{"id":758,"date":"1963-04-01T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1963-03-31T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963"},"modified":"2018-05-18T06:22:03","modified_gmt":"2018-05-18T00:52:03","slug":"university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963","title":{"rendered":"University Of Delhi & Anr vs Ram Nath on 1 April, 1963"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
University Of Delhi & Anr vs Ram Nath on 1 April, 1963<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1963 AIR 1873, \t\t 1964 SCR (2) 703<\/div>\n
Author: P Gajendragadkar<\/div>\n
Bench: Gajendragadkar, P.B.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nUNIVERSITY OF DELHI & ANR.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nRAM NATH\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n01\/04\/1963\n\nBENCH:\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\nBENCH:\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\nWANCHOO, K.N.\nGUPTA, K.C. DAS\n\nCITATION:\n 1963 AIR 1873\t\t  1964 SCR  (2) 703\n CITATOR INFO :\n E\t    1968 SC 554\t (16,21)\n E\t    1970 SC1407\t (1)\n R\t    1972 SC 763\t (12)\n F\t    1976 SC 145\t (9)\n O\t    1978 SC 548\t (79,112,117,124,159,161)\n RF\t    1988 SC1182\t (6)\n R\t    1988 SC1700\t (5)\n\n\nACT:\n  Industrial  Dispute-Bus drivers in employ  of\t university-\nWhether\t \"workers\"-Education  institution, if  an  industry'\n-Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), ss. 2  (g),  2\n(j) 2 (s), 33c (2).\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n  Appellant No. 1, the University of Delhi and Appellant No.\n2 Miranda House, a college affiliated to the University, are\ninstitutions  for education, the predominant  activities  of\nthese  being  the imparting of education.  At  the  material\ntime  respondent  No.  1 was employed as  bus  driver  under\nappellant  No. 2. Both the respondents were discharged\tfrom\nservice\t by  giving separate notices and on payment  of\t one\nmonth's\t salary each in lieu of notice.\t The respondents  by\nseparate  petitions applied before the\tindustrial  Tribunal\nfor  the  award of retrenchment\t benefits.   The  appellants\nresisted  the petitions on the preliminary ground that\tthey\ndid  not  constitute  an \"industry\" under S. 2\t(j)  of\t the\nIndustrial  Disputes  Act,  1947, and  that  they  were\t not\n\"employees\" under s. 2 (g) of the said Act and therefore the\napplication  made by the respondents under S. 33 (c) (2)  of\nthe  Act  were\tincompetent.   The  Tribunal  rejected\tthis\ncontention and after considering the merits passed an  order\nin favour of the respondents directing the appellants to pay\nRs.  1050\/-  to\t each one  of  respondents  as\tretrenchment\ncompensation.\nThe  appellants appealed to this Court with  special  leave.\nThey contended in the appeal that the Tribunal was in  error\nin  giving the definition of the word \"industry\" under s.  2\n(j)  its  widest  denotation by adopting  a  mechanical\t and\nliteral\t rule  of  construction and it was  urged  that\t the\npolicy\t of  the  Act  clearly\tis  to\t leave\t educational\nInstitutions   out   of\t the  purview  of  the\t Act.\t The\nrespondents' contention was that s. 2 ( j ) had defined\t the\nword \"industry\" in words of widest amplitude and there is no\njustification  for putting any artificial restraint  on\t the\nmeaning of the said word as defined.\n704\nHeld  that  having  regard  to the fact\t that  the  work  of\neducation is primarily and exclusively\tcarried on with\t the\nassistance  of the labour and co-operation of teachers,\t the\nnon-inclusion  of  the\twhole class  of\t teachers  from\t the\ndefinition  prescribed by 3. 2 (s) has an important  bearing\nand   significance   in\t relation  to  the   problem   under\nconsideration.\tIt could not have been the policy of the Act\nthat education should be treated as industry for the benefit\nof a very minor and insignificant number of persons who\t may\nbe  employed  by educational institutions to  carry  on\t the\nduties\tof the subordinate staff.  Reading s. 2(g), (j)\t and\n(s)  together  it  is reasonable to hold that  the  work  of\neducation carried on by an educational institution like\t the\nUniversity of Delhi is not an industry within the meaning of\nthe Act.\nIn  the main scheme of imparting education, the\t subordinate\nstaff with function like those of the respondents play\tsuch\na minor, subsidiary and insignificant part that it would not\nbe reasonable to allow the work of this subordinate staff to\nlend its industrial colour to the principal activity of\t the\nUniversity  which is imparting education.  From\t a  rational\npoint  of  view\t it would be regarded  as  inappropriate  to\ndescribe  education even as a profession.  Education in\t its\ntrue aspect is more of a mission and a vocation rather\tthan\na  profession or trade or business, however wide may be\t the\ndenotation of the two latter words under the Act.\nThe appellants cannot be regarded as carrying on an industry\nunder  s.  2  (\t j ) and so the\t -application  made  by\t the\nrespondents  against  them under s. 33c (2) of the  Act\t are\nheld to be incompetent.\nState of Bombay v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha<\/a> [1960) 2 S. C.\nR.  866, Lalit Hari Ayurvedic College Pharmacy Pilibhit.  v.\nLalit\tHari  Ayurvedic\t College  Pharmacy  Workers   Union,\nPilibhit,  A. I. R.<\/a> 1960 S. C. 1261, The  Ahmedabad  Textile\nIndustry  a  Research Association v. The  State\t of  Bombay,\n[1961] 2 S. C. R . 481, The Federated State School Teachers'\nAssociation of Australia v. State of Victoria' [1929] 41 _C.\nL. R. 569 and The Corporation of the, City of Nagpur v.\t Its\nEmployees,<\/a> [1960] 2 S. C. R. 942, Case-law reviewed.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
  CIVIL APPFLLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 650\t and
\n651 of 1962.\n<\/p>\n
Appeals by special leave from the order dated
\nSeptember 22, 1961 of the Labour Court, Delhi, in
\nL C. A No. 479 of 1961.\n<\/p>\n
 705<\/span><\/p>\n
M.C.  Setalpad,\t K. K. Raizada.\t B. K. Jain  -and  A.  G.
\nRatnaparkhi, for the appellants.\n<\/p>\n
\t   Janardan Sharma, for the respondents.\n<\/p>\n
S.   P. Verma, for Intervener No. 1.\n<\/p>\n
T.   R. Bhasin, S. C. Malik Sushma Malik
\nand Bhejalal Malik, for intervener No. 2.\n<\/p>\n
1963.  April 1. The judgment of the Court was delivered by
\nGAJENDRAGADKAR\tJ.-These two appeals by special leave  arise
\nout  of two petitions filed against the University of  Delhi
\nand Principal, Miranda House, University College for  Women,
\nappellants  1 and 2, by two of their employees Ram Nath\t and
\nAsgar  Masih, respondents 1 & 2 respectively, under  section
\n33C  (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14  of  1947)
\n(hereinafter  called ‘the -Act’).  Appellant No. 2 which  is
\nthe University College for women is run by appellant No.  1,
\nand  so, in substance, the claim made by the  two  employees
\nwas mainly against appellant No. 1. Ram Nath’s case was that
\nhe  had\t been  employed\t as driver by  appellant  No.  2  in
\nOctober,  1949 and was served with a notice on May 1,  1961,
\nthat since his services were no longer required, he would be
\ndischarged  from  his employment on payment of\tone  month’s
\nsalary\tin lieu of notice.  Asgar Masih\t made  substantially
\nsimilar\t allegations.\tHe bad been employed  in  the  first
\ninstance,  by  appellant  No.  1  as  driver  but  was\tthen
\ntransferred  to\t appellant No. 2 on October  1,\t 1949.\t His
\nservices were similarly terminated by notice on May 1,\t1961
\non  payment  of\t one month’s salary in advance\tin  lieu  of
\nnotice.\t It is common ground that appellant No. 1 found that
\nrunning\t the buses for the convenience of the girl  students
\nattending  the\tcollege run by appellant No. 2\tresulted  in
\nloss, and so, it was
\n706<\/span>
\ndecided\t to  discontinue  that\tamenity.   Inevitably,\t the
\nservices  of the two drivers had to be retrenched,  and\t so,
\nthere  is  no dispute that the retrenchment is\tgenuine\t and
\nthere is no element of mala fides or unfair labour  practice
\ninvolved  in  it.   It is also common  ground  that  if\t the
\nemployees are workmen within the meaning of the Act, and the
\nwork  carried on by the appellants is an industry  under  s.
\n2(j),\tsection\t  25F  has  not\t been  complied\t  with\t and
\nretrenchment  amount payable under it has not been  paid  to
\nthe respondents.  The petitions made by the respondents were
\nresisted  by appellant No. 1 on the preliminary ground\tthat
\nappellant No. 1 was not an employer under s. 2(g), that\t the
\nwork carried on by it was not an industry under s. 2(j), and
\nso,   the  applications\t made  under  section  33C(2)\twere
\nincompetent.   The  Tribunal has rejected  this\t preliminary
\nobjection  and having considered the merits, has  passed  an
\norder in favour of the respondents directing the  appellants
\nto  pay\t Rs.  10,50\/-  to each one  of\tthe  respondents  as
\nretrenchment compensation.  It is the validity of this award
\nthat is challenged before us by the appellants, and the only
\nground\ton  which  the challenge is made is  that  the\twork
\ncarried\t on  by appellant No. 1 is, not\t an  industry  under
\ns.2(j).\n<\/p>\n
Though\tthe question thus raised by these two  appeals\tlies
\nwithin\ta narrow compass, its importance is very great.\t  If
\nit is held that the work of imparting education conducted by
\neducational institutions like the University of Delhi is  an
\nindustry under s. 2(j), all the educational institutions  in
\nthe country may be brought within the purview of the Act and
\ndisputes  arising between them and their employees would  be
\nindustrial  disputes which can be referred for\tadjudication
\nunder  section 10 (1) of the Act and in\t appropriate  cases,
\napplications  can be made by the employees under s.  33C(2).
\nThe  appellants\t contend that the Tribunal was in  error  in
\ngiving the definition of the word ‘industry’ under s. 2\t (j)
\nits widest
\n 707<\/span>
\ndenotation  by\tadopting a mechanical and  literal  rule  of
\nconstruction  and  it is urged that.the policy\tof  the\t Act
\nclearly is to leave education and educational.\tinstitutions
\nout of the purview of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
On the other hand, the respondents contend that s.     2(j)
\nhas defined the word ‘industry’ deliberately in\t  words\t  of
\nwidest\tamplitude and there is no justification for  putting
\nany artificial restrain on the meaning of the I said word as
\ndefined.  In support of this argument, reliance is placed or
\nthe  decision  of this court in the State of Bombay  v.\t The
\nHospital  Mazdoor  Sabha<\/a>  (1).\tIn  that  case,\t this  Court
\nobserved that “as a working principle, it may be stated that
\nan activity systematically or habitually undertaken for\t the
\nproduction or distribution of goods or for the rendering  of
\nmaterial  services  to the community at large or a  part  of
\nsuch community with the help of employees is an undertaking.
\nSuch an activity generally involves the co-operation of\t the
\nemployer-   and\t the  employees;  and  its  object  is\t the
\nsatisfaction of material human needs.  It must be  organised
\nor  arranged  in  a manner in which  trade  or\tbusiness  is
\ngenerally organised or arranged.  It must not be causal\t nor
\nmust it be for oneself, nor for pleasures.” The argument  is
\nthat the concept of ‘service’ which is expressly included in
\nthe  definition\t of  ‘industry’ need  not  -be\tconfined  to
\nmaterial service and ought to be held to include even educa-
\ntional\tor cultural service, and in that  sense\t educational
\nwork  carried  on by the University of Delhi held to  be  an
\nindustry.\n<\/p>\n
Having\tregard\tto  the fact that the  word  -,industry’  as
\ndefined\t in  the Act takes within its sweep any\t calling  or
\nservice\t or  employment, it cannot be denied that  there  is
\nprima  facie  some  force  in  the  argument  urged  by\t the
\nrespondents,  but in testing the validity of this  argument,
\nit will immediately become necessary to enquire whether\t the
\nwork
\n(1)[1960] 2 S. C. R. 866, 879.\n<\/p>\n
708<\/span><\/p>\n
carried\t on by an educational institution can be said to  be
\nwork  carried on by it with the assistance of labour or\t co-
\noperation  of  teachers.  The main function  of\t educational
\ninstitutions is to impart education to students and if it is
\nheld that the impartings education’ is industry in reference
\nto  which  the educational institution is the  employer,  it
\nmust  follow  that  the teachers  who  co-operate  with\t the
\ninstitution  and  assist it with their labour  in  imparting
\neducation  are\tthe employees of the  institution,  and\t so,
\nnormally,  one\twould  expect that  the\t teachers  would  be
\nemployees who would be entitled to the benefits of the\tAct.
\nThe  co-operation of the employer and the employees, or,  in
\nother words, the co-operation between capital and labour  to
\nwhich  reference is always made by  industrial\tadjudication
\nmust,  on the respondents’ contention, find its parallel  in
\nthe co-operation between the educational institution and its
\nteachers.   It would, DO doubt, sound somewhat strange\tthat
\neducation  should be described as industry and the  teachers
\nas workmen within the meaning of the Act, but if the literal
\nconstruction for which the respondents contend is  accepted,
\nthat consequence must follow.  If the scheme of the Act\t and
\nthe  other relevant considerations necessarily lead  to\t the
\nsaid  consequence,  the\t Court\twill  have  to\taccept\t the
\nrespondents’  contention  notwithstanding the fact  that  it
\ndoes  not  fit in with the generally accepted sense  of\t the
\nword industry’.\n<\/p>\n
Does the concept of co-operation between teachers and  their
\ninstitution  being  treated as similar\tto  the\t co-opration
\nbetween labour and capital fit in with the scheme of the Act
\n?  That\t is  inevitably\t the next  question  which  we\tmust
\nconsider and in doing so, three definitions will have to  be
\nborne  in mind.\t Section 2 (g) (i) defines an ’employer’  as
\nmeaning in relation to\tan industry carried on by or – under
\nthe authority of any department of the\tCentral
\n 709<\/span>
\nGovernment  or a State Government, the authority  prescribed
\nin  this  behalf, or where no authority is  prescribed,\t the
\nhead  of  the department; and S. 2(g)(ii) provides  that  an
\nemployer  means in relation to an industry carried on by  or
\non behalf of a local authority,, the chief executive officer
\nof that authority.  If the work of imparting education is an
\nindustry.,  the University of Delhi may have to be  regarded
\nas an employer within the meaning of s. 2 (g). Section\t2\n<\/p>\n
(j) defines an ‘industry’ as meaning\tany business, trade,
\nundertaking, manufacture or   calling\tof   employers\t and
\nincludes ‘any calling,service, employment, handicraft, or
\nindustrial  occupation or avocation ‘of workmen.  It is\t un-
\nnecessary to comment on this definition, because the precise
\nscope  of this definition is the very subject matter of\t the
\ndispute\t which we are, considering.  ‘That takes us  to\t the
\ndefinition  of “workman” prescribed by s. 2 (s).  A  workman
\nunder  the said definition means., inter alia,\tany  person,
\nincluding an apprentice, employed in any industry to do\t any
\nskilled\t or  unskilled manual,\tsupervisory,,  technical  or
\nclerical work for hire or reward.  It is common ground that’
\nteachers  employed by educational institutions, whether\t the
\nsaid   institutions  are  imparting   primary.,\t  secondary,
\ncollegiate or postgraduate education, are not workmen  under
\ns.   2(s),  and\t so,  it  follows that\tthe  whole  body  of
\nemployees with whose co-operation the work of\t  imparting
\neducation  is carried on by educational institutions do\t not
\nfall within the purview of s. 2(s), and any disputes between
\nthem  and the -institutions which employed them are  outside
\nthe  scope  of\tthe  Act.   In\tother  words,  if  imparting
\neducation  is  an industry under s. 2(j), the  bulk  of\t the
\nemployees  being  outside the purview of the Act,  the\tonly
\ndisputes  which\t can fall within the scope of  the  Act\t are
\nthose  which  arise  between  such  institutions  and  their
\nsubordinate  staff, the members of which may fall  under  s.
\n2(s).  In our
\n710<\/span>
\nopinion,  having  regard  to  the  fact\t that  the  work  of
\neducation  is primarily and exclusively carried on with\t the
\nassistance of the labour and co-operation of’ teachers,\t the
\nomission of the whole class of teachers from the  definition
\nprescribed   by\t s.  2(s)  has\tan  important  bearing\t and
\nsignificance  in  relation  to\tthe  problem  which  we\t are
\nconsidering.   It could not have been the policy of the\t Act
\nthat education should be treated as industry for the benefit
\nof a very minor and insignificant number of persons who\t may
\nbe  employed  by educational institutions to  carry  on\t the
\nduties of the subordinate staff.  Reading ss. 2(g), (j)\t and\n<\/p>\n
(s)  together,\twe  are inclined to hold that  the  work  of
\neducation  carried on by educational institutions  like\t the
\nUniversity of Delhi is not an industry within the meaning of
\nthe Act.\n<\/p>\n
Having\treached\t this conclusion, it may  be  legitimate  to
\nobserve\t that it is not surprising that the Act should\thave
\nexcluded  education from its scope, because the\t distinctive
\npurpose and object of education would make it very difficult
\nto  assimilate it to the position of any trade, business  or
\ncalling or service within the meaning of s. 2(j).  Education
\nseeks to build up the personality of the pupil by  assisting
\nhis physical, intellectual, moral and emotional development.
\nTo  speak of this educational process in terms\tof  industry
\nsounds\tso completely incongruous that one is not  surprised
\nthat  the Act has deliberately so defined workman  under  s.
\n2(s) as to exclude teachers from its scope.  Under the sense
\nof  values  recognised\tboth by\t the  traditional  and\tcon-
\nservative  as  well  as the modern  and\t progressive  social
\noutlook,  teaching  and teachers are, no doubt,\t assigned  a
\nhigh  place  of\t honour and it is  obviously  necessary\t and
\ndesirable  that\t teaching and teachers\tshould\treceive\t the
\nrespect that is due to them. -A proper sense of values would
\nnaturally hold teaching and teachers in high esteem,  though
\npower or wealth may not be associated with them.  It  cannot
\nbe denied
\n 711<\/span>
\nthat the concept of social justice is wide enough to include
\nteaching  and  teachers, and the requirement  that  teachers
\nshould\treceive proper emoluments and other amenities  which
\nis  essentially based on social justice cannot be  disputed;
\nbut  the effect of excluding teachers from s. 2(s)  is\tonly
\nthis  that the remedy available for the betterment of  their
\nfinancial prospects does not fall under the Act.  It is well
\nknown that Education Departments of the State Governments as
\nwell  as  the Union Government, and  the  UniversitY  Grants
\nCommission  carefully consider this problem .and assist\t the
\nteachers  by requiring the payment to them of proper  scales
\nof pay and by insisting on the fixation of other  reasonable
\nterms  and  conditions\tof service  in\tregard\tto  teachers
\nengaged\t in primary and secondary education  and  collegiate
\neducation  which fall under their respective  jurisdictions.
\nThe  position  nevertheless  is\t clear\tthat  any   problems
\nconnected  with teachers and their salaries are outside\t the
\npurview\t of  the Act, and since the teachers from  the\tsole
\nclass  of  employees with whose\t co-operation  education  is
\nimparted  by educational institutions, their exclusion\tfrom
\nthe   purview  of  the\tAct  necessarily  corroborates\t the
\nconclusion that education itself is not without its scope.
\nIn  this  connection, it would be material  to\texamine\t the
\ncomposition of the University of Delhi.\t This University has
\nbeen   established  and\t incorporated  as  a  teaching\t and
\naffiliating University under the Delhi University Act,\t1922
\n(No.  8\t of  1922).  The  Organization\tof  this  University
\nconsists  of  the Officers of the University,  such  as\t the
\nChancellor,  the  ProChancellor,  the  Vice-Chancellor,\t the
\nTreasurer, the Registrar, the Deans of Faculties and others,
\nand  its  authorities,\tsuch as\t the  Court,  the  executive
\nCouncil,  the Academic Council, the Finance  Committee,\t the
\nFaculties  and\tothers\tvide  sections\t8  and\t17.    These
\nauthorities  are composed of the teachers in the  University
\nwho are classified as Professors, Readers
\n712<\/span>
\nand Lecturers and other persons interested in education.  In
\nother  words., it is the officers of the University and\t its
\nrespective  authorities that constitute the Organization  of
\nthe  University\t of  Delhi.   It is  well  known  that\tthis
\nOrganization  does  not\t contribute  capital  of  itself  in
\ncarrying  out  its work of imparting higher  education.\t  It
\nreceives  grants  from\tthe  Central  Government,  from\t the
\nUniversity Grants Commission and from charitable donors\t and
\ncharitable institutions.  It also receives some income from
\ntuition fees. But then it seems very difficult to postulate
\nthatin the work of imparting education, the Universityof
\nDelhi contributes any capital as such.\tThis workis carried
\non  by\tthe  University with the  co-operation\tof  all\t its
\nteachers and it would sound inappropriate to hold that\tthis
\nwork is in the nature of a trade or business, or it  amounts
\nto rendering of service which can be treated as an  industry
\nunder  the Act.\t What we have said about the  University  of
\nDelhi,\t would\tbe  equally  true  about   all\t educational
\ninstitutions which are founded primarily for the purpose  of
\nimparting education.\n<\/p>\n
It  is\ttrue  that like\t all  educational  institutions\t the
\nUniversity  of\tDelhi  employs subordinate  staff  and\tthis
\nsubordinate  staff does the work assigned to it; but in\t the
\nmain  scheme of imparting education, this subordinate  staff
\nplays  such a minor, subsidiary and insignificant part\tthat
\nit  would  be unreasonable to allow this work  to  lend\t its
\nindustrial   colour  to\t the  principal\t activity   of\t the
\nUniversity  which  is  imparting  education.   The  work  of
\npromoting education is carried on by the University and\t its
\nteachers  and if the teachers are excluded from the  purview
\nof  the Act, it would be unreasonable to regard the work  of
\nimparting  education  as industry only\tbecause\t its  minor,
\nsubsidiary  and incidental work may seem to partake  of\t the
\ncharacter of service which may fall under s . 2(j).\n<\/p>\n
 713<\/span><\/p>\n
It is well known that the University of Delhi and most other
\neducational  institutions  are not formed or  conducted\t for
\nmaking profit; no doubt, the absence of profit motive  would
\nnot take the work of any institution outside s. 2 (j) if the
\nrequirements of the said definition are otherwise satisfied.
\nWe  have  referred to the absence of profit motive  only  to
\nemphasis   the\tfact  that  the\t work  undertaken  by\tsuch
\neducational institutions differs from the normal concept  of
\ntrade. or business.  Indeed, from a rational point of  view,
\nit would be regarded as inappropriate to describe  education
\neven as a profession.  Education in its true aspect is\tmore
\na  mission and a vocation rather than a profession or  trade
\nor  business, however wide may be the denotation of the\t two
\nlatter\twords under the Act.  That is why we think it  would
\nbe  unreasonable to hold that educational  institutions\t are
\nemployers  within the meaning of s. 2 (g), or that the\twork
\nof teaching carried on by them is an industry under s. 2(j),
\nbecause,  essentially,\tthe  creation  of  a  well-educated,
\nhealthy young generation imbued with a rational\t progressive
\noutlook\t on life which is the sole aim of education,  cannot
\nat all be compared or assimilated with what may be described
\nas an industrial process.  Therefore, we are satisfied\tthat
\nthe  University of Delhi and the Miranda College  for  Women
\nrun  by\t it cannot be regarded as carrying  on\tan  industry
\nunder  s.  2(j),  and  so,  the\t applications  made  by\t the
\nrespondents against them under s. 33 C(2) of the Act must be
\nheld to be incompetent.\n<\/p>\n
It  still  remains to consider some of the  decisions  which
\nhave been cited at the Bar before us in these appeals.\t The
\nfirst  decision to which reference must be made is the\tcase
\nof the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (1).  In that case, this Court
\nconsidered  somewhat  elaborately the  implications  of\t the
\ndefinition  prescribed\tby s. 2 (j), but  it  was  expressly
\nstated that the Court was not then expressing any opinion
\n(1)  L1960] 2 S. C. R. 866, 879.\n<\/p>\n
714<\/span><\/p>\n
on  the\t question  as  to  whether  running  an\t educational
\ninstitution  would be an industry under the Act.  A  similar
\nstatement  was\tmade  in the case of  Lalit  Hari  Ayurvedic
\nCollege\t Pharmacy Pilibhit v. Lalit Hari  Ayurvedic  College
\nPharmacy  Workers Union, Pilibhit<\/a> (,).\tHaving held that  on
\nthe  broad  facts proved in -that case, there was  no  doubt
\nthat the activity of the appellant was an undertaking  under
\ns.  2(j), the Court proceeded to add that it was not  called
\nupon  to decide whether running an  educational\t institution
\nwould be an industry under the Act.\n<\/p>\n
In the Ahmedabad Textile Industry’s Research Association  v.
\nThe State of Bombay (2), while discussing the question as to
\nthe  character\tof  the\t work  undertaken  by  the  Research
\nAssociation,  this  Court took the precaution  of  observing
\nthat the activities of the Association had little in  common
\nwith  the  activities  of  what\t may  be  called  a   purely
\neducational  institution.  It would thus be noticed that  in
\nholding\t that  the Research Association was carrying  on  an
\nindustry,  this Court emphasized the fact that its work\t was
\ndistinct. and separate from the work of an institution which
\ncarries on purely educational activities.  The question thus
\nleft  open  has been raised by the present appeals  for\t our
\ndecision.\n<\/p>\n
It  is,\t however,  argued by the  respondents  that  in\t the
\nHospital  Mazdoor Sabha case (3), this Court in\t terms,\t has
\napproved  of  the  minority judgment of\t Isaacs\t j.  in\t The
\nFederated State School Teachers’ Association of Australia v.
\nThe State of Victoria (4), and since Isaacs J. held that the
\ndispute\t raised by the teachers in that case amounted to  an
\nindustrial  dispute,  it  would follow that  this  Court  by
\nimplication,   has  expressed  its  concurrence\t  with\t the
\nconclusion of Isaacsj.\tThis argument is not
\n(1)  A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1261.\n<\/p>\n
(3)  [1960] 2 S.C.R. 866,879.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1961] 2 S.C.R. 48 1.\n<\/p>\n
(4) (1929) 41 C. L.R. 569.\n<\/p>\n
 715<\/span><\/p>\n
well founded.  It is true that in the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha
\ncase (1), this Court expressed its general approval with the
\nsocial philosophy to which Isaacs J. gave expression in\t his
\ndissenting judgment in dealing with the scope and effect  of
\nthe  definition prescribed by s. 2 (j) in our Act ;  but  it
\ndeliberately  took  the\t precaution  of\t making\t a  specific
\nstatement that though the general views expressed by  Isaacs
\nJ. appeared to the Court to be acceptable, the Court  should
\nnot   be  understood  as  having  concurred  in\t his   final
\nconclusion  in,\t regard\t to  the  character  of\t educational
\nactivities  carried  on by  educational\t institutions.\t The
\nobservation made in the judgment leaving open that  question
\nwas not a casual or an accidental observation ; it was\tmade
\ndeliberately to avoid a possible argument in future that the
\nsaid judgment impliedly accepted the conclusion of Isaacs J.
\nTherefore, the approval given to the general views expressed
\nby  Isaacs, J. in that case does not necessarily  mean\tthat
\nhis final conclusion was accepted.\n<\/p>\n
Let us then briefly notice the effect of the decision of the
\nAustralian  High  Court in the case of the  Federated  State
\nSchool Teachers’ Association of Australia (2).\tThe  dispute
\nin  that case was in regard to the wages and  conditions  of
\nservice\t and it had been raised by teachers employed by\t the
\nStates in their various schemes of national education and  a
\npoint  which arose for decision was whether the\t educational
\nactivities  of the States carried on under  the\t appropriate
\nstatutes and statutory regulations of each State relating to
\neducation  constituted\tan industry within  the\t meaning  of
\nsection\t 4 of the Commonwealth Conciliation and\t Arbitration
\nAct, 1904-28.  The majority decision was that the occupation
\nof  the\t teachers  so employed was  not\t an  ”\t industrial”
\noccupation,  and that the dispute which existed between\t the
\nStates and the teachers employed by them was, therefore, not
\nan “industrial dispute”\n<\/p>\n
(1) E1960J 2 S.C.R. 866, 879.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1929] 41 C.L.R. 569.\n<\/p>\n
716<\/span><\/p>\n
within\tsection\t 51 of the Constitution.  According  to\t the
\nmajority  decision, “If the carrying on a system. of  public
\neducation  is not within the sphere of industrialism,  those
\nwho confine their efforts to that activity cannot be engaged
\nin  an industry or in an industrial occupation or  pursuit.”
\n(pp.  575-576).\t The argument that if the said activity\t was
\ncarried\t on by a private person, it would be described as  a
\nbusiness,  trade or industry, was repelled with\t the  answer
\nthat  “‘a private person could no more carry on this  system
\nof  public  education that he could carry on  His  Majesty’s
\nTreasury  or  any  of the  other  executive  departments  of
\nGovernment;  and if he were authorized to do So,  which\t was
\nalmost\tinconceivable,\tthen he would no more  carry  on  an
\nindustry  than the State does now.” (p. 575).  Rich J.,\t who
\nconcurred with the majority opinion, observed that “teaching
\ndoes  not,  like banking and insurance, play a part  in\t the
\nscheme\tof  national industrial activity” (p.  591)  and  he
\nrejected  the view expressed by Isaacs, J.,  that  education
\nplayed\ta direct part in the promotion of industry,  because
\nhe  thought  that an industrial system could  exist  without
\nnational  education.   “The  existence\tof  human   beings,”
\nobserved the learned judge, –‘is no doubt necessary but  it
\nis absurd’ to suggest that everything that goes to make\t the
\nman  forms  a part of the community  industrially  organised
\nwith  a view to the production and distribution of  wealth.”
\n(p.  592).   Isaacs, J., however, struck a  strong  note  of
\ndissent.  With the general observations made by Isaacs,\t J.,
\nin regard to the scope of industrial disputes this Court has
\nalready expressed its concurrence., but, with respect, it is
\nnot  easy  to accept the theory of the\tlearned\t judge\tthat
\neducation provided by the State in that case constituted  in
\nitself\tan  independent industrial operation  as  a  service
\nrendered  to the community (p. 588).  Similar comment  falls
\nto  be made in regard to another observation of the  learned
\njudge  that there is at least as much reason  for  including
\nthe educational
\n 717<\/span>
\nestablishments\t in  the  constitutional  power\t as   labour
\nservices,  as  there is to include  insurance  companies  as
\ncapital\t services.  The learned Judge thought that “in\tthat
\ncompound   process,  two  facts\t emerge\t with\trespect\t  to
\neducation.   One  is that industrial education is  less\t and
\nless  left to apprenticeship systems and the other  is\tthat
\nthe efficiency of the worker is generally directly  affected
\nby  his\t education.” (pp. 588 & 589).  We  are\tinclined  to
\nthink that the comment made by Rich, J., on this  _reasoning
\nof Isaacs, J., is not without force.\n<\/p>\n
There  is, besides, another point which has to be  borne  in
\nmind in appreciating the effect of this Australian decision.
\nUnder  the  Commonwealth Conciliation and  Arbitration\tAct,
\n1904-34,  the  definition of the word “’employee”  is  wider
\nthan that of the definition of the word “‘workman” under  s.
\n2  (s) of our Act.  The “employee’ under the Australian\t Act
\nmeans  any employee in any industry and includes any  person
\nwhose usual occupation is that of employee in any  industry.
\nIt   would  appear  that  teachers  would  fall\t under\t the
\ndefinition  . of employees’ and so, the definitions  of\t the
\nwords  “industry”,  “industrial\t disputes”  and\t “industrial
\nmatters” would naturally be wide enough to take in the cases
\nof  disputes  raised  by teachers in  regard  to  industrial
\nmatters, such as wages, hours relating to work, retrenchment
\nand  others.   Thus, it is clear that  the  main  difficulty
\nwhich arises from the definition of workman prescribed by s.
\n2(s)  in  our  Act did not arise  under\t the  definition  of
\nemployee in the Australian Act, and that is undoubtedly\t one
\nimportant point of distinction.\t Therefore, we do not  think
\nthat much assistance can be drawn from the minority decision
\nof Isaacs, J., in answering the problem which the appellants
\nhave raised before us in the present appeals..
\nThe  respondents,  however, contend that there is  a  recent
\ndecision of this Court which supports
\n718<\/span>
\nthe  view taken by the Tribunal that the work carried on  by
\nthe appellants amounts to an industry under s. 2(j).  In The
\nCorporation of the City of Nagpur V. Its Employees,<\/a> (1)\t the
\nquestion  which\t arose for the decision of  this  Court\t was
\nwhether\t and to what extent the municipal activities of\t the
\nCorporation  of Nagpur City fell within the term  “industry”
\nas  defined  by s. 2(14) of the C.P.  and  Berar  Industrial
\nDisputes Settlement Act, 1947.\tIt appears that disputes has
\narisen between the Corporation and its employees in  various
\ndepartments  and in an adjudication by the State  Industrial
\nCourt  it  was\theld  that  the\t Corporation  and  all\t its
\ndepartments  were  covered by the definition  of  “industry”
\nprescribed  by s.2(14). The award thus passed by  the  State
\nIndustrial  Court was challenged by the\t Corporation  before
\nthe  High  Court by a writ petition under Art.\t226  of\t the
\nConstitution.\tThe  High Court rejected  the  Corporation’s
\nplea  that its activities did not  constitute  an-industry-,
\nbut   remanded\tthe  case  to  the  Industrial\t Court\t for
\ndetermining which of the departments of the Corporation fell
\nwithin\tthe definition.\t After remand, the Industrial  Court
\nfound  all the departments of the Corporation to  constitute
\nan  industry,  except  five.  Against the  said\t award,\t the
\nCorporation came to this Court by special leave.  No  appeal
\nwas,  however, preferred by the employees in respect of\t the
\nfive  departments  which were excluded from s.2(14)  by\t the
\naward.\t The appeal preferred by the Corporation failed\t and
\nthis  Court added that the finding of the  Industrial  Court
\nexcluding five departments from the definition under s.2(14)
\nneed  not be examined, since it had not been  challenged  by
\nthe employees.\tThat, in substance, is the decision of\tthis
\nCourt.\n<\/p>\n
It  would be noticed that the main argument which was  urged
\non  behalf of the Corporation was that its  activities\twere
\nregal or governmental in Character, and so, it was  entirely
\noutside the purview of the
\n(1)  [1960] 2 S.C.R. 942.\n<\/p>\n
 719<\/span><\/p>\n
Berar  Act.  This argument was carefully examined.   It\t was
\nconceded  that the regal functions described as primary\t and
\ninalienable  functions of the State are outside the  purview
\nof the Berar Act and if they are delegated to a Corporation,
\nthey  would be excluded from s. 2 (14), but the\t Court\theld
\nthat these, regal functions must be confined to\t legislative
\npower,\tadministration of law and judicial power.   That  is
\nhow the broad and main argument urged by the Corporation was
\nrejected.   Dealing with the work carried on by the  several
\ndepartments of the Corporation, this Court observed that  if
\na  service  rendered by an individual or  a  private  person
\nwould be an industry, it would equally be an industry in the
\nhands of a corporation, and it held that if a department  of
\na municipality discharges many functions, some pertaining to
\nindustry  as  defined in the Act  and  other  non-industrial
\nactivities,  the  predominant functions\t of  the  department
\nshall be-the criterion for the purposes of the Act.  Amongst
\nthe  departments which were then examined was the  education
\ndepartment  under  which the corporation  looked  after\t the
\nprimary\t education  of the citizens within its\tlimits.\t  In
\nconnection  with this department, it was observed  that\t the
\nservice rendered by the department could be done by  private
\npersons,  and  so, the subordinate menial employees  of\t the
\ndepartment came under the definition of employees and  would
\nbe entitled to the benefits of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
Reading\t the judgment as a whole there can be no doubt\tthat
\nthe  question as to whether educational work carried  on  by
\neducational institutions like the University of Delhi  which
\nhave  been  formed primarily and solely for the\t purpose  of
\nimparting  education  amounts  to  an  industry\t within\t the
\nmeaning of s.2 (14), was not argued before the Court and was
\nnot really raised in that form.\t The main attack against the
\naward proceeded on the basis that what the
\n720<\/span>
\nCorporation  was doing through its several  departments\t was
\nwork  which could be regarded as regal or governmental,\t and
\nas  such,  was\toutside the purview of\tthe  Act,  and\tthat
\nargument  was  rejected.   The other  point  which  is\talso
\nrelevant  is that one of the tests laid down by\t this  Court
\nwas  that  if  a department was\t carrying  on  predominantly
\nindustrial activities, the fact that some of its  activities
\nmay  not  be industrial did not matter.\t Applying  the\tsame
\ntest  to  the  Corporation  as a  whole,  the  question\t was
\nexamined  and the inclusion of the education  department  in
\nthe  award was upheld.\tIt would thus be clear that  if\t the
\ntest  of  the character of the predominant activity  of\t the
\ninstitution which was applied to the Corporation is  applied
\nto  the\t University of Delhi, the answer  would\t be  plainly
\nagainst\t the respondents.  The predominant activity  of\t the
\nUniversity of Delhi is outside the Act, because teaching and
\nteachers  connected with it do not come within its  purview,
\nand so, the minor and incidental activity carried on by\t the
\nsubordinate  staff which may fall within the purview of\t the
\nAct   cannot   alter  the  predominant\tcharacter   of\t the
\ninstitution.\n<\/p>\n
It  would  be  recalled that in the  case  of  the  Hospital
\nMazdoor\t  Sabha\t  (1),\tthe   question\t about\t educational
\ninstitutions  was deliberately and expressly left open,\t and
\nif the said question was intended to be decided in the\tcase
\nof the Corporation of the City of Nagpur (2), naturally more
\nspecific  arguments  would have been urged and\tthe  problem
\nwould have been examined in all its aspects.   Incidentally,
\nwe may add that the Bench that left the question open in the
\ncase of Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (1) was the same Bench  which
\nheard the case of the Corporation of the City of Nagpur\t and
\nthe  two matters were argued soon after each  other,  though
\nthe judgment in the first case was delivered on January\t 29,
\n1960, and that in the latter case on
\n(1) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 866, 879.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t (2) [1960] 2 S.C. R. 942.\n<\/p>\n
 721<\/span><\/p>\n
February 10, 1960.  We are making these observations with  a
\nview to emphasize the fact that the question which has\tbeen
\nraised\tfor  our  decision in the present  appeals  was\t not
\nraised,\t nor argued, in the case of the Corporation  of\t the
\nCity  of Nagpur and cannot, therefore, be said to have\tbeen
\ndecided\t even incidentally only by reason of the  fact\tthat
\namongst\t the departments which were held to have  been\tpro-
\nperly included in the award was the education department  of
\nthe  Corporation.   If we had been satisfied that  the\tsaid
\njudgment  had.\tdecided\t this point, we\t would\teither\thave
\nfollowed  the  said  decision, or would\t have  referred\t the
\nquestion to a larger Bench.\n<\/p>\n
In  the result, the appeals are allowed,, the orders  passed
\nby  the Industrial Tribunal arc set aside and the  petitions
\nfiled by the respondents under s.  33  C (2) of the Act\t are
\ndismissed.  There would be    no order as to costs.
\nAppeals allowed.\n<\/p>\n
722<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India University Of Delhi & Anr vs Ram Nath on 1 April, 1963 Equivalent citations: 1963 AIR 1873, 1964 SCR (2) 703 Author: P Gajendragadkar Bench: Gajendragadkar, P.B. PETITIONER: UNIVERSITY OF DELHI & ANR. Vs. RESPONDENT: RAM NATH DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01\/04\/1963 BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N. GUPTA, K.C. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-758","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nUniversity Of Delhi & Anr vs Ram Nath on 1 April, 1963 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"University Of Delhi & Anr vs Ram Nath on 1 April, 1963 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1963-03-31T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2018-05-18T00:52:03+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"30 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"University Of Delhi & Anr vs Ram Nath on 1 April, 1963\",\"datePublished\":\"1963-03-31T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-05-18T00:52:03+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963\"},\"wordCount\":5322,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963\",\"name\":\"University Of Delhi & Anr vs Ram Nath on 1 April, 1963 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1963-03-31T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-05-18T00:52:03+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"University Of Delhi & Anr vs Ram Nath on 1 April, 1963\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"University Of Delhi & Anr vs Ram Nath on 1 April, 1963 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"University Of Delhi & Anr vs Ram Nath on 1 April, 1963 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1963-03-31T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2018-05-18T00:52:03+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"30 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"University Of Delhi & Anr vs Ram Nath on 1 April, 1963","datePublished":"1963-03-31T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-05-18T00:52:03+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963"},"wordCount":5322,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963","name":"University Of Delhi & Anr vs Ram Nath on 1 April, 1963 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1963-03-31T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-05-18T00:52:03+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/university-of-delhi-anr-vs-ram-nath-on-1-april-1963#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"University Of Delhi & Anr vs Ram Nath on 1 April, 1963"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/758","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=758"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/758\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=758"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=758"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=758"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}