{"id":70012,"date":"1965-08-05T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1965-08-04T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/mirza-ali-akbar-kashani-vs-united-arab-republic-and-anr-on-5-august-1965"},"modified":"2016-10-26T20:28:40","modified_gmt":"2016-10-26T14:58:40","slug":"mirza-ali-akbar-kashani-vs-united-arab-republic-and-anr-on-5-august-1965","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/mirza-ali-akbar-kashani-vs-united-arab-republic-and-anr-on-5-august-1965","title":{"rendered":"Mirza Ali Akbar Kashani vs United Arab Republic And Anr on 5 August, 1965"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Mirza Ali Akbar Kashani vs United Arab Republic And Anr on 5 August, 1965<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1966 AIR 230, \t\t 1966 SCR (1) 319<\/div>\n
Author: P Gajendragadkar<\/div>\n
Bench: Gajendragadkar, P.B. (Cj), Wanchoo, K.N., Hidayatullah, M., Shah, J.C., Sikri, S.M.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nMIRZA ALI AKBAR KASHANI\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nUNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND ANR.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n05\/08\/1965\n\nBENCH:\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ)\nBENCH:\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ)\nWANCHOO, K.N.\nHIDAYATULLAH, M.\nSHAH, J.C.\nSIKRI, S.M.\n\nCITATION:\n 1966 AIR  230\t\t  1966 SCR  (1) 319\n CITATOR INFO :\n R\t    1972 SC 202\t (8)\n D\t    1987 SC   9\t (17)\n F\t    1991 SC 814\t (2)\n\n\nACT:\nCode of Civil Procedure, 1908, s. 86(1)-Suit against foreign\nState  Consent\tof  Central  Government\t whether   necessary\n-'Ruler\t of  a foreign State' whether  distinguishable\tfrom\nforeign State for the purpose of the section.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nThe  appellant filed a suit for breach of  contract  against\nthe  respondents on the Original Side of the  Calcutta\tHigh\nCourt.\t The first respondent was the United  Arab  Republic\nwhile the second respondent was one of its departments.\t The\nsuit was filed without obtaining the consent of the  Central\nGovernment  under s. 86(1) of the Code of  Civil  Procedure,\nbut the High Court granted leave to the appellant under\t cl.\n12   of\t the  Letters  Patent.\t The   respondents   entered\nappearance  but\t claimed  that leave under  cl.\t 12  of\t the\nLetters\t Patent\t be cancelled and the  plaint  be  rejected.\nTheir contention was that the suit was incompetent  inasmuch\nas the suit was in substance against the Ruler of the United\nArab Republic and consent of the Central Government under s.\n86(1)  was necessary before it was filed.  They\t also  urged\nthat respondent no.  1 was a sovereign State and as such  it\nenjoyed absolute immunity from being sued under the Rules of\nInternational  Law adopted and applied by the municipal\t law\nof  India.  The trial court did not accept either  of  these\ncontentions and passed a decree in favour of the  appellant.\nThe  respondents  appealed under the Letters Patent  to\t the\nDivision Bench of the High Court.  The Division Bench agreed\nwith the trial court that s. 86(1) wag not applicable to the\nappellant's  suit because the said section referred  to\t the\nRuler of a foreign State and not to a foreign State as such.\nIn This connection the High Court observed that only in\t the\ncase  of a monarchical State could the Ruler be taken to  be\nidentical with the State.  However, on the alternative\tplea\nof the respondent based on immunity under International Law,\nthe Division Bench differed from the trial court and decided\nin favour of the respondents.  Consequently the\t appellant's\nplaint\tstood  rejected.  With certificate  from  'the\tHigh\nCourt the appellant came to this Court.\nHELD  :\t (i)  As  a matter of  procedure  it  would  not  be\npermissible to draw a sharp distinction between the Ruler of\na  foreign  State  and a foreign State of which\t he  is\t the\nRuler.\t This is apparent from the fact that s. 87  provides\nthat even when a Ruler of a State sues or is sued, the\tsuit\nmust  be  in the name of the State.  It is  also  remarkable\nthat  though  the heading of ss. 84-87B does  not  in  terms\nrefer  to foreign States at all, s. 84 in terms\t empowers  a\nforeign\t State\tto  bring  a  suit  in\ta  competent  court;\nobviously  the Legislature did not think that the case of  a\nforeign\t State\twould not be included under 'he\t heading  of\nthis group of sections. [328 A-D]\n(ii)Section  86 is a counterpart to s. 84.  Whereas  s.\t 84\nconfers\t a  right  on a foreign State to sue,  s.  86(1)  in\nsubstance imposes a liability on foreign States to be  sued.\nThe foreign State can sue, as laid down in the proviso to s.\n84  to enforce a private right vested in the Ruler  of\tsuch\nState\n320\nor in any officer of such State in his public capacity.\t  By\n'private right' in this context is meant rights which can be\nenforced  in  the  municipal courts of a  foreign  State  as\ndistinguished  from a political or territorial rights  which\nmust be settled under International Law by agreement between\nStates.\t As a counterpart, s. 86(1) proceeds to prescribe  a\nlimited\t  liability  against  foreign  States.\t The   first\nlimitation  is that such a suit cannot be instituted  except\nwith  the  consent of the Central  Government.\t The  second\nlimitation  is\tthat the Central Government shall  not\tgive\nconsent\t unless it appears that the case falls under one  or\nthe other cls. (a) to (d) of s. 86(2).\tHaving provided\t for\nthis limited liability to be sued the Legislature has  taken\ncare  to save Ruler of a foreign State from  arrest,  except\nwith the consent of the Central Government and has  directed\nthat no decree shall be executed against the property of any\nsuch  Ruler;  that  is\tthe effect of  s.  86(3).   What  is\nexempted here is the separate property of the Ruler  himself\nand not the property of the Ruler as head of the State. [332\nB-H]\nHajonManick v. Bur Sing, II Cal. 17, referred to.\n(iii)When  s.  86(i)  refers to a Ruler\t of  a\tforeign\nState, it refers to the Rulerin relation to the said State,\nand means the person who is for the time being recognised by\nthe  Central  Government to be the head of that\t State.\t  In\nview  of  the definition of 'Ruler' in s. 87 (1) (b)  it  is\ndifficult  to accept the argument that the  expression\t'the\nRuler  of a foreign State under s. 86(1) can take  in  cases\nonly  of  Rulers of foreign States which are governed  by  a\nmonarchical form of Government.\t In view of the\t definition,\nwhen  s. 86(1) refers to Rulers of foreign State, it  refers\nto  Rulers of all foreign States whatever be their  form  of\nGovernment whether monarchical or republican. [330 H-331 A]\nBesides,  on principle, there is no reason why it should  be\nassumed\t that  the  Code of Civil Procedure  always  made  a\ndistinction  between  Rulers of foreign States\tgoverned  by\nmonarchical form of Government and those which were governed\nby  Republican\tform of Government.  The  Legislature  which\nframed\tthe relevant provisions of the Code was\t aware\tthat\nthere  were several States in which the monarchical form  of\nGovernment  did\t not prevail.  It could not  have  been\t the\nintention of the framers of the Code of Civil Procedure that\nmonarchical  States  should be liable to be  sued  under  s.\n86(1)  subject to the consent of the Central  Government  in\nthe municipal courts of India, whereas foreign States not so\ngoverned  should fall outside s. 86(1) and thus be  able  to\nclaim  immunity under International Law.  When s. 87(1)\t (b)\nwas  introduced in 1951 it must have been intended that\t the\ndefinition  of 'Ruler' therein should include all  heads  of\nforeign States whatever their form of Government. [331 E-F]\n(iv)The effect of the provisions of s. 86(1) appears to\t be\nthat it makes astatutory  provision  covering  a  field\nwhich would otherwise be coveredby   the   doctrine    of\nimmunity under International Law.  Every sovereign State  is\ncompetent to make its own laws in relation to the rights and\nliabilities  of\t a foreign State to be sued within  its\t own\nmunicipal  courts.  Just as an independent  sovereign  State\nmay  statutorily provide for its own rights and\t liabilities\nto  sue\t and be sued, so can it provide for the\t rights\t and\nliabilities  of\t foreign States to sue and be  sued  in\t its\nmunicipal  courts.  That being so it would be legitimate  to\nhold  that the effect of s. 86(1) is to modify to a  certain\nextent the doctrine of immunity recognised by  International\nLaw.  This section provides that foreign States can be\tsued\nwithin the municipal courts of India with the consent of the\nCentral\t Government  and  when such consent  is\t granted  as\nrequired  by  s. 86(1), it would not be open  to  a  foreign\nState\tto   rely  on  the  doctrine   of   immunity   under\nInternational  Law  because the municipal  courts  in  India\nwould be\n321\nbound  by the statutory provisions, such as those  contained\nin the Code of Civil Procedure. [333 B-E]\nChandulal  Khushalji  v.  Awad Bin Umar\t Sultan\t Nawaz\tJung\nBahadur, I.L.R. 21 Dom. 351 referred to.\n(v)Section  86(1)  thus applies to cases where\tsuits  are\nbrought against Rulers of foreign States and foreign  States\nfall within its scope whatever be their form of\t Government.\nThe Section applied to the present suit, and the consent  of\nthe  Central Government not having been obtained  before  it\nwas filed, the suit was barred. [334 B-C]\n[in view of the decision that s. 86(1) barred the suit,\t the\nCourt  did not find it necessary to deal with  the  question\nwhether the respondents were justified in claiming  absolute\nimmunity under International Law.] [334 C]\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 220 of 1964.
\nAppeal\tfrom the judgment and order dated April 17, 1961  of
\nthe Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Order No. 11
\n5 of 1960.\n<\/p>\n
R.Chowdhury,  S. Mukherjee and S. N. Mukherjee,\t for  the
\nappellant.\n<\/p>\n
B.Sen, V. A. Seyid Muhammad, P. K. Das and P. K. Bose<\/a> for
\nthe respondents.\n<\/p>\n
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\nGajendragadkar, C.J. This appeal arises out of a suit  filed
\nby  the appellant, Mirza Ali Akbar Kashani, against the\t two
\nrespondents,  the United Arab Republic, and the Ministry  of
\nEconomy, Supplies, Importation Department of the Republic of
\nEgypt  at Cairo, on the Original Side of the  Calcutta\tHigh
\nCourt.\tBy his plaint, the appellant claimed to recover from
\nthe respondents damages assessed at Rs. 6,07,346 for  breach
\nof  contract.  According to the appellant, the\tcontract  in
\nquestion  was  made between the parties on March  27,  1958.
\nRespondent  No.\t 2  which was a party to  the  contract\t had
\nagreed to buy tea from the appellant upon certain terms\t and
\nconditions; one of these was that respondent No. 2 would not
\nplace  any further orders in India for purchase of tea\twith
\nanyone\telse during the tenure of the contract and  that  it
\nwould, in every case, give the appellant the benefit of\t the
\nfirst\trefusal\t  for\trespondent   No.   2’s\t  additional
\nrequirements.  The appellant alleged that during the  tenure
\nof  the contract, the respondents had wrongfully  placed  an
\norder  for  the\t supply of tea with a  third  party  without
\ngiving\tthe  appellant\ta chance to  comply  with  the\tsaid
\nrequirement.   That is how the respondents had\tcommitted  a
\nbreach of a material term of the contract.\n<\/p>\n
322<\/span><\/p>\n
Formerly,  the Republic of Egypt and the Republic  of  Syria
\nwere  two  independent\tsovereign  States.   They,  however,
\nmerged\tand  formed a new Sovereign State  on  February\t 22,
\n1958.  This new sovereign State is known as the United\tArab
\nRepublic and is referred as respondent No. 1 in the  present
\nappeal.\t   This\t new  State  has  been\trecognised  by\t the
\nGovernment of India.  Respondent No. 2 has been working as a
\ndepartment  of\trespondent No. 1 and is a  part\t and  parcel
\nthereof.   The\tpresent suit was instituted  on\t August\t 10,
\n1959.  It is common ground that the appellant did not obtain
\nthe consent of the Central Government to the institution  of
\nthe  suit under s. 86 of the Code of Civil  Procedure.\t The
\nappellant, however, applied for leave under Clause 12 of the
\nLetters Patent in view of the fact that a part of the  cause
\nof action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta
\nHigh Court.  This leave was granted to the appellant by\t the
\nlearned trial Judge.\n<\/p>\n
On  December 3, 1959, the respondents entered appearance  in
\nthe  suit;  and on December 17, 1959, they  applied  for  an
\norder that the leave granted under Clause 12 of the  Letters
\nPatent should be revoked, the plaint should be rejected\t and
\nfurther proceedings in the suit should be stayed.  According
\nto  the respondents, the trial Court had no jurisdiction  to
\nentertain  the suit inasmuch as the President of the  United
\nArab  Republic was its Ruler and the suit was,\tin  reality,
\nand  in\t substance, a suit against him and as such,  it\t was
\nbarred\tunder S. 86 of the Code.  It was further averred  on
\ntheir behalf that no part of the alleged cause of action had
\narisen\twithin the jurisdiction of the Court; and so,  leave
\ncould  not  be granted under Clause 12.\t At the\t hearing  of
\nthis  petition,\t the  respondents were allowed\tto  urge  an
\nadditional  ground in support of their plea that  the  leave
\nshould\tbe revoked; they urged that respondent No. 1  was  a
\nforeign\t sovereign  State and as such  it  enjoyed  absolute
\nimmunity from being sued in the trial Court under the  Rules
\nof International Law as adopted and applied by the municipal
\nlaw of India.\n<\/p>\n
These pleas were controverted by the appellant, It was urged
\nthat S. 86 of the Code was not a bar to the present suit, as
\nthe  said  section created a bar only against a Ruler  of  a
\nforeign\t State and the present suit clearly did not fall  in
\nthat  category.\t  According to the appellant,  the  immunity
\nfrom  being  sued  without  the\t sanction  of  the   Central
\nGovernment to which s. 86 of the Code referred could not  be
\ninvoked\t by  a foreign State such as respondent No.  1.\t The
\nappellant  also\t urged\tthat in view of the  fact  that\t the
\ntransaction  which  has given rise to the present  suit\t has
\nnothing to do with the governmental functions of  respondent
\nNo. 1, no immunity
\n\t\t\t    323<\/span>
\ncould  be claimed by the respondents under the\tdoctrine  of
\nInternational Law.  The appellant further contended that  by
\nappearing  in  the present proceedings and by  filing  pleas
\nthereafter,   the   respondents\t  had\tsubmitted   to\t the
\njurisdiction of the Court and had waived their objection  to
\nits jurisdiction.\n<\/p>\n
The  learned  trial Judge held that s. 86 did  not  bar\t the
\npresent\t suit.\tHe accepted the contention of the  appellant
\nthat  that bar could be invoked only against the Ruler of  a
\nforeign State and not against respondent No. 1 which was  an
\nindependent  sovereign State.  On the question of  the\tplea
\nraised by the respondents under International Law, the trial
\nJudge  held  that  having  regard  to  the  nature  of\t the
\ntransaction  which has given rise to the present  suit,\t the
\nplea  of  immunity  raised  by\tthe  respondents  cannot  be
\nsustained.   He\t also found against the respondents  on\t the
\nquestion of waiver.  In the result, the application made  by
\nthe  respondents  for revoking leave was  dismissed  by\t the
\ntrial Judge.\n<\/p>\n
The  respondents then took the matter before the  Court\t of’
\nAppeal of the Calcutta High Court under the Letters  Patent.
\nBoth the learned Judges who constituted the Court of  Appeal
\nhave upheld the finding of the trial Judge that s. 86 of the
\nCode  does not create a bar against the present suit.\tThey
\nhave, however, reversed the trial Judge’s conclusions on the
\nquestion  of  immunity\tclaimed\t by  the  respondents  under
\nInternational  Law  as well as on the  question\t of  waiver.
\nThey  have held that it was not shown that  the\t application
\nmade by the respondents challenging the jurisdiction of\t the
\ntrial  Judge  to  entertain the\t suit  could  be  reasonably
\nconstrued as submission to the jurisdiction of the Court  by
\nthem; and they have come to the conclusion that the doctrine
\nof International Law which recognises the absolute  immunity
\nof  sovereign independent States from being sued in  foreign
\ncourts\tcreated\t a  bar against the present  suit.   In\t the
\nresult,\t the  appeal preferred by the respondents  has\tbeen
\nallowed,  the order passed by the trial Judge has  been\t set
\naside,\tand  the  plaint filed by  the\tappellant  has\tbeen
\nrejected  under\t prayer (b) of the  Master’s  Summons.\t The
\nappellant  has applied for and obtained a  certificate\tfrom
\nthe Court of Appeal and it is with the said certificate that
\nhe has come to this Court in appeal.\n<\/p>\n
Mr.  R.\t Chaudhry for the appellant has contended  that\t the
\nview taken by the Court of Appeal about the scope and effect
\nof the doctrine of immunity on which the respondents  relied
\nis  erroneous  in law.\tIn support of his argument,  he\t has
\nurged that the trend of recent decisions and the tendency of
\nthe development of Inter-\n<\/p>\n
324<\/span><\/p>\n
national  Law in recent times indicate that the doctrine  of
\nimmunity  in  question\tcan  no longer\tbe  regarded  as  an
\nabsolute  and  unqualified doctrine.  He  suggests  that  in
\nmodem  times, States enter into commercial transactions\t and
\nit   would  be\tinappropriate  to  allow   such\t  commercial
\ntransactions  the protection of the doctrine of immunity  of
\nsovereign  States from being sued in foreign countries.\t  In
\nsupport\t of  his argument, Mr. Chaudhry\t has  very  strongly
\nrelied\ton the observations made by H. Lauterpacht  who\t has
\n,edited the eighth edition of Oppenheim’s International Law.
\nSays  Editor Lauterpacht, “The grant of immunity  from\tsuit
\namounts in -effect to a denial of a legal remedy in  respect
\nof  what may be .a valid legal claim; as such,\timmunity  is
\nopen  to objection.  The latter circumstance  provides\tsome
\nexplanation   of  the  challenge  to  -which  it  has\tbeen
\nincreasingly  exposed-in addition to the  circumstance\tthat
\nthe  vast expansion of activities of the modem State in\t the
\neconomic sphere has tended to render unworkable a rule which
\ngrants\tto  the\t State operating as a  trader  a  privileged
\nposition  as  compared with private traders.   Most  States,
\nincluding  the United States, have now abandoned or  are  in
\nthe  process of abandoning the rule of absolute immunity  of
\nforeign\t States with regard to what is usually described  as
\nacts of a private law nature.  The position in this  respect
\nin Great Britain must be regarded as fluid” (p. 273).
\nEven  Dicey in his Conflict of Laws while enunciating,\tRule
\n17  in\trelation to such immunity in unqualified  form,\t has
\nmade  some  comment to which Mr. Chaudhry  has\tinvited\t our
\nattention.   It is true that Rule 17 says, inter alia,\tthat
\nthe  Court  has no jurisdiction to entertain  an  action  or
\nother  proceeding against any foreign State, or the head  of
\ngovernment  or\tany  ,department of the\t government  of\t any
\nforeign State.\tCommenting on this rule, the learned  author
\nobserves  that “the immunity is derived ultimately from\t the
\nrules of Public International Law and from the maxim of that
\nlaw, par in parem non habet imperium.  The relevant rule  of
\nPublic International Law has become part of English law.  It
\nis  not impossible, however, that English law  goes  further
\nthan the international legal system demands in this regard”.
\nThen the learned author subjects the English decisions to  a
\nclose  analysis and concludes that it may well be  that\t the
\nsystem\tof international law as a whole is moving towards  a
\n“functional”  concept  of  jurisdictional  immunities  which
\nwould  confine\ttheir scope to matters within the  field  of
\nactivity  conceived as belonging essentially to a person  of
\nthat system of whatsoever category(1).\n<\/p>\n
(1)Dicey’s Conflict of Laws, 7th Ed. pp. 132-33.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t    325<\/span><\/p>\n
Mr.  Chaudhry naturally lays emphasis on these\tobservations
\nof  Dicey.   He has conceded that the general  consensus  of
\nopinion as disclosed in the English decisions bearing on the
\npoint  is  not in his favour, though the  voice\t of  dissent
\nraised\t by   Lord  Denning  in\t Rahimtolia  v.\t  Nizam\t  of
\nHyderabad(1) distinctly supports Mr. Chaudhry’s plea.  That,
\nin  substance, is how Mr. Chaudhry has attempted to  present
\nhis  case on the interesting question about the immunity  of
\nsovereign States under International Law.
\nWhilst\twe  were  hearing Mr. Chaudhry\ton  this  point,  we
\nenquired  from him whether be supported the finding  of\t the
\ncourts\tbelow that the present suit was not barred under  s.
\n86 of the Code, and he contended that his case was that that
\nfinding was clearly right and the present appeal would\thave
\nto  be\tdealt  with on the footing that\t s.  86\t created  no
\ndifficulty  against  the appellant.  Mr.  Chaudhry  did\t not
\ndispute the correctness of the finding recorded by the Court
\nof Appeal on the question of waiver.\n<\/p>\n
Mr. B. Sen who appeared for the respondents, however,  urged
\nthat  he wanted to challenge the correctness of the  finding
\nrecorded by the Calcutta High Court as to the  applicability
\nof  s. 86 of the Code.\tHe conceded that the trial Judge  as
\nwell as the two learned Judges who heard the Letters  Patent
\nAppeal\thad  agreed  in holding that s. 86  was\t not  a\t bar
\nagainst\t the present suit; but Mr. Sen’s argument  was\tthat
\nthe  said  finding was plainly inconsistent  with  the\ttrue
\nscope  and  effect of s. 86.  He also urged  that  the\tview
\ntaken by the Court of Appeal as to the applicability of\t the
\ndoctrine of immunity under International Law was right.
\nDuring\tthe  course of the hearing of this appeal,  it\tthus
\nbecame clear that two questions fall to be considered by us;
\nthe first is in relation to the application of s. 86 of\t the
\nCode;  and the second in regard to the scope and  effect  of
\nthe   doctrine\t of  immunity\tunder\tInternational\tLaw.
\nLogically,  the effect of s. 86 has to be considered  first,
\nbecause it is common ground that if we were to hold that  s.
\n86 was a bar to the present suit, then the interesting point
\nabout  immunity under International Law may not have  to  be
\nconsidered.  The appeal would, in that view, be liable to be
\ndismissed  on the ground that the suit was barred by s.\t 86.
\nAfter hearing both Mir.\t Chaudhry and Mr. Sen, we have\tcome
\nto  the conclusion that the learned Judges of  the  Calcutta
\nHigh  Court were, with respect, in error in holding that  s.
\n86  does  not create a bar against the present\tsuit.\tThat
\nbeing  our view, we do not propose to consider\twhether\t the
\nCourt of Appeal was right in
\n(1) [1959] A.C. 379.\n<\/p>\n
326<\/span><\/p>\n
upholding  the respondents’ plea of absolute immunity  under
\nInternational Law.  Let us, therefore, deal with the problem
\nraised under s. 86 of the Code.\n<\/p>\n
The  relevant provisions are to be found in sections  83-87B
\nof  the Code.  The heading of these provisions is “Suits  by
\naliens\tand  by or against foreign Rulers,  Ambassadors\t and
\nEnvoys”.  The present sections have been introduced by s. 12
\nof  the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act,  1951\t(No.
\n11 of 1951).  Prior to the amendment, the relevant  sections
\nwere  83-87.   As a result of the amendment,  cases  of\t the
\nRulers of former Indian States are now dealt with by s. 87B,
\nand  the remaining provisions deal with foreign\t States\t and
\nRulers\tof foreign States.  It is a matter of  history\tthat
\nthe  Rulers of Indian States who could claim the benefit  of
\nthe  provisions\t contained in sections 84 and 86  under\t the
\nCode  of 1908 have ceased to be Rulers and are now  entitled
\nto be described as Rulers of former Indian States.  That  is
\nwhy  a\tspecific  and separate provision has  been  made  in
\nregard\tto Rulers of former Indian States by s. 87B.   That,
\nbroadly stated, is the main distinction between the  schemes
\nof earlier sections 83-87 and the present sections 83-87B.
\nThe  learned  Judges  of the Calcutta High  Court  who\thave
\nrepelled  the respondents’ contention that the present\tsuit
\nis barred under s. 86 of the Code, appear to have taken\t the
\nview that s. 86(1)refers  to Ruler of a foreign State  and
\nnot to a foreign State assuch.\tWe will presently  cite
\nthe  relevant  sections\t and construe  them;  but,  for\t the
\npresent,  we  are indicating the main ground  on  which\t the
\ndecision  of the learned Judges is founded.   Section  86(1)
\nsays  that no Ruler may be sued except with the\t consent  of
\nthe Central Government; and the learned Judges thought\tthat
\na  Ruler must be distinguished as from a State and s.  86(1)
\ncannot be extended to a case of the State.  The reference to
\na  Ruler made by s. 86(1) was contrasted with the  reference
\nto  a  foreign State made by s. 84; and\t this  contrast\t was
\npressed into service in support of the conclusion that s. 86
\ncannot\tbe invoked against a foreign State.   Similarly,  s.
\n86(3)  grants exemption to a Ruler from arrest\texcept\twith
\nthe  consent of the Central Government.\t A similar  argument
\nis  based  on this provision to take the case of  a  foreign
\nState outside the purview of s. 86.  Likewise, s. 85  refers
\nto  a  Ruler  while authorising the  Central  Government  to
\nappoint any person to act on behalf of such Ruler, and it is
\nsaid  that this provision also brings out the fact that\t the
\nRuler of a foreign State is treated as apart from the  State
\nitself.\n<\/p>\n
317<\/span><\/p>\n
It  appears  from the judgments of the learned\tJudges\tthat
\nthey  were  prepared to concede that in regard\tto  a  State
\nwhich  is governed by a monarchical form of  Government,  it
\nwould  not be permissible to make a distinction between\t the
\nState as such and its Ruler; and so, it was thought that  in
\nregard to a monarchical State, s. 86 may conceivably  apply,
\nthough the words used in s. 86(1) do not, in terms, refer to
\na  State.   On\tthis view, the\tcourt  of  Appeal  naturally
\nconsidered   the   question  about  the\t immunity   of\t the
\nrespondents under the provisions of International Law.\t The
\npoint  which  arises  for our decision thus  lies  within  a
\nnarrow compass; was the Calcutta High Court right in holding
\nthat the ?resent suit does not fall under the purview of  s.
\n86(1)?\t It is clear that if the answer to this question  is
\nin  the negative, the suit would be bad because it has\tbeen
\nfiled without the consent of the Central Government.
\nThe decision of this question depends primarily on the\tcon-
\nstruction of s. 86(1) itself; but before construing the said
\nsection,  it is necessary to examine s. 84.  The present  s.
\n84 reads thus:-\n<\/p>\n
\t      “A  foreign  State may sue  in  any  competent
\n\t      court  : Provided that the object of the\tsuit
\n\t      is  to enforce a private right vested  in\t the
\n\t      Ruler of such State or in any officer of\tsuch
\n\t      State in his public capacity”.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The  predecessor of this section in the Code of 1882 was  s.
\n431 it read thus :-\n<\/p>\n
\t      “A  foreign  State may sue in  the  Courts  of
\n\t      British India, provided that-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (a)   it has been recognised by Her Majesty or
\n\t      the Governor-General in Council, and\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (b)   the object of the suit is to enforce the
\n\t      private rights of the head or of the  subjects
\n\t      of the foreign State.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      The  Court shall take judicial notice  of\t the
\n\t      fact   that   foreign  State  has\t  not\tbeen
\n\t      recognised by Her Majesty or by the  Governor-
\n\t      General in Council.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
1908,  s. 84(1) took the place of s. 431.  In enacting\tthis
\nsection,  an  amendment\t was made in the  structure  of\t the
\nsection\t and  two  provisos  were  added  to  it.   We\twill
\npresently  refer  to the purpose which was  intended  to  be
\nserved by the second proviso.\n<\/p>\n
It is plain that s. 84 empowers a foreign State to sue.\t  In
\nother  words,  it confers a right on the  foreign  State  to
\nbring a suit,
\n328<\/span>
\nwhereas s. 86 imposes a liability or obligation on the Ruler
\nof  a foreign State to be sued with consent of\tthe  Central
\nGovernment,  It\t is remarkable that though  the\t heading  of
\nthese sections does not in terms refer to foreign States  at
\nall, s. 84 in terms empowers a foreign State to bring a suit
\nin  a  competent Court.\t It is true that too  much  emphasis
\ncannot\tbe placed on the significance of the heading of\t the
\nsections;  but, on the other hand, its relevance  cannot  be
\ndisputed;  and so, it seems to us that the  Legislature\t did
\nnot  think  that the case of a foreign State  would  not  be
\nincluded under the heading of this group of sections.
\nIn  this  connection, it is necessary to bear in  mind\tthat
\never when the Ruler of a State sues or is sued, the suit has
\nto  be in the name of the State; that is the effect  of\t the
\nprovision  of S. 87, so that it may be legitimate  to  infer
\nthat  the effect of reading sections 84, 86 and 87  together
\nis that a suit would be in the name of the State, whether it
\nis a suit filed by a foreign State under s. 84, or is a suit
\nagainst the Ruler of a foreign State under s. 86 As a matter
\nof  procedure, it would not be permissible to draw  a  sharp
\ndistinction  between  the  Ruler of a foreign  State  and  a
\nforeign State of which he is the Ruler.\t For the purpose  of
\nprocedure, in every case the suit has to be in the name of a
\nState.\tThat is another factor which cannot be ignored.
\nThen  in regard to the scope of the suit which may be  filed
\nby  a foreign State under s. 84, the proviso makes it  clear
\nthat the suit which can be filed by a foreign State must  be
\nto enforce a private right vested in the Ruler of such State
\nor in any office. -of such State in his public capacity.  It
\nwill  be  recalled that s. 431(b) of the Code  of  1882\t had
\nprovided  that the object of the suit which could  be  filed
\nunder s. 431 should be to enforce the private rights of\t the
\nhead  or of the subjects of the foreign State.\t It  appears
\nthat  this  clause gave rise to some doubt as to  whether  a
\nsuit  could be brought by a foreign State in respect of\t the
\nprivate\t rights of the subjects of that State; and in  order
\nto  remove  the said doubt, the Code of\t 1908  inserted\t the
\nsecond proviso to s. 84(1) which took the place of s. 431 of
\nthe  Code  of  1882.  This proviso made it  clear  that\t the
\nobject of litigation by a foreign State cannot be to enforce
\nthe  right vesting in subject as such as a private  subject;
\nit must be the enforcement of a private right vested in\t the
\nhead of a State or in any office of such State in his public
\ncapacity.  In other words, the suit which can be filed under
\ns.  84 and which could have been filch under s. 431  of\t the
\nCode of 1882, must relate to a private right. vested in\t the
\nhead of the State or of the subjects meaning some
\n\t\t\t    329<\/span>
\npublic\tofficers  of  the said\tState.\t The  private  right
\nproperly  so called of an individual as\t distinguished\tfrom
\nthe private right of the State, was never intended to be the
\nsubject-matter of a suit. by a foreign State under the\tCode
\nof Civil Procedure at any stage.\n<\/p>\n
That takes us to the question as to what is the true meaning
\nof  the words “private rights”.\t In interpreting  the  words
\n“private  rights”, it is necessary to bear in mind the\tfact
\nthat the suit is by a foreign State; and the private  rights
\nof  the\t State must, in the context, be\t distinguished\tfrom
\npolitical  rights.   The  contrast is  not  between  private
\nrights or individual rights as opposed to those of the\tbody
\npolitic\t :  the contrast is between private  rights  of\t the
\nState  as  distinguished from its political  or\t territorial
\nrights.\t  It is plain that all rights claimed by  a  foreign
\nState which are political and teritorial in character can be
\nsettled\t under\tInternational Law by agreement\tbetween\t one
\nState and another.  They cannot be the; subject-matter of  a
\nsuit in the municipal courts of a foreign State.  Thus,\t the
\nprivate\t right\tto  which the proviso  refers  is,  on\tthem
\nultimate  analysis, the right vesting in the State;  it\t may
\nvest in the Ruler of a State or in any officer of such State
\nin  his public capacity; but it is a right which really\t and
\nin substance vests in, the State.  It is in respect of\tsuch
\na  right that a foreign State is authorised to bring a\tsuit
\nunder s. 84.\n<\/p>\n
In  Hajon  Manick  v. Bur Sing(1) a Division  Bench  of\t the
\nCalcutta High Court had occasion to consider the  denotation
\nof  the words “private rights” spoken of in s.\t431,  clause\n<\/p>\n
(b)  of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, and it  was\theld
\nthat the said words do not mean individual rights as opposed
\nto  those  of the body politic or State, but  those  private
\nrights\tof  the State which must be enforced in a  Court  of
\nJustice, as distinguished from its political or\t territorial
\nrights,\t which\tmust, from their very nature,  be  made\t the
\nsubject of arrangement between one State and another.\tThey
\nare rights which may be enforced by a foreign State  against
\nprivate\t individuals as distinguished from rights which\t one
\nState in its political capacity may have as against  another
\nState in its political capacity.\n<\/p>\n
That  takes  us to s. 86.  Section 86(1) with which  we\t are
\ndirectly concerned reads thus :-\n<\/p>\n
\t      “No  Ruler of a foreign State may be  sued  in
\n\t      any court otherwise competent to try the\tsuit
\n\t      except   with  the  consent  of  the   Central
\n\t      Government certified in writing by a Secretary
\n\t      to that Government.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
(1)11 Cal. 17.\n<\/p>\n
330<\/span><\/p>\n
There  is  a proviso to this section with which we  are\t not
\nconcerned  in the present appeal.  Section 86(2) deals\twith
\nthe  question  of consent which the  Central  Government  is
\nauthorised to give, and it lays down how the consent can  be
\ngiven  and  also provides for cases in\twhich  such  consent
\nshall not be given.  Section 86(3) refers to the question of
\narrest\tand provides that no Ruler of a foreign State  shall
\nbe   arrested  except  with  the  consent  of  the   Central
\nGovernment  and\t no  decree shall be  executed\tagainst\t the
\nproperty  of  any  such Ruler.\tSection\t 86(4)\textends\t the
\npreceding  provisions  of s. 86 to the three  categories  of
\nOfficers specified in clauses (a), (b) and (c).
\nSection\t 86(1) as it stood prior to the amendment of 195  1,
\nread thus :-\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Any such Prince or Chief, and any  Ambassador
\n\t      or  Envoy\t of a foreign State, may,  with\t the
\n\t      consent  of the Central Government,  certified
\n\t      by  the  signature  of  a\t Secretary  to\tthat
\n\t      Government  but not without such\tconsent,  be
\n\t      sued in any competent Court.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
So far as the other provisions are concerned, there does not
\nappear\tto be any material change made by the Amending\tAct.
\nThe form of the section and its structure have however\tbeen
\naltered.\n<\/p>\n
Then follows s. 87 to which we have already referred.\tThis
\nsection provides that the Ruler of a foreign State may\tsue,
\nand shall be sued, in the name of his State.  This provision
\nof the present section is substantially the same as in s. 87
\nwhich  occurred\t in  the Code of  1908.\t  The  said  section
\nprovided  that a Sovereign Prince or Ruling Chief  may\tsue,
\nand shall be sued, in the name of his State.  This provision
\nnaturally conforms to s. 86(1) as it then stood.
\nSection\t 87A(1) which has been added for the first  time  by
\nthe  Amending  Act of 1951, prescribes\tthe  definitions  of
\n“foreign  State”  and “Ruler”.\tSection\t 87A(1)(a)  provides
\nthat  in this Part “foreign State” means any  State  outside
\nIndia  which has been recognised by the Central\t Government;
\nand  (b) “Ruler”, in relation to a foreign State, means\t the
\nperson\twho is for the time being recognised by the  Central
\nGovernment to be the head of that State.\n<\/p>\n
Reverting  then\t to  S. 86, there can be  no  difficulty  in
\nholding\t that when s. 86(1) refers to a Ruler of  a  foreign
\nState, it refers to the Ruler in relation to the said State,
\nand means the person who is for the time being recognised by
\nthe Central Government to be
\n\t\t\t    3 31
\nthe  head  of  that  State.   In  view\tof  the\t  definition
\nprescribed by s. 8 7A (1) (b), it seems difficult to  accept
\nthe  argument  that the expression “the Ruler of  a  foreign
\nState”\tunder s. 86(1) can take in cases only of  Rulers  of
\nforeign\t States which are governed by a monarchical form  of
\nGovernment.   In view of the definition of a foreign  Ruler,
\nit  is plain that when s. 86(1) refers to Rulers of  foreign
\nStates,\t it refers to Rulers of all foreign States  whatever
\nbe their form of Government.  If the form of Government pre-
\nvailing in a foreign State is Republican, then the Ruler  of
\nthe said State would be the person who is recognised for the
\ntime being by the Central Government to be the head of\tthat
\nState.\t In other words, the definition of a  Ruler  clearly
\nand  unambiguously shows that whoever is recognised  as\t the
\nhead of a foreign State would fall within the description of
\nRuler of a foreign State under s. 86.  That being so, we  do
\nnot  think in reading s. 86(1), it would be permissible,  to
\nimport\tany  terms of limitation; and unless some  terms  of
\nlimitation are imported in construing s. 86(1), the argument
\nthat  the head of a Republican State is not a Ruler of\tthat
\nState cannot be upheld.\n<\/p>\n
Besides,  on principle, it is not easy to understand why  it
\nshould\tbe assumed that the Code of Civil  Procedure  always
\nmade a distinction between Rulers of foreign States governed
\nby  monarchical\t form  of Government and  those\t which\twere
\ngoverned  by Republican form of Government.  Both  forms  of
\nGovernment  have been in existence for many years past,\t and
\nthe Legislature which framed the relevant provisions of\t the
\nCode  was  aware  that there are  several  States  in  which
\nmonarchical  form of Government does not prevail.  Could  it
\nhave been the intention of the framers of the Code of  Civil
\nProcedure  that\t monarchical States should be liable  to  be
\nsued  under s. 86(1), subject to the consent of the  Central
\nGovernment,  in\t the  municipal\t courts\t of  India,  whereas
\nforeign States not so governed should fall outside s.  86(1)
\nand  thus be able to claim the immunity under  International
\nLaw  ?\tIn our opinion, no valid ground has  been  suggested
\nwhy this question should be answered in the affirmative.
\nThere is one more circumstance to which we may refer in this
\nconnection.  We have already noticed that while amending the
\nprovisions,  the  Amending Act of 1951 has  dealt  with\t the
\nquestion of Rulers of former Indian States separately  under
\ns.  87B,  and having made some formal and  some\t substantial
\nchanges\t in the rest of the provisions, the Legislature\t has
\nintroduced  s’\t87A which is a definition section.   At\t the
\ntime  when s. 87A(1)(b) defined “Ruler”, it must  have\tbeen
\nplain to the Legislature that
\n332<\/span>
\nthis  definition would take in all heads of  foreign  States
\nwhatever  the form of government prevailing in them may\t be;
\nand so, it would not be unreasonable to hold that the object
\nof  the\t definition  was to make it  clear  that  Rulers  of
\nforeign States to which s. 86(1) applied would cover  Rulers
\nof   all  foreign  States,  provided  they   satisfied\t the
\nrequirements of the definition of s.\t87A(1)(b).
\nIncidentally,  the  construction which we  are\tinclined  to
\nplace on s. 86(1) is harmonious with the scheme of the\tCode
\non this point.\tSection 84 authorises a foreign State to sue
\nin  respect  of\t the rights to\twhich  its  proviso  refers.
\nHaving conferred the said right on foreign States, s.  86(1)
\nproceeds  to prescribe a limited liability  against  foreign
\nStates.\t  The limitation on the liability of foreign  States
\nto be sued is twofold.\tThe first limitation is that such  a
\nsuit  cannot  be instituted except with the consent  of\t the
\nCentral\t Government certified in writing by a  Secretary  to
\nthat Government.  This requirement shows the anxiety of\t the
\nLegislature  to\t save  foreign\tStates\tfrom  frivolous\t  or
\nunjustified  claims.   The  second limitation  is  that\t the
\nCentral Government shall not give consent unless it  appears
\nto  the Central Government that the case falls under one  or
\nthe  other  of\tclauses (a) to (d) of s.  86(2).   In  other
\nwords, the Legislature has given sufficient guidance to\t the
\nCentral\t Government to enable the said Government to  decide
\nthe  question as to when consent should be given to  a\tsuit
\nbeing  filed against the Ruler of a foreign  State.   Having
\nprovided  for  this  limited  liability\t to  be\t sued,\t the
\nLegislature  has taken care to save the Ruler of  a  foreign
\nState  from arrest, except with the consent of\tthe  Central
\nGovernment  similarly  certified and has  directed  that  no
\ndecree\tshall be executed against the property of  any\tsuch
\nRuler; that is the effect of s. 86(3).\n<\/p>\n
It  is true that this provision exempts the property of\t any
\nsuch  Ruler from execution of any decree that may be  passed
\nagainst a Ruler, and apparently, the High Court thought that
\nthis tends to show that the Ruler of a foreign State  within
\nthe contemplation of s. 86(1) must be the Ruler himself\t and
\nnot  the  State.   In our opinion, this view  is  not  well-
\nfounded.   The\tprovision that a decree passed\tagainst\t the
\nRuler  of a foreign State shall not be executed against\t the
\nproperty  of such Ruler, rather tends to show that  what  is
\nexempted  is the separate property of the Ruler himself\t and
\nno*,  the  property of the Ruler as head of  the  State.   A
\ndistinction  is made between the property belonging  to\t the
\nState  of which the Ruler is recognised to be the head,\t and
\nthe  property belonging to the Ruler individually.  We\tare,
\ntherefore, satisfied
\n333<\/span>
\nthat  s.  86(1)\t applies to cases where\t suits\tare  brought
\nagainst\t Rulers\t of foreign States and that  foreign  States
\nfall within its scope whatever be their form of\t Government.
\nWe  have already indicated that whenever a suit is  intended
\nto be brought by or against the Ruler of a foreign State, it
\nhas  to\t be in the name of the State, and that\tis  how\t the
\npresent suit has, in fact, been filed.\n<\/p>\n
The effect of the provisions of s. 86(1) appears to be\tthat
\nit makes a statutory provision covering a field which  would
\notherwise  be  covered\tby the doctrine\t of  immunity  under
\nInternational  Law. it is not disputed that every  sovereign
\nState  is competent to make its own laws in relation to\t the
\nrights\tand liabilities of foreign States to be sued  within
\nits own municipal courts.  Just as an independent  sovereign
\nState  may  statutorily\t provide  for  its  own\t rights\t and
\nliabilities  to sue and be sued, so can it provide  for\t the
\nrights and liabilities of foreign States to sue and be\tsued
\nin  its\t municipal  courts.   That being  so,  it  would  be
\nlegitimate to hold that the effect of s. 86(1) is to  modify
\nto  a certain extent the doctrine of immunity recognised  by
\nInternational  Law.   This  section  provides  that  foreign
\nStates\tcan be sued within the municipal of India  with\t the
\nconsent\t of the Central Government and when such consent  is
\ngranted\t as required by s. 86(1), it would not be open to  a
\nforeign\t State\tto rely on the doctrine\t of  immunity  under
\nInternational  Law,  because the municipal courts  in  India
\nwould  be bound by the statutory provisions, such  as  those
\ncontained in the Code of Civil Procedure.  In substance,  s.
\n86(1) is not merely procedural; it is in a sense a  counter-
\npart  of s. 84.\t Whereas s. 84 confers a right on a  foreign
\nState  to sue, s. 86(1) in substance imposes a liability  on
\nforeign\t States\t to  be\t sued,\tthough\tthis  liability\t  is
\ncircumscribed and safeguarded by the limitations  prescribed
\nby it.\tThat is the effect of s. 8 6 (1 ).\n<\/p>\n
In  Chandulal Khushalji v. Awed Ritz Umar Sultan Nawaz\tJung
\nBahadur(1),  Strachey,\tJ., had occasion  to  consider\tthis
\naspect of the matter in relation to the provisions of s. 433
\nof  the\t Code of 1882.\tWhat s. 433 does, said\tthe  learned
\nJudge,\t“is  to create a personal  privilege  for  sovereign
\nprinces and ruling chiefs and their ambassadors and envoy,,.
\nIt  is a modified form of the absolute privilege enjoyed  by
\nindependent  sovereigns and their ambassadors in the  Courts
\nin   England,\tin  accordance\twith   the   principles\t  of
\ninternational law.  The difference is that while in  England
\nthe  privilege is unconditional, dependent only on the\twill
\nof  the\t sovereign  or his representative, in  India  it  is
\ndependent  upon\t the  consent of  the  Governor\t General  in
\nCouncil, which can
\n(1) I.L.R.21 Bom. 351 at pp. 371-2-\n<\/p>\n
sup.CI\/65—7
\n334<\/span>
\nbe given only under specified conditions.  This modified  or
\nconditional  privilege is, however, based  upon\t essentially
\nthe  same principle as the absolute privilege,\tthe  dignity
\nand independence of the ruler, which would be endangered  by
\nallowing  any  person  to  sue\thim  at\t pleasure,  and\t the
\npolitical  inconveniences and complications which  would  be
\nresult’.  We are inclined to think that this view  correctly
\nrepresents the result of the provisions of S. 433 as much as
\nof those contained in s. 86(1).\n<\/p>\n
In  view  of. our conclusion that s. 86(1)  applies  to\t the
\npresent ,suit, it follows that in the absence of the consent
\nof  the\t Central Government as prescribed by  it,  the\tsuit
\ncannot\tbe entertained. ,On that view of the matter,  it  is
\nnot necessary to deal with the other question as to  whether
\nthe respondents were justified in claiming absolute immunity
\nunder International Law.  It is common ground that if  there
\nis a specific statutory provision such as is contained in s.
\n86(1)  which  allows a suit to be filed\t against  a  foreign
\nState  subject\tto  certain  conditions,  it  is  the\tsaid
\nstatutory  provision  that will govern the decision  of\t the
\nquestion  as to whether the suit has been properly filed  or
\nnot.  In dealing with such a question, it is unnecessary  to
\ntravel\tbeyond\tthe provisions of the statute,\tbecause\t the
\nstatute determines the competence of the suit.
\nThe  result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed.  In\tview
\nof the fact that we are affirming the decision of the  Court
\nof  Appeal  on ,a ground which did not succeed\tbefore\tthat
\nCourt,\twe direct that parties should bear their  own  costs
\nthroughout.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t     Appeal dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
335<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Mirza Ali Akbar Kashani vs United Arab Republic And Anr on 5 August, 1965 Equivalent citations: 1966 AIR 230, 1966 SCR (1) 319 Author: P Gajendragadkar Bench: Gajendragadkar, P.B. (Cj), Wanchoo, K.N., Hidayatullah, M., Shah, J.C., Sikri, S.M. PETITIONER: MIRZA ALI AKBAR KASHANI Vs. RESPONDENT: UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND ANR. DATE […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-70012","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nMirza Ali Akbar Kashani vs United Arab Republic And Anr on 5 August, 1965 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/mirza-ali-akbar-kashani-vs-united-arab-republic-and-anr-on-5-august-1965\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Mirza Ali Akbar Kashani vs United Arab Republic And Anr on 5 August, 1965 - 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