{"id":70535,"date":"1986-10-21T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1986-10-20T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986"},"modified":"2015-12-15T06:17:54","modified_gmt":"2015-12-15T00:47:54","slug":"institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986","title":{"rendered":"Institute Of Chartered … vs L.K. Ratna & Others on 21 October, 1986"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Institute Of Chartered … vs L.K. Ratna & Others on 21 October, 1986<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1987 AIR 71, \t\t 1986 SCR (3)1048<\/div>\n
Author: R Pathak<\/div>\n
Bench: Pathak, R.S.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nINSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nL.K. RATNA & OTHERS\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT21\/10\/1986\n\nBENCH:\nPATHAK, R.S.\nBENCH:\nPATHAK, R.S.\nMUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)\n\nCITATION:\n 1987 AIR   71\t\t  1986 SCR  (3)1048\n 1986 SCC  (4) 538\t  JT 1986   671\n 1986 SCALE  (2)614\n CITATOR INFO :\n RF\t    1992 SC 248\t (537)\n\n\nACT:\n     Chartered Accountants  Act,  1949,\t ss.  17(3),  21(3),\n21(4),\t22A  and  First\t Schedule  Part\t I  clauses  6\t&  7\nRegulations   11-15-Member   of\t  Institute   of   Chartered\nAccountants-Charged with  Misconduct-Disciplinary Committee-\nJurisdiction of-Scope of inquiry-Member, Whether entitled to\nhearing by Council of Institute after Disciplinary Committee\nsubmits report.\n     Sec. 21-Nature  of Proceedings  before the Disciplinary\nCommittee & Council of the Institute-What are-The conclusion\nof Disciplinary\t Committee does\t not enjoy  the status\tof a\n'finding'-Conclusion of\t Council is  the first determinative\nfinding-Council-Whether obliged\t to  give  reasons  for\t its\nfinding.\n     Administrative    Law-Professional\t   Body-Charge\t  of\nmisconduct-Disciplinary\t Committee   conducting\t inquiry   &\nsubmitting   report   to   Council   for   final   decision-\nParticipation  of   members  of\t Disciplinary  Committee  in\nCouncil deliberations-Principles  of Natural Justice-Whether\nviolated.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n     The appellant-the Institute of Chartered Accountants of\nIndia was  created as  a body  corporate under the Chartered\nAccountants Act 1949. Its members are Chartered Accountants.\nThe affairs  of the Institute are managed by a body known as\nthe  Council  of  the  Institute  which\t is  headed  by\t the\nPresident. Below  him is  the  Vice-President.\tOne  of\t the\nStanding Committees  of\t the  Council  is  the\tDisciplinary\nCommittee. It  consists\t of  the  President  and  the  Vice-\nPresident ex-officio  of the Council, two members elected by\nthe Committee from its members, and a third member nominated\nby the Central Government.\n     Section 21\t of the\t Act lays  down\t the  procedure\t for\nconducting inquiries  relating to cases of misconduct by the\nmembers and  the penalty which may be imposed. Sub-s. (1) of\ns. 21 provides that where\n1050\nthe Council  is prima  facie of\t opinion that any member has\nbeen guilty of any professional or other misconduct it shall\nrefer the  case to  the Disciplinary  Committee which  is to\nhold an inquiry and report the result to the Council. Sub-s.\n4 lays\tdown that  where the  finding  of  the\tDisciplinary\nCommittee is  that a  member has been guilty of professional\nmisconduct it shall afford an opportunity of being heard and\nmay thereafter\tmake an\t order either  to: (a) reprimand the\nmember; or  (b) remove\tthe name  of  the  member  from\t the\nRegister for  such period  not exceeding  five years, or (c)\nwhere it  appears to  the Council  that the  case is  one in\nwhich the  name of  the member\tought to be removed from the\nregister for a period exceeding five years or permanently or\nif the\tmember is  guilty of  misconduct other than any such\nmisconduct as  is referred  to in sub-s. 4, it shall forward\nthe case to the High Court with its recommendations thereon.\nSection 22A of the Act entitles a member to prefer an appeal\nto the High Court against an order of the Council.\n     The respondents-Chartered\tAccountants and\t members  of\nthe Institute,\twere charged  for committing the offences of\nprofessional misconduct under clauses 6 & 7 of Part I of the\nFirst Schedule\tto the\tAct, in\t that they  had prepared and\nbrought out  a brochure\t relating to  Management Consultancy\nServices,  and\t had  sent  out\t letters  to  Auditor  Firms\nappraising them\t of its\t existence. The\t Council  considered\ntheir replies and being of the prima facie opinion that they\nwere guilty of professional misconduct referred the cases to\nthe Disciplinary Committee which, after affording a personal\nhearing to  the respondents,  submitted its  report  to\t the\nCouncil\t opining  that\tthey  were  guilty  of\tprofessional\nmisconduct. The\t Council considered  the  aforesaid  report,\nand, after  having  found  the\trespondents  guilty  of\t the\nmisconduct, proposed to remove their names from the register\nof  members  for  a  period  not  exceeding  five  years  in\naccordance with\t the procedure\tlaid down  in section 21(4).\nThe respondents were informed that they would be called upon\nto appear  before  the\tCouncil\t to  make  a  representation\nagainst the  proposed action  and that the scope of the oral\nhearing or written representation would be restricted to the\npenalty proposed.\n     Aggrieved\tby   the  order\t  of  the   appellant,\t the\nrespondents filed Writ Petitions in the High Court. A Single\nJudge of  the High  Court allowed the petitions, quashed the\norders imposing\t penalty on the respondents and remanded the\ncases to the Council for fresh consideration on the finding:\n(i) that the Council should have given an opportunity to the\nrespondents to represent before it against the report of the\nDisciplinary Committee;\t and (ii)  that the  decision of the\nCouncil was\n1051\nvitiated inasmuch  as the  President, the Vice-President and\nthe two\t members of  the Institute, who were also members of\nthe   Disciplinary   Committee,\t  were\t disqualified\tfrom\nparticipating in  the proceedings  of the  Council  when  it\nconsidered the\treport of  the Disciplinary  Committee.\t The\nappeals\t filed\t by  the  appellant  having  been  summarily\nrejected by  the Division  Bench, the  Institute appealed to\nthis Court.\n     Dismissing the appeals of the appellant, this Court,\n^\n     HELD: 1.1 A member accused of misconduct is entitled to\na hearing  by the  Council when, on receipt of the report of\nthe Disciplinary  Committee, it\t proceeds to find whether he\nis or is not guilty. [1067D]\n     1.2 The Council is empowered to find a member guilty of\nmisconduct. The\t penalty which\tfollows is  so harsh that it\nmay result in his removal from the register of Members for a\nsubstantial number  of years.  The removal  of his name from\nthe register  deprives him  of the right to a certificate of\npractice. In  these circumstances  there is  every reason to\npresume in  favour of  an opportunity to the member of being\nheard by  the Council  before it  proceeds to  pronounce him\nguilty of misconduct. [1063F-G]\n     2.1 In  the scheme\t incorporated in  s. 21\t of the\t Act\nthere\tare   separate\t functionaries,\t  the\tDisciplinary\nCommittee, the Council and in certain cases, the High Court.\nThe controlling\t authority is  the Council. The Disciplinary\nCommittee plays\t a subordinate\trole. It conducts an inquiry\ninto the  allegations. Since the inquiry is into allegations\nof misconduct by the member, it possesses the character of a\nquasi-judicial\tproceedings.   The  Disciplinary   Committee\nthereafter submits  a report of the result of the inquiry to\nthe  Council.\tThe  Disciplinary   Committee  is  merely  a\nCommittee of  the Institute,  with a  function\tspecifically\nlimited by  the provisions  of the  Act. Its conclusions are\ntentative only.\t They cannot  be regarded as 'findings'. The\nDisciplinary Committee\tis not\tvested by the Act with power\nto render any findings. It is the Council which is empowered\nto find\t whether the  member is\t guilty of  misconduct.\t The\nfinding by  the Council\t is the determinative decision as to\nthe guilt  of the  member, and\tbecause it is determinative,\nthe Act requires it to be recorded. [1062C-H]\n     A responsibility  so grave\t as the determination that a\nmember is  guilty of  misconduct, and  the recording of that\nfinding, has  been specifically\t assigned by  the Act to the\ngoverning body, the Council. It is also\n1052\nonly upon  a finding  being recorded by the Council that the\nAct moves  forward to  the final  stage of penalisation. The\nrecording  of\tthe  finding   by   the\t  Council   is\t the\njurisdictional spring board for the penalty proceeding which\nfollows. [1062H; 1063A-B]\n     2.2  The\treport\tconstitutes   the  material   to  be\nconsidered by the Council. The Council will take into regard\nthe allegations against the member, his case in defence, the\nrecorded evidence,  and the  conclusions  expressed  by\t the\nDisciplinary  Committee.   The\tnature\t of   the   function\ndischarged by the Council in rendering its finding is quasi-\njudicial. A  member whose  conduct has\tbeen the  subject of\ninquiry by  the Disciplinary Committee ending in conclusions\nadverse to  him can  legiti-mately entertain an apprehension\nthat the President and the Vice-President of the Council and\nthe  other  members  of\t the  Disciplinary  Committee  would\nmaintain the  opinion expressed\t by them in their report and\nwould press  the acceptance  of the  report by\tthe Council.\nAlthough the  member has participated in the inquiry, he has\nhad no\topportunity to\tdemonstrate the\t fallibility of\t the\nconclusions  of\t  the  Disciplinary  Committee.\t It  is\t the\nmaterial which\tfalls within  the domain of consideration by\nthe Council.  It should also be open to the member, to point\nout to the Council any error in the procedure adopted by the\nDisciplinary  Committee\t  which\t could\t have  resulted\t  in\nvitiating the inquiry. [1063B-D]\n     S. 21(8) arms the Council with power to record oral and\ndocumentary evidence, and it is precisely to take account of\nthat eventuality and to repair the error that this power has\nbeen conferred.\t It cannot,  therefore, be  denied that even\nthough the member has participated in the inquiry before the\nDisciplinary Committee, there is a range of consideration by\nthe Council  on which  he has  not been heard. He is clearly\nentitled to  an opportunity  of hearing\t before the  Council\nfinds him guilty of misconduct. [1063D-E]\n     3.1 The  finding by  the Council operates with finality\nin the\tproceedings, and  it constitutes  the foundation for\nthe penalty by the Council on him. [1063G-H]\n     The power to find and record whether a member is guilty\nof misconduct  has been specifically entrusted by the Act to\nthe entire  Council itself  and not  to a few of its members\nwho constitute the Disciplinary Committee. [1063H; 1064A]\n     3.2  It   is  the\t character  and\t complexion  of\t the\nproceeding consi-\n1053\ndered in conjunction with the structure of power constituted\nby the\tAct which leads to the conclusion that the member is\nentitled to  a hearing by the Council before it can find him\nguilty. [1064A-B]\n     Manek Lal\tv. Dr.\tPrem Chand,<\/a> [1957] SCR 575, referred\nto.\n     4. There  is no  doubt that there is difference between\nthe provisions\tof s.  21(3) and  21(4), in that while in s.\n21(4) Parliament  has indicated that an opportunity of being\nheard should  be accorded to the member, nowhere in s. 21(3)\nthere is  such requirement.  But, that\tdoes not  affect the\nquestion. The  textual different  is not decisive. It is the\nsubstance of  the matter,  the character of the allegations,\nthe far-reaching  consequences\tof  a  finding\tagainst\t the\nmember, the  vesting of responsibility in the governing body\nitself, all  these and kindred considerations enter into the\ndecision of  the question  whether the law implies a hearing\nto the member at that stage. [1064D-E]\n     5. There is nothing in Regulation 14 which excludes the\noperation of  the principle of natural justice entitling the\nmember to be heard by the Council when it proceeds to render\nits finding. [1065B-C]\n     The principles of natural justice must be read into the\nunoccupied interstices\tof the\tstatute unless\tthere  is  a\nclear mandate to the contrary. [1065C]\n     6. There  are cases  where an  order may  cause serious\ninjury as soon as it is made, an injury not capable of being\nentirely erased\t when the  error is  corrected on subsequent\nappeal. Where  a member\t of a  highly respected and publicly\ntrusted profession is found guilty of misconduct and suffers\npenalty, the  damage to\t his professional  reputation can be\nimmediate and  far-reaching. To many a man, his professional\nreputation is  his most valuable possession. It is often the\ncarefully garnered  fruit of  a long  period of\t scrupulous,\nconscientious and  diligent industry.  It is the portrait of\nhis professional  honour. In  such a  case, after  the\tblow\nsuffered  by  the  initial  decision,  it  is  difficult  to\ncontemplate  complete\trestitution  through   an  appellate\ndecision. Therefore,  there is\tmanifest need to ensure that\nthere is  no breach of fundamental procedure in the original\nproceeding, and\t to avoid  treating an\tappeal as an overall\nsubstitution for the original proceeding. [1066F-H; 1067A-C]\n     7.1 By  virtue of\ts. 17(3)  it is\t obligatory that the\nDisciplinary Committee\tshould be  composed of the President\nand the\t Vice-President\t of  the  Council  and\tthree  other\nmembers of the Council. While that is so,\n1054\nthere is  nothing in the Act to suggest that the meetings of\nthe Council must always be presided over by the President or\nthe Vice-President  and that no meeting can be held in their\nabsence. There\tis an  element of flexibility which makes it\npossible for  the Council  to consider\tthe  report  of\t the\nDisciplinary Committee\twithout\t the  participation  of\t the\nmembers of  the\t Committee.  Because  of  the  'flexibility'\npotential in  the scheme,  the doctrine of necessity, cannot\ncome into play. [1069E-H]\n     7.2. There\t is nothing  in s. 21 of the Act to indicate\nwhether the  members of the Disciplinary Committee should be\nexcluded when the Council enters upon its task. The function\nof the Disciplinary Committee of holding an inquiry under s.\n21(1) of  the Act into the conduct of the member calls for a\nrecording of  evidence by  the Committee.  Its duty does not\nend there.  It must  consider the  evidence and\t come to its\nconclusions. Section  21(2) of the Act plainly says, it must\nreport \"the  result of\tits enquiry\"  to the Council. In the\nabsence of  express or\timplied statutory  intendment to the\ncontrary,  the\t members  of   such  a\tcommittee  would  be\ndisqualified from  participating in the deliberations of the\nCouncil when  it proceeds to consider the report in order to\nfind whether  the member  is guilty  of misconduct. For that\nalone would  be consistent  with the  fundamental  principle\nthat justice  must not\tonly be done but must also appear to\nbe done. [1068B-F]\n     Re Daneyger  and Alberta Pharmaceutical Association, 17\nD.L.R. (3d)  206,  Re  Prescott,  19  D.L.R.  (3d)  446,  Re\nMerchant and Benchers of the Law Society, 32 D.L.R. (3d) 178\nand Law\t Socieety of  Upper Ganada v. French, 49 D.L.R. (3d)\n1, distinguished.\n     8. The  Council is\t obliged to  give  reasons  for\t its\nfinding that  a member\tis guilty of misconduct. In fairness\nand justice,  the member is entitled to know why he has been\nfound guilty. [107 1E-G]\n     The member has been given a right of appeal to the High\nCourt under  s. 22-A  of the  Act. To  exercise his right of\nappeal effectively  he must  know the  basis  on  which\t the\nCouncil has  found him\tguilty. Further,  a finding  by\t the\nCouncil is  the first  determinative finding on the guilt of\nthe member. It is a finding by a Tribunal of first instance.\nThe conclusion\tof the Disciplinary Committee does not enjoy\nthe status  of a  \"finding\". Moreover, the reasons contained\nin  the\t  report  by  the  Disciplinary\t Committee  for\t its\nconclusion may\tor may\tnot  constitute\t the  basis  of\t the\nfinding\t rendered   by\tthe   Council.\tThe   Council  must,\ntherefore, state the reasons for the finding. [1071F-G]\n1055\n     9. Due  recognition should\t be given to the fundamental\nprinciples and accepted axioms of law. [1070B-C]\n     [Removal  of   the\t anomaly   by  suitable\t legislative\namendment of s. 17(3) of the Act so that the constitution of\nthe Disciplinary  Committee should  not necessarily  include\nthe President  and the\tVice-President of  the\tCouncil\t was\nsuggested by the Court.] [1070B-C]\n     James Edward  Jeffs and  Others v.\t New  Zealand  Dairy\nProduction and\tMarketing Board and others, [1967] 1 AC 551,\nChandra Bhavan\tBoarding and  Lodging Bangalore v. The State\nof Mysore  and Anr.<\/a>[1970]  2 SCR  600 and  K.L. Tripathi  v.\nState  Bank   of  India\t  and  Others,<\/a>\t [1984]\t 2  SCC\t 43,\ninapplicable.\n     Leary v.  National Union  of Vehicle Builders, [1971] 1\nCh. 34,\t Re Cardinal and Board of Commissioners of Police of\nCity of\t Cornwall, [1974]  42 D.L.R.  (3d) 323,\t Wisland  v.\nMedical\t Practioners   Disciplinary  Committee,\t  [1974]   1\nN.Z.L.R. 29  and Reid  v. Rowley,  [1977]  2  N.Z.L.R.\t472,\nreferred to.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
     CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeals Nos. 1911
\nand 1912 of 1980.\n<\/p>\n
     From the  Judgment and  Order dated  16.4.1980  of\t the
\nBombay High Court in Appeal No. 203 and 205 of 1980.\n<\/p>\n
     F.S. Nariman,  Anil B.  Divan, K.K.  Jain, S.K.  Gupta,
\nPromod Dayal, G. Banerjee and A.D. Sanger for the Appellant.\n<\/p>\n
     Atul Setalvad,  Atul Rajadhya  and Mrs.  A.K. Verma for
\nthe Respondents.\n<\/p>\n
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\n     PATHAK,  J.   These  appeals   raise  some\t fundamental
\nquestions  in\tregard\tto  the\t conduct  and  procedure  of
\ndisciplinary   proceedings   taken   under   the   Chartered
\nAccountants Act, 1949. Two of the questions are:\n<\/p>\n
\t  1. “Whether a member of the Institute of Chartered
\n\t  Accountants of  India is  entitled to a hearing by
\n\t  the\tCouncil\t  of   the   Institute\t after\t the
\n\t  Disciplinary Committee has sub-
\n1056<\/span><\/p>\n
\t  mitted its  report to\t the Council  of its enquiry
\n\t  into allegations of misconduct against the member?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  2. When  the\tCouncil\t proceeds  to  consider\t the
\n\t  Report  of  the  Disciplinary\t Committee,  is\t the
\n\t  proceeding vitiated by the presence of the members
\n\t  of the  Disciplinary\tCommittee  who\tinclude\t the
\n\t  President and\t the Vice-President  of the  Council
\n\t  and three other members of it?”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The appellant is the Institute of Chartered Accountants
\nof India  (the “Institute”).  The Institute was created as a
\nbody corporate\tunder the  Chartered Accountants  Act,\t1949
\n(the “Act”),  and its members are Chartered Accountants. The
\naffairs of  the Institute are managed by a body known as the
\nCouncil of the Institute, which is headed by a President and
\na  Vice-President   below  him.\t There\tare  three  Standing
\nCommittees  of\t the  Council,\t and  one  of  them  is\t the
\nDisciplinary Committee.\t The Disciplinary Committee consists
\nof the\tPresident and  the Vice-President  ex-officio of the
\nCouncil, two  members elected  by  the\tCommittee  from\t its
\nmembers\t and   a  third\t member\t nominated  by\tthe  Central
\nGovernment. Chapter V of the Act contains provisions dealing
\nwith cases  of\tmisconduct  of\tmembers\t of  the  Institute.
\nSection 21  provides for  conducting enquiries\trelating  to
\nsuch misconduct\t and the penalties which may be imposed, and
\nsection 22A  provides for  an appeal by a member against the
\nimposition of  a penalty. As the sections are material, they
\nmay be set forth:\n<\/p>\n
\t  S.21.\t  Procedure   in   inquiries   relating\t  to
\n\t  misconduct of members of Institute
\n\t  (1) Where  on receipt\t of information\t by, or of a
\n\t  complaint made  to it,  the Council is prima facie
\n\t  of opinion  that any\tmember of  the Institute has
\n\t  been\tguilty\t of  any   professional\t  or   other
\n\t  misconduct, the  Council shall  refer the  case to
\n\t  the Disciplinary  Committee, and  the Disciplinary
\n\t  Committee shall thereupon hold such inquiry and in
\n\t  such manner as may be prescribed, and shall report
\n\t  the result of its inquiry to the Council.
\n\t  (2) If on receipt of such report the Council finds
\n\t  that the  member of the Institute is not guilty of
\n\t  any professional  or other  misconduct,  it  shall
\n\t  record its finding accordingly and direct that the
\n\t  proceedings shall  be filed or the complaint shall
\n\t  be dismissed, as the case may be.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
1057<\/span><\/p>\n
\t  (3) If on receipt of such report the Council finds
\n\t  that the  member of the Institute is guilty of any
\n\t  professional or  other misconduct, it shall record
\n\t  a finding  accordingly and  shall proceed  in\t the
\n\t  manner laid down in the succeeding sub-section.
\n\t  (4) Where  the finding  is that  a member  of\t the
\n\t  Institute  has   been\t guilty\t of  a\tprofessional
\n\t  misconduct specified\tin the\tFirst Schedule,\t the
\n\t  Council shall\t afford to the member an opportunity
\n\t  of being  heard before  orders are  passed against
\n\t  him on  the case,  and may  thereafter make any of
\n\t  the following orders, namely:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t       (a) reprimand the member;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t       (b) remove  the name  of the  member from the
\n\t       Register for  such period, not exceeding five
\n\t       years, as the Council thinks fit:<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t       Provided that where it appears to the Council
\n\t  that the  case is  one in  which the\tname of\t the
\n\t  member ought to be removed from the Register for a
\n\t  period exceeding  five years\tor  permanently,  it
\n\t  shall not make any order referred to in clause (a)
\n\t  or clause  (b), but  shall forward the case to the
\n\t  High Court with its recommendations thereon.
\n\t  (5) Where  the misconduct  in respect of which the
\n\t  Council has  found any  member  of  the  Institute
\n\t  guilty  is   misconduct  other   than\t  any\tsuch
\n\t  misconduct as is referred to in subsection (4), it
\n\t  shall forward\t the case to the High Court with its
\n\t  recommendations thereon.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (6) On  receipt of  any case under sub-section (4)
\n\t  or subsection (5), the High Court shall fix a date
\n\t  for the hearing of the case and shall cause notice
\n\t  of the  date so fixed to be given to the member of
\n\t  the Institute\t concerned, the\t Council and  to the
\n\t  Central Government,  and shall afford such member,
\n\t  the  Council\t and  the   Central  Government\t  an
\n\t  opportunity of  being heard,\tand  may  thereafter
\n\t  make any of the following orders namely:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t       (a) direct  that the proceedings be filed, or
\n\t       dismiss the complaint, as the case may be;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
1058<\/span><\/p>\n
\t       (b) reprimand the member;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t       (c)  remove   him  from\t membership  of\t the
\n\t       Institute  either  permanently  or  for\tsuch
\n\t       period as the High Court thinks fit;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t       (d) refer the case to the Council for further
\n\t       inquiry and report.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (7)  ………………………………………
\n\t  (8) For  the purposes\t of any\t inquiry under\tthis
\n\t  section,  the\t  Council   and\t  the\tDisciplinary
\n\t  Committee shall have the same powers as are vested
\n\t  in  a\t  civil\t court\t under\tthe  Code  of  Civil
\n\t  Procedure,  1908,  in\t respect  of  the  following
\n\t  matters, namely:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t       (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of
\n\t       any person and examining him on oath;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t       (b)  the\t discovery  and\t production  of\t any
\n\t       document; and\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t       (c) receiving evidence on affidavit.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
22A. Appeals
\n\t  (1) Any  member of  the Institute aggrieved by any
\n\t  order of  the Council\t imposing on  him any of the
\n\t  penalities  referred\tto  in\tsub-section  (4)  of
\n\t  Section 21, may, within thirty days of the date on
\n\t  which the  order is communicated to him, prefer an
\n\t  appeal to the High Court:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t       Provided that  the High\tCourt may  entertain
\n\t  any such  appeal after  the  expiry  of  the\tsaid
\n\t  period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the
\n\t  member was  prevented\t by  sufficient\t cause\tfrom
\n\t  filing the appeal in time.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (2) The  High Court  may, on\tits  own  motion  or
\n\t  otherwise, after  calling for\t the records  of any
\n\t  case, revise\tany order  made by the Council under
\n\t  sub-section (2)  or sub-section  (4) of Section 21
\n\t  and may-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
1059<\/span><\/p>\n
\t       (a) confirm, modify or set aside the order;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t       (b) impose  any penalty or set aside, reduce,
\n\t       confirm, or  enhance the\t penalty imposed  by
\n\t       the order;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t       (c) remit  the case  to the  Council for such
\n\t       further inquiry\tas the\tHigh Court considers
\n\t       proper in the circumstances of the case; or\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t       (d) pass\t such other  order as the High Court
\n\t       thinks fit:<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n
\t       Provided that  no order\tof the Council shall
\n\t  be modified  or set  aside unless  the Council has
\n\t  been given  an opportunity  of being\theard and no
\n\t  order imposing  or enhancing\ta penalty  shall  be
\n\t  passed unless\t the person  concerned has also been
\n\t  given an opportunity of being heard.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The Act provides for the framing of Regulations. Regulations
\n11 to  15 set  forth  the  procedure  for  an  enquiry\tinto
\nallegations of misconduct.\n<\/p>\n
     Messrs A.F.  Ferguson &  Co. (“Ferguson  & Co.”)  is  a
\nreputed firm  of Chartered Accountants. The respondent Lalit
\nKumar Ratna  is a  partner and\tthe respondents\t Ashok Kumar
\nBehl and  P.R. Bhoopatkar  are employees  in the  firm.\t All
\nthree  are   Chartered\tAccountants   and  members   of\t the
\nInstitute.\n<\/p>\n
     In\t 1967\tFerguson  &  Co.  established  a  Management
\nConsultancy Division.  Ratna was  head of  the Division, and
\nBehl and  Bhoopatkar worked  under him.\t On April  15, 1970,
\nFerguson &  Co. wrote  to the Institute enquiring whether it
\ncould send  out letters\t to Auditor  Firms apprising them of
\nthe existence  of the  Management  Consultancy\tService\t and
\nwhether it  was forbidden  from doing so by any rules of the
\nInstitute. The\tSecretary of  the Institute replied that the
\nCouncil had  appointed a  Sub-Committee for  considering the
\nethical problems  arising out  of  the\tfunctioning  of\t the
\nInstitute’s members  in the  area of  Management Consultancy
\nService\t and   the  firm  was  requested  to  wait  for\t the
\nrecommendations of the Sub-Committee.\n<\/p>\n
     On December  8, 1971,  Ratna issued  a circular  to the
\npartners and principals of the firm setting forth guidelines
\non bringing  the Management Consultancy Service brochures to
\nthe attention of their
\n1060<\/span>
\nrespective clients.  Meanwhile, Ferguson & Co. also referred
\nthe matter  to their  solicitors, and the solicitors advised
\nthat making available of printed informative material in the
\nform of\t a brochure would not be in contravention of Clauses
\n6 and  7 in  Part I  of the  First Schedule  to the  Act  or
\notherwise amount to professional misconduct.\n<\/p>\n
     A few  days later\tthe Council  published an  “exposure
\ndraft”, setting\t forth the  proposals under consideration by
\nthe Council  regarding the  regulations and ethical rules in
\nrespect of  Management\tConsultancy  Services  by  Chartered
\nAccountants, and  invited members  to send their suggestions
\non the\tproposals. It  was  pointed  out  further  that\t the
\nrecommendations to  be made  by the  Council  would  require
\nappropriate amendments\tin Part\t I of  the First Schedule to
\nthe Act\t which contained  rules in  respect of\tprofessional
\nmisconduct.\n<\/p>\n
     Meanwhile, Ratna  had prepared  a brochure\t relating to
\nthe  Management\t  Consultancy  Service\tto  be\tprovided  by
\nFerguson &  Co. It was stated that the brochure was intended
\nfor the\t use of\t the  clients  of  the\tfirm  who  requested
\ninformation regarding  such services  and that\tit  was\t for
\nlimited\t circulation  only,  the  clients  themselves  being
\nwarned of  that\t restriction.  On  February  19,  1973,\t the
\nCouncil wrote  to Ferguson and Co. inviting its attention to
\nthe brochure  and alleging  that  it  contained\t information
\nagainst\t the   firm  under   Section  21  of  the  Chartered
\nAccountants Act\t read with  clauses 6 and 7 of Part I of the
\nFirst Schedule to the Act, and in accordance with Regulation
\n11(5)  (b)   read  with\t  Regulation  12  of  the  Chartered
\nAccountants Regulations\t 1964,\tthe  firm  was\trequired  to
\ndisclose to the Council the name of the member answerable to
\nthe charge  of misconduct. In reply, the firm named Ratna as
\nthe member responsible for the brochure.\n<\/p>\n
     On April  14, 1973, Ratna submitted a written statement
\nto the\tInstitute denying that he was guilty of professional
\nmisconduct and\the set\tforth a\t detailed statement  of\t the
\nreasons in  support of his stand. The Council considered the
\nmatter in  its meeting\tof September 13, 14 and 15, 1973 and
\nbeing of  prima facie  opinion\tthat  Ratna  was  guilty  of
\nprofessional   misconduct   referred   the   case   to\t the
\nDisciplinary Committee. The Disciplinary Committee consisted
\nof the\tPresident,  S.K.  Gupta,  the  Vice-President,\tN.C.
\nKrishnan, two  members of  the Institute,  R.K.\t Khanna\t and
\nBansi S.  Mehta and  the Government  nominee, Ganapathi. The
\nDisciplinary Committee gave a personal hearing on January 4,
\n1974, to  Ratna and  his counsel.  On February 14, 1974, the
\nDisciplinary Committee\tsubmitted its  report to the Council
\nopining
\n1061<\/span>
\nthat Ratna  was\t guilty\t of  professional  misconduct  under
\nclauses 6  and 7  of Part I of the First Schedule to the Act
\ninsofar as  he solicited  clients directly or indirectly and
\nalso advertised professional attainments of his services. In
\nits meeting  of February 16, 1974 the Council considered the
\nreport of  the Disciplinary  Committee and  found that Ratna
\nwas guilty  of the  misconduct. In  February 25,  1974,\t the
\nInstitute wrote\t to Ratna  that the  Council had  found\t him
\nguilty of  professional misconduct,  as charged, and that it
\nwas proposed to remove his name from the Register of Members
\nfor a period not exceeding five years in accordance with the
\nprocedure laid\tdown in s. 21(4) of the Act. He was informed
\nthat he would be called upon to appear before the Council at
\nits next  meeting but in case he did not wish to be heard in
\nperson he  was entitled\t to send  a  written  representation
\nagainst the  proposed action.  He was  required to take note
\nthat the  scope of the oral hearing for consideration of the
\nwritten representation\twould be  restricted to\t the penalty
\nproposed. Copies of the Report of the Disciplinary Committee
\nand the\t findings of  the Council  were forwarded to him. On
\nMarch 4, 1974, Ratna applied for extension of time to enable
\nhim to\tmake his  representation and the Council granted him
\ntime up to April 13, 1974, for that purpose.\n<\/p>\n
     It\t may   be  stated   at\tthis   stage  that  parallel
\nproceedings were  taken in  the case of Behl and Bhoopatkar.
\nThe brochure  was treated  as information against them also,
\nand on April 14, 1973, they sent their written statements to
\nthe Institute.\tTheir submissions  were\t considered  by\t the
\nCouncil, which\tbeing of  opinion that they were prima facie
\nguilty\tof   misconduct,  referred   the   matter   to\t the
\nDisciplinary Committee. On January 4, 1974, the Disciplinary
\nCommittee granted  a full  personal  hearing  to  these\t two
\nrespondents, who were represented by counsel. As in the case
\nof Ratna,  the Disciplinary Committee made its report to the
\nCouncil\t that\tthese  two   respondents  were\t guilty\t  of
\nprofessional misconduct\t under clauses\t6 and 7 of Part I of
\nthe First  Schedule to\tthe  Act,  and\tin  its\t meeting  on
\nFebruary 16,  1974 the\tCouncil held them guilty accordingly
\nand proposed  the same penalty as in Ratna’s case. They were
\nalso invited  to appear\t in person  or\tto  make  a  written
\nrepresentation\tagainst\t the  penalty  proposed\t before\t the
\nCouncil.\n<\/p>\n
     Ratna now\tfiled W.P.  No. 426  of 1974  and  Behl\t and
\nBhoopatkar filed  W.P. No.  428 of 1974 in the High Court of
\nBombay. The  Writ Petitions  were allowed  by Lentin,  J  by
\nseparate orders dated March 3, 1980, on the finding that the
\nCouncil should\thave given  an opportunity to the members to
\nrepresent before it against the report of the Disci-\n<\/p>\n
1062<\/span><\/p>\n
plinary Committee and that the President, the Vice-President
\nand the two members of the Institute who were members of the
\nDisciplinary Committee\twere disqualified from participating
\nin the\tproceedings of\tthe Council  when it  considered the
\nreport of  the\tDisciplinary  Committee,  and  that  as\t the
\ndecision of the Council was consequently vitiated the orders
\nimposing penalty  on the  respondents were  quashed and\t the
\ncase remanded  to the  Council for  fresh consideration. The
\nInstitute appealed to a Division Bench of the High Court and
\nthe appeals  have been summarily rejected by separate orders
\ndated April 16, 1980.\n<\/p>\n
     It is apparent that in the scheme incorporated in s. 21
\nof  the\t  Act  there   are   separate\tfunctionaries,\t the
\nDisciplinary Committee,\t the Council  and, in certain cases,
\nthe High  Court. The  controlling authority  is the Council,
\nwhich is  only logical for the Council is the governing body
\nof the Institute. When the Council receives information or a
\ncomplaint alleging  that a member of the Institute is guilty
\nof misconduct,\tand it\tis prima facie of opinion that there
\nis substance  in the  allegations it  refers the case to the
\nDisciplinary Committee.\t The Disciplinary  Committee plays a
\nsubordinate  role.   It\t conducts   an\tinquiry\t  into\t the
\nallegations.  Since  the  inquiry  is  into  allegations  of
\nmisconduct by  the member,  it possesses  the character of a
\nquasi-judicial\tproceeding.   The   Disciplinary   Committee
\nthereafter submits  a report of the result of the inquiry to
\nthe  Council.\tThe  Disciplinary   Committee  is  merely  a
\nCommittee of  the Institute,  with a  function\tspecifically
\nlimited by the provisions of the Act. As a subordinate body,
\nit reports  to the  Council, the  governing body. The report
\nwill contain  a statement  of the  allegations, the  defence
\nentered by  the member,\t a record  of the  evidence and\t the
\nconclusions upon  that material.  The  conclusions  are\t the
\nconclusions of\tthe Committee. They are tentative only. They
\ncannot be regarded as ‘findings’. The Disciplinary Committee
\nis not\tvested by the Act with power to render any findings.
\nIt is  the Council  which is  empowered to  find whether the
\nmember is  guilty of  misconduct. Both s. 21(2) and s. 21(3)
\nare clear  as to  that. If  on receipt\tof  the\t report\t the
\nCouncil finds  that the\t member is not guilty of misconduct,
\ns. 21(2)  requires it to record its finding accordingly, and
\nto direct  that\t the  proceedings  shall  be  filed  or\t the
\ncomplaint shall\t be dismissed.\tIf, on\tthe other  hand, the
\nCouncil finds  that the\t member is  guilty of misconduct, s.
\n21(3) requires\tit to  record  a  finding  accordingly,\t and
\nthereafter to  proceed\tin  the\t manner\t laid  down  in\t the
\nsucceeding subsections. So the finding by the Council is the
\ndeterminative decision\tas to  the guilt  of the member, and
\nbecause it  is determinative  the  Act\trequires  it  to  be
\nrecorded. A responsibility so grave as the determina-\n<\/p>\n
1063<\/span><\/p>\n
tion  that  a  member  is  guilty  of  misconduct,  and\t the
\nrecording of that finding, has been specifically assigned by
\nthe Act\t to the\t governing body,  the Council.\tIt  is\talso
\napparent that  it is  only upon\t a finding being recorded by
\nthe Council that the Act moves forward to the final stage of
\npenalisation. The recording of the finding by the Council is
\nthe jurisdictional  springboard for  the penalty  proceeding
\nwhich follows.\n<\/p>\n
     Now when it enters upon the task of finding whether the
\nmember is  guilty of  misconduct, the  Council considers the
\nreport submitted  by the  Disciplinary Committee. The report
\nconstitutes the\t material to  be considered  by the Council.
\nThe Council  will take\tinto regard  the allegations against
\nthe member,  his case  in defence, the recorded evidence and
\nthe conclusions\t expressed by  the  Disciplinary  Committee.
\nAlthough the  member has participated in the inquiry, he has
\nhad no\topportunity to\tdemonstrate the\t fallibility of\t the
\nconclusions of\tthe Disciplinary  Committee. It\t is material
\nwhich falls  within  the  domain  of  consideration  by\t the
\nCouncil. It  should also be open to the member, we think, to
\npoint out  to the Council any error in the procedure adopted
\nby the\tDisciplinary Committee\twhich could have resulted in
\nvitiating the  inquiry. S. 21(8) arms the Council with power
\nto record oral and documentary evidence, and it is precisely
\nto take\t account of that eventuality and to repair the error
\nthat this  power seems\tto have\t been conferred.  It cannot,
\ntherefore,  be\tdenied\tthat  even  though  the\t member\t has
\nparticipated  in   the\tinquiry\t  before  the\tDisciplinary
\nCommittee, there  is a range of consideration by the Council
\non which he has not been heard. He is clearly entitled to an
\nopportunity of\thearing before\tthe Council finds him guilty
\nof misconduct.\n<\/p>\n
     At\t this  point  it  is  necessary\t to  advert  to\t the
\nfundamental character of the power conferred on the Council.
\nThe Council  is\t empowered  to\tfind  a\t members  guilty  of
\nmisconduct. The\t penalty which\tfollows is  so harsh that it
\nmay result in his removal from the Register of Members for a
\nsubstantial number  of years.  The removal  of his name from
\nthe Register  deprives him  of the right to a certificate of
\npractice. As  is clear\tfrom s.\t 6(1) of  the Act, he cannot
\npractice without  such\tcertificate.  In  the  circumstances
\nthere is every reason to presume in favour of an opportunity
\nto the\tmember of  being heard\tby  the\t Council  before  it
\nproceeds to  pronounce upon  his guilt. As we have seen, the
\nfinding\t by  the  Council  operates  with  finality  in\t the
\nproceeding,  and  it  constitutes  the\tfoundation  for\t the
\npenalty imposed\t by the\t Council  on  him.  We\tconsider  it
\nsignificant that  the power  to find  and record  whether  a
\nmember\tis   guilty  of\t misconduct  has  been\tspecifically
\nentrusted by the
\n1064<\/span>
\nAct to\tthe entire  Council itself  and not  to a few of its
\nmembers who constitute the Disciplinary Committee. It is the
\ncharacter and  complexion of  the proceeding  considered  in
\nconjunction with  the structure\t of power constituted by the
\nAct which  leads us  to the  conclusion that  the member  is
\nentitled to  a hearing by the Council before it can find him
\nguilty. Upon the approach which has found favour with us, we
\nfind no\t relevance in  James Edward  Jeffs and others v. New
\nZealand Dairy  Production and  Marketing Board\tand  others,
\n[1967] 1  AC 551 cited on behalf of the appellant. The Court
\nmade observations  there of  a general\tnature and indicated
\nthe  circumstances  when  evidence  could  be  recorded\t and
\nsubmissions of\tthe parties heard by a person other than the
\ndecision making\t authority. Those  observations can  have no
\nplay in a power structure such as the one before us.\n<\/p>\n
     Our  attention  has  been\tinvited\t to  the  difference
\nbetween the  terms in  which s. 21(3) and s. 21(4) have been
\nenacted and,  it is  pointed out,  that while  in  s.  21(4)
\nParliament has\tindicated that an opportunity of being heard
\nshould be  accorded to the member, nowhere in s. 21(3) do we
\nfind such  requirement. There is no doubt that there is that
\ndifference between  the two  provisions. But,  to our  mind,
\nthat does not affect the question. The textual difference is
\nnot decisive.  It  is  the  substance  of  the\tmatter,\t the
\ncharacter of  the allegations, the far-reaching consequences
\nof  a\tfinding\t against   the\tmember,\t  the\tvesting\t  of
\nresponsibility in  the governing  body itself, all these and
\nkindred\t considerations\t enter\tinto  the  decision  of\t the
\nquestion whether  the law implies a hearing to the member at
\nthat stage.\n<\/p>\n
     Learned counsel  for the  appellant relies\t on  Chandra
\nBhavan Boarding\t and Lodging,  Bangalore  v.  The  State  of
\nMysore and  Anr.,<\/a> [1970]  2 SCR\t 600, where this Court found
\nthat the  procedure adopted  by the  Government in  fixing a
\nminimum wage  under s.\t5(1) of\t the Minimum Wages Act, 1948
\nwas not\t vitiated merely  on the  ground that the Government
\nhad failed  to constitute  a committee\tunder s. 5(1) (a) of
\nthat Act.  Reference was also made to K.L. Tripathi v. State
\nBank of\t India\tand  Others,<\/a>  [1984]  1\t SCC  43  where\t the
\npetitioner complained  of a  breach  of\t the  principles  of
\nnatural justice\t on the\t ground that  he was  not  given  an
\nopportunity to\trebut the  material gathered in his absence.
\nNeither case  is of  assistance to  the\t appellant.  In\t the
\nformer, the Court found that reasonable opportunity had been
\ngiven to  all the  concerned parties to represent their case
\nbefore the  Government\tmade  the  impugned  order.  In\t the
\nlatter, the  Court held\t that no  real\tprejudice  had\tbeen
\nsuffered by  the complainant  in the  circumstances  of\t the
\ncase.\n<\/p>\n
1065<\/span><\/p>\n
     It is  next pointed out on behalf of the appellant that
\nwhile Regulation  15 requires  the Council, when it proceeds
\nto act\tunder s.  21(4), to  furnish to the member a copy of
\nthe  report   of  the\tDisciplinary  Committee,   no\tsuch
\nrequirement  is\t  incorporated\tin   Regulation\t  14   which
\nprescribes what\t the Council  will do  when it\treceives the
\nreport of  the Disciplinary  Committee. That,  it  is  said,
\nenvisages  that\t  the  member\thas  no\t  right\t to  make  a
\nrepresentation before  the Council against the report of the
\nDisciplinary Committee.\t The contention\t can be\t disposed of
\nshortly. There\tis nothing  in Regulation  14 which excludes
\nthe operation  of the principle of natural justice entitling
\nthe member  to be  heard by  the Council when it proceeds to
\nrender its  finding. The  principles of natural justice must
\nbe read\t into the  unoccupied  interstices  of\tthe  statute
\nunless there is a clear mandate to the contrary.\n<\/p>\n
     It is  then urged\tby learned counsel for the appellant
\nthat the  provision of an appeal under s. 22-A of the Act is
\na  complete  safeguard\tagainst\t any  insufficiency  in\t the
\noriginal proceeding  before  the  Council,  and\t it  is\t not
\nmandatory that\tthe member  should be  heard by\t the Council
\nbefore it  proceeds to\trecord its  finding. Section 22-A of
\nthe Act\t entitles a  member to\tprefer an appeal to the High
\nCourt against  an order\t of the\t Council imposing  a penalty
\nunder s.  21(4) of  the Act.  It  is  pointed  out  that  no
\nlimitation has\tbeen imposed on the scope of the appeal, and
\nthat an\t appellant is entitled to urge before the High Court
\nevery ground  which was available to him before the Council.
\nAny insufficiency,  it is  said, can  be cured\tby resort to
\nsuch appeal. Learned counsel apparently has in mind the view
\ntaken in  some cases  that an  appeal provides\tan  adequate
\nremedy\tfor  a\tdefect\tin  procedure  during  the  original
\nproceeding. Some of those cases are mentioned in Sir William
\nWades erudite  and classic  work on “Administrative Law” But
\nas that\t learned author\t observes, “in principle there ought
\nto be  an observance  of natural  justice  equally  at\tboth
\nstages”, and
\n\t  “if natural  justice\tis  violated  at  the  first
\n\t  stage, the  right of\tappeal is not so much a true
\n\t  right of  appeal as  a corrected  initial hearing:
\n\t  instead of  fair trial  followed  by\tappeal,\t the
\n\t  procedure is\treduced to  unfair trial followed by
\n\t  fair trial.”\n<\/p>\n
And he\tmakes reference to the observations of Megarry J. in
\nLeary v.  National Union  of Vehicle  Builders, [1971] 1 Ch.\n<\/p>\n
34. Treating  with another aspect of the point, that learned
\nJudge said:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “If one  accepts the\tcontention that\t a defect of
\n\t  natural justice
\n1066<\/span>
\n\t  in the  trial body can be cured by the presence of
\n\t  natural justice  in the  appellate body,  this has
\n\t  the result of depriving the member of his right of
\n\t  appeal from  the expelling  body. If the rules and
\n\t  the law  combine to give the member the right to a
\n\t  fair trial  and the right of appeal, why should he
\n\t  be told  that he  ought to  be satisfied  with  an
\n\t  unjust trial and a fair appeal? Even if the appeal
\n\t  is treated  as a  hearing de\tnovo, the  member is
\n\t  being stripped  of his  right to appeal to another
\n\t  body from  the effective  decision to expel him. I
\n\t  cannot think\tthat natural justice is satisfied by
\n\t  a process  whereby an\t unfair\t trial,\t though\t not
\n\t  resulting in\ta valid expulsion, will nevertheless
\n\t  have the  effect of  depriving the  member of\t his
\n\t  right of appeal when a valid decision to expel him
\n\t  is subsequently  made. Such a deprivation would be
\n\t  a powerful result to be achieved by what in law is
\n\t  a mere  nullity; and it is no mere triviality that
\n\t  might be  justified on  the  ground  that  natural
\n\t  justice  does\t not  mean  perfect  justice.  As  a
\n\t  general rule, at all events, I hold that a failure
\n\t  of natural  justice in  the trial  body cannot  be
\n\t  cured by  a sufficiency  of natural  justice in an
\n\t  appellate body.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The view  taken by\t Megarry, J.  was  followed  by\t the
\nOntario High  Court in\tCanada in  Re Cardinal\tand Board of
\nCommissioners of  Police of  City  of  Cornwall,  [1974]  42
\nD.L.R. (3d)  323. The  Supreme\tCourt  of  New\tZealand\t was
\nsimilarly  inclined   in  Wislang   v.\tMedical\t Practioners
\nDisciplinary Committee,\t [1974] 1 N.Z.L.R. 29 and so was the
\nCourt of  Appeal of  New Zealand in Reid v. Rowley, [1977] 2
\nN.Z.L.R. 472.\n<\/p>\n
     But perhaps  another way  of looking at the matter lies
\nin examining  the consequences\tof the initial order as soon
\nas it  is passed.  There are  cases where an order may cause
\nserious injury\tas soon as it is made, an injury not capable
\nof being  entirely erased  when the  error is  corrected  on
\nsubsequent appeal.  For instance,  as in  the present  case,
\nwhere a\t member of  a highly  respected and publicly trusted
\nprofession  is\t found\tguilty\tof  misconduct\tand  suffers
\npenalty, the  damage to\t his professional  reputation can be
\nimmediate and  far-reaching. “Not  all the King’s horses and
\nall  the   King’s  men”\t  can  ever  salvage  the  situation
\ncompletely, notwithstanding  the widest scope provided to an
\nappeal. To  many a  man, his  professional reputation is his
\nmost  valuable\tpossession.  It\t affects  his  standing\t and
\ndignity among  his fellow  members in  the  profession,\t and
\nguarantees the\testeem of  his clientele.  It is  often\t the
\ncarefully garnered fruit of a long period of scrupulous,
\n1067<\/span>
\nconscientious and  diligent industry.  It is the portrait of
\nhis professional honour. In a world said to be notorious for
\nits blase  attitude towards  the noble\tvalues of an earlier
\ngeneration, a  man’s professional  reputation is  still\t his
\nmost sensitive\tpride.\tIn  such  a  case,  after  the\tblow
\nsuffered  by  the  initial  decision,  it  is  difficult  to
\ncontemplate  complete\trestitution  through   an  appellate
\ndecision. Such\ta case\tis unlike  an action  for  money  or
\nrecovery of  property, where  the  execution  of  the  trial
\ndecree may  be stayed pending appeal, or a successful appeal
\nmay result  in refund  of the  money or\t restitution of\t the
\nproperty, with\tappropriate compensation  by way of interest
\nor  mesne  profits  for\t the  period  of  deprivation.\tAnd,
\ntherefore, it  seems to us, there is manifest need to ensure
\nthat there  is no  breach of  fundamental procedure  in\t the
\noriginal proceeding,  and to  avoid treating an appeal as an
\noverall substitute for the original proceeding.\n<\/p>\n
     Upon the  aforesaid considerations,  we are of definite
\nopinion that a member accused of misconduct is entitled to a
\nhearing by the Council when, on receipt of the report of the
\nDisciplinary Committee, it proceeds to find whether he is or
\nis not\tguilty. The  High Court\t is, therefore, right in the
\nview on this point.\n<\/p>\n
     Accordingly, the  respective findings  of\tthe  Council
\nthat Ratna, Behl and Bhoopatkar are guilty of misconduct are
\nvitiated and  must be  quashed.\t Consequently,\tthe  penalty
\nimposed on each of them is also liable to be quashed.\n<\/p>\n
     Our decision  on the  first question  is sufficient  to
\ndispose of  these appeals.  But the  appellant is anxious to
\nobtain our  opinion on\tthe second  question also  as, it is
\nsaid, the  question is\tbound to arise in future in cases of
\ndisciplinary proceedings.  As it  was one  of the  points on
\nwhich the  High Court  allowed the writ petitions, and as we
\nhave already  heard full  agrument on  it, we proceed now to
\nconsider the point.\n<\/p>\n
     The question  is whether the respective findings of the
\nCouncil holding\t the three  members guilty of misconduct can
\nbe said\t to be\tvitiated by  bias because the members of the
\nDisciplinary Committee participated in those proceedings. As
\nhas been  pointed out,\ts. 17  of the  Act  provides  for  a
\nDisciplinary Committee,\t consisting of the President and the
\nVice-President ex-officio  of the  Council, who\t will be the
\nChairman and  Vice-Chairman respectively of the Disciplinary
\nCommittee, and\tthree other  members of\t the Council, two of
\nthem
\n1068<\/span>
\nbeing elected by the Council to the Committee, and the third
\nbeing nominated\t by the\t Central Government from amongst the
\npersons nominated  to the Council by the Central Government.
\nTherefore,  all\t  the  five   members  of  the\tDisciplinary
\nCommittee are drawn from the Council.\n<\/p>\n
     Now the  Council is  vested with  power under  s. 21 to
\nfind whether  the member  is guilty  of misconduct. There is
\nnothing in  s. 21  of the  Act, however, to indicate whether
\nthe members of the Disciplinary Committee should be excluded
\nwhen the  Council enters  upon its  task. The answer must be
\nfound from the general scheme of the Act and the fundamental
\nprinciples of law.\n<\/p>\n
     There can\tbe no  dispute\tthat  the  function  of\t the
\nDisciplinary Committee\tof holding an enquiry under s. 21(1)
\nof the\tAct into  the conduct  of the  member  calls  for  a
\nrecording of  evidence by  the Committee.  Its duty does not
\nend there.  It must  consider the  evidence and\t come to its
\nconclusions. As\t s. 21(2)  of the  Act plainly says, it must
\nreport “the  result of\tits enquiry”  to the Council. In the
\nabsence of  express or\timplied statutory  intendment to the
\ncontrary, it  appears to  us that  the\tmembers\t of  such  a
\nCommittee would\t be disqualified  from participating  in the
\ndeliberations of  the Council  when it\tproceeds to consider
\nthe report  in order to find whether the member is guilty of
\nmisconduct. For\t that alone  would be  consistent  with\t the
\nfundamental principle that justice must not only be done but
\nmust also  appear to  be done.\tThe nature  of the  function
\ndischarged by  the Council in rendering its finding is quasi
\njudicial, and  we are  reminded of  the observations of this
\nCourt as far back as Manek Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand,<\/a> [1957] SCR\n<\/p>\n
575.\n<\/p>\n
\t  “It  is  well\t settled  that\tevery  member  of  a
\n\t  tribunal that\t is called  upon to  try  issues  in
\n\t  judicial or  quasi-judicial  proceedings  must  be
\n\t  able to  act judicially;  and it is of the essence
\n\t  of judicial  decisions and judicial administration
\n\t  that judges  should be  able to  act\timpartially,
\n\t  objectively and  without any\tbias. In  such cases
\n\t  the test  is\tnot  whether  in  fact\ta  bias\t has
\n\t  affected the judgment; the test always is and must
\n\t  be whether  a litigant  could reasonably apprehend
\n\t  that a  bias\tattributable  to  a  member  of\t the
\n\t  tribunal might  have operated\t against him  in the
\n\t  final decision  of the  tribunal. It\tis  in\tthis
\n\t  sense that  it is often said that justice must not
\n\t  only be done but must also appear to be done.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
1069<\/span><\/p>\n
     We must  remember that  the  President  and  the  Vice-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
President of  the Council  and\t3  members  of\tthe  Council
\ncompose the  Disciplinary Committee.  The President  and the
\nVice-President do  certainly hold  significant status in the
\nmeetings of the Council. A member whose conduct has been the
\nsubject of  enquiry by\tthe Disciplinary Committee ending in
\nconclusions adverse  to him  can legitimately  entertain  an
\napprehension that  the President  and the  Vice-President of
\nthe Council  and  the  other  members  of  the\tDisciplinary
\nCommittee would\t maintain the  opinion expressed  by them in
\ntheir report  and would\t press for  the\t acceptance  of\t the
\nreport by  the Council. To the member whose conduct has been
\ninvestigated  by  the  Committee,  the\tpossibility  of\t the
\nCouncil disagreeing  with the  report in the presence of the
\nPresident and  the Vice-President  and the  other members of
\nthe Committee  would so\t rather remote.\t His fears  would be
\naggravated by  the circumstance\t that  the  President  would
\npreside over  the meeting  of the Council, and would thus be
\nin  a\tposition  to   control\tand  possibly  dominate\t the
\nproceedings during  the meeting.  We do\t not doubt  that the
\nPresident and  the Vice-President,  and also the three other
\nmembers\t of  the  Disciplinary\tCommittee,  should  find  it
\npossible  to  act  objectively\tduring\tthe  decision-making
\nprocess of  the\t Council.  But\tto  the\t member\t accused  of
\nmisconduct,  the  danger  of  partisan\tconsideration  being
\naccorded to the report would seem very real indeed.\n<\/p>\n
     The objection  on the  ground of  bias would  have been
\nexcluded  if   the  statute  had  expressed  itself  to\t the
\ncontrary. But  nowhere do we find in the Act any evidence to
\nestablish such\texclusion. It  is true\tthat by virtue of s.
\n17(3) it  is  obligatory  that\tthe  Disciplinary  Committee
\nshould be  composed of\tthe President and the Vice-President
\nof the Council and three other members of the Council. While
\nthat is\t so, there is nothing in the Act to suggest that the
\nmeetings of  the council must always be presided over by the
\nPresident or  the Vice-President, and that no meeting can be
\nheld in\t their absence.\t We find  that Regulation 140 framed
\nunder the  Act contemplates that the Council may meet in the
\nabsence\t of   the  President  and  the\tVice-President,\t and
\nprovides that  in their\t absence a member elected from among
\nthe members  who are  present should  preside. There  is  an
\nelement of  flexibility which  makes  it  possible  for\t the
\nCouncil to consider the report of the Disciplinary Committee
\nwithout the  participation of  the members of the Committee.
\nBecause of  the ‘flexibility’  potential in  the scheme, the
\ndoctrine of  necessity, to  which reference has been made on
\nbehalf of  the Institute,  cannot come\tinto play.  We\tmust
\nadmit that  it does  appear anomalous that the President and
\nthe Vice-President  of the  Council should  be disabled from
\nparticipating in a meeting of the
\n1070<\/span>
\nCouncil because they are bound by statute to function as the
\nChairman  and\tthe  Vice-Chairman   of\t  the\tDisciplinary
\nCommittee, and\twere it\t not for  the factor  of flexibility
\nwhich we  see in the scheme, we would have been compelled to
\nthe conclusion\tthat the  Act implies  an exclusion  of\t the
\ndoctrine of bias. But as we have observed, no such exclusion
\nis implied  by the  scheme of  the Act\tor  its\t policy.  We
\nsuggest the  removal of\t the anomaly by suitable legislative
\namendment of s. 17(3) of the Act so that the constitution of
\nthe Disciplinary  Committee should  not necessarily  include
\nthe President  and the\tVice-President of the Council. It is
\nonly appropriate that due recognition should be given to the
\nfundamental principles and accepted axioms of law.\n<\/p>\n
     Learned counsel for the Institute relies on Re Dancyger
\nand Alberta  Pharmaceutical Association, 17 D.L.R. (3d) 206;
\nRe Prescott, 19 D.L.R. (3d) 446; Re Merchant and Benchers of
\nthe Law Society. 32 D.L.R. (3d) 178 and the majority opinion
\nin Law\tSociety of  Upper Canada v. French, 49 D.L.R. (3d) 1
\nin support  of the  contention\tthat  participation  by\t the
\nmembers of  the Disciplinary  Committee does not vitiate the
\nproceedings of the Council. The principal basis on which the
\nCanadian courts\t proceeded in  upholding the validity of the
\nmeeting\t of  the  parent  body,\t despite  the  participation
\ntherein of the members of the Disciplinary Committee, lay in
\nthis that  the entire proceeding, that is to say the enquiry
\nby the\tCommittee and  the subsequent  consideration of\t its
\nreport by  the parent body, constituted a single proceeding,
\nand had\t to be\tdistinguished from a case where the decision
\nby a  subordinate body\twas  assailed  in  appeal  before  a
\nsuperior authority. This distinction, it seems to us, can be
\nof little assistance if full play is given to the maxim that
\nno man\tshall be  a Judge in his own cause. We are impressed
\nby the\tsoundness of the minority opinion pronounced by that
\nlearned and  distinguished  Judge,  Laskin,  C.J.C.  in\t Law
\nSociety of  Upper Canada  v. French  (supra) decided  by the
\nSupreme Court of Canada. He observed:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “I do\t not think that the issue herein falls to be
\n\t  decided according  to whether\t the proceedings  in
\n\t  Convocation are  or amount  to an appeal or are or
\n\t  amount to  a review  under a\ttwo-stage scheme  of
\n\t  inquiry   into    allegations\t  of\tprofessional
\n\t  misconduct.  No  doubt,  characterization  of\t the
\n\t  proceedings as  an appeal  may lend  weight to the
\n\t  contention of\t the appellant\tsolicitor,  but\t the
\n\t  principle underlying\this position rises above any
\n\t  such\tformalistic   approach.\t The   principle  is
\n\t  immanent in  the ancient maxim nemo judex in causa
\n\t  sua, expressed by Coke in Dr. Benham’s case (1610)\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  8. Co. Rep. 113b, 77E.R. 646.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
1071<\/span><\/p>\n
     The conclusion  reached by us has not been an easy one.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The authorities\t on the\t subject have  oscillated  from\t one
\nextreme to the other, and an analysis of the cases points at
\ntimes to  some rather slender element in the mosaic of facts
\nwhich has  influenced the  outcome.  There  is\tgood  reason
\nultimately for\tadopting a  liberal view,  for as  has\tbeen
\nobserved  by  the  late\t Professor  S.A.  De  Smith  in\t his
\n‘Judicial Review of Administrative Action’ Fourth Edition p.
\n261:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “….. a  report will normally include a statement
\n\t  of findings  and  recommendations,  which  may  be
\n\t  controverted before the parent body; and in such a
\n\t  case the  participation of  members  of  the\tsub-
\n\t  committee in\tthe final decision may be of dubious
\n\t  validity. The\t problem is not merely one of strict
\n\t  law; it is also one of public policy.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Accordingly, we  concur with  the High  Court that\t the
\nfinding of  the Council\t holding the respondents Ratna, Behl
\nand Bhoopatkar\tguilty of  misconduct  is  vitiated  by\t the
\nparticipation of the members of the Disciplinary Committee.\n<\/p>\n
     Before we\tconclude, we  may refer\t to  a\tthird  point
\nraised before  us, the\tpoint being  whether the  Council is
\nobliged to  give reasons  for its  finding that\t a member is
\nguilty of  misconduct. It seems to us that it is bound to do
\nso. In\tfairness and justice, the member is entitled to know
\nwhy he\thas been  found guilty.\t The case  can be so serious
\nthat it can attract the harsh penalties provided by the Act.
\nMoreover, the member has been given a right of appeal to the
\nHigh Court  under s.  22-A of the Act. To exercise his right
\nof appeal  effectively he  must know  the basis on which the
\nCouncil has  found him\tguilty. We  have already pointed out
\nthat a\tfinding by  the Council\t is the\t first determinative
\nfinding on  the guilt  of the  member. It  is a finding by a
\nTribunal  of   first  instance.\t  The  conclusion   of\t the
\nDisciplinary Committee\tdoes  not  enjoy  the  status  of  a
\n“finding”. Moreover,  the reasons contained in the report by
\nthe Disciplinary Committee for its conclusion may or may not
\nconstitute the basis of the finding rendered by the Council.
\nThe Council  must, therefore,  state  the  reasons  for\t its
\nfinding.\n<\/p>\n
     The  appeals   fail  and  are  dismissed,\tbut  in\t the
\ncircumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.\n<\/p>\n
M.L.A.\t\t\t\t\t  Appeals dismissed.\n1072<\/span>\n\n\n\n<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Institute Of Chartered … vs L.K. Ratna & Others on 21 October, 1986 Equivalent citations: 1987 AIR 71, 1986 SCR (3)1048 Author: R Pathak Bench: Pathak, R.S. PETITIONER: INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS Vs. RESPONDENT: L.K. RATNA & OTHERS DATE OF JUDGMENT21\/10\/1986 BENCH: PATHAK, R.S. BENCH: PATHAK, R.S. MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) CITATION: […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-70535","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nInstitute Of Chartered ... vs L.K. Ratna & Others on 21 October, 1986 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Institute Of Chartered ... vs L.K. Ratna & Others on 21 October, 1986 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1986-10-20T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2015-12-15T00:47:54+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"46 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Institute Of Chartered … vs L.K. Ratna & Others on 21 October, 1986\",\"datePublished\":\"1986-10-20T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2015-12-15T00:47:54+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986\"},\"wordCount\":6651,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986\",\"name\":\"Institute Of Chartered ... vs L.K. Ratna & Others on 21 October, 1986 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1986-10-20T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2015-12-15T00:47:54+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Institute Of Chartered … vs L.K. Ratna & Others on 21 October, 1986\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Institute Of Chartered ... vs L.K. Ratna & Others on 21 October, 1986 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Institute Of Chartered ... vs L.K. Ratna & Others on 21 October, 1986 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1986-10-20T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2015-12-15T00:47:54+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"46 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Institute Of Chartered … vs L.K. Ratna & Others on 21 October, 1986","datePublished":"1986-10-20T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2015-12-15T00:47:54+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986"},"wordCount":6651,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986","name":"Institute Of Chartered ... vs L.K. Ratna & Others on 21 October, 1986 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1986-10-20T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2015-12-15T00:47:54+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/institute-of-chartered-vs-l-k-ratna-others-on-21-october-1986#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Institute Of Chartered … vs L.K. Ratna & Others on 21 October, 1986"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70535","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70535"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70535\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70535"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70535"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70535"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}