{"id":70625,"date":"2010-05-05T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2010-05-04T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010"},"modified":"2018-07-28T22:18:30","modified_gmt":"2018-07-28T16:48:30","slug":"oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010","title":{"rendered":"Oil vs Parmar on 5 May, 2010"},"content":{"rendered":"
Gujarat High Court<\/div>\n
Oil vs Parmar on 5 May, 2010<\/div>\n
Author: H.K.Rathod,&Nbsp;<\/div>\n
   Gujarat High Court Case Information System \n\n  \n  \n    \n\n \n \n    \t      \n         \n\t    \n\t\t   Print\n\t\t\t\t          \n\n  \n\n\n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t\n\n\n \n\n\n\t \n\nSCA\/5658\/2010\t 27\/ 57\tJUDGMENT \n \n \n\n\t\n\n \n\nIN\nTHE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD\n \n\n \n\n\n \n\nSPECIAL\nCIVIL APPLICATION No. 5658 of 2010\n \n\n \n \nFor\nApproval and Signature:  \n \nHONOURABLE\nMR.JUSTICE H.K.RATHOD\n \n \n=========================================================\n\n \n\t  \n\t \n\t  \n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\n1\n\t\t\n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nWhether\n\t\t\tReporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ?\n\t\t\n\t\n\n \n\t  \n\t \n\t  \n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\n2\n\t\t\n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nTo be\n\t\t\treferred to the Reporter or not ?\n\t\t\n\t\n\n \n\t  \n\t \n\t  \n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\n3\n\t\t\n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nWhether\n\t\t\ttheir Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ?\n\t\t\n\t\n\n \n\t  \n\t \n\t  \n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\n4\n\t\t\n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nWhether\n\t\t\tthis case involves a substantial question of law as to the\n\t\t\tinterpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order\n\t\t\tmade thereunder ?\n\t\t\n\t\n\n \n\t  \n\t \n\t  \n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\n5\n\t\t\n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nWhether\n\t\t\tit is to be circulated to the civil judge ?\n\t\t\n\t\n\n \n\n \n=========================================================\n\n \n\nOIL\n& NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LTD - Petitioner(s)\n \n\nVersus\n \n\nPARMAR\nPRAVINBHAI GIRDHARBHAI & 9 - Respondent(s)\n \n\n=========================================================\n \nAppearance\n: \nMR\nAJAY R MEHTA for\nPetitioner(s) : 1, \nNone for Respondent(s) : 1 -\n10. \n=========================================================\n\n\n \n\t  \n\t \n\t  \n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nCORAM\n\t\t\t: \n\t\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nHONOURABLE\n\t\t\tMR.JUSTICE H.K.RATHOD\n\t\t\n\t\n\n \n\n \n \n\n\n \n\nDate\n: 05\/05\/2010 \n\n \n\n \n \nORAL\nJUDGMENT<\/pre>\n
Heard
\n\tlearned advocate Mr. AR Mehta on behalf of petitioner.\n<\/p>\n
The
\n\tpetitioner ONGC has challenged award passed by Industrial Tribunal,
\n\tBaroda in ITC no. 17\/2002 dated 22\/10\/2003, wherein Industrial
\n\tTribunal, Baroda has allowed reference and directed petitioner ONGC,
\n\tMakarpura, Baroda to make permanent all seven employees from date of
\n\tjoining in service as direct employees of ONGC and considering them
\n\tpermanent from date of joining, whatever benefits and salary are
\n\tavailable to permanent employees, same is to be paid and termination
\n\torder dated 5\/10\/1999 has been set aside with a direction to
\n\treinstate each workman with continuity of service with full back
\n\twages of interim period with costs of Rs. 10,000\/- to be paid to
\n\tUnion and order passed in Review Application no. 2\/2009 exh 9 dated
\n\t15\/2\/2010. This Review application filed by petitioner has been
\n\trejected with costs of Rs. 5,000\/- to each workman to be paid within
\n\t30 days.\n<\/p>\n
Learned
\n\tadvocate Mr. Mehta submitted that award passed by Industrial
\n\tTribunal, Baroda on 22\/10\/2003. He has read before this Court
\n\toperating portion, which is at page 69\/70. He submitted that relief
\n\twhich has been granted by Industrial Tribunal, Baroda in favour of
\n\tseven workmen, those who were contractor workmen. It is made clear
\n\tby him that award is not so far implemented by petitioner till date
\n\tand these workmen are out of job since 5\/10\/1999. He submitted that
\n\tchallenging aforesaid award dated 22\/10\/2003 one SCA no. 2193\/2004
\n\tfiled by petitioner where on 23\/2\/2004 (Coram: Honourable Mr.
\n\tJustice Jayant Patel) has passed following order as under:\n<\/p>\n
 Mr.Mehta for
\nthe  petitioner  states  that  since before  the Industrial Tribunal
\nthe evidence could not be lead on behalf of the petitioner,  the
\npetitioner  seeks permission  to  withdraw  the  petition  with a
\nview to initiate appropriate proceedings before the Industrial
\nTribunal  for  permitting the petitioner to lead evidence and to
\nreconsider the matter.  Mr.Mansoori  appearing  by caveat  states
\nthat he is not admitting the right of the petitioner to move such
\napplication.\n<\/p>\n
2.Considering the facts and  circumstances  of  the case,   permission   is  granted.  Petition  shall  stand disposed of as withdrawn. Contentions of both  sides  are  kept open.\n<\/p>\n
Before
\n\tthis Court, Mr. Mehta seek permission to withdraw petition with a
\n\tview to initiate appropriate proceeding before Industrial Tribunal
\n\tfor permitting petitioner to lead evidence and to reconsider matter.
\n\t At that occasion, learned advocate Mr. Mansuri has filed caveat and
\n\tstated that he is not admitting right of petitioner to move such
\n\tapplication.  However, permission is granted by this Court and
\n\tpetition shall stand disposed of as withdrawn. Meaning thereby that
\n\tchallenge to award 22\/10\/2003 has been withdrawn and accordingly
\n\tpetition has been disposed of as withdrawn.  This Court has granted
\n\tpermission to withdraw present petition  but this Court has not
\n\tgranted any liberty to petitioner to file appropriate proceeding
\n\tbefore Industrial Tribunal by way of Review application.  So,
\n\tliberty from this Court is atleast relevant and necessary for
\n\tkeeping right open to challenge of award dated 22\/10\/2003. Once
\n\tpetition is withdraw challenging award in question subsequent to
\n\tchallenge same award by present petition and liberty was not given
\n\tby this Court, to challenge same award after order in Reviwe
\n\tapplication then according to my opinion, petitioner is not entitled
\n\tto challenge same award by another present petition after withdrawal
\n\tof petition which was disposed of as withdrawn.\n<\/p>\n
Therefore,
\n\tin present petition petitioner can only challenge order passed in
\n\tReview application by Industrial Tribunal, Baroda but petitioner is
\n\tnot entitled to challenge award passed by Industrial Tribunal,
\n\tBaroda dated 22\/10\/2003.\n<\/p>\n
Learned
\n\tadvocate Mr. Mehta fairly has not made any submission against order
\n\tpassed by Industrial Tribunal in Review application because in
\n\tIndustrial Dispute Act as well as Industrial Dispute Rules, 1966
\n\tthere is no express provisions made by Statutory provision which
\n\tgives power to Industrial Tribunal to consider or to entertain
\n\tReview Application.  In short, Industrial Tribunal has no power to
\n\treview its own order because there is no such express provision made
\n\tunder Act as well as Rules.\n<\/p>\n
He
\n\tfairly considered before this Court that in view of decision of Apex
\n\tCourt in case of Kapra Majdur Ekta Union Vs. Management of Birla
\n\tCotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd and Ors reported in 2005 (II)
\n\tLLJ 271, Apex Court has held it that as and when any mistake in
\n\tprocedure if it is committed by Industrial Tribunal being a quashi
\n\tjudicial authority in absence of express provision, then such award
\n\tcan not be reviewed by Industrial Tribunal. The Labour Court or
\n\tIndustrial Tribunal has no power to review its own award\/order.
\n\tThere is no express provision made under provision of Industrial
\n\tDispute Act, which give express Statutory powers to review in favour
\n\tof Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal.\n<\/p>\n
The
\n\tIndustrial Tribunal has considered another decision of Jharkhand
\n\tHigh Court reported in 2004 (1) LLN 1144, where also it has been
\n\tdecided that under provision of Industrial Dispute Act, there is no
\n\tsuch power has been given to Industrial Tribunal to review its own
\n\torder\/award and such powers can not be exercised by Industrial
\n\tTribunal as inherent power of Court.  The Industrial Tribunal can
\n\tcorrect only arithmetical mistake or accidental mistake but not
\n\thaving jurisdiction to re-examine facts which goes against its
\n\tearlier award, for that, such powers are not with Industrial
\n\tTribunal.  The Industrial Tribunal has also considered decision of
\n\tDelhi High Court reported in 2002 (1) LLN 506 where also it has been
\n\theld that Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to review its own
\n\taward unless specific provision  or express provision is made for
\n\tit. The Industrial Tribunal has also considered decision of Madhya
\n\tPradesh High Court reported in 1995 (2) LLN 1075 where it is held
\n\tthat so long specific powers of review is not given such powers can
\n\tnot be exercised by Industrial Tribunal as inherent power but only
\n\ttyping or clerical mistake can be corrected.  The Industrial
\n\tTribunal has also considered another decision of Delhi High Court
\n\treported in 1995 (1) LLN 111 which was delivered in case of Workmen
\n\tCompensation Act, 1923 and in that also Delhi High Court has held
\n\tthat Industrial Tribunal and Labour Court has no jurisdiction or
\n\tpower to review its own award or order.  The Apex Court in in
\n\tthe case of P. N. Thakershi Vs. Pradhyumansinghji reported in AIR
\n\t1970 SC 1273 also held it that power of review is not
\n\tinherent power but it must be given expressly by Statutory
\n\tprovision. Therefore, in absence of that, Industrial Tribunal has no
\n\tjurisdiction to review its own award.  The Industrial Tribunal has
\n\tconsidered Rule 31 of I. D. Rules, 1966 which relating to only
\n\tcorrection in clerical or typing or accidental mistake but not given
\n\tpower of review under Rule 31 of Industrial Dispute Rules.\n<\/p>\n
The
\n\tIndustrial Tribunal has come to conclusion that such application,
\n\twhich has been filed by petitioner to review its own award, was
\n\tearlier decided by Industrial Tribunal in reference ITC no. 17\/2002
\n\ton merits. After closing right to lead evidence by Corporation,
\n\tdetailed argument has been made, at that occasion, Corporation was
\n\taware about facts that they have not led any oral evidence and right
\n\tto lead oral evidence has not been availed and left it voluntarily
\n\tthen subsequently application which has been filed by petitioner
\n\tCorporation to give him an opportunity to fill up Lecuna or gape
\n\tthat request can not consider to be legal and reasonable.  If such
\n\tpermission is granted by Court in Review application then workers
\n\tmay not be able to get final adjudication in such matter and
\n\tremained continuous litigation by such kind of application.  For
\n\tthat, there is no such provision made in Industrial Disputes
\n\tAct\/Rules.  The Industrial Tribunal has rightly observed that award
\n\tis dated 22\/10\/2003, more than six years have passed but
\n\tunfortunately, workers are not able to get fruit of such award.
\n\tWhatever delay has been occurred was considered to be deliberated as
\n\tintentional and once matter has been decided on merits no review
\n\tapplication can be entertained, for that, industrial Tribunal has no
\n\tjurisdiction and power to entertain it.\n<\/p>\n
The
\n\tview taken by Apex Court in bench of three judges in case of Kapra
\n\tMajdur Akta Union Vs. Management of Birla Cotton Spinning and
\n\tvivaing Mills Ltd and Ors reported in 2005 (II) LLJ 271, where same
\n\tquestion has been examined by Apex Court in light of considering
\n\tvarious decision and also having almost identical facts of present
\n\tcase.  The facts of above referred decision is relevant and similar
\n\tso it can be compared with facts of present case, which are almost
\n\tin similar nature.  The relevant discussion made in para 8 to 21 are
\n\tquoted as under:\n<\/p>\n
\t 8.\tIn the
\n\tlight of the order of this Court the Industrial Tribunal heard the
\n\tparties and passed an Award on June 12, 1987.  The Award is a
\n\tdetailed reasoned Award.  The Tribunal took note of the background
\n\tin which the disputes had arisen and the reference made to it.  It
\n\trejected the argument of the appellant-Union that once a reference
\n\tis made, the Labour Department of the appropriate Government becomes
\n\tfunctus officio in the matter. After considering to the decisions of
\n\tthis Court in State of Bihar vs. D.N. Ganguly & Ors.<\/a> : 1959 1
\n\tSCR 1191 ; Sirsilk Limited  vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and<\/a>
\n\tanother  : AIR 1964 SC 160 and Paraga Tools Ltd. vs. Mazdoor Sabha :
\n\t1975(I) LLJ 210 it concluded that merely because a dispute had been
\n\treferred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication, it did not
\n\tprevent the Conciliation Officer from playing his role when other
\n\tdisputes arose between the parties and the industrial peace was
\n\tdisturbed.   It noticed the fact that in the instant case a notice
\n\tof strike was given on February 14, 1983 and a notice of closure of
\n\ta part of the undertaking on April 4, 1983.  The workers were
\n\tdisturbed and the atmosphere was surcharged. In this background if
\n\tthe Conciliation Officer intervened in an attempt to bring about a
\n\tsettlement, it cannot be contended that he had no jurisdiction to do
\n\tso.  In fact the Labour Department was not only justified but
\n\tlegally competent and compelled to set the conciliation proceedings
\n\tin motion so as to restore industrial peace.\n<\/p>\n
\t9.\tHaving found
\n\tthat the settlement was brought about in the course of conciliation
\n\tproceedings, the Tribunal considered the terms of settlement and
\n\trecorded the following conclusion :-\n<\/p>\n
\t“I have
\n\tcarefully gone through the terms of the settlement.  These are not
\n\tonly well bargained but quite detailed and very sound in the
\n\tcircumstances obtaining. It’s various items made provision for
\n\tmeeting all the relevant problems of relief and rehabilitation of
\n\tthe affected workers because of the closure of weaving section of
\n\tthe mill and envisages an expert technical body for deciding on the
\n\tpossibility and extent of the revival of weaving work in the Mill,
\n\tunder the time bound schedule.  I find the settlement fair and
\n\tjust.”\n<\/p>\n
\t10.\tThe
\n\tTribunal, therefore, concluded that the settlement of  May 17, 1983
\n\twas a settlement reached between the Workmen and the Management in
\n\tthe course of conciliation proceedings and hence binding on all the
\n\tworkers of the respondent-Company.  It proceeded to decide the
\n\treference declaring that the disputes stood settled as between the
\n\tparties by a valid and binding settlement dated May 17, 1983 and
\n\tthus the reference had been rendered redundant.  There was no
\n\tdispute surviving and no purpose was left in making the terms of a
\n\tvalid and binding settlement of 1983 as a part of the award, as all
\n\tthe agreed terms should stood executed and implemented.  The order
\n\tof the Industrial Tribunal making the Award is of June 12, 1987.
\n\tThe said Award was duly published by the appropriate Government in
\n\tthe Gazette on August 10, 1987.\n<\/p>\n
\t11.\tOn September
\n\t7, 1987 the appellant-Union filed an application before the
\n\tIndustrial Tribunal to the effect that the only question which had
\n\tbeen argued before the Tribunal was in relation to the power and
\n\tjurisdiction of the Conciliation Officer to record settlement
\n\tbetween the parties during the pendency of the disputes.  The
\n\tquestion as to whether the settlement was fair and just, and should
\n\tbe accepted by the Tribunal, was not argued since that required
\n\tevidence.  It was, therefore, understood that the said question will
\n\tbe decided later on in case the Tribunal held that the Conciliation
\n\tOfficer had jurisdiction to record the settlement.  Under some
\n\tmisconception the Tribunal had determined the terms of the
\n\tsettlement to be fair and just and had passed an Award on June 12,
\n\t1987.  It was, therefore, prayed that the appellant-Union be given
\n\tan opportunity to establish that the settlement was neither just nor
\n\tfair. For this purpose the Award may be recalled and the
\n\tappellant-Union be given an opportunity to establish that the
\n\tsettlement is unjust and unfair, adversely affecting a large number
\n\tof workmen.  It was prayed that the Award may be recalled which was
\n\tin fact an ex-parte Award, and the question of fairness of the
\n\tsettlement be decided after providing an opportunity to the parties
\n\tto produce evidence.\n<\/p>\n
\t12.This
\n\tapplication filed by the appellant-Union was strongly opposed by the
\n\trespondent-Management, but the successor Presiding Officer of
\n\tIndustrial Tribunal No.II, Delhi allowed the application.  It
\n\tobserved that a perusal of the order dated June 12, 1987 showed that
\n\tthe then Tribunal did not make a single observation as to whether
\n\tthe settlement dated May 17, 1983 was just and fair.  No issue was
\n\tframed nor any evidence was recorded on that point.  No argument was
\n\tadvanced and no finding was given by his learned predecessor on this
\n\tpoint.  Relying upon the judgment of this Court in Satnam Verma  vs.
\n\t Union of India<\/a> :  1984 (supp) SCC 712 and Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs.
\n\tCentral Government Industrial Tribunal and others<\/a> : 1980 (Supp) SCC
\n\t420  it was held that where the Tribunal proceeds to make an Award
\n\twithout notice to a party, the Award is a nullity and, therefore,
\n\tthe Tribunal has not only the power but also the duty to set aside
\n\tsuch an ex-parte Award.  It was held that in the instant case no
\n\targuments were advanced and no finding was given as to whether the
\n\tsettlement was just and fair.  In view of its finding that the
\n\tTribunal has power to review its Award even if the same is published
\n\tin the Gazette, the Tribunal proceeded to exercise its power to
\n\treview its earlier order dated June 12, 1987.  It further framed an
\n\tadditional issue which is as follows:- “Whether the settlement
\n\tdated 17.5.1983 is just and fair and if so, is it not binding on the
\n\tparties?”\n<\/p>\n
\t13.\tIt further
\n\tdirected that only arguments shall be heard since there was no need
\n\tto record evidence on this point.  Accordingly by its order of
\n\tFebruary 19, 1990 the Industrial Tribunal decided to review its
\n\tearlier order and framed an additional issue as to whether the
\n\tsettlement was just and fair.\n<\/p>\n
\t14.\tThe
\n\tManagement – respondent herein preferred a writ petition before the
\n\tHigh Court of Delhi at New Delhi and sought quashing of the order
\n\tdated February 19, 1990 passed by Industrial Tribunal No. II, Delhi,
\n\tand for declaration that the Award dated June 12, 1987 earlier made
\n\tby the Tribunal effectively terminated the reference pending before
\n\tit.  The High Court by its impugned judgment and order allowed the
\n\twrit petition and granted the reliefs prayed for. The judgment and
\n\torder of the High Court has been impugned before us in this appeal.\n<\/p>\n
\t15.\tThe core
\n\tquestion which arises for consideration is whether the Industrial
\n\tTribunal was justified in recalling the earlier Award made on June
\n\t12, 1987 and in framing an additional issue for adjudication by the
\n\tTribunal.  According to the appellant the recall of the order was
\n\tfully justified in the facts of the case, while the respondents
\n\tcontend to the contrary.  Two issues arise for our consideration
\n\twhile considering the legality and propriety of the Tribunal in
\n\trecalling its earlier Award. Firstly – whether the Tribunal had
\n\tjurisdiction to recall its earlier order which amounted virtually to
\n\ta review of its earlier order; and secondly –  whether the Tribunal
\n\thad no jurisdiction to entertain the application for recall as it
\n\thad become functus offico.  The High Court answered the first
\n\tquestion in favour of the respondent-Management and the second in
\n\tfavour of the appellant.\n<\/p>\n
\t16.\tWe shall
\n\tfirst take up the second question namely # whether the Tribunal was
\n\tfunctus offico having earlier made an Award which was published by
\n\tthe appropriate Government.   It is not in dispute that the Award
\n\twas made on June 12, 1987 and was published in the Gazette on August
\n\t10, 1987.  The application for recall was made on September 7, 1987.
\n\t Under sub-section (1) of Section 17A of the Act an Award becomes
\n\tenforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its
\n\tpublication under Section 17 of the Act.  Thus the Award would have
\n\tbecome enforceable with effect from September 9, 1987.  However, the
\n\tapplication for recalling the Award was made on September 7, 1987
\n\ti.e. 2 days before the Award would have become enforceable in terms
\n\tof sub-section (1) of Section 17A of the Act.  The High Court
\n\trightly took the view that since the application for recall of the
\n\torder was made before the Award had become enforceable, the Tribunal
\n\thad not become fuctus offico and had jurisdiction to entertain the
\n\tapplication for recall.  This view also find supports from the
\n\tjudgment of this Court in  Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs.  Central
\n\tGovernment Industrial Tribunal and others<\/a> (supra).  This Court after
\n\tnoticing the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act
\n\twhich provides that the proceedings before the Tribunal would be
\n\tdeemed to continue till the date on which the Award become
\n\tenforceable under Section 17A, held that till the Award becomes
\n\tenforceable the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute
\n\treferred to it for adjudication, and up to that date it has the
\n\tpower to entertain the application in connection with such dispute.
\n\tThe jurisdiction of the Tribunal had to be seen on the date of the
\n\tapplication made to it and not the date on which it passed the
\n\timpugned order.   The judgment in Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs.  Central
\n\tGovernment Industrial Tribunal and others<\/a> (supra) has been
\n\treiterated by this Court in Satnam Verma  vs.  Union of India<\/a>
\n\t(supra), J.K. Synthetics Ltd.  vs.  Collector of Central Excise<\/a> :
\n\t(1996) 6 SCC 92 and M.P. Electricity Board  vs.  Hariram air 2004 SC
\n\tSuppl 4791 : 2004 (8) SCC 246 : 2004 III LLJ 1144.\n<\/p>\n
\t17.\tIn the
\n\tinstant case as well we find that as on September 7, 1987 the Award
\n\thad not become enforceable and, therefore, on that date the Tribunal
\n\thad jurisdiction over the disputes referred to it for adjudication.
\n\tConsequently it had the power to entertain an application in
\n\tconnection with such dispute. The order of recall passed by the
\n\tTribunal on February 19, 1990, therefore, cannot be assailed on the
\n\tground that the Tribunal had become fuctus offico.\n<\/p>\n
\t18.\tThe question
\n\tstill remains whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to recall its
\n\tearlier Award dated June 12, 1987.  The High Court was of the view
\n\tthat in the absence of an express provision in the Act conferring
\n\tupon the Tribunal the power of review the Tribunal could not review
\n\tits earlier Award. The High Court has relied upon the judgments of
\n\tthis Court in Dr. (Smt.) Kuntesh Gupta vs. Management of Hindu Kanya
\n\tMaha Vidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.) and others<\/a>  : (1987) 4 SCC 525 and
\n\tPatel Narshi Thakershi and others vs. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsingji<\/a> :
\n\tAIR 1970 SC 1273 wherein this Court has clearly held that the power
\n\tof review is not an inherent power and must be conferred by law
\n\teither expressly or by necessary implication.  The appellant sought
\n\tto get over this legal hurdle by relying upon the judgment of this
\n\tCourt in Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs.  Central Government Industrial
\n\tTribunal and others<\/a> (supra). In that case the Tribunal made an
\n\tex-parte Award.  Respondents applied for setting aside the ex-parte
\n\tAward on the ground that they were prevented by sufficient cause
\n\tfrom appearing when the reference was called on for hearing.  The
\n\tTribunal set aside the ex-parte Award on being satisfied that there
\n\twas sufficient cause within the meaning of Order 9 Rule 13 of the
\n\tCode of Civil Procedure and accordingly set aside the ex-parte
\n\tAward.  That order was upheld by the High Court and thereafter in
\n\tappeal by this Court.\n<\/p>\n
\t19.\tIt was,
\n\ttherefore, submitted before us relying upon Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs.
\n\tCentral Government Industrial Tibunal and others<\/a> (supra) that even
\n\tin the absence of an express power of review, the Tribunal had the
\n\tpower to review its order if some illegality was pointed out.  The
\n\tsubmission must be rejected as misconceived.  The submission does
\n\tnot take notice of the difference between a procedural review and a
\n\treview on merits.  This Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs.  Central
\n\tGovernment Industrial Tribunal and others<\/a> (supra) clearly
\n\thighlighted this distinction when it observed :-\n<\/p>\n
\t“Furthermore,
\n\tdifferent considerations arise on review.  The expression ‘review’
\n\tis used in the two distinct senses, namely (1) a procedural review
\n\twhich is either inherent or implied in a court or Tribunal to set
\n\taside a palpably erroneous order passed under a mis-apprehension by
\n\tit, and (2) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected
\n\tis one of law and is apparent on the face of the record.  It is in
\n\tthe latter sense that the court in Patel Narshi Thakershi case held
\n\tthat no review lies on merits unless a statute specifically provides
\n\tfor it.  Obviously when a review is sought due to a procedural
\n\tdefect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be
\n\tcorrected ex debita justitiae to prevent the abuse of its process,
\n\tand such power inheres in every court or Tribunal”.\n<\/p>\n
\t20.\tApplying
\n\tthese principles it is apparent that where a Court or quasi judicial
\n\tauthority having jurisdiction to adjudicate on merit proceeds to do
\n\tso, its judgment or order can be reviewed on merit only if the Court
\n\tor the quasi judicial authority is vested with power of review by
\n\texpress provision or by necessary implication.  The procedural
\n\treview belongs to a different category.  In such a review, the Court
\n\tor quasi judicial authority having jurisdiction to adjudicate
\n\tproceeds to do so, but in doing so commits a procedural illegality
\n\twhich goes to the root of the matter and invalidates the proceeding
\n\titself, and consequently the order passed therein. Cases where a
\n\tdecision is rendered by the Court or quasi judicial authority
\n\twithout notice to the opposite party or under a mistaken impression
\n\tthat the notice had been served upon the opposite party, or where a
\n\tmatter is taken up for hearing and decision on a date other than the
\n\tdate fixed for its hearing, are some illustrative cases in which the
\n\tpower of procedural review may be invoked.  In such a case the party
\n\tseeking review or recall of the order does not have to substantiate
\n\tthe ground that the order passed suffers from an error apparent on
\n\tthe face of the record or any other ground which may justify a
\n\treview.  He has to establish that the procedure followed by the
\n\tCourt or the quasi judicial authority suffered from such illegality
\n\tthat it vitiated the proceeding and invalidated the order made
\n\ttherein, inasmuch the opposite party concerned was not heard for no
\n\tfault of his, or that the matter was heard and decided on a date
\n\tother than the one fixed for hearing of the matter which he could
\n\tnot attend for no fault of his.  In such cases, therefore, the
\n\tmatter has to be re-heard in accordance with law without going into
\n\tthe erit of the order passed.  The order passed is liable to be
\n\trecalled and reviewed not because it is found to be erroneous, but
\n\tbecause it was passed in a proceeding which was itself vitiated by
\n\tan error of procedure or mistake which went to the root of the
\n\tmatter and invalidated the entire proceeding.  In Grindlays Bank
\n\tLtd. vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and others<\/a> (supra),
\n\tit was held that once it is established that the respondents were
\n\tprevented from appearing at the hearing due to sufficient cause, it
\n\tfollowed that the matter must be re-heard and decided again.\n<\/p>\n
\t21.\tThe facts of
\n\tthe instant case are quite different.  The recall of the Award of
\n\tthe Tribunal was sought not on the ground that in passing the Award
\n\tthe Tribunal had committed any procedural illegality or mistake of
\n\tthe nature which vitiated the proceeding itself and consequently the
\n\tAward, but on the ground that some mattes which ought to have been
\n\tconsidered by the Tribunal were not duly considered.  Apparently the
\n\trecall or review sought was not a procedural review, but a review on
\n\tmerits.  Such a review was not permissible in the absence of a
\n\tprovision in the Act conferring the power of review on the Tribunal
\n\teither expressly or by necessary implication.\n<\/p>\n
In
\n\tview of aforesaid observations made by Apex Court, learned advocate
\n\tMr. Mehta, has not argued or raised any contention before this Court
\n\tagainst order of Industrial Tribunal passed in Review Application
\n\tdated 15\/2\/2010 in review ITC no. 2\/2009. Therefore, challenged in
\n\tpresent petition against order passed by Industrial Tribunal in
\n\tReview application is apparently failed as no contention has been
\n\traised by learned advocate Mr. Mehta fairly and rightly because that
\n\tissue has been covered by Apex Court in case of Kapra as referred
\n\tabove.\n<\/p>\n
Initially,
\n\tpetition was filed being SCA no. 2193\/2004 challenging award passed
\n\tby Industrial Tribunal dated 22\/10\/2003, where it has been
\n\twithdrawn. At that occasion no liberty has been given by this Court
\n\tto challenge very same award by petitioner Corporation subsequent to
\n\torder of Industrial Tribunal, which will be passed in review
\n\tapplication.  Apart from that, learned advocate Mr. Mehta has argued
\n\ton merits and raised contention about question of regularization as
\n\tdirect employees those who were appointed without following
\n\trecruitment procedure. He raised contention that they were
\n\tundisputedly contractor workmen with respondent no. 9 and 10 and
\n\tIndustrial Tribunal has come to conclusion that said contract is
\n\tsham and bogus  as no document has been produced by petitioner.  In
\n\tsuch circumstances, it is a duty of Union to move machinery under
\n\tLabour Contract (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970.\n<\/p>\n
He
\n\tsubmitted that respondent has raised industrial dispute on the
\n\tground that they were terminated on 5\/10\/1999 which was referred for
\n\tadjudication before Industrial Tribunal, Baroda in reference ITC no.
\n\t17\/2002.  The respondent Union has filed their statement of claim
\n\tvide exh 3 before Industrial Tribunal alleged that ONGC was their
\n\tPrincipal Employer and they were working in prohibited category as
\n\tper notification dated 8\/9\/1994, they to be treated as direct
\n\temployees of ONGC.  The reply was filed by petitioner Corporation
\n\tand denying averment made in statement of claim and contention was
\n\traised in written statement that respondents were employees of
\n\tcontractor. They had no right to seek regularization in ONGC and
\n\tfurther that even if it was assumed that they were working in
\n\tprohibited category, they had no right of claiming regularization
\n\tsince they were not recruited by following any procedure.\n<\/p>\n
He
\n\tsubmitted that Tribunal has not followed decision of Apex Court in
\n\tcase of Steel Authority reported in 2001 (7) SCC 1.  He also
\n\tsubmitted that Tribunal had not followed scheme dated 16\/7\/1991 of
\n\tregularization of contingent workers.  He also submitted that no
\n\tprocedure has been followed by Union under provisions of Labour
\n\tContract (Regulation and  Abolition) Act, 1970 for abolition of such
\n\tcontract and in absence of challenge by Union for abolishing
\n\tcontract system, direction given by Tribunal to regularize service
\n\tof workmen can not be given.\n<\/p>\n
He
\n\tsubmitted that in all, seven workmen were concerned in dispute, out
\n\tof that one workman has given deposition and another six have not
\n\tgiven any deposition.  On their behalf, there was no evidence on
\n\trecord.  Therefore, in favour of rest of workmen, Industrial
\n\tTribunal should not have to pass any award in their favour, i.e. how
\n\taward is bad.\n<\/p>\n
He
\n\trelied upon decision of Larger bench of Apex Court in case of State
\n\tof Karnataka Vs. Uma Devi reported in 2006 (4) SCC 1.  Except that
\n\tlearned advocate Mr. Mehta has not made any submission before this
\n\tCourt.\n<\/p>\n
I
\n\thave considered his submission and I have also perused award passed
\n\tby Industrial Tribunal, Baroda. The dispute has been raised by Union
\n\twhich referred for adjudication on 20\/3\/2002 by appropriate
\n\tGovernment under section 10 subsection 1 of Industrial Dispute Act,
\n\t1947.  The first party before Industrial Tribunal in reference is
\n\tONGC and party no. 2 and 3 are Contractor.  In reference, both
\n\tcontractors are join as party challenging termination order of seven
\n\temployees.  The reference was filed with  a prayer to grant
\n\treinstatement with continuity of service with full back wages of
\n\tinterim period. This employees were working with Contractors in
\n\tprohibited category.  Therefore, they are to be considered as
\n\tpermanent employees of Corporation and entitled all benefits as
\n\tpermanent employees of Corporation.\n<\/p>\n
The
\n\tstatement of claim was filed by workmen and also contention raised
\n\tthat contract which was given, was not genuine contract but it was
\n\tsham and bogus contract.  Exh 7, reply was filed by Corporation
\n\tdenying averment made in statement of claim raising almost same
\n\tcontention before Industrial Tribunal by Corporation.  Thereafter,
\n\tmatter was heard by Industrial Tribunal.  It is necessary to note
\n\tthat in conciliation proceeding and even before Industrial Tribunal,
\n\tnone remained present on behalf of petitioner Corporation. The
\n\tpetitioner Corporation has not produced any documents.  Even
\n\tpetitioner Corporation has not produced contract if it is genuine
\n\taccording to Corporation.  According to case of Corporation, these
\n\tseven workmen were if employees of contractor then it is a duty of
\n\tCorporation to produce relevant record to establish facts before
\n\tIndustrial Tribunal that they were employees of Contractor. There
\n\twas no license obtained by Contractor and these workmen were working
\n\tin prohibited category where contract labour system has been
\n\tabolished by Appropriate Government.  The evidence of one workman
\n\thas not been challenged in cross examination in respect to aforesaid
\n\tfacts and petitioner Corporation has not produced any oral evidence
\n\tto establish or prove contention which are raised in written
\n\tstatement before Industrial Tribunal, Baroda.\n<\/p>\n
On
\n\tthe contrary, respondent workmen has produced relevant record exh
\n\t13\/6 that they are employees of category IV.  On behalf of
\n\tpetitioner Corporation no officer was examined before Industrial
\n\tTribunal. According to Corporation, certain facts have been admitted
\n\tby one workman in cross examination, therefore, there was no need to
\n\texamined any officer.  The workmen has not completed continuous
\n\tservice of 240 days and their services was not illegally terminated
\n\tand they were not employed by Corporation on the basis of
\n\tRecruitment Rules. The Industrial Tribunal has considered terms of
\n\treference as discussed in para 7 of award. Thereafter, Industrial
\n\tTribunal has considered that both contractors have not filed any
\n\treply before Industrial Tribunal against statement of claim not only
\n\tthat but either of contractor has not remained present before
\n\tIndustrial Tribunal, Baroda.\n<\/p>\n
The
\n\tIndustrial Tribunal, Baroda has come prima facie opinion that expect
\n\treply exh 7 petitioner Corporation has not produced any material
\n\tbefore Industrial Tribunal either by documents or by oral evidence.
\n\tTherefore, contract which was alleged to be sham and bogus has been
\n\testablished by workmen by leading proper evidence as well as
\n\tproducing relevant documents before Industrial Tribunal.\n<\/p>\n
On
\n\tbehalf of workman, one Pravinbhai Girdharbhai Parmar was examined
\n\texh 16, whose evidence has been remained as it is being
\n\tunchallenged. He has given evidence on behalf of all workmen as per
\n\tpara 6 of his evidence at page 43.  The evidence of Pravinbhai
\n\tGirdharbhai Parmar vide exh 16 started from page 41.  According to
\n\this evidence, he has supported facts which are stated in statement
\n\tof claim.  Initially, he was join on 3\/4\/1993 in ONGC establishment
\n\tTBG.  Thereafter, he was enrolled as contract employee in Assistant
\n\tExpert Service, then his name has been sifted in contractor Sun Rise
\n\tTyping Class but he was remained continued in service for performing
\n\tsame kind of work  as directed by Officer of Corporation. No
\n\tdirection has been given by Contractor to him. The nature of work
\n\twhich was performed by workmen is discussed in para 4.  According to
\n\thim, Mr. G. A. Das – Senior Deputy Director, Mr. K. Ambedkar
\n\tManager of P & A Establishment have given direction to these
\n\tworkmen and they were performing same kind of work in similar nature
\n\tand manner.  His evidence is not only relating to his personal
\n\tevidence but it is relating to in favour of all, covering details of
\n\tall workmen those who are concerned in reference.  He has made clear
\n\tstatement in chief examination that whatever work performed by him
\n\talmost in similar nature of work, was performed by other employees
\n\tviz. Shri Amitkumar Haribhai Rohit, Rathod Ganpatbhai Somabhai,
\n\tRohit Thakorbhai Somabhai, Parmar Amarsinh Babarbhai, Parmar
\n\tSunilbhai Devjibhai and Vasava Gopalbhai Chandubhai.  They all were
\n\tworking with him and he knows each one and they are also performing
\n\tsame work which has been performed by him in ONGC as employee of
\n\tpetitioner corporation.  All workmen were terminated on 5\/10\/1999
\n\tand each workman has completed 240 days continuous service.  Before
\n\tthat no notice, notice pay, and retrenchment compensation paid by
\n\tpetitioner corporation and his last salary was Rs. 1500\/- per month.
\n\t After his termination, he has made sincere efforts to get
\n\temployment but he was not able to get it.  Similarly, other six
\n\tworkmen were also made sincere efforts for getting job but all were
\n\tremained unemployed. They are prepared to join duty if petitioner
\n\tcorporation is prepared to reinstate them.  The said chief
\n\texamination was carried out dated 25\/10\/2002.\n<\/p>\n
Thereafter,
\n\tone advocate Mr. Mahendra Patel has cross examined workman Shri
\n\tPravinbhai Girdharbhai Parmar. In cross examination, this question
\n\twas not put to him by advocate of petitioner that he was not having
\n\tknowledge of other workmen.  On the contrary, he has given his
\n\tanswer in cross examination that he is having information and
\n\tknowledge about other workmen those who were working with him.
\n\tTherefore, contention raised by learned advocate Mr. Mehta that
\n\tevidence of one workman exh 16 is not enough to cover facts of other
\n\tsix workmen, can not be accepted because looking to evidence of
\n\tPravinbhai Girdharbhai Parmar exh 16 not a personal evidence, but it
\n\tcovered evidence on behalf of all remaining workmen means common
\n\tevidence.  Therefore, it was not necessary to examine other workmen
\n\tbefore Industrial Tribunal. Shri Pravinbhai Girdharbhai Parmar
\n\texamined vide exh 16 giving detailed evidence in respect to all
\n\tother six workmen and in respect to date of termination, date of
\n\tjoining and nature of work performed by them.  They were also
\n\tremained unemployed inspite of sincere efforts have been made by
\n\tthem.  Therefore, contention raised by learned advocate Mr. Mehta
\n\tcan not be accepted.\n<\/p>\n
The
\n\trespondent workman has produced certain written documents vide exh
\n\t12, from that I-card issued by employer is very relevant. The
\n\trespondent workman has produced  xerox copy of various cheque and
\n\talso certain slips, which were given for taking tea and breakfast.
\n\tSimilarly, vide exh 13, passbook has been produced on record.
\n\tAgainst which, no evidence has been produced as rebuttal evidence by
\n\tpetitioner Corporation and such documents are not disputed by
\n\tpetitioner Corporation.\n<\/p>\n
In
\n\tlight of this back ground, Industrial Tribunal has considered that
\n\tif according to petitioner Corporation, these workmen were working
\n\tunder contractor then they should have to produce license received
\n\tby contractor where name of workmen must be there but no such
\n\tlicense was produced on record.  Even Corporation was not having any
\n\tlicense in prohibited area under Act 1970. Therefore, Corporation
\n\thas failed to establish their case by leading proper oral and
\n\tdocumentary evidence before Industrial Tribunal.  The Industrial
\n\tTribunal has considered evidence which has been produced by workmen
\n\tand these workmen were working as an employee in prohibited area not
\n\tas an employee of contractor.  The petitioner Corporation is having
\n\tpossession of necessary documents but none of documents has been
\n\tproduced by Corporation before Industrial Tribunal.  One Shri
\n\tPravinbhai Girdharbhai Parmar exh 16 was examined on behalf of all
\n\tthe workmen.  Thereafter, considering evidence on record, Industrial
\n\tTribunal has come to conclusion that respondent workmen has
\n\testablished facts on the basis of documents as well as oral evidence
\n\tthat it was not genuine contract in prohibited area and whatever
\n\tarrangement was made that was considered to be a paper arrangement.
\n\tTherefore, such contract is considered to be Sham and bogus.  In
\n\tsuch circumstances, there is no need for workmen to move machinery
\n\tunder Labour Contract (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 for
\n\tabolishing contract system.\n<\/p>\n
The
\n\tIndustrial Tribunal has also come to conclusion on factual aspect
\n\tand also considered decision of Apex Court in case of Steel
\n\tAuthority of India reported in 2001 LLR 961.  The Industrial
\n\tTribunal has considered that I-card given by petitioner corporation
\n\tand other relevant documents which has been produced by workmen vide
\n\texh 12 and 13, contract system which has been taken as defence was
\n\tnot genuine but it was merely paper arrangement and same has been
\n\tconsidered to be Sham and bogus.  Therefore, Industrial Tribunal has
\n\tdecided only factual aspect of matter and against that no rebuttal
\n\tevidence led by petitioner corporation before Industrial Tribunal.
\n\tThe workman has established their case properly before Industrial
\n\tTribunal and evidence of workman remained unchallenged before
\n\tIndustrial Tribunal.\n<\/p>\n
According
\n\tto my opinion, when existence of contract between workmen and
\n\tcorporation, if it is not established by petitioner corporation then
\n\tnaturally, these workmen are considered to be an employee of
\n\tpetitioner corporation because existence of contract has not been
\n\testablished by petitioner before Industrial Tribunal. The service
\n\trendered by each workman has completed more than 240 days continuous
\n\tservice. The Section 25 F of I. D. Act, 1947 has been violated by
\n\tpetitioner corporation being an undisputed facts and no gainfully
\n\temployment has been proved by petitioner corporation before
\n\tIndustrial Tribunal. I have also considered evidence of Shri
\n\tPravinbhai Girdharbhai Parmar exh 16 including cross examination.\n<\/p>\n
The
\n\tdecision of Apex Court as relied by learned advocate Mr. Mehta in
\n\tSteel Authority of India reported in 2001 (7) SCC 1 and in case of
\n\tState of Karnataka Vs. Uma Devi reported in 2006 (4) SCC 1, are not
\n\tapplicable to facts of present case.  Therefore, in absence of
\n\tevidence from petitioner corporation, Industrial Tribunal has
\n\trightly passed an award granting appropriate effective relief in
\n\tfavour of workmen. For that, Industrial Tribunal has not committed
\n\tany error which would require interference by this Court while
\n\texercising power under Art. 227 of Constitution of India.\n<\/p>\n
This
\n\tCourt is having limited jurisdiction and power to disturb finding of
\n\tfact recorded by Industrial Tribunal under Art. 227 of Constitution
\n\tof India as per recent decision of Apex Court in case of State
\n\tof Haryana & Ors Vs. Manoj Kumar reported in 2010 AIR SCW 1990.
\n\tThe relevant observation made in para 22 to 29 are quoted as under:\n<\/p>\n
\t22. The
\n\tappellants urged that the jurisdiction of the High Court under
\n\tArticle 227 is very limited and the High Court, while exercising the
\n\tjurisdiction under Article 227, has to ensure that the courts below
\n\twork within the bounds of their authority.\n<\/p>\n
\t23. More than
\n\thalf a century ago, the Constitution Bench of this court in Nagendra
\n\tNath Bora and Another v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals,
\n\tAssam & Others AIR<\/a> 1958 SC 398 settled that power under Article
\n\t227 is limited to seeing that the courts below function within the
\n\tlimit of its authority or jurisdiction.\n<\/p>\n
\t24. This court
\n\tplaced reliance on Nagendra Nath’s case in a subsequent judgment in
\n\tNibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Ghughu AIR<\/a> 1963 SC 1895. The
\n\tcourt observed that jurisdiction conferred under Article 227 is not
\n\tby any means appellate in its nature for correcting errors in the
\n\tdecisions of subordinate courts or tribunals but is merely a power
\n\tof superintendence to be used to keep them within the bounds of
\n\ttheir authority.\n<\/p>\n
\t25. This court
\n\thad an occasion to examine this aspect of the matter in the case of
\n\tMohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim & Others<\/a> (1983) 4 SCC 566 . The
\n\tcourt observed as under:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “The
\n\tsupervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article
\n\t227 of the Constitution is limited “to seeing that an inferior
\n\tCourt or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority,”
\n\tand not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much
\n\tless an error of law. for this case there was, in our opinion, no
\n\terror of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record.
\n\tThere was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to
\n\texercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of
\n\tnatural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in
\n\tconsonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the
\n\tsupervisory power under Article 227, the High Court does not act as
\n\tan Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or reweigh the
\n\tevidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or
\n\ttribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the
\n\tdecision.”\n<\/p>\n
\t26. This court
\n\tagain clearly reiterated the legal position in Laxmikant Revchand
\n\tBhojwani & Another v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi<\/a> (1995) 6
\n\tSCC 576. The court again cautioned that the High Court under Article
\n\t227 of the Constitution cannot assume unlimited prerogative to
\n\tcorrect all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be
\n\trestricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse
\n\tof fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice
\n\twould be done unless the High Court interferes.\n<\/p>\n
\t27. A three-Judge
\n\tBench of this court in Rena Drego (Mrs.) v. Lalchand Soni &
\n\tOthers<\/a> (1998) 3 SCC 341 again abundantly made it clear that the High
\n\tCourt cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the
\n\tsubordinate court or the tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction
\n\tunder Article 227. Its function is limited to seeing that the
\n\tsubordinate court or the tribunal functions within the limits of its
\n\tauthority. It cannot correct mere errors of fact by examining the
\n\tevidence and re-appreciating it.\n<\/p>\n
\t28. In Virendra
\n\tKashinath Ravat & Another v. Vinayak N. Joshi & Others<\/a>
\n\t(1999) 1 SCC 47 this court held that the limited power under Article
\n\t227 cannot be invoked except for ensuring that the subordinate
\n\tcourts function within its limits.\n<\/p>\n
\t29. This court
\n\tover 50 years has been consistently observing that limited
\n\tjurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 cannot be exercised
\n\tby interfering with the findings of fact and set aside the judgments
\n\tof the courts below on merit.\n<\/p>\n
The
\n\tservice of workmen terminated on 5\/10\/1999 and Industrial Tribunal
\n\thas passed an award on 22\/10\/2003 from date of termination, more
\n\tthan 11 years have passed and from date of award more than 7 years
\n\thave passed.  Even though, till the date award passed by Industrial
\n\tTribunal, Baroda which is challenged in present petition has not
\n\tbeen implemented.  The Corporate body being a State Authority
\n\tcontrolled by Central Government has misused a legal machinery for
\n\tdenying legitimate right of workmen after adjudication by Industrial
\n\tTribunal, Baroda without any protest, as if that petitioner
\n\tcorporation is entitled to violate or commit breach of award without
\n\tany order of this Court.  It is made clear by this Court that from
\n\tdate on which petition is withdraw on 23\/2\/2004 till Review
\n\tapplication decided by Industrial Tribunal on 15\/2\/2010, in between
\n\tthere was no stay at all operating in favour of petitioner
\n\tCorporation.  What would be situation and condition of family of
\n\tworkmen, petitioner Corporation has not taken even care to see that
\n\tatleast award must have to be complied with after order passed by
\n\tIndustrial Tribunal in Review application. The petitioner
\n\tCorporation even not paid last drawn wages to concern employee,
\n\tthose who are out of job since 5\/10\/1999 and award of reinstatement
\n\twas in favour of them since 22\/10\/2003.  In such circumstances, no
\n\tlabour matter, which are almost sensitive relating to right to life
\n\tand livelihood of family of workman, has been ignored as matter of
\n\tright by petitioner Corporation.  The Corporation being giant
\n\tcompany not worried about even breach of award committed by
\n\tpetitioner corporation under section 29 of Industrial Dispute Act,
\n\t1947.  Such approach by petitioner Corporation being a giant
\n\tCorporation protected by Central Government earning lot of revenue
\n\tbut not protected legitimate right of such seven employees those who
\n\tare out of job since 5\/10\/1999.  While considering such kind of
\n\tfacts, constitutional goal is to be kept in mind by this Court as
\n\trecently examined and express opinion how to deal with such labour
\n\tmatter by High Court under Art. 226 and 227 of Constitution of India
\n\tin case of Harjinder Singh Vs Punjab State Warehousing Corpn.
\n\treported in 2010 (1) SCALE 613, relevant para 17 to 44
\n\tis quoted as under:\n<\/p>\n
 17.\tBefore
\n\tconcluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while
\n\texercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and\/or 227 of the
\n\tConstitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are
\n\tduty bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and
\n\tother similar legislative instruments are social welfare
\n\tlegislations  and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in
\n\tview the goals set out in the preamble of the Constitution and the
\n\tprovisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38,
\n\t39(a) to (e), 43 and 43A in particular, which mandate that the State
\n\tshould secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the
\n\tpeople, ensure equality between men and women and equitable
\n\tdistribution of material resources of the community to sub serve the
\n\tcommon good and also ensure that the workers get their dues.  More
\n\tthan 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J, opined that  the concept of
\n\tsocial and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary
\n\timport; it gives substances to the rule of law and meaning and
\n\tsignificance to the ideal of welfare State: – State of Mysore Vs.
\n\tWorkers of Gold Mines AIR 1958 SC 923.\n<\/p>\n
18.\tIn
\n\tY. A. Mamarde Vs. Authority under the Minimum Wages Act (1972) 2 SCC
\n\t108, this Court while interpreting the provisions of Minimum Wages
\n\tAct, 1948, observed:\n<\/p>\n
 The
\n\tanxiety on the part of the society for improving the general
\n\teconomic condition of some its less favoured members appears to be
\n\tin supersession of the old principle of absolute freedom of contract
\n\tand the doctrine of laissez faire and in recognition of the new
\n\tprinciple was advocated by the movement for liberal employment in
\n\tcivilized countries and the Act which is a pre constitution measure
\n\twas the offspring of that movement.  Under our present Constitution
\n\tthe State is now expressly directed to endeavor to secure to all
\n\tworkers (whether agricultural, industrial or otherwise) not only
\n\tbare physical subsistence but a living wage and conditions of work
\n\tensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure.
\n\tThis Directive Principle of State Policy being conductive to the
\n\tgeneral interest of the nation as a whole, merely lays down the
\n\tfoundation for appropriate social structure in which the labour will
\n\tfind its place of dignity, legitimately due to it in lieu of its
\n\tcontribution to the progress of national economic prosperity.\n<\/p>\n
19.\tThe
\n\tpreamble and various Articles contained in Part IV of the
\n\tConstitution promote social justice so that life of every individual
\n\tbecomes meaningful and he is able to live with human dignity.  The
\n\tconcept of social justice engrafted in the Constitution consists of
\n\tdiverse principles essentially for the orderly growth and
\n\tdevelopment of personality of every citizen.  Social justice is thus
\n\tan integral part of justice in the generic sense.  Justice is the
\n\tgenus, of which social justice is one of its species.  Social
\n\tJustice is a dynamic devise to mitigate the sufferings of the poor,
\n\tweak, dalits, tribals and deprived sections of the society and to
\n\televate them to the level of equality to live a life with dignity of
\n\tperson.  In other words, the aim of social justice is to attain
\n\tsubstantial degree of social economic and political equality, which
\n\tis the legitimate expectation of every section of the society.  In a
\n\tdeveloping society like ours which is full of unbridgeable and ever
\n\twidening gaps of inequality in status and of opportunity, law is a
\n\tcatalyst to reach the ladder of justice.  The philosophy of welfare
\n\tState and social justice is amply reflected in large number of
\n\tjudgments of this Court, various High Court, National and State
\n\tIndustrial Tribunals involving interpretation of the provisions of
\n\tthe Industrial Dispute Act, Indian Factories Act, Payment of Wages
\n\tAct, Minimum Wages Act, Payment of Bonus Act, Workmen’s Compensation
\n\tAct, the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act
\n\tand the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act enacted by different
\n\tStates.\n<\/p>\n
20.\tIn
\n\tRamon Services (P) Ltd Vs. Subhash Kapoor (2001) 1 SCC 118, R. P.
\n\tSethi, J. observed:  that after independence the concept of social
\n\tjustice has become a part of our legal system.  This concept givens
\n\tmeaning and significance to the democratic ways of life and of
\n\tmaking the life dynamic.  The concept of welfare State would remain
\n\tin oblivion unless social justice is dispensed.  Dispensation of
\n\tsocial justice and achieving the goals set forth in the Constitution
\n\tare not possible without the active, concerted and dynamic efforts
\n\tmade by the persons concerned with the justice dispensation system.
\n\tIn L. I. C. of India Vs. Consumer Education and Research Center and
\n\tOthers (1995) 5 SCC 482, K. Ramaswamy, J. observed that social
\n\tJustice is a device to ensure life to be meaningful and liveable
\n\twith human dignity.  The State is obliged to provide to workmen
\n\tfacilities to reach minimum standard of health, economic security
\n\tand civilized living.  The principle laid down by this law requires
\n\tcourts to ensure that a workman who has not been found guilty can
\n\tnot be deprived of his device then that is misconduct on the part of
\n\tthe employer can not possibly be permitted to deprive a person of
\n\twhat is due to him.\n<\/p>\n
21.\tIn
\n\t70s, 80s and early 90s, the courts repeatedly negated the doctrine
\n\tof laissez faire and the theory of hire and fire.  In his teaties:
\n\tDemocracy, Equality and Freedom, Justice Mathew wrote:\n<\/p>\n
 The
\n\t\toriginal concept of employment was that of master and servant.  It
\n\t\twas therefore held that a Court will not specifically enforce a
\n\t\tcontract of employment.  The law has adhered to the age old rule
\n\t\tthat an employer may dismiss the employee at will.  Certainly, an
\n\t\temployee can never expect to be completely free to do what he likes
\n\t\tto do.  He must face the prospect of discharge for failing or
\n\t\trefusing to do his work in accordance with his employer’s
\n\t\tdirections.  Such control by the employer over the employee is
\n\t\tfundamental to the employment relationship. But there are
\n\t\tinnumerable facets of the employee’s life that have little or no
\n\t\trelevance to the employment relationship and over which the
\n\t\temployer should not be allowed to exercise control.  It is no doubt
\n\t\tdifficult to draw a line between reasonable demands of an employer
\n\t\tand those which are unreasonable as having no relation to the
\n\t\temployment itself.  The rule that an employer can arbitrarily
\n\t\tdischarge an employee with or without regard to the actuating
\n\t\tmotive is a rule settled beyond doubt.  But the rule become settled
\n\t\tat the time when the words ‘master’ and ‘servant’ were taken more
\n\t\tliterally than they are now and when, as in early Roman Law, the
\n\t\trights of the servant, like the rights of any other member of the
\n\t\thousehold, were not his own, but those of his pater familias.  The
\n\t\tovertones of this ancient doctrine and discernible in the judicial
\n\t\topinion which rationalized the employer’s absolute right to
\n\t\tdischarge the employee.  Such a philosophy of the employer’s
\n\t\tdominion over his employee may have been in tune with the rustic
\n\t\tsimplicity of bygone days.  But the philosophy is incompatible with
\n\t\tthese days of large, impersonal, corporate employers.  The
\n\t\tconditions have not vastly changed and it is difficult to regard
\n\t\tthe contract of employment with large scale industries and
\n\t\tgovernment scale industries and government enterprises conducted by
\n\t\tbodies which are created under special statutes as mere contract of
\n\t\tpersonal service.  Where large number of people are unemployed and
\n\t\tit is extremely difficult to find employment, an employee who is
\n\t\tdischarged from service might have to remain without means of
\n\t\tsubsistence for a considerably long time and damages in the shape
\n\t\tof wages for a certain period may not be an adequate compensation
\n\t\tto the employee for non employment.  In other words, damages would
\n\t\tbe a poor substitute for reinstatement.  The traditional rule has
\n\t\tsurvived because of the sustenance it received from the law of
\n\t\tcontracts.  From the contractual principle of mutuality of
\n\t\tobligation, it was reasoned that if the employee can quit has job
\n\t\tat will, then so too must the employer have the right to terminate
\n\t\tthe relationship for any or no reason.  And there are a number of
\n\t\tcases in which even contracts for permanent employment, i.e., for
\n\t\tindefinite terms, have been held unenforceable on the ground that
\n\t\tthey lack mutuality of obligation.  But these case demonstrate that
\n\t\tmutuality is a high sounding phrase of little use as an analytical
\n\t\ttool and it would seem clear that mutuality of obligation is not an
\n\t\tinexorable requirement and that lack of mutuality is simply, as
\n\t\tmany courts have come to recognize, an imperfect way of referring
\n\t\tto the real obstacle to enforcing any kind of contractual
\n\t\tlimitation on the employer’s right of discharge, i.e. lack of
\n\t\tconsideration.  If there is anything in contract law which seems
\n\t\tlikely to advance the present inquiry, it is the growing tendency
\n\t\tto protect individuals from contracts of adhesion from overreaching
\n\t\tterms often found in standard forms of contract used by large
\n\t\tcommercial establishments.  Judicial disfavour of contracts of
\n\t\tadhesion has been said to reflect the assumed need to protect the
\n\t\tweaker contracting pari against the harshness of the common law and
\n\t\tthe abuses of freedom of contract.  The same philosophy seems to
\n\t\tprovide an appropriate answer to the argument, which still seems to
\n\t\thave some vitality, that  the servant can not complain, as he
\n\t\ttakes the employment on the terms which are offered to him.\n<\/p>\n
22.\tIn
\n\t\tGovernment Branch Press Vs. D. B. Belliappa (1979) 1 SCC 477, the
\n\t\temployer invoked the theory of hire and fire by contending that the
\n\t\trespondent’s appointment was purely temporary and his service could
\n\t\tbe terminated at any time in accordance with the terms and
\n\t\tconditions of appointment which he had voluntarily accepted.  While
\n\t\trejecting this plea as wholly misconceived, the Court observed:\n<\/p>\n
 It
\n\t\tis borrowed from the archaic common law concept that employment was
\n\t\ta matter between the master and servant only.  In the first place,
\n\t\tthis rule in its original absolute from is not applicable to
\n\t\tgovernment servants.  Secondly, even with regard to private
\n\t\temployment, much of it has passed into fossils of time.   this
\n\t\trule held the field at the time when the master and servant were
\n\t\ttaken more literally than they are now and when, as in early Roman
\n\t\tLaw, the rights of the servant, like the rights of any other member
\n\t\tof household, were not his own, but those of his pater familias.
\n\t\tThe overtones of this ancient doctrine are discernible in the Anglo
\n\t\tAmerican jurisprudence of the 18th  century and the
\n\t\tfirst half of the 20th century, which retionalised the
\n\t\temployer’s absolute right to discharge the employee.   Such a
\n\t\tphilosophy , as pointed out by K. K. Mathew, J.  (vide his
\n\t\ttreatise:  Democracy Equality and Freedom , p. 326),  of the
\n\t\temployer’s dominion over his employee may have been in tune with
\n\t\tthe rustic simplicity of bygone days.  But that philosophy is
\n\t\tincompatible with these days of large, impersonal, corporate
\n\t\temployers .    To bring it in tune with vastly changed and
\n\t\tchanging socio-economic conditions and mores of the day, much of
\n\t\tthis old, antiquated and unjust doctrine has been eroded by
\n\t\tjudicial decisions and legislation, particularly in its application
\n\t\tto persons in public employment, to whom the Constitutional
\n\t\tprotection of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 311 is available.  The
\n\t\targument is therefore overruled.\n<\/p>\n
The
\n\t\tdoctrine of laissez faire was again rejected in Glaxo Labouratories
\n\t\t(India) Ltd Vs. Presiding Officer (1984) 1 SCC 1, in the following
\n\t\twords:\n<\/p>\n
 In
\n\t\tthe days of laissez faire when industrial relation was governed by
\n\t\tthe harsh weighted law of hire and fire the management was the
\n\t\tsupreme master, the relationship being referable to contract
\n\t\tbetween unequals and the action of the management treated almost
\n\t\tsacrosanct.  The developing notions of social justice and the
\n\t\texpanding horizon of socio economic justice necessitated statutory
\n\t\tprotection to the unequal partner in the industry namely, those who
\n\t\tinvest blood and flesh against those who bring in capital.  Moving
\n\t\tfrom the days when whim of the employer was suprema lex, the Act
\n\t\ttook a modest step to compel by statute the employer to prescribe
\n\t\tminimum conditions of service subject to which employment is given.
\n\t\t The Act was enacted as its long title shows to require employers
\n\t\tin industrial establishments to define with sufficient precision
\n\t\tthe conditions of employment under them and to make the said
\n\t\tconditions known to workmen employed by them.  The movement was
\n\t\tfrom status of contract, the contract being not left to be
\n\t\tnegotiated by two unequal persons but statutory imposed.  If this
\n\t\tsocially beneficial Act was enacted for ameliorating the conditions
\n\t\tof the weaker partner, conditions of service prescribed thereunder
\n\t\tmust receive such interpretation as to advance the intendment
\n\t\tunderlying the Act and defeat the mischief.\n<\/p>\n
23.\tOf
\n\t\tlate, there has been a visible shift in the courts approach in
\n\t\tdealing with the cases involving the interpretation of social
\n\t\twelfare legislations.  The attractive mantras of globalization and
\n\t\tliberalisation are fast becoming the raison d’etre of the judicial
\n\t\tprocess and an impression has been created that the constitutional
\n\t\tcourts are no longer sympathetic towards the plight of industrial
\n\t\tand unorganized workers.  In large number of cases like the present
\n\t\tone, relief has been denied to the employees falling in the
\n\t\tcategory of workmen, who are illegally retrenched from service by
\n\t\tcreating by lanes and side lanes in the jurisprudence developed by
\n\t\tthis Court in three decades.  The stock plea raised by the public
\n\t\temployer in such cases is that the initial employment\/engagement of
\n\t\tthe workman employee was contrary to some or the other statute or
\n\t\tthat reinstatement of the workman will put unbrearable burden on
\n\t\tthe financial health of the establishment. The courts have readily
\n\t\taccepted such plea unmindful of the accountability of the wrong
\n\t\tdoer and indirectly punished the tiny beneficiary of the wrong
\n\t\tignoring the fat that he may have continued in the employment for
\n\t\tyears together and that micro wages earned by him may be the only
\n\t\tsource of his livelihood.  It need no emphasis that if a man is
\n\t\tderived of his livelihood, he is deprived of all his fundamental
\n\t\tand constitutional rights and for him the goal of social and
\n\t\teconomic justice, equality of status and of opportunity the
\n\t\tfreedoms enshrined in the Constitution remain illusory.  Therefore,
\n\t\tthe approach of the courts must be compatible with the
\n\t\tconstitutional philosophy of which the Directive Principles of
\n\t\tState Policy constitute an integral part and justice due to the
\n\t\tworkman should not be denied by entertaining the specious and
\n\t\tuntenable grounds put forward by the employer   public or
\n\t\tprivate.\n<\/p>\n
24.In
\n\t\tthe result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the High
\n\t\tCourt is set aside and the award passed by the Labour Court is
\n\t\trestored.  The appellant shall get cost of Rs. 25,000\/- from the
\n\t\tCorporation.\n<\/p>\n
Ganguly,
\n\t\tJ.- I entirely agree with the view express by me learned Brother
\n\t\tJustice G. S. Singhvi.  Having regard to the changing judicial
\n\t\tapproach noticed by his Lordship and if I, may say so, rightly, I
\n\t\tmay add a few words.  I consider it a very importance aspect in
\n\t\tdecision making by this Court.\n<\/p>\n
26.\tJudges
\n\t\tof the last Court in the largest democracy of the world have a duty
\n\t\tand the basic duty is to articulate the Constitutional goal which
\n\t\thas found such an eloquent utterance in the Preamble.  If we look
\n\t\tat our Premable, which has been recognized, a part of the
\n\t\tConstitution in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharti Sripadagalvaru and
\n\t\tothers vs. State of Kerala and<\/a> another (1973 SC 1461), we can
\n\t\tdiscern that as divide in three parts.  The first part is a
\n\t\tdeclaration whereby people of India adopted and gave to themselves
\n\t\tthe Constitution.  The second part is a resolution whereby people
\n\t\tof India solemnly resolved to constitute India into a sovereign,
\n\t\tsocialist, secular, democratic republic.  However, the most vital
\n\t\tpart is the promise and the promise is to secure to all its
\n\t\tcitizens:\n<\/p>\n
 JUSTICE,
\n\t\tsocial, economic and political;\n<\/p>\n
LIBERTY
\n\t\tof thought, expression, belief, faith and worship;\n<\/p>\n
EQUALITY
\n\t\tof status and of opportunity;\n<\/p>\n
And
\n\t\tto promote among them all<\/p>\n
FRATERNITY
\n\t\tassuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity
\n\t\tof the Nation;\n<\/p>\n
(SEE:\n<\/p>\n
\t\tJustice R. C. Lahoti, Preamble   The Spirit and backbone of the
\n\t\tConstitution of India, Anundoram Barooah law Lectures, Seventh
\n\t\tSeries, Eastern Book Company, 2004, at p. 3)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
27.\tJudges
\n\t\tand specially the judges of the highest Court have a vital role to
\n\t\tensure that the promise is fulfilled.  If the judges fail to
\n\t\tdischarge their duty in making an effort to make the Preambular
\n\t\tpromise a reality, they fail to uphold and abide by the
\n\t\tConstitution which is their oath of office.  In my humble opinion,
\n\t\tthis has to be put as high as that and should be equated with the
\n\t\tconscience of this Court.\n<\/p>\n
28.\tAs
\n\t\tearly as in 1956, in a Constitution Bench judgment dealing with an
\n\t\tArticle 32 petition, Justice Vivian Bose, while interpreting the
\n\t\tArticle 14 of the Constitution, posed the following question:\n<\/p>\n
 After
\n\t\tall, for whose benefit was the Constitution enacted?\n<\/p>\n
(Bidi
\n\t\tSupply Co. Vs. Union of India and Others   AIR 1956 SC 479 at
\n\t\tpara 23, page 487)<\/p>\n
29.\tHaving
\n\t\tposed the question, the Learned Judge answered the same in his
\n\t\tinimitable words and which I may quote:\n<\/p>\n
\t\tI am clear that
\n\t\tthe Constitution is not for the exclusive benefit of Governments
\n\t\tand States; it is not only for lawyers and politicians and
\n\t\tofficials and those highly placed.  It also exists for the common
\n\t\tman, for the poor and the humble for those who have businesses as
\n\t\tstake, for the  butcher, the baker and the candlestick maker .
\n\t\tIt lays down for this land a  rule of law  as understood in the
\n\t\tfree democracies of the world.  It constitutes India into a
\n\t\tSovereign Democratic Republic and guarantees in every page rights
\n\t\tand freedom to the individual side by side and consistent with the
\n\t\toverriding power of the State to act for the common good of all.\n<\/p>\n
30.\tThe
\n\t\tessence of our Constitution was also explained by the eminent
\n\t\tjurist Palkhivala in the following words:\n<\/p>\n
 Our
\n\t\tConstitution is primarily shaped and moulded for the common man.
\n\t\tIt takes no account of  the portly presence of the potentates,
\n\t\tgoodly in girth .  It is a Constitution not meant for the ruler
\n\t\t but the ranker, the tramp of the road, The slave with sack on
\n\t\this shoulders pricked on with the goad, The man with too weighty a
\n\t\tburden, too weary a load.  (N.A. Palkhivala, Our Constitution
\n\t\tDefenced and Defiled. Mac Millan 1974 p. 29)<\/p>\n
31.\tI
\n\t\tam in entire agreement with the aforesaid interpretation of the
\n\t\tConstitution given by this Court and also by the eminent jurist.\n<\/p>\n
32.\tIn
\n\t\tthis context another aspect is of some relevance and it was pointed
\n\t\tout by Justice Hidayatullah, as His Lordship was then, in Naresh
\n\t\tShridhar Mirajkar and Anr (AIR  1967 SC 1).  In a minority
\n\t\tjudgment, His Lordship held that the judiciary is a State within
\n\t\tthe meaning of Art. 12. (See paras 100, 101 at page 28, 29 of the
\n\t\treport).  This minority judgment, His Lordship was endorsed by
\n\t\tjustice Mathew in Kesavannanda Bharti (supra) (at page 1949, para
\n\t\t1717 of the report) and it was held that the State under Article 12
\n\t\twould include the judiciary.\n<\/p>\n
33.\tThis
\n\t\twas again reiterated by Justice Mathew in the Constitution bench
\n\t\tjudgment in the case of State of Kerala and another Vs. N. M.
\n\t\tThomas and others (AIE 1976 SC 490) where Justice Mathew’s view was
\n\t\tthe majority view, though given separately.  At para 89, page 515
\n\t\tof the report, his Lordship held that under Article 12, ‘State’
\n\t\twould include ‘Court’<\/p>\n
34.\tIn
\n\t\tview of such an authoritative pronouncement the definition of State
\n\t\tunder Article 12 encompass the judiciary and in Kesavnanda (supra)
\n\t\tit was held that  judicial process  is also  state action
\n\t\t(Para 1717, page 1949.)<\/p>\n
35.\tThat
\n\t\tbeing the legal position under Article 38 of the Constitution, a
\n\t\tduty is cast of the State, which includes the judiciary, to secure
\n\t\ta social order for the promotion of the welfare of the people.
\n\t\tArticle 38(1) runs as follows:\n<\/p>\n
 The
\n\t\t\tState shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by
\n\t\t\tsecuring and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in
\n\t\t\twhich justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all
\n\t\t\tthe institutions of the national life.\n<\/p>\n
36.\tTherefore,
\n\t\tit is clearly the duty of the judiciary to promote a social order
\n\t\tin which justice, economic and political informs all the
\n\t\tinstitution of the national life. This was also made clear in
\n\t\tKesavananda Bharati (supra) by Justice Mathew at para 1728, p. 1952
\n\t\tand His Lordship held that the Directive Principles nevertheless
\n\t\tare:\n<\/p>\n
 &fundamental in the governance of the country and all the organs of the State, including the judiciary are bound to enforce those directives. The Fundamental Rights themselves have no fixed content; most of them are mere empty vessels into which each generation must pour its content in the light of its experience.\n<\/p>\n
37.\tIn view of such clear enunciation of the legal principles, I am in clear agreement with Brother J. Singhvi that this Court has a duty to interpret statutes with social welfare benefits in such a way as to further the statutory goal and not to frustrate it. In doing so this Court should make an effort to protect the rights of the weaker sections of the society in view of the clear constitutional mandate discussed above.\n<\/p>\n
38.\tThus, social justice, the very signature tune of our Constitution and being deeply embedded in our Constitutional ethos in a way is the arch of the Constitution which ensures rights of the common man to be interpreted in a meaningful way so that life can be lived with human dignity.\n<\/p>\n
39.\tCommenting on the importance of Article 38 in the Constitutional scheme, this court in Sri Srinivasa Theatre and Others vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and others<\/a> [(1992) 2 SCC 643], held that equality before law is a dynamic concept having many facets. One facet- the most commonly acknowledged- is that there shall be not be any privileged person or class and that none shall be above the law. This Court held that Art 38 contemplates an equal society [Para 10, pg. 651].\n<\/p>\n
40.\tIn Indra Sawhney and Others  vs. Union of India and Others<\/a> [1992 Supp. (3) SCC 217], the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that:\n<\/p>\n
 The content of the expression  equality before law  is illustrated not only by Articles 15 to 18 but also by the several articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 39-A, 41 and 46.   [at Paras 643, pg. 633] <\/p>\n
41.\tTherefore, the Judges of this Court are not mere phonographic recorders but are empirical social scientists and the interpreters of the social context in which they work. That is why it was said in Authorised Officer, Thanjavur and another vs. S. Naganatha Ayyar and others – [(1979) 3 SCC 466], while interpreting the land reforms Act, that beneficial construction has to be given to welfare legislation. Justice Krishna Iyer, speaking for the Court, made it very clear that even though the judges are  constitutional invigilators and statutory interpreters  they should  also be responsive to part IV of the Constitution being  one of the trinity of the nation s appointed instrumentalities in the transformation of the socio-economic order . The Learned Judge made it very clear that when the Judges when  decode social legislation, they must be animated by a goal oriented approach  and the Learned Judge opined, and if I may say so, unerringly, that in this country  the judiciary is not a mere umpire, as some assume, but an activist catalyst in the constitutional scheme.  [Para 1, p. 468] <\/p>\n
42.\tI am in entire agreement with the aforesaid view and I share the anxiety of my Lord Brother Justice Singhvi about a disturbing contrary trend which is discernible in recent times and which is sought to be justified in the name of globalisation and liberalisation of economy.\n<\/p>\n
43.\tI am of the view that any attempt to dilute the constitutional imperatives in order to promote the so called trends of  Globalisation , may result in precarious consequences. Reports of suicidal deaths of farmers in thousands from all over the country along with escalation of terrorism throw dangerous signal. Here if we may remember Tagore who several decades ago, in a slightly different context spoke of eventualities which may visit us in our mad rush to ape western ways of life. Here if I may quote the immortal words of Tagore:
\n We have for over a century been dragged by the prosperous West behind its chariot, choked by the dust, deafened by the noise, humbled by our own helplessness and overwhelmed by the speed. We agreed to acknowledge that this chariot-drive was progress, and the progress was civilization. If we ever ventured to ask  progress toward what, and progress for whom , it was considered to be peculiarly and ridiculously oriental to entertain such ideas about the absoluteness of progress. Of late, a voice has come to us to take count not only of the scientific perfection of the chariot but of the depth of the ditches lying in its path.\n<\/p>\n
44.\tHow Stunningly relevant are these words and how deep are the ditches created in our society by the so called advanced of globalization.\n<\/p>\n
Recently,
\n\tApex Court in case of International Airport authority of India
\n\tVs. International Air Cargo Workers Union and Ors
\n\treported in 2009 (6) SCALE 169, wherein it is held that in
\n\tcase when labour contract is bogus, sham and merely paper
\n\tarrangement then remedy is available to Union\/workers under
\n\tprovision of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947.  The legal background and
\n\tquestion for decision in above referred decision has been discussed
\n\tand highlighted position as well as made it clear by Apex Court and
\n\tin light of aforesaid decision of Apex Court. The decision which has
\n\tbeen relied by learned advocate Mr. Mehta in case of State of
\n\tKarnataka Vs. Uma Devi reported in 2006 (4) SCC 1 and in case of
\n\tSteel Authority of India as referred above are not much relevant and
\n\tapplicable to facts of present case because legal position has been
\n\tnow made clear by Apex Court recently.  In recent decision of
\n\tInternational Airport Authority as referred above, relevant
\n\tobservation made by Apex Court in para 16 to 20, which are quoted as
\n\tunder:\n<\/p>\n
\t 16.\tWhen the
\n\tlearned Single Judge considered the matter, the legal position was
\n\tgoverned by the decision in Gujarat Electricity Board Vs. Hindu
\n\tMazdoor Sabha   1995 (5) SCC 27, partly modified by Air India
\n\tStatutory Corporation Vs. United Labour Union 1997 (9) SCC 377.  by
\n\tthe time the Division Bench decided the writ appeal, the decision of
\n\tthe Constitution Bench in Steel Authority of India Ltd., Vs.
\n\tNational Union Waterfront Workers   2001 (7) SCC 1 (for short
\n\t‘SHAIL’) had been rendered, but on account of the short gap between
\n\tthe two dates, the Division Bench did not notice the decision in
\n\tSAIL.\n<\/p>\n
\t17.\tIn Gujarat
\n\tElectricity Board, this Court held:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t ….the
\n\t\texclusively authority to decide whether the contract labour should
\n\t\tbe abolished or not is that of the appropriate Government under the
\n\t\tsaid provision.  It is further not disputed before that the
\n\t\tdecision of the Government is final subject, of course, to the
\n\t\tjudicial review on the usual grounds.  However, as stated earlier,
\n\t\tthe exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate Government under
\n\t\tSection 10 of the Act arises only where the Labuor contract is
\n\t\tgenuine and the question can be examined and adjudicated upon by
\n\t\tthe court or by the industrial adjudicator, as the case may be.
\n\t\tHence, in such cases, the workmen can make a grievance that there
\n\t\tis not genuine contract and that they are in fact the employees of
\n\t\tthe principal employer.\n<\/p>\n
\t\tIf the contract
\n\t\tis sham or not genuine, the workmen of the so called contractor can
\n\t\traise an industrial dispute for declaring that they were always the
\n\t\temployees of the principal employer and for claiming the
\n\t\tappropriate service conditions.  When such dispute is raised, it is
\n\t\tnot a dispute for abolition of the labour contract and hence the
\n\t\tprovisions of Section 10 of the Act will not bar either the raising
\n\t\tor the adjudication of the dispute.  When such dispute is raised,
\n\t\tthe industrial adjudicator has to decide whether the contract is
\n\t\tsham or genuine.  It is only if the adjudicator comes to the
\n\t\tconclusion that the contract is genuine, he may refer the workmen
\n\t\tto the appropriate Government for abolition of the contract labour
\n\t\tunder Section 10 of the Act and keep the dispute pending.  However,
\n\t\the can do so if the dispute is espoused by the direct workmen of
\n\t\tthe principal employer.  If the workmen of the principal employer
\n\t\thave no espoused the dispute, the adjudicator, after coming to the
\n\t\tconclusion that the contract is genuine, has to reject the
\n\t\treference, the dispute being not an industrial dispute within
\n\t\tmeaning of Section 2(k) of the I. D. Act.  He will not be competent
\n\t\tto give any relief to the workmen of the erstwhile contractor even
\n\t\tif the labour contract is abolished by the appropriate Government
\n\t\tunder section 10 of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
\t\tIn view of the
\n\t\tprovisions of section 10 of the Act, it is only the appropriate
\n\t\tgovernment which has the authority to abolish genuine labour
\n\t\tcontract in accordance with the provisions of the said section.  No
\n\t\tcourt including industrial adjudicator has jurisdiction to do so.\n<\/p>\n
\t18.\tGujarat
\n\tElectricity Board was partly overruled in Air India in regard to the
\n\tquestion whether on abolition of contract labour system, the
\n\tcontract labour have to be automatically absorbed by the principal
\n\temployer, this Court held as follows in Air India:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t The moment
\n\t\tthe contract labour system stands prohibited under section 10(1),
\n\t\tthe embargo to continue as a contract labour is put an end direct
\n\t\trelationship has been provided between the workmen and the
\n\t\tprincipal employer.  Thereby, the principal employer directly
\n\t\tbecomes reasonable for taking the services of the workmen hitherto
\n\t\tregulated through the contractor.  The linkage between the
\n\t\tcontractor and the employee stood snapped and direct relationship
\n\t\tstood restored between the principal employer and the contract
\n\t\tlabuor as its employees.  Considering from this perspective, all
\n\t\tthe workmen in the respective services working on contract labour
\n\t\tare required to be absorbed in the establishment of the employer.\n<\/p>\n
\t19.\tA course
\n\tcorrection, if we may use that expression, was applied by the
\n\tConstitution Bench, in SAIL.  This Court made it clear that neither
\n\tsection 10 nor any other provision in CLRA Act provides for
\n\tautomatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a notification by
\n\tthe appropriate government under section 10(1) of the CLRA Act and
\n\tconsequently the principal employer can not be required to absorb
\n\tthe contract labour working in the establishment.  This Court
\n\tfurther held that on a prohibition notification being issued under
\n\tsection 10(1) of the CLRA Act, prohibiting employment of contract
\n\tlabuor in any process, operation or other work, if an industrial
\n\tdispute is raised by any contract labour in regard to conditions of
\n\tservice, the industrial adjudicator has been interposed either on
\n\tthe ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the
\n\testablishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the
\n\testablishment under a genuine contract, or as a mere
\n\trule\/camouflager to evade compliance with various beneficial
\n\tlegislations so as to deprive the workers of statutory benefits.  If
\n\tthe contract is found to be sham or nominal and merely a camouflage,
\n\tthen the so called contract labour will have to be treated as direct
\n\temployees of the principle employer and the industrial adjudicator
\n\tshould direct the principal employer to regularize their services in
\n\tthe establishment subject to such conditions as it may specify for
\n\tthat purpose.  On the other hand if the contract is found to be
\n\tgenuine and at the same time there is a prohibition notification
\n\tunder section 10(1) of CLRA Act, in respect of the establishment,
\n\tthe principal employer intending to employ regular workmen for the
\n\tprocess, operation or other work of the establishment in regard to
\n\twhich the prohibition notification has been issued, it shall give
\n\tpreference to the erstwhile contract labour if otherwise found
\n\tsuitable, if necessary by giving relaxation of age.  As noticed
\n\tabove, SAIL did not specifically deal with the legal position as to
\n\twhen a dispute is brought before the Industrial Adjudicator as to
\n\twhether the contract labour agreement is sham, nominal and merely a
\n\tcamouflage, when there is no prohibition notification under section
\n\t10(1) of CLRA Act.\n<\/p>\n
\t20.\tBut where
\n\tthere is no abolition of contract labour under section 10 of CLRA
\n\tAct, but the contract labour contend that the contract between
\n\tprincipal employer and contractor is sham and nominal, the remedy is
\n\tpurely under the ID Act, the principles in Gujarat Electricity Board
\n\tcontinue to govern the issue.  The remedy of the workmen is to
\n\tapproach the industrial adjudicator for an adjudication of their
\n\tdispute that they are the direct employees of the principle employer
\n\tand the agreement is sham, nominal and merely a camouglage, even
\n\twhen there is no order under section 10(1) of CLRA Act.  The
\n\tIndustrial adjudicator can grant the relief sough if it finds that
\n\tcontract between principal employer and the contractor is sham,
\n\tnominal and merely a camouflage to deny employment benefits to the
\n\temployer and that there is in fact a direct employment, by applying
\n\ttests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to remove\/dismiss
\n\tfrom service to initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the
\n\temployee the way in which the work should be done, in short who has
\n\tdirection and control over the employee.  But where there is no
\n\tnotification under section 10 of the CLRA Act and where it is not
\n\tproved in the industrial adjudication that the contract was
\n\tsham\/nominal and camouflage, then the question of directing the
\n\tprincipal employer to absorb or regularize the services of the
\n\tcontract labour does not arise.  The tests that are applied to find
\n\tout whether a person is an employee or an independent contract may
\n\tnot automatically apply in finding out whether the contract labour
\n\tagreement is a sham, nominal and is a mere camouflage.  For example,
\n\tif the contract is for supply of labour, necessarily, the labour
\n\tsupplied by the contractor will work under the directions,
\n\tsupervision and control of the principal employer but that would not
\n\tmake the worker a direct employee of the principal employer, if the
\n\tsalary is paid by contractor, if the right to regulate employment is
\n\twith the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies
\n\twith the contractor.  The principal employer only controls and
\n\tdirects the work to be done by a contract labour, when such labuor
\n\tis assigned\/alloted\/sent to him.  But it is the contractor as
\n\temployer who chooses whether the worker is to be assigned\/alloted to
\n\tthe principal employer or used otherwise.  In short, worker being
\n\tthe employee of the contractor, the ultimate supervision and control
\n\tlies with the contractor as he decides where the employee will work
\n\tand how long he will work and subject to what conditions.  Only when
\n\tthe contractor assigns\/sends the worker to work under the principal
\n\temployer, the worker works under the supervision and control of the
\n\tprincipal employer but that is secondary control.  The primary
\n\tcontrol is with the contractor.\n<\/p>\n
In
\n\tview of observations made by Apex Court as referred above, according
\n\tto my opinion, there is no substance at all in present petition.
\n\tThe Industrial Tribunal, Baroda has not committed any error and no
\n\tsuch error are pointed by learned advocate  Mr. Mehta on behalf of
\n\tpetitioner which required interference and which exercised power
\n\tunder Art. 227 of Constitution of India.  Accordingly, present
\n\tpetition is dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
Let
\n\tpetitioner Corporation may consider  observation which is already
\n\tmade by this Court in body of present order.  It is necessary to
\n\tissue certain direction for doing substantial justice to respondent
\n\tworkmen.  The service of workmen were terminated on 5\/10\/1999 and an
\n\tindustrial dispute was raised by Union which referred for
\n\tadjudication on 20\/3\/2002 being ITC no. 17\/2002. The award passed by
\n\tIndustrial Tribunal, Baroda on 22\/10\/2003 granted reinstatement with
\n\tfull back wages as direct employees of petitioner and also directed
\n\tto pay all benefits as permanent employee of petitioner.  They
\n\tshould have to consider permanent from date on which they were join
\n\tin service.  Thereafter, petition was filed by petitioner being SCA
\n\tno. 2193\/2004 and order was passed by this Court on 23\/2\/2002. The
\n\treview application was preferred by petitioner in the year 2009
\n\tbeing no. 2\/2009 exh 9 decided on 15\/2\/2010.  this award is not
\n\timplemented so far by petitioner as admitted by learned advocate Mr.
\n\tMehta before this Court.  Even after such long gap of more than 10
\n\tyears from date of termination  and seven years from date of award,
\n\tworkmen are not able to get fruit of such award.  Therefore, it is
\n\tdirected to petitioner to implement and to execute award passed by
\n\tIndustrial Tribunal, Baroda in reference no. 17\/2002 dated
\n\t22\/10\/2003 within a period of  two months from date of receiving
\n\tcopy of present order.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t(H.K.RATHOD,
\nJ)<\/p>\n
asma<\/p>\n
\t\t   \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n
\t\t   Top<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Gujarat High Court Oil vs Parmar on 5 May, 2010 Author: H.K.Rathod,&Nbsp; Gujarat High Court Case Information System Print SCA\/5658\/2010 27\/ 57 JUDGMENT IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION No. 5658 of 2010 For Approval and Signature: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE H.K.RATHOD ========================================================= 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[16,8],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-70625","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-gujarat-high-court","category-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nOil vs Parmar on 5 May, 2010 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Oil vs Parmar on 5 May, 2010 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2010-05-04T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2018-07-28T16:48:30+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"67 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Oil vs Parmar on 5 May, 2010\",\"datePublished\":\"2010-05-04T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-07-28T16:48:30+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010\"},\"wordCount\":13340,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Gujarat High Court\",\"High Court\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010\",\"name\":\"Oil vs Parmar on 5 May, 2010 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2010-05-04T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-07-28T16:48:30+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Oil vs Parmar on 5 May, 2010\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Oil vs Parmar on 5 May, 2010 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Oil vs Parmar on 5 May, 2010 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"2010-05-04T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2018-07-28T16:48:30+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"67 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Oil vs Parmar on 5 May, 2010","datePublished":"2010-05-04T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-07-28T16:48:30+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010"},"wordCount":13340,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Gujarat High Court","High Court"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010","name":"Oil vs Parmar on 5 May, 2010 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"2010-05-04T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-07-28T16:48:30+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/oil-vs-parmar-on-5-may-2010#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Oil vs Parmar on 5 May, 2010"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70625","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70625"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70625\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70625"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70625"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70625"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}