{"id":78822,"date":"1985-02-27T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1985-02-26T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/k-ramanathan-vs-state-of-tamil-nadu-anr-on-27-february-1985"},"modified":"2016-06-19T03:59:57","modified_gmt":"2016-06-18T22:29:57","slug":"k-ramanathan-vs-state-of-tamil-nadu-anr-on-27-february-1985","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/k-ramanathan-vs-state-of-tamil-nadu-anr-on-27-february-1985","title":{"rendered":"K.Ramanathan vs State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr on 27 February, 1985"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
K.Ramanathan vs State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr on 27 February, 1985<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1985 AIR 660, \t\t 1985 SCR (2)1028<\/div>\n
Author: A Sen<\/div>\n
Bench: Sen, A.P. (J)<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nK.RAMANATHAN\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nSTATE OF TAMIL NADU & ANR.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT27\/02\/1985\n\nBENCH:\nSEN, A.P. (J)\nBENCH:\nSEN, A.P. (J)\nVARADARAJAN, A. (J)\nERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J)\n\nCITATION:\n 1985 AIR  660\t\t  1985 SCR  (2)1028\n 1985 SCC  (2) 116\t  1985 SCALE  (1)510\n\n\nACT:\n     Constitution of India 1950, Arts 14, 19 (1) (2) (p) and\n301\n      Essential\t Commodities Act,  1955, ss. 3 (1) & (2) and\n5-Power under  sub-s. (2)-Whether  general in  nature-Sub-s.\n(2)-Whether confers  any fresh power-Whether illustrative of\npower conferred\t by sub-s  (1)-Cl. (d) of sub-s. (2)-Whether\ncontains specific power-Making of Orders by State Government\nunder cls.  (a) to  (f) of  sub-s. 2-Source of power-Whether\nflows from  sub-s. (1) - Delegation of-By notification under\ns. 5\n      Essential Commodities-Tamil Nadu Paddy (Restriction on\nMovement) Order. 1982-Cl. 3 (1A). issued by State Government\nunder s.  3 read with Ministry of Agriculture (Department of\nFood) Order,  S. R.  800 dt.  June  9  1978-Placing  ban  on\ntransport, movement  or otherwise  carrying of\tPaddy out of\ncertain specified  are as  in the Stale-Whether in excess of\ndelegated powers  -Whether violative  of Articles 14, 19 (1)\n(g) and 301,\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n     Section 3\t(2) (d)-Whether\t regulating includes  in the\ncontext prohibiting.\n     Interpretation of\tstatutes-Whether some  words may  be\nused in different senses in the Same sentence.\n     Words and\tphrases-Regulation  and\t Prohibiting-Meaning\nand scope of.\n     Due to  failure of\t monsoon in the years 1981-82, there\nwas a  steep fall  in production  of  paddy  and  it  became\nnecessary for the State Government of Tamil Nadu to build up\nits  buffer  stocks  for  distribution\tthrough\t the  public\ndistribution   system\tthroughout   the   State.   ID\t the\ncircumstances, the State Government had no other alternative\nbut to\tintroduce a  monopoly procurement scheme with a view\nto procure the maximum stock of paddy by banning purchase by\ntraders. This  was in addition to compulsory levy on dealers\nof paddy  and rice  to the  extent of 50% under cl. 5 (1) of\nthe Tamil  Nadu Paddy  & Rice  (Regulation of  Trade) Order,\n1974.\n1029\n     In exercise  of the  powers conferred under s. 3 of the\nEssential Commodities  Act, 1955 read with the Government of\nIndia, Ministry\t of Agriculture\t (Department or\t Food) Order\nGSR 800 dated Juno 9, 1978 issued under s. 5 of the Act with\nthe prior  concurrence of the Government of India, the State\nGovernment accordingly\tpromulgated  the  Tamil\t Nadu  Paddy\n(Restriction on\t Movement) Order,  1982 on October 22, 1982.\nClause 3 (1A) of the Order prohibited transport, movement or\notherwise carrying  of paddy  outside the  State by  road or\nrail or\t otherwise except  under and  in accordance with the\nconditions of  a permit\t issued by  an officer authorised in\nthat behalf.  By GOMS  No. 293\tdated May 11, 1982 the State\nGovernment introduced  sub-cl. (IA)  to cl.  3 of  the Order\nwhich prohibited  transport; movement  or otherwise carrying\nof paddy  outside places  notified by  cl. 3 of the Order by\nroad or rail or otherwise. Thereafter, on June 20, 1983, the\nState Government  made a  further  amendment  to  the  newly\ninserted  cl.  3  (IA)\twhich  clamped\ta  complete  ban  on\ntransport,   movement or otherwise carrying of paddy outside\nthe  Thanjavur\tDistrict,  Chidambaram\tand  Kattumannarkoil\nTaluks in  South  Arcot\t District  and\tMusiri,\t Kulithalai,\nLalgudi\t and   Tiruchirapalli  Talulks\t in   Tiruchirapalli\nDistrict.\n     The appellant  along with\tother traders  assailed\t the\nconstitutional validity\t of cl.\t 3 (IA)\t of  the  Order,  as\namended, which\tplaced a complete ban on transport, movement\nor  otherwise\tcarrying  of  paddy  outside  the  Thanjavur\ndistrict  and  the  aforesaid  Taluks  in  South  Arcot\t and\nTiruchirapalli districts  as being  violative of  Arts.\t 14,\n19(1)(g) and 301 of the Constitution The High Court repelled\nthe contentions and dismissed the writ petitions.\n      In  the  appeal,\tthe  appellant\tcontended  that\t the\nimpugned cl.  3 (IA)  of the Order was ultra vires the State\nGovernment on  two grounds,  namely: (1) The delegation of a\nspecific power\tunder s\t 3 (2)\t(d)  of\t the  Act  to  State\nGovernment by  the aforesaid notification dated June 9, 1978\nissued by  the Central\tGovernment under  s. 5 of the Act to\nregulate storage,  transport, distribution, disposal etc. Of\nan essential  commodity, in relation to foodstuffs, does not\ncarry with  it The  general power  of the Central Government\nunder sub-s.  (1) of  s.  3  to\t regulate  or  prohibit\t the\nproduction, supply  and distribution  thereof and  trade and\ncommerce therein.  And (2)  That the word regulating' in cl.\n(d) of\ts. 3  (2) of  the Act does not take in 'prohibiting'\nand  as\t  such\tthere  cannot  be  a  total  prohicition  on\ntransport, movement  or otherwise  carrying of\tpaddy out of\nthe areas  in question under (d) but only regulation of such\nactivities in  the course  of trade and commerce by grant of\nlicences or permits.\n      Dismissing the appeal,\n^\n       HELD:   1.  Sub-s  (2)  of  s.  3  of  the  Essential\nCommodities Act,  1955 offers  no fresh powers but is merely\nillustrative of\t the general  poweres by  sub-s. (1) of s. 3\nwithout exhausting  the subjects  in relation to such powers\ncan be exercised. Although cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of s. 3\nwith a\tspecific power,\t the  general  power  to  issue\t the\nimpugned\n1030\norder flows  from the  provisions of sub-s. (1) of s.3 which\nstands delegated  to the  State Government  by virtue of the\nnotification issued under s. S of the Act. [1042H; 1043B]\n      Santosh  Kumar Jain  v. The State, [I951] SCR 303, and\nEmperor v. Sibnath Banerjee, LR [1945]] 72 IA 241, followed.\n      Nanalal Navalnathji Yogi v. Collector of Bulsar & Ors.\nAIR 1981 Guj. 87. approved.\n      Atulya  Kumar v. Director of Procurement & Supply, AIR\n1953 Cal. 548, approved. _\n      Tarakdas\tMukherjee v.  State of West Bengal, [1978] 2\nCal. L.J.  398 and  Lila Biswas\t v. State  of  West  Bengal,\n[1918-89] CWN 539, approved.\n      Sujan  Singh v.  State of\t Haryana, AIR 1998 Pun, 363,\nState of  Uttar Pradesh v. Suraj Bhan, AIR<\/a> 1972 All. 401 and\nBejoy Kumar  Routrai v. State of Orissa AIR [1976] Orr. 138,\noverruled.\n\t   2. The word 'regulation' cannot have any rigid or\ninflexible meaning   as\t to  exclude  'prohibiting'.  It  is\ndifficult to  define  the  word\t 'regulate'  as\t having\t any\nprecise meaning. It has different shades of meaning and must\ntake its  colour from the context in which it is used having\nregard to the purpose and object of the legislation, and the\nCourt must  necessarily keep  in view the mischief which the\nlegislature seeks to remedy. The question essentially is one\nof degree  and it is impossible to fix any definite point at\nwhich 'regulation'  ends and  prohibition' begins. The power\nto regulate  does  not\tnecessarily  include  the  power  to\nprohibit,  and\t ordinarily  the   word\t 'regulate'  is\t not\nsynonymous with\t the word  'prohibit'. This  is\t true  in  a\ngeneral sense  and in  the sense that mere regulation is not\nthe same  as absolute prohibition. But the power to regulate\ncarries with  it  full\tpower  over  the  thing\t subject  to\nregulation and\tin obsence  of restrictive  words, the power\nmust be\t regarded as  plenary over  the entire\tsubject.  It\nimplies the  power to rule, direct and control and- involves\nthe adoption  of a  rule or guiding principle to be followed\nor the\tmaking of a rule with respect to the   subject to be\nregulated. The\tpower to regulate implies the power to check\nand  may   imply  the\tpower  to   prohibit  under  certain\ncircumstances,\tas   where  the\t best  or  only\t efficatious\nregulation consists of suppression.\n\t\t\t\t\t   [1045G-H; 1046E-F\n      Narendra Kumar v. Union of India,<\/a> [1960] 2 SCR 361\n\t  Slaitery v. Naylor, LR [1888] AC 446 and Municipal\nCorporation of\tthe City  of Toronto  v. Virgo, LR [1896] AC\n88, Corpus  Juris Secundum,  vol. 76 at p. 611 and Webster s\nThird New  International Dictionary,  vol  II,\tp  1913\t and\nThorter Oxford\tDictionary, vol.  II,  3rd  edn.,  p.  1784,\nreferred to\n\t State of Mysore v. H. Sanjeeviah,<\/a> [1967] 2 SCR 361,\ndistinguish and limited.\n1031\n      The source of power to issue an order under cl. (d) of\nsub-s. (2)  of A  s. 3\tof the\tAct being  relatable to\t the\ngeneral powers of the Central Government under sub-s. (1) of\ns. 3,  there is\t no justification  for giving  a  restricted\nmeaning to  the word  'regulating,' in cl. (d) of sub-s. (2)\nof s.  3 of  the Act  so as  not to take in 'prohibiting'. A\nword may  be used  in  two  different  senses  in  the\tsame\nsection. [1050B-C]\n      The  Act is  a piece of socio-economic legislation and\nits predominant\t object is  to provide\tin the\tinterests of\ngeneral public,\t for the  control of  the production, supply\nand distribution  of, and  trade and  commerce\tin,  certain\nessential commodities.\tSuch control  can be  exercised in a\nvariety of ways otherwise than by placing compulsory levy on\nthe producers, for example, by fixing a controlled price for\nfoodstuffs, by placing a limit on the stock of foodstuffs to\nbe held\t by a wholesale dealer, commission agent or retailer\nby placing  sales except  in certain  specified manners etc.\nAll these arc nothing but regulatory measures. Placing a ban\non  inter-State\t  or  inter-State   movement  or  export  of\nfoodstuffs is  one of  the ways\t to regulate and control and\nsuch  ban  prevents  the  spiral  rise\tin  prices  of\tsuch\nfoodstuffs   by\t  artificial   creation\t  of   shortage\t  by\nunscrupulous traders.  The various  Control Orders issued by\nthe Central  Government under  sub-s. (1) of s- 3 of the Act\nor by  the State  Governments under s. 3 read with s. 5 have\nintroduced a  system of\t checks and  balances to achieve she\nobject\tof   the  legislation\ti.e.  to   ensure  equitable\ndistribution and  availability of  essential commodities  at\nfair prices.  Special public  interest in  an industry e. g.\nthat it\t is engaged in the production of a commodity vitally\nessential to  the community,  may justify  the regulation of\nits production,\t supply and  distribution and  its trade and\ncommerce, provided  such regulation is not arbitrary and has\na rational  nexus with\tthe object  sought to  be  achieved.\n[1048C-D; 1047F-H; 1048A]\n      If one part of the country or of a State is faced with\na famine  or even  acute shortage  of foodstuffs.  it is not\nunreasonable for  the Government  to acquire foodstuffs from\nthe surplus  areas and\tdistribute the\tsame in\t areas where\nthey  are  most\t needed.  Since\t there\twas  steep  fall  in\nproduction of\tpaddy  due to  failure of monsoons the State\nGovernment of  Tamil Nadu was justified not only to reimpose\ncompulsory levy\t on the\t producers of paddy to the extent of\n50% but\t also to  introduce a scheme for a monopoly purchase\nof paddy  by the  Government with  a view  to build  up\t its\nbuffer\t stock\t for   distribution   through\tthe   public\ndistribution system throughout: the State. [1049E-G]\n      State  of Tamil Nadu v. Hind Stone & Ors.<\/a> [19811 2 SCC\n205, C.\t K Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu<\/a> [1975] 2 SCR 715,\nKrishan Lal  Praveen kumar  & Ors.  v. State  of Rajasthan &\nOrs., [1981  4 SCC  550, Suraj\tMal Kailash Chand &  Ors, v.\nUnion of  India & Ors.,<\/a> [1981] 4 SCC 554 and Bishamber Dayal\nChandra Mohan  & Ors.  v. State of U.P. & Ors., [1982] 1 SCR\n1137, relied on.\n1032\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
      CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION:  Civil Appeal No. 11417
\nof 1983
\n      From  the Judgment  and Order dated 14. 9. 1983 of the
\nHigh Court of Madras in W. P. N. 4615 of 1983.
\n\t K. Ram Kumar for the Appellant.\n<\/p>\n
      A. V. Rangam for the Respondents
\n\t The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\n\t     SEN,  J. This  appeal by special leave directed
\nagainst the  judgment and  order of  the Madras\t High  Court
\ndated  September   14,\t1983   raises  a  question  of\tsome
\ncomplexity. The\t question is as to whether cl. 3 (IA) of the
\nTamil Nadu  Paddy  (Restriction\t on  Movement)\tOrder,\t1982
\nissued by  the State  Government under\ts 3 of the Essential
\nCommodities Act,  1955 read  with the  Government of  India,
\nMinistry of Agriculture (Department of Food) Order, a. s. R,
\n800 dated  June 9,  1978, with\tthe prior concurrence of the
\nGovernment of  India, was  ultra vires\tthe State Government
\nbeing in  excess of  its delegated  powers. That  depends on
\nwhether the  delegation of a specific power under cl. (d) of
\nsub-s. (2)  of s. 3 of the Act by the aforesaid notification
\nissued by  the Central Government under s. 5 to regulate the
\nstorage, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition, use
\nor consumption\tof an  essential commodity,  in relation  to
\nfoodstuffs, carries  with  it  the  general  powers  of\t the
\nCentral Government  under sub-s.  (1) of  s. 3 of the Act to
\nregulate or prohibit the production, supply and distribution
\nof essential  commodities and  trade and  commerce  therein.
\nThere is  a conflict  OF opinion  on this  question  between
\ndifferent High\tCourts. Hence  we thought  it fit  to  grant
\nspecial leave  and heard the appeal on merits. After hearing
\nthe parties,  we dismissed  the appeal\tby  an\torder  dated
\nDecember  5,   1983  for  reasons  to  follow.\tThe  reasons
\ntherefore are set out below .\n<\/p>\n
      Briefly  stated, the  facts are these. In the State of
\nTamil Nadu,  there has\tbeen a\tsystem of  imposing levy  on
\npurchase of  paddy by  traders in vogue since the year 1970.
\nThis was  imposed by  cl. 3  (5) (i) of the Tamil Nadu Paddy
\nand Rice  (Licensing, Regulation & Disposal of Stock) Order,
\n1968 issued  by the  State Government  under s. 3 of the Act
\nwith the prior concurrence of the Government
\n1033<\/span>
\nOf India.  Cl. 3  (5) (i)  empowered the State Government to
\nimpose A  and collect  upto 50% of the stocks by way of levy
\non purchases  of  paddy\t by  traders  on  payment  of  price
\nspecified from\ttime to time. The said Order was replaced by
\nthe Tamil  Nadu Paddy  and Rice (Regulation of Trade) Order,
\n1974 issued under s. 3 of the Act with the prior concurrence
\nof the Government of India. Cl. 5 (1) of this Order empowers
\nthe State  Government to impose and collect levy upto 50% of
\nthe purchase  of paddy\tand rice  by the  dealers other than
\nretail dealers\tand they  are paid  prices notified  by\t the
\nGovernment. This  clause was  subsequently amended  in 1976.
\nThe power  to impose  and collect  levy on  the purchase  of
\npaddy and  rice was  exercised by the State Government under
\ns. 3  of the  Act with\ta view\tto  procure  the  stock\t for
\ndistribution of\t rice to about 118 lakhs family card-holders
\nthroughout the\tState through  nearly  17,  800\t fair  price
\nshops. A  review of the food situation in the latter half of
\n1980 and  the beginning\t of 1981  revealed that the stock of
\npaddy and  rice with the Government was not adequate to meet
\nthe requirements  under the  public distribution system. The
\nState  Government  in  the  Food  &  Cooperation  Department
\naccordingly, decided to enforce the levy on traders by G. O.
\nMs. No.\t 33 dated January 1, 1981 and to collect 40% levy on
\nthe purchases  of paddy\t and rice  by dealers even though it
\nhad the\t power to impose levy upto 50% at prices fixed by it
\nfrom time  to time. Thereafter, the Government in the Food &
\nCooperation Department by G. O. MS. No. 765 dated October 1,
\n1981 increased\tthe levy from 40% to 50% from kuruvai season
\n1981.\n<\/p>\n
      There  was a  failure of\tmonsoon in  the State in the
\nyears 1981-82  and the\toff take  of rice  in the fair price
\nshops had  increased from  34,000 tonnes  in April to 85,000
\ntonnes in  December  1982.  Due\t to  failure  of  south-west
\nmonsoon in  the year  1982 and consequent poor rainfall, the
\nstorage level  in the  Mettur reservoir fell. As a result of
\nthis there was a steep fall in kuruvai cultivation of paddy.
\nIn  Thanjavur\tdistrict  alone,   the\tacreage\t  of   paddy
\ncultivation was\t reduced from 4. 5 lakhs acres to 2.97 lakhs
\nacres. Added  to this,\tthe north-east\tmonsoon in the State
\nalso failed  causing a\tserious fall  in the  production  of
\npaddy. In  the circumstances,  the State  Government in\t the
\nFood &\tCooperation Department\thad no other alternative but
\nto introduce  a monopoly  procurement scheme of paddy with a
\nview to\t procure the  maximum stock  of paddy by banning the
\npurchases by traders.\n<\/p>\n
1034<\/span><\/p>\n
      In  exercise of the powers conferred under s. 3 of the
\nEssential Commodities  Act, 1955 read with the Government of
\nIndia, Ministry\t of Agriculture\t (Department of Food) Order,
\nG. S.  R. 800 dated June 9, 1978, with the prior concurrence
\nof the Government of India, the State Government promulgated
\nthe Tamil  Nadu Paddy  (Restriction on Movement) Order, 1982
\non October 22, 1982. Cl. 3 (1) of the Order provides:\n<\/p>\n
\t       “No person shall transport, move or otherwise
\n     carry or  prepare or  attempt  to\ttransport,  move  or
\n     otherwise carry,  or aid  or  abet\t in  the  transport,
\n     movement or  otherwise carrying  of paddy\toutside\t the
\n     State by  road\/rail or  otherwise except  under and  in
\n     accordance with the conditions of a permit issued by an
\n     authorized officer.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      On  January 22,  1983, the State Government Department
\nissued\tG.  O.\tMS.  No.  42  for  purchase  of\t the  entire
\nmarketable surplus  of paddy  in Thanjavur  District by\t the
\nGovernment through the Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation
\nas an  agent of\t the Government.  On February\t, 1982,\t the
\nState Government  in  the  Food\t &  Co-operation  Department
\nissued another G. O. Ms. No. 84 extending the provision made
\nwith  regard   to  Thanjavur  district\tof  Chidambaram\t and
\nKattumannarkoil taluks\tin South  Arcot district and Musiri,
\nKulithalai,  Lalgudi   and  7\tTiruchirapalli\t taluks\t  in
\nTiruchirapalli district.\n<\/p>\n
      On  May 11,  1983, the  State Government in the Food &
\nCo-operation Department issued G. O. Ms. No. 293 introducing
\nsub-cl. (1A)  to cl.  3 of the Order. The newly inserted cl.
\n(IA) is as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t       “No person shall transport, move or otherwise
\n     carry or  prepare or  attempt  to\ttransport,  move  or
\n     otherwise carry,  or aid  or  abet\t in  the  transport,
\n     movement or  otherwise carrying  of paddy\toutside\t the
\n     places notified  under Clause 3 of the Tamil Nadu Paddy
\n     & Rice  (Restriction of Rates) Order, 1974 by road\/rail
\n     or otherwise.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      Thereafter,  on June 20, 1983, the State Government in
\nthe Food & Cooperation Department by G. O. Ms. No 413 made a
\nfurther amendment  to the  newly introduced  sub-cl. (1A) of
\ncl. 3. The amended cl. (IA) of cl. 3 is follows:\n<\/p>\n
1035<\/span><\/p>\n
\t       “No person shall transport, move or otherwise
\n     carry or  prepare or  attempt  to\ttransport,  move  or
\n     otherwise carry,  or aid  or  abet\t in  the  transport,
\n     movement or  other wise  carrying of  paddy outside the
\n     Thanjavur\tDistrict,  Chidambaram\tand  Kattumannarkoil
\n     Taluks in\tSouth Arcot District and Musiri, Kulithalai,
\n     Lalgudi and  Tiruchirapalli  Taluks  in  Tiruchirapalli
\n     District.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
       These   various\torders\twere  issued  by  the  state
\nGovernment in  exercise of  the powers\tconferred by s. 3 of
\nthe Act\t read with  the Government  of\tIndia,\tMinistry  of
\nAgriculture (Department\t of Food)  Order, G. S. R. 800 dated
\nJune 9, 1978 which is set out below: C
\n\t  “MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURAL AND IRRIGATION
\n\t\t    (DEPARTMENT OF FOOD)
\n\t\t\t   ORDER
\n\t\t\t      New Delhi, the 9th June, 1978.\n<\/p>\n
      G. S. R. 800-In exercise of the powers conferred by s.
\n5 of  the Essential  Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), and
\nin supersession\t of the\t Order of the Government of India in
\nthe late Ministry of Agriculture (Department of Food) No. G.
\nS. R.  316 (E)\tdated  the  20th  June,\t 1972,\tthe  Central
\nGovernment hereby directs that the powers conferred on it by
\nsub-s. (1) of s. 3 of the said Act to make orders to provide
\nfor the\t matters specified  in cls. (a), (b), (c), (d), (e),\n<\/p>\n
(f), (h),  (i), (ii) and (j) of sub-s. (2) thereof shall, in
\nrelation to  foodstuffs\t be  exercisable  also\tby  a  State
\nGovernment subject to the conditions-\n<\/p>\n
     (1)      that such powers shall be exercised by a State
\n     Government subject\t to such  directions, if any, as may
\n     be issued by the Central Government in this behalf;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (2)      that before  making an  order relating  to any
\n     matter
\n specified  in the said cls. (a), (c) or (f) or in regard to
\ndistribution or disposal of foodstuffs to places outside the
\nState or  in regard  to\t regulations  or  transport  of\t any
\nfoodstuffs, under  the said  cl (d),  the  State  Government
\nshall also  obtain the\tprior  concurrence  of\tthe  Central
\nGovernment and
\n1036<\/span>
\n     (3)      that in making an order relating to any of the
\n     matter  specified\t in  the  said\tcl.  (i)  the  State
\n     Government\t shall\t authorize  only   an\tofficer\t  of
\n     Government.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\tSd\/-K. Balakrishnan,
\n\t\t    Dy. Secretary to the Government of India
\n\t\t\t  (No. 3 (Genl) (1)\/78-D&R (1) 59).”\n<\/p>\n
\t   The appellant and various other agriculturists of
\nThanjavur district  and\t the  aforesaid\t traditionally\trice
\ngrowing areas  of South\t Arcot and Thiruchirapalli districts
\nchallenge the  constitutional validity\tof cl. 3 (1A) of the
\nOrder placing  a complete  ban on the transport, movement or
\notherwise carrying  of paddy  outside Thanjavur district and
\nthe aforementioned taluks of South Arcot and Thiruchirapalli
\ndistricts by petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution in
\nthe High  Court. There were as many as 300 writ petitions in
\nthe High  Cort which were disposed of by the judgment under
\nappeal. The  validity of cl 3 (IA) of the Order was assailed
\non three  main grounds:\t (1) Cl. 3 (1A) was wholly arbitrary
\nand  irrational\t and  thus  violative  of  Art.\t 14  of\t the
\nConstitution. (2)  Cl. 3 (IA) was in excess of the delegated
\npowers conferred  on the  State Government under s. 3 of the
\nAct by\tthe aforesaid  G. S. R 800 dated June 9, 1978 issued
\nby the Central Government under s. 5 of the Act. And (3) The
\ntotal ban  on  movement\t of  paddy  from  out  of  Thanjavur
\ndistrict  and  the  aforesaid  taluks  of  South  Arcot\t and
\nThiruchirapalli districts  by cl. 3 (1A) of the Order was an
\nunreasonable  restriction   on\tthe  freedom  of  trade\t and
\ncommerce guaranteed under Art. 19 (l) (g) and also infringes
\nthe freedom  of inter-State  trade, commerce and intercourse
\nunder Art.  301 of the Constitution. The High Court repelled
\nall these contentions.\n<\/p>\n
      Shri  P. Govindan\t Nair, learned counsel appearing for
\nthe  appellant\targued\tthe  case  with\t much  learning\t and
\nresource. Learned  counsel with\t his usual  fairness did not
\nadvance some of the contentions raised before the High Court
\nas they\t were apparently  misconceived. He  has confined his
\nsubmissions to\tonly two  grounds, namely:  (l)Cl. 3 (IA) of
\nthe impugned Order issued by the State Government under s. 3
\nof the\tAct read with G. S. R. 800 dated June 9, 1978 issued
\nby the\tCentral Government  under s.  5 of  the Act with the
\nprior concurrence  of the  Government of India placing a ban
\non the transport, movement or otherwise carrying of
\n1037<\/span>
\npaddy from  out of  Thanjavur district,\t the two  taluks  of
\nSouth Arcot  district and the four taluks of Thiruchirapalli
\ndistrict, was  ultra vires  the State  Government  being  in
\nexcess of  the\tdelegated  powers.  It\tis  urged  that\t the
\ndelegation of a specific power under cl. (d) of subs. (2) of
\ns. 3  of the Act by the aforesaid notification issued by the
\nCentral Government  under s.  5 of  the Act  to regulate the
\nstorage,  transport,   distribution,  disposal\tetc.  Of  an
\nessential commodity,  in relaston  to foodstuffs,  does\t not
\ncarry with  it the  general power  of the Central Government
\nunder sub-s.  (l) of  s.  3  to\t regulate  or  prohibit\t the
\nproduction, supply  and distribution  thereof and  trade and
\ncommerce therein.  And (2)  The word ‘regulating’ in cl. (d)
\nof sub-\t s. (2)\t of s.\t3  of  the  Act\t does  not  take  in
\n‘prohibiting’ for  the words  ‘regulating’ and ‘prohibiting’
\ndenote two  distinct and  separate attributes  of power\t and
\nthey are  mutually exclusive  Otherwise according to learned
\ncounsel, there\twas no\tpoint in  the Legislature using both
\nthe words ‘regulating’ and ‘prohibiting’ in sub-s. (1) of s.
\n3 of  the Act  and the\twords ‘regulating’ and ‘prohibiting’
\ndifferently in\tvarious clauses of sub-s. (2) thereof. It is
\nurged that there cannot be a total prohibition on transport,
\nmovement or  otherwise carrying of paddy out of the areas in
\nquestion under\tcl. (d)\t of  subs.  (2)\t of  s\t3  but\tonly
\nregulation of  such activities\tin the\tcourse of  trade and
\ncommerce by grant of licences or permits The learned counsel
\nis fortified  in his  submissions by  the decisions  of\t the
\nPunjab, Allahabad  and Orissa  High Courts  in Sujan Singh v
\nState of Haryana,(1) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Suraj Bhan<\/a>(2)
\nand Bejoy  Kumar  Routrai  v.  State  of  Orissa(3)  and  he
\nquestions the  correctness of  the decision  of the  Gujarat
\nHigh Court  in Nanalal Navalnathji Yogi Collestor of Bulsar&
\nOrs.(4) taking a view to the contrary. We are afraid, we are
\nunable to accept any of the contentions advanced by him.\n<\/p>\n
      In  order to  appreciate the  contentions advanced, it
\nwould be  convenient  to  set  out  the\t relevant  statutory
\nprovisions. Sub-s. (1) of s. 3 of the Act is in these terms:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“3 (1). Power to control production, supply,
\n     distribution etc. Of essential commodities-<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (1). AIR [1968] Pun. 363
\n\t (2). AIR [.972] Al]. 401
\n\t (3). AIR [1976] Orr. 138
\n\t (4). [1981] . 87
\n1038<\/span>
\n\t     If the Central Government is of opinion that it
\n     is necessary  or expedient\t so to do for maintaining or
\n     increasing supplies  of any  essential commodity or for
\n     securing their  equitable distribution and availability
\n     at\t fair\tprices,\t (or   for  securing  any  essential
\n     commodity for  the defence\t of India  or the  efficient
\n     conduct of\t military  operations)\tit  may,  by  order,
\n     provide for  regulating or\t prohibiting the production,
\n     supply and\t distribution thereof and trade and commerce
\n     therein.”\n<\/p>\n
      Sub-s.  (2) of  s. 3  of the Act, insofar as material,
\nlays down:\n<\/p>\n
\t     ” 3. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of
\n     the powers\t conferred by  sub-s.  (1),  an\t order\tmade
\n     thereunder may provide-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (a) * * * *\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (b) * * * *\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (c) * * * *\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (d)  for regulating  by licences,\tpermits or otherwise
\n\t  the storage,\ttransport,  distribution,  disposal,
\n\t  acquisition, use  or consumption  of any essential
\n\t  commodity.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      S. S of the Act provides:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t     “5. Delegation of powers-The Central Government
\n     may, by  notified order, direct that (the power to make
\n     orders or\tissue notifications  under s.  3)  shall  in
\n     relation  to   such  matters,   and  subject   to\tsuch
\n     conditions,  if   any,  as\t may  be  specified  in\t the
\n     direction, be exercisable also by-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (a)  such officer  or authority subordinate to the
\n\t       Central Government, or\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (b)\tsuch  State Government\tor such\t officer  or
\n\t       authority subordinate to a State Government.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t as may be specified in the direction.”\n<\/p>\n
1039<\/span><\/p>\n
\t     The   infirmity  in the  argument lies  in\t the
\nerroneous assumption A that the source of power on authority
\nto promulgate  the impugned  Order was\tderived by the State
\nGovernment under  cl.(d) of  sub-s (2) of s. 3 of the Act by
\nvirtue\tof   the  delegation   of  powers   by\tthe  Central
\nGovernmnent by\tthe notification  No G. S. R. 800 dated June
\n9, 1978\t under s  5 of\tthe Act.  The  source  of  power  to
\npromulgate an order of this description is derived from sub-
\ns. (1  of s.  3 of the Act, According to its plain language,
\nthe aforesaid notification No. G. S. R. 800 provides that in
\nexercise of  the powers conferred by s. 5 of the Act, and in
\nsupersession of the earlier order of the Government of India
\nin the Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Food, No. G. S
\nR 316  dated June  20, 1972,  the Central Government directs
\nthat ‘the  powers conferred  on it  by sub-s. (1) of s. 3 of
\nthe Act’  to make orders to provide for matters specified in
\nclauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (h), (i), (ii) and (j)
\nof sub-s.  (2) thereof shall, in relation to foodstuffs, ‘be
\nexercisable also  by  a\t State\tGovernment  subject  to\t the
\nconditions set\tout therein’.  There must be some meaningful
\neffect given  to the  words ‘the  Central Government  hereby
\ndirects that  the powers conferred on it by sub-s. (1) of s.
\n3 of  the Act to make orders etc.. shall be exercisable also
\nby a  State Government\tsubject to  the conditions  set\t out
\ntherein’. On  a plain  construction, the  first part  of the
\naforesaid notification\tin specific  terms provides  for the
\ndelegation by  the Central  Government under s. 5 of the Act
\nof the\tpowers conferred  on it by sub-s. (1) of s. 3 of the
\nAct. That power is general in its terms and authorises inter
\nalia the  promulgation of any order providing for regulating
\nor prohibiting\tthe production,\t supply and distribution of,
\nand trade  and commerce in, any essential commodity, insofar
\nas it  is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or
\nincreasing  supplies   or  for\t securing  their   equitable
\ndistribution and  availability at  fair prices.\t The  second
\npart of\t the notification  directs that\t the power  to\tmake
\n‘orders thereunder’  i.e. the power under sub-s. (1) of s. 3
\nof the\tAct shall be exercisable also by a State Government,
\nin relation  to foodstuffs,  with respect  to ‘such matters’
\nviz. for  the matters  specified in  clauses (a),  (b), (c),\n<\/p>\n
(d), (e),  (f), (h), (i), (ii) and (j) of sub-s. (2) thereof
\nand subject  to\t ‘such\tconditions’  set  out  therein.\t The
\naforesaid notification\tG. S.  R. 800  dated  June  9,\t1978
\nissued by  the Central Government was strictly in conformity
\nwith s.\t 5 of the Act. Of the three conditions, the one that
\nis material  for our purpose is condition 2 It provides that
\nbefore making  an order\t under cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of s. 3
\nof the Act in regard to
\n1040<\/span>
\ndistribution or disposal of foodstuffs to places outside the
\nState or  in regard  to\t regulations  or  transport  of\t any
\nfoodstuffs, the State Government shall also obtain the prior
\nconcurrence of\tthe Central  Government. It is manifest on a
\nplain reading  that the\t aforesaid notification No. G. S. R.
\n800 dated  June 9,  1978 was strictly in conformity with the
\nrequirements of s. 5 of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
      Learned  counsel for the appellant however strenuously
\ncon tends  that the  delegation of  powers  by\tthe  Central
\nGovernment under  s. 5\tof the\tAct must  necessarily be  in
\nrelation to  ‘such matters’ and subject to ‘such conditions’
\nas may\tbe specified  in the notification. The whole attempt
\non the\tpart of\t the learned counsel is to confine the scope
\nand ambit  of the impugned order to cl. (d) of sub-s ( .) of
\ng. 3 of the Act which uses the word ‘regulating’ and take it
\nout of\tthe purview  of sub-s.\t(1) of\ts. 3  which uses the
\nwords ‘regulating  or prohibiting’. That is not a proper way
\nof construction\t of sub-ss (l) and (2) of s. 3 of the Act in
\ntheir normal  setting.\t The restricted construction of s. 3
\ncontended for  by learned  counsel for\tthe appellant  would
\nrender the  scheme of  the Act wholly unworkable. As already
\nindicated, the\tsource of  power to  make an  order of\tthis
\ndescription is\tsub-s. (l)  of s 3 of the Act and sub-s. (2)
\nmerely\tprovides   illustration\t for   the  general   powers
\nconferred by  sub-s. (l).  Sub-s. (2)  of s.  3 of  the\t Act
\ncommences  with\t  the  words   ‘Without\t prejudice   to\t the
\ngenerality of  the powers  conferred by\t sub-s. (1)’.  It is
\nmanifest that  sub-s. (2) of s 3 of the Act confers no fresh
\npowers but  is merely  illustrative of\tthe  general  powers
\nconferred by  sub-s. (1)  of s.\t 3  without  exhausting\t the
\nsubjects in relation to which such powers can be exercised.\n<\/p>\n
     The matter\t is no\tlonger\tres  integra.  The  question
\ndirectly arose\tfor consideration  by this  Court in Santosh
\nKumar  Jain   v.  The\tState  (1).  There,  the  Court\t was
\nconsidering the\t validity of  the Sugar\t and sugar  Products
\nControl Order, 1947 issued by the then Provincial Government
\nof Bihar  in exercise  of the powers conferred on it by s. 3
\nof the\tEssential Supplies  (Temporary Powers)\tAct, 1946 by
\nvirtue of the delegation of powers by the Central Government
\nto make\t orders in  relation to\t foodstuffs under cl. (j) of
\nsub-s. (2)  of s.  3 of\t that Act.  Patanjali  Shastri,\t J.,
\nspeaking for  the Court explaining the relevant functions of
\nsub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 3 of the Act, said:\n<\/p>\n
      (1) [1951] S.C.R. 303.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
1041<\/span><\/p>\n
\t     “It is manifest that sub-s. (2) of s. 3 confers
\n     no fur. A the or other powers on the Central Government
\n     than what are conferred under sub-s. (1), for it is “an
\n     order made\t thereunder” that may provide for one or two
\n     other of  the matter  specifically enumerated in sub-s.
\n     (2) which are only illustrative, as such enumeration is
\n     “without prejudice\t to the\t generality  of\t the  powers
\n     conferred by  sub-s. (1)”.\t Seizure of an article being
\n     thus shown to fall within the purview of sub-s. (l), it
\n     must be  competent for  the Central  Government or\t its
\n     delegate, the  Provincial Government,  to make an order
\n     for seizure  under\t that  sub-section  apart  from\t and
\n     irrespective of  the anticipated  contravention of\t any
\n     other order as contemplated in cl. (j) of sub-s. (2).”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      The Court drew support for this view from the decision
\nof the\tPrivy Council in Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee.(‘) The
\nFederal Court  in that\tcase held  r. 26  of the  Defence of
\nIndia Rules  made under\t cl (j)\t of sub-s (2) of s. 3 of the
\nDefence of India Act, 1939 to be ultra vires, which decision
\nwas reversed  by the  Privy Council,  The Court\t quoted with
\napproval the  following observations  of Lord Thankerton, J.
\ndelivering the judgment of Privy Council:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t “In the  opinion of  their  Lordships,\t the
\n     function of  sub s.  (2) is merely an illustrative one;
\n     the rule-making  power is\tconferred by sub-s. (1), and
\n     “the rules”  which\t are  referred\tto  in\tthe  opening
\n     sentence  of   sub-s.  (2)\t are  the  rules  which\t are
\n     authorized\t by,   and  made   under,  sub-s.  (1);\t the
\n     provisions of  sub-s (2)  are not restrictive of sub-s.
\n     (1), as,  indeed  is  expressly  stated  by  the  words
\n     “without prejudice\t to the\t generality  of\t the  powers
\n     conferred by sub-s (1).”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      This  accords with  our view of the purport and effect
\nof sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 3 of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
       In   Atulya  Kumar   v.\tDirector  of  Procurement  &
\nSupply(a), the\tchallenge was to the validity of West Bengal
\nFoodgrains (Intensive  Procurement Order,  1952 issued under
\ns. 3  (1) of  the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act,
\n1946 by\t virtue of  delegation\tof  powers  by\tthe  Central
\nGovernment under s. 5 of the Act which was
\n\t (1) LR [1945] 72 IA 241.\n<\/p>\n
\t (2). AIR [1953] Cal. 548.\n<\/p>\n
1042<\/span><\/p>\n
almost in  identical terms  with s.  5 of the Act. Sinha, J.
\n(as he then was) held that the powers to promulgate the levy
\norder was  derived from\t sub-s. (1)  of s  3 of the Act; and
\nthat the  power was  general in\t terms and  authorized inter
\nalia the  promulgation of any order providing for regulating
\nor prohibiting\tthe production,\t supply and distribution of,
\nand trade  and commerce in, any essential commodity, insofar
\nas it appears necessary or expedient to the State Government
\nfor maintaining or increasing supplies or for securing their
\nequitable distribution\tand availability at fair prices. The
\nlearned Judge  after referring to the Privy Council decision
\nin Sibnath Banerjee’s case and that of this Court in Santosh
\nKumar Jain’s case, observed :\n<\/p>\n
\t       “Sub-s. (2) of s. 3, commences with the words
\n     “without prejudice\t to the\t generality  of\t the  powers
\n     conferred by sub-s. (1)….etc.” This shows that sub-s.
\n     (2) confers  no fresh powers but provides illustrations
\n     of the general powers conferred by sub-s. (1)……”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The learned Judge went on to observe:\n<\/p>\n
\t     “This is undoubtedly very incompetent drafting.
\n     But I  think that\tthe meaning is reasonably clear. The
\n     ‘Matters  Specified’  in  sub-s.  (2),  being  “without
\n     prejudice” to the generality of the powers conferred by
\n     sub-s (1)\tmust be held to include such powers. Thus it
\n     cannot be\tsaid that  the general\tpowers have not been
\n     conferred upon  the State,\t but only those specified in
\n     cls. (a)  to (j)  of sub-s. (2). The only limitation is
\n     with  regard   to\tthe   kind  of\tessential  commodity
\n     concerned. The  State has\tbeen given powers limited to
\n     ‘foodstuffs’ only.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      Quite  recently, the  Calcutta High  Court in Tarakdas
\nMukherjee v.  State of\tWest Bengal(1)\tand Lila  Biswas  v.
\nState of  West Bengal  12) following the dictum of Sinha, J.
\nin Atulya Kumar’s case, supra, have held that the delegation
\nof specific powers to issue an impugned order of this nature
\nis derived  from sub-s.\t (1) of s. 3 and that the provisions
\nof sub-s.  (2)\tthereof\t are  merely  illustrative.  It\t has
\nfurther held  that the various clauses of sub-s. (2) of s. 3
\nof the\tAct cannot  be made  operative independently  by any
\nnotification
\n\t (1) [1978] 2 Cal. LJ 383
\n\t (2) [1978-9] 83 CWN 539
\n1043<\/span>
\nunder s.  5 of\tthe Act\t without deriving the general powers
\nunder sub-s.  (1) of  s.  3  of\t the  Act.  We\tare  of\t the
\nconsidered opinion  that the view of the Calcutta High Court
\naccords both  with reason  and principle.  The view  to\t the
\ncontrary taken\tby the\tPunjab, Allahabad  and\tOrissa\tHigh
\nCourts\tin  Sujan  Singh’s.  Suraj  Ban’s  and\tBejoy  Kumar
\nRoutrai’s cases,  supra, dose not lay down good law. It must
\naccordingly be\theld that  although cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of
\ns. 3  of the  Act deals\t only with  a  specific\t power,\t the
\ngeneral power  to issue\t the impugned  order flows  from the
\nprovisions of  sub-h. (1)  of s. 3 which stands delegated to
\nthe State  Government by  virtue of  the notification issued
\nunder s. S of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
      Upon that view, the question as to the construction of
\nthe word  ‘regulating’ occurring in cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of
\n8.3 of\tthe Act\t does not  really arise.  However, since the
\nquestion has  been raised  at the  Bar we think it proper to
\ndeal with  it. As a matter of construction, Shri P- Govindan
\nNair, learned  counsel for  the appellant  contends that the
\nwords ‘regulating’ and prohibiting’ connote two distinct and
\nseparate attributes  of power  which are  mutually exclusive
\nand therefore  the word\t ‘regulating’ used in cl. (d) cannot
\nbe given the same meaning as ‘prohibiting’. He urges that is
\nA sound rule of construction to give the same meaning to the
\nsame  word  occurring  in  different  parts  of\t an  Act  of
\nParliament. For the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning
\nof the word ‘regulating’ in the context of cl. (d) of sub-s.
\n(2) of\ts. 3, he has referred to us the different clauses of
\nthat sub-section.  A perusal  of the  various clauses (a) to\n<\/p>\n
(j) indicates  that while cls. (a), (d) and (g) speak of the
\npower to  prohibit, and\t the remaining\tcls. (b),  (c), (f),\n<\/p>\n
(h), (i),  (ii) and (j) though they do not mention that they
\nare illustrative  of the power to regulate impliedly partake
\nof the\tcharacter of  that power.  If the  contention of the
\nlearned counsel were to be accepted, it would imply that the
\nCentral Government  derives its power under sub-s. (1) of s.
\n3 of  the Act as the power to promulgate any order providing
\nfor regulating\tor prohibiting\tthe production,\t supply\t and
\ndistribution of,  and trade  and commerce  in, any essential
\ncommodity insofar as it appears necessary or expedient so to
\ndo, for\t maintaining or\t increasing supplies or for securing
\ntheir  equitable   distribution\t and  availability  at\tfair
\nprices. If  the Central\t Government were  to make  an  order
\nunder sub-s.  (1) in respect of the matters specified in cl.\n<\/p>\n
(d), it\t may not  only\tregulate  or  control  the  storage,
\ntransport,  distribution  etc.\tOf  an\tessential  commodity
\nincluding the
\n1044<\/span>
\nmovement of such foodstuffs by grant of licenses, permits or
\notherwise, but\talso place  a ban  on the  movement of wheat
\nfrom one  place to  another; but  the State Government under
\ncl. (d) has only a regulatory power in relation thereto i.e.
\nto make\t an order  only for regulating the movement of wheat
\nfrom one  place to another by issue of the permits, licenses
\nor otherwise  as provided for by cl. 3 of the impugned Order
\nbut could  not have  issued cl.\t 3 (IA)\t placing  a  ban  on
\nmovement of  wheat from\t one place  to another.\t Although by
\nforce of logic one may be driven to that conclusion that the
\nState Government  has  power  to  promulgate  cl  3  of\t the
\nimpugned Order but not cl. 3 (IA), there is no reason for us
\nto give\t such a restrictive meaning to the word ‘regulating’
\nappearing in  cl. (d)  of sub-s.  (2) of s. 3 of the Act. it
\nwould seem  that the  rule of construction is clearly y-well
\nrecognized that\t a word\t may be used in two different senses
\nin the same section of an Act.\n<\/p>\n
      The  world  ‘regulation’\thas  not  that\trigidity  of
\nmoaning as  never to take in ‘prohibition’. I must depend on
\nthe context  in which  it is  used in  the statute  and\t the
\nobject sought  to be achieved by the legislation. For a time
\ndifferent views\t were expressed\t on the question whether the
\nword  ‘regulation’   in\t Art.\t19(2)  to   19(6)   includes
\n‘prohibition’ till  the Court  in Narendra Kumar v. Union of
\nIndia<\/a>(1) answered it in the affirmative.\n<\/p>\n
       Shri  P.\t Govindan  Nair,  learned  counsel  for\t the
\nappellant however contends that the word ‘regulation’ should
\nnot   be    confused   with   the   expression\t ‘reasonable
\nrestrictions’  occurring   in  Art.  19(2)  to\t(6)  of\t the
\nConstitution and  therefore the\t view  t-taken\tin  Narendra
\nKumar’s case  is not  applicable. According to him, the word
\n‘regulation’ in cl. (d) of sub-. (2) of s. 3 of the Act does
\nnot take  in ‘prohibition’.  He seeks  to draw a distinction
\nbetween prohibition  or prevention  o-certain activities and
\ntheir regulation  or governance.  It is said that a power to
\nregulate or  govern would  imply continued existence of that
\nwhich is to be regulated or governed; and to be inconsistent
\nwith absolute  prohibition. He\ttherefore submits that cl. 3
\n(IA)  of  the  Order  was  ultra  vires\t because  the  State
\nGovernment had\tonly power under cl. (d) of sub-s, (2) of s.
\n3 of the Act to regulate production, supply and distribution
\nof, and\t trade and  commerce in,  essential commodities like
\nfoodstuffs by
\n\t (1) [1960] 2 SCR 361.\n<\/p>\n
1045<\/span><\/p>\n
grant\tof    permits,\t  licenses    or    otherwise,\t  in
\ncontradistinction to  the A  power of the Central Government
\nunder sub-s.  (1) of  s. 3  to\tregulate  or  prohibit\tsuch
\nproduction,  supply  and  distribution\tof,  and  trade\t and
\ncommerce in, essential commodities.\n<\/p>\n
      Learned  counsel for  the appellant placed reliance on
\nthe decision  of the  Allahabad High  Court in\tSuraj Bhan’s
\ncase which  proceeds Upon  a decision of this Court in State
\nof Mysore  v. Sanjeeviah<\/a>(1)  holding that  power to regulate
\ndoes  not   include  power   to\t prohibit  or  restrict.  In
\nSanjeeviah’s case,  the question  arose whether two provisos
\nframed by  the State  Government under\ts. 37  of the Mysore
\nForest Act,  1900 which\t empowered the\tmaking of  rules  to
\nregulate the transit of forest produce which placed absolute
\nprohibition against transportation of forest produce between
\nsunset and  sunrise and\t a qualified  prohibition in certain
\ncircumstances, was beyond the rule-making power of the State
\nGovernment. The\t contention on behalf of the State was. that
\nthe  two   provisos  were  regulatory  and  prohibitory-  In
\nrepelling the contention, the Court observed:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t “The power  which the\tState Government may
\n     exercise is  the power  to regulate transport of forest
\n     produce, and  not the  power to  prohibit\tor  restrict
\n     transport. Prima  facie, a rule which totally prohibits
\n     movement of  forest produce  during the  period between
\n     sunset and sunrise is prohibitory or restrictive of the
\n     right to transport forest produce.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      These  observations  do  not  lay\t down  any  rule  of
\nuniversal application.\n<\/p>\n
       The  word  ‘regulation’\tcannot\thave  any  rigid  or
\ninflexible meaning  as to  exclude ‘prohibition’.  The\tword
\n‘regulate’ is  difficult to  define as\thaving\tany  precise
\nmeaning. It  is a  word of  broad  import,  having  a  broad
\nmeaning, and  is very  comprehensive in\t scope. There  is  a
\ndiversity of  opinion as  to its meaning and its application
\nto a  particular state\tof facts,  some Courts giving to the
\nterm a\tsomewhat restricted,  and  others  giving  to  it  a
\nliberal, construction.\tThe different  shades of meaning are
\nbrought out in Corpus Juris Secundum, vol. 76 at p. 611:
\n\t (1) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 361,
\n1046<\/span>
\n\t       “Regulate” is variously defined as meaning to
\n     adjust; to adjust; order, or govern by rule, method, or
\n     established mode; to adjust or control by rule, method,
\n     or established  mode, or  governing principles or laws:
\n     to govern\tto govern  by rule; to govern by, or subject
\n     to, certain  rules or restrictions; to govern or direct
\n     according to  rule; to  control, govern,  or direct  by
\n     rule or regulations.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t “Regulate” is\talso defined  as meaning  to
\n     direct; to\t direct by rule or restriction; to direct or
\n     manage according  to certain standards, laws, or rules;
\n     to rule;  to conduct; to fix or establish; to restrain;
\n     to restrict.”\n<\/p>\n
       See   also:   Webster’s\t Third\t New   International
\nDictionary, vol.  II, p. 1913 and Shorter Oxford Dictionary,
\nVol. II, 3rd edn., p. 1784.\n<\/p>\n
      It has often been said that the power to regulate does
\nnot  necessarily   include  the\t  power\t to   prohibit,\t and
\nordinarily the\tword ‘regulate’\t is not\t synonymous with the
\nword ‘prohibit’.  This is true in a general sense and in the
\nsense that  mere regulation  is not  the  same\tas  absolute
\nprohibition. At the same time, the power to regulate carries
\nwith it\t full power over the thing subject to regulation and
\nin absence  of restrictive words, the power must be regarded
\nas plenary  over the  entire subject It implies the power to
\nrule, direct  and control,  and involves  the adoption\tof a
\nrule or guiding principle to be followed, or the making of a
\nrule with respect to the subject to be regulated. ‘the power
\nto regulate  implies the  power to  check and  may imply the
\npower to  prohibit under certain circumstances, as where the
\nbest or\t only efficacious regulation consists of suppression
\nIt would  therefore appear that the word ‘regulation’ cannot
\nhave any inflexible meaning as to exclude ‘prohibition’. let
\nhas different  shades of  meaning and  must take  its colour
\nfrom the  context in  which it\tis used having regard to the
\npurpose and  object of\tthe legislation,  and the Court must
\nnecessarily keep  in view the mischief which the legislature
\nseeks to remedy.\n<\/p>\n
      The  question essentially\t is one\t of degree and it is
\nimpossible to  fix any\tdefinite point at which ‘regulation’
\nends  and   ‘prohibition’  begins.  We\tmay  illustrate\t how
\ndifferent minds\t have differently  reacted as to the meaning
\nof the\tword ‘regulate’ depending on the context in which it
\nis used and the purpose and object of the legislation
\n1047<\/span>
\nIn Slattery  v. Naylor,(l)  the question  arose\t before\t the
\nJudicial Committee of the Privy Council whether a bye-law by
\nreason\tof   its  prohibition  internment  altogether  in  a
\nparticular cemetry,  was ultra\tvires because  the Municipal
\nCouncil had only power of regulating internments whereas the
\nbye-law totally\t prohibited them in the cemetry in question,
\nand it was said by Lord Hobhouse, delivering the judgment of
\nthe Privy Council:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t “A rule  or bye-law cannot be held as ultra
\n     vires merely  because it  prohibits where\tempowered to
\n     regulate, as regulation often involved prohibition.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      In  contrast in  Municipal Corporation  of the City of
\nToronto v.  Virgo,(2) where  the question  for decision\t was
\nwhether a  section or  a bye-law  prohibiting  hawkers\tfrom
\nplying their  trade, was competently and validity made, Lord
\nDavey delivering  the judgment\tof the\tPrivy Council  while
\nlaying down that a power to make a bye law to ‘regulate’ and
\n‘govern’ a  trade does not authorize the prohibition of such
\ntrade, and added:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t “There is  a marked distinction between the
\n     prohibition or prevention of a trade and the regulation
\n     or governance  of it, and, indeed, a power to regulate’
\n     and ‘govern’  seems to imply the continued existence of
\n     that which is to be regulated or governed.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      The predominant object of the Act, as reflected in the
\npreamble is  to provide,  in the  interests of\tthe  general
\npublic, for  the  control  of  the  production,\t supply\t and
\ndistribution  of,   and\t trade\t and  commerce\tin,  certain
\nessential  commodities.\t It  is\t a  piece  of  socioeconomic
\nlegislation enacted  in\t the  national\tinterest  to  secure
\ncontrol over the production, supply and distribution of, and
\ntrade and  commerce in,\t essential commodities.\t The various
\nControl Orders\tissued by the Central Government under sub-s
\n(1) of\ts. 3 of the Act or by the State Government under s 3
\nread with  s. 5\t have introduced  a  system  of\t checks\t and
\nbalances to  achieve the  object of  the legislation i.e. to
\nensure equitable  distribution and availability of essential
\ncommodities at\tfair prices.  Special public  interest in an
\nindustry e.g.  that it\tis engaged  in the  production of  a
\ncommodity,
\n      (1) LR [1888] AC 446
\n\t (2) LR [1896] AC 88
\n1048<\/span>
\nvitally\t essential   to\t the   community,  may\tjustify\t the
\nregulation of  its production,\tsupply and  distribution and
\nits trade  and commerce,  provided such\t regulation  is\t not
\narbitrary and has a rational nexus with the object sought to
\nbe achieved.\n<\/p>\n
     the power\tto  regulate  or  prohibit  the\t production,
\nsupply and  distribution of,  and  trade  and  commerce\t in,
\nessential commodities  may be exercised in innumerable ways.
\nOne of the ways in which such regulation or control over the
\nproduction,  supply  and  distribution\tof,  and  trade\t and
\ncommerce in,  an essential  commodity like foodstuffs may be
\nexercised by  placing a\t ban on\t inter Slate  or inter-State
\nmovement of  foodstuffs to  ensure that\t the excess stock of
\nfoodstuffs held\t by a  wholesale dealer, commission agent or
\nretailer is  not transported  to places outside the State or
\nfrom one  district to  another with  a view  to maximize the
\nprocurement of\tsuch foodstuffs\t from  the  growers  in\t the
\nsurplus areas  for  their  equitable  distribution  at\tfair
\nprices in  the deficit\tareas. The  placing of\tsuch ban  on
\nexport of  foodstuffs across  the State\t or from one part of
\nthe State  to another  with a  view to\tprevent\t outflow  of
\nfoodstuffs from\t a State  which is  a surplus State prevents
\nthe spiral  in\tprices\tof  such  foodstuffs  by  artificial
\ncreation of  shortage  by  unscrupulous\t traders.  But\tsuch
\ncontrol can be exercised in a variety of ways otherwise than
\nby placing compulsory levy on the producers, for example, by
\nfixing a controlled price for foodstuffs, by placing a limit
\non the stock of foodstuffs to be held by a wholesale dealer,
\ncommission agent,  or retailer,\t by prohibiting sales except
\nin certain  specified manner,  etc. These  are\tnothing\t but
\nregulatory measures.\n<\/p>\n
       We   find  no   lawful  justification  for  giving  a
\nrestricted meaning  to the  word ‘regulating’  in cl. (d) of
\nsub  s.\t (2)  of  s.  3\t of  the  Act  as  not\tto  take  in
\nprohibiting’. In  State of  Tamil Nadu v. M\/S Hind Stone and
\nOrs.<\/a>(‘) Chinnappa  Reddy,  J.  referred\t with  approval\t the
\nobservations of\t Mathew, J.  in G.K.  Krishnan v.  State  of
\nTamil Nadu<\/a>(2)  laying down that the word ‘regulation’ has no
\nfixed connotation  and that its meaning differs according to
\nthe nature  of that,  thing to\twhich  it  is  applied.\t The
\nlearned Judge also observed:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “In modern statutes concerned as they are with
\n     economic and  social activities,  ‘regulation’ must, of
\n     necessity,
\n      (1) [l981] 2 SCC 205
\n\t (2) [1975] 2 SCR 715
\n1049<\/span>
\n\t\t receive so  wide an inter-pretation that in
\n     certain situations,  A it\tmust exclude  competition to
\n     the public sector from the private sector. More so in a
\n     welfare State.  It was pointed out by the Privy Council
\n     in Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South wales
\n     [1949] 2  All. ER\t755 (PC)-and  we agree with what was
\n     stated therein-that  the problem  whether an  enactment
\n     was  regulatory   or  something   more  or\t  whether  a
\n     restriction  was\tdirect\tor   only  remote   or\tonly
\n     incidental involved,  not so  much legal  as political,
\n     social or\teconomic consideration and that it could not
\n     be\t laid  down  that  in  no  circumstances  could\t the
\n     exclusion of  competition so  as to  create a monopoly,
\n     either  in\t  a  State   or\t Commonwealth\tagency,\t  be
\n     justified.”
\n      In  Krishan Lal  Praveen Kumar  &\t Ors-  v.  State  of
\nRajasthan & Ors.,<\/a>(l) Suraj Mal kailash Chand & ors. v. Union
\nof India & Ors.,(a) and Bishamber Dayal Chandra Mohan & Ors.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
v. State  of U.P.  & Ors.(3)  the  Court  has  held  that  a
\nrestriction placed  on movement\t of wheat  from one State to
\nanother and\/on\tmovement  of  wheat  from  one\tdistrict  to
\nanother under  cl. (d)\tof sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act, to
\nbe regulatory in character.\n<\/p>\n
      Surely  when a  part of  the  country  is\t verging  on
\nconditions of  acute shortage or even famine, it is expected
\nof the\tgovernment to  procure foodstuffs from surplus areas
\nand transport the same for distribution in deficit areas. [D
\nthe State  of Tamil  Nadu like\tsome other  States, the\t two
\nthings most  essential for  the sustenance of human life are
\nrice and  paddy. It  is amply borne out from the material on
\nrecord that  due to  the failure of the southwest and north-
\neast monsoons  in successive  years, and the consequent poor
\nrainfall, there\t was a steep fall in production of paddy. In
\nthe  circumstances,   the  State  Government  had  no  other
\nalternative not\t only to  reimpose compulsory  levy  on\t the
\nproducers of  paddy to\tthe extent  of\t50%%,  but  also  to
\nintroduce a  scheme for\t a monopoly purchase of paddy by the
\nGovernment with\t a view\t to build  up its  buffer stock\t for
\ndistribution through the public distribution
\n      (1) 11981] 4 SCC 550
\n\t (2) [1981] 4 SCC 554
\n\t (3) [1982] I SCR 137
\n1050<\/span>
\nsystem throughout  the State.  If one  part of\tthe State is
\nfaced with a famine or even acute shortage of foodstuffs, it
\nis not unreasonable for the Government to acquire foodstuffs
\nfrom the  surplus areas\t and distribute\t the same  in  areas
\nwhere they  are most needed. The source of power to issue an
\norder under  cl.. (d) of sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act being
\nrelatable tot  he general  powers of  the Central Government
\nunder sub-s.  (1) of s. 3, there is no reason for us to give
\na restricted  meaning to the word ‘regulating’ in cl. (d) of
\nsub-s. (2)  of s.  3 of\t the  Act  so  as  not\tto  take  in
\nprohibiting’.\n<\/p>\n
     For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal must fail.\n<\/p>\n
 A.P.J.\t\t\t\t\t   Appeal dismissed.\n1051<\/span>\n\n\n\n<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India K.Ramanathan vs State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr on 27 February, 1985 Equivalent citations: 1985 AIR 660, 1985 SCR (2)1028 Author: A Sen Bench: Sen, A.P. (J) PETITIONER: K.RAMANATHAN Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ANR. DATE OF JUDGMENT27\/02\/1985 BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) VARADARAJAN, A. (J) […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-78822","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nK.Ramanathan vs State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr on 27 February, 1985 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/k-ramanathan-vs-state-of-tamil-nadu-anr-on-27-february-1985\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"K.Ramanathan vs State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr on 27 February, 1985 - 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