and alarming proportions in the
\nrecent years.”\n<\/p>\n
Under Section 4(1) of the Act, the Central Government is obliged to take
\nall such measures as are deemed necessary for the purpose of preventing and
\ncombating the abuse of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and the
\nillicit traffic therein. By Notification S.O. No. 96(E) dated 17th March
\n1985, the Central Government constituted the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB)
\nin exercise of its powers under Section 4(3) of the Act to discharge the
\npowers and functions of the Central Government under the Act subject to the
\nsuperintendence and control of the Central Government.\n<\/p>\n
It is, in the circumstances, clear that when cases are started on the
\ncomplaint of the NCB, it is not a mere complainant but is the Executive and
\nit must act in discharge of a mandate statutorily cast upon it to
\neffectively check among other activities, the illegal dissemination and
\nsmuggling of drugs.\n<\/p>\n
As early as in 1968 this Court had expressed the hope that :\n<\/p>\n
“Perhaps it will be possible to enlarge Section 337 to take in certain
\nspecial laws dealing with customs, foreign exchange etc., where accomplice
\ntestimony will always be useful and witnesses will come forward because of
\nthe conditional pardon offered to them.”8<\/p>\n
The hope has been fulfilled by enacting provisions like Section 64 in the
\nAct, Section 291 in the Income Tax Act, 1961 and Section 60 in the Foreign
\nExchange Regulation Act, 1973. Each of these sections are substantially
\nidentical.\n<\/p>\n
Under Section 64(1) of the Act, the Central Government or the State
\nGovernment may tender immunity from prosecution for any offence under the
\nAct or under the Penal Code or under any Central or State Act with a view<\/p>\n
7.  AIR  (1989) SC   1966.\n<\/p>\n
8    Laxmipat Choraria  v.  State  of Maharashtra<\/a>  (supra)  at  p.  945. to
\nobtaining the evidence of any person appearing to have been directly or
\nindirectly concerned in or privy to the contravention of any of the
\nprovisions of the Act. The limitations on the exercise of the power are two
\nfold; first the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may
\nbe, must form an opinion that it is necessary or expedient to grant
\nimmunity to such a person. The reasons for such opinion are required to be
\nrecorded in writing. The second limitation on the exercise of the power
\nunder Section 64( 1) is that it can be granted only conditionally – the
\ncondition being that the person granted the immunity must make a full and
\ntrue disclosure of the whole circumstances relating to the contravention.
\nThe immunity is limited only to the offence in respect of which a tender of
\nevidence is made [Section 64(2)]. If the condition subject to which the
\nimmunity is granted is not fulfilled by the person to whom the immunity has
\nbeen tendered, after recording a finding to that effect by the Central
\nGovernment or the State Government, the immunity ‘shall be taken to have
\nbeen withdrawn and such person may be tried for the offence in respect of
\nwhich the tender of immunity was made or for any other offence of which he
\nappears to have been guilty in connection with the same matter.9 The
\nunderlying rationale of Section 64 is that the Government\/NCB which is
\nvitally interested in getting hold of the culprits, must be allowed to
\nassess the strength of the evidence available to it and if necessary,
\nbolster its case with evidence of an accomplice. Therefore, the Section
\nserves the same purpose as the grant of pardon to approvers under Section
\n307 Cr.P.C.\n<\/p>\n
Section 64. Power to tender immunity from prosecution-(I) The Central
\nGovernment or the State Government may, if it is of opinion (the reasons
\nfor such opinion being recorded in writing) that with a view to obtaining
\nthe evidence of any person appearing to have been directly or indirectly
\nconcerned in or privy to the contravention of any of the provisions of this
\nact or for any rule or order made thereunder it is necessary or expedient
\nso to do, tender to such person immunity from prosecution for any offence
\nunder this Act or under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or under any
\nother Central Act or State Act. as the case may be. for the time being in
\nforce, on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole
\ncircumstances relating to such contravention. (2) A tender of immunity made
\nto. and accepted by the person concerned, shall, to the extent to which the
\nimmunity extends, render him immune from prosecution for any offence in
\nrespect of which the tender was made (3) If it appears to the Central
\nGovernment or. as the case may be. the State Government, that any person to
\nwhom immunity has been tendered under this section has not complied with
\nthe conditions on which the tender was made or is wilfully concealing
\nanything or is giving false evidence, the Central Government, or as the
\ncase may be. the State Government, may record a finding to that effect and
\nthereupon the immunity shall be deemed to have been withdrawn and such
\nperson may be tried for the offence in respect of which the tender of
\nimmunity was made or for any other offence of which he appears to have been
\nguilty in connection with the same matter The object of Section 64 being
\nthe same as Section 307, it should logically follow that it may be
\nexercised at any time during the course of the trial. It is true that the
\nwords ‘immunity from prosecution’ have been used, but the phrase does not
\nmean anything more than the power to withdraw from prosecution. That, as
\nhas been noted earlier, can be exercised at any time in the course of the
\ntrial, but before judgment is delivered.\n<\/p>\n
However, according to the appellant the word ‘prosecution’ is limited to
\nthe initiation of proceedings and, therefore, the grant of immunity cannot
\nbe made subsequently. We are of the opinion that no principle of
\ninterpretation requires a statutory provision to be broken down to the
\nwords which constitute it and then after defining each word individually
\nweld them together to arrive at the meaning of a phrase. Words take their
\ncolour from the context in which they are used. Given the nature and object
\nof the power, the word ‘prosecution’ must in the context of Section 64 mean
\nthe entire proceeding till the judgment of the Court is delivered. It may
\nbe pointed out that the words ‘prosecution’ and ‘punishment’ have been held
\nto have no fixed connotation and they are susceptible of both a wider and a
\nnarrower meaning.10<\/p>\n
Nevertheless even adopting the method of interpretation suggested by the
\nappellant, we arrive at the same result. The definition of the word
\n‘immunity’ in the context of Section 64 is – ‘Freedom or exemption from
\npenalty, burden, or duty.'” Prosecution has been defined as – “A criminal
\naction; a proceeding instituted and carried on by due course of law, before
\na competent tribunal, for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence
\nof a person charged with crime”12.\n<\/p>\n
(emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
Cobbling these two definitions together, the phrase ‘immunity from
\nprosecution’ in Section 64 would mean ‘Freedom from punishment during a
\nproceeding instituted and carried on by law’.\n<\/p>\n
There is thus nothing in Section 64 of the Act to circumscribe the power of
\nthe Central or State Government under Section 64 to a point of time prior
\nto the commencement of the trial. Therefore, if in any trial of offences
\nunder the Act, it is felt by the Government, in this case the NCB, that it
\nis necessary to have the evidence of the co-accused, it can, subject to the
\nconditions<\/p>\n
10.   See  S.A.   Venkataraman  v.  Union  of India.<\/a>   (1954)  SC  376.\n<\/p>\n
11.   Black   Law   Dictionary-Sixth  Edition. 12    ibid. specified in
\nSection 64(1), withdraw the case against such co-accused by granting him
\nimmunity.\n<\/p>\n
The decisions cited by the appellant viz., S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of
\nIndia<\/a> (supra) and Thomas Dana v. State of Punjab’<\/a> are inapposite. In both
\ncases, the question was whether the appellant could avail of the protection
\nunder Article 20(2) of the Constitution. In S.A. Venkararamn, the
\npetitioner had challenged criminal proceedings initiated against him
\nclaiming that he had already been prosecuted and punished (or the same
\noffences by the proceedings under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act which
\nhad been resulted in his dismissal from service. It was held by this Court
\nthat the inquiry under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act was not a
\nprosecution for the purposes of Article 20 since the inquiry did not result
\nin punishment under that Act<\/p>\n
Similarly, in Thomas Dana v. State of Punjab.<\/a> (supra), the only issue-was
\nwhether a person proceeded against under Section 167(8) of Sea Customs Act
\ncould be said to have been prosecuted and punished so that he could claim
\nprotection from trial under the Criminal Procedure Code by virtue of
\nArticle 20(2) of the Constitution. The issue was answered in the negative.
\nNeither of the cases hold that prosecution only means the initiation of
\nproceedings.\n<\/p>\n
The order under Section 64 was fully operative when the applications under
\nSection 311 to examine the respondent No. 1 were filed by the prosecution
\nbefore the Sessions Judge. The refusal of the applications under Section 3
\nI 1 by the Session Judge in fact would result in the withdrawal of the
\nimmunity granted to the respondent No. I under Section 64 since the
\nimmunity had been granted to the respondent No. I subject to the condition
\nthat evidence would be tendered by him in the pending cases. The Sessions
\nJudge could not sit in appeal over the decision of the NCB more so when no
\none had challenged the order under Section 64 before him.\n<\/p>\n
The power conferred on the NCB is not an arbitrary one. Reasons are
\nrequired to be recorded in writing. Needless to say, the reasons would have
\nto be appropriate and germane to the object sought to be achieved by the
\nexercise of such power. We have scrutinised the order dated 18th August
\n2000 and are satisfied that the reasons recorded for granting the immunity
\nto the respondent No. I are neither extraneous nor relevant.\n<\/p>\n
There is no conflict between the powers exercised by the Court under
\nSection 307 and by the Government under Section 64. All that Section 64
\ndoes is to bring expressly to the fore the role which the Executive already
\nhas to play under Section 307. The only difference is in the authority
\nwhich orders the pardon or the grant of immunity. Even under the Cr.P.C.,
\n1898 it was held that the provisions of Sections 337 and 338 of the Code
\ncontemplated concurrent jurisdiction in the Magistrate and the District
\nMagistrate to tender a pardon. The powers were independent so that when the
\nMagistrate rejected the grant of pardon under Section 337 it did not take
\naway the power or jurisdiction of the District Magistrate to entertain a
\nfurther application for grant of pardon.14<\/p>\n
Assuming there is a conflict between the powers of the Court under Section
\n307 Cr.P.C. and the power of the Central Government under Section 64 of the
\nAct, then it must be held that Section 64 would prevail both on the ground
\nthat the Act being a special Act overrides the Cr.P.C. which is a general
\nAct and also because the later enactment must prevail over the earlier<\/p>\n
We are told that after the decision of the High Court, the respondent No. I
\nhas in fact tendered the evidence promised by him. To refuse him the
\nimmunity now would not only be illegal but particularly unjust.\n<\/p>\n
For the reasons aforementioned, we uphold the decision of the High Court
\nand dismiss these appeals.\n<\/p>\n
14.     See Kanta Prashad v. Delhi Administration.<\/a>  [1958] SCR  1219 and
\nState of U.P. v. Kailash Nath Agarwal and Ors..<\/a>  [1973] 3 SCR 728.\n<\/p>\n
15.     See (1) Sarwan Singh and Anr.  v. Kasturi Lal,<\/a> [1977] 2 SCR 421;
\n(2) Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial and Investment Corporation
\nof Maharashtra Ltd. and Anr..<\/a>  [1993] 2 SCC  144; (3) Allahabad Bank v.
\nCanara Bank and Anr..<\/a>  [2000] 4 SCC 4C6 and (4) Solidaire India Ltd.  v.
\nFairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. and Ors.<\/a>  [2001] 3 SCC 71.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Jasbir Singh vs Vipin Kumar Jaggi And Ors on 16 August, 2001 Bench: G.B. Pattana1K, Ruma Pal CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.) 826-827 of 2001 PETITIONER: JASBIR SINGH RESPONDENT: VIPIN KUMAR JAGGI AND ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16\/08\/2001 BENCH: G.B. PATTANA1K & RUMA PAL JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT 2001 Supp(1) SCR 598 The Judgment […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-69934","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nJasbir Singh vs Vipin Kumar Jaggi And Ors on 16 August, 2001 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/jasbir-singh-vs-vipin-kumar-jaggi-and-ors-on-16-august-2001\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Jasbir Singh vs Vipin Kumar Jaggi And Ors on 16 August, 2001 - 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