{"id":79648,"date":"2003-12-11T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-12-10T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003"},"modified":"2014-07-31T11:12:42","modified_gmt":"2014-07-31T05:42:42","slug":"madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003","title":{"rendered":"Madura Coats Limited vs The Presiding Officer on 11 December, 2003"},"content":{"rendered":"
Madras High Court<\/div>\n
Madura Coats Limited vs The Presiding Officer on 11 December, 2003<\/div>\n
       \n\n  \n\n  \n\n \n \n IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS\n\nDated: 11\/12\/2003\n\nCoram\n\nThe Honourable Mr.  Justice V.S.  SIRPURKAR\nand\nThe Honourable Mr. Justice N. KANNADASAN\n\nW.A. No.721 OF 1999\n\n\nMadura Coats Limited\nAmbasamudram\nrep. by its Group Industrial\nRelations Manager               ...             Appellant\n\n-Vs-\n\n1.  The Presiding Officer\n    Principal Labour Court\n    Madurai\n\n2.  S. Ramaswamy                ...        Respondents\n\n\nAppeal under Cl.15 of the Letters Patent against the order\ndated 8-3-1999 in W.P.  No.7063 of 1991\n\n!For Appellant          ::  Mr.  Sanjay Mohan, for\n                        M\/s.  Ramasubramanianm and\n                        Associates\n\n^For Respondents ::  Mr.  Viduthalai for R2\n\n:JUDGMENT\n<\/pre>\n
V.S.  SIRPURKAR, J.\n<\/p>\n
                An order passed by the learned single  Judge,  confirming  the
\norder  passed  by  the  Principal  Labour  Court is the subject-matter of this
\nappeal.\n<\/p>\n
                2.  Two applications came to be filed  by  the  Management  of
\nMadurai  Coats  Limited  (in  short  ‘the Management’) against one Murugan and
\nRamasamy, under the provisions of Sec.33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes  Act
\n(in short  ‘the  I.D.    Act’), for approval of their action of dismissing the
\nsaid two employees.  In this appeal, we are concerned only with Ramasamy.  The
\nsaid approval was refused by the Labour Court.\n<\/p>\n
                3.  The case of the Management, in  short,  was  that  a  show
\ncause notice under Sec.20(1)(d) of the Company’s Standing Order, dated 27-6-19
\n86, was served on the respondent and he was placed under suspension.  A charge
\nsheet  came  to be served in which, it was alleged that the workman along with
\none Murugan, either jointly or independently, stolen three  new  transformers.
\nThe cost of the three transformers being Rs.450\/-.\n<\/p>\n
        3.1.   An  enquiry  ensued against him and in that enquiry, the charge
\nagainst him was held to be proved.  He was dismissed from service, considering
\nhis past record with effect from 29-12-1986.\n<\/p>\n
        3.2.  An application came to be filed under Sec.33(2)(b) of  the  I.D.
\nAct,  for  seeking approval of the dismissal since there was already a dispute
\npending between the Union and the Management vide I.D.  No.1  of  1985.    The
\nsaid  incident of theft had come to light because one Murugan was caught while
\ncarrying the transformers and when questioned, he had implicated  the  present
\nrespondent  Ramasamy,  suggesting  that  it  was  Ramasamy  who  had given the
\ntransformers to him.  The enquiry proceeded against both the  workmen  and  as
\nsuggested  earlier, the present respondent was found guilty along with Murugan
\nand both were dismissed.  Two approval petitions, therefore, came to be  filed
\nseparately.\n<\/p>\n
        3.3.  The Presiding Officer of the Special Industrial Tribunal, before
\nwhom the said approval applications were pending, held that the enquiry itself
\nwas  not  proper  and  prejudice  was  caused to the workmen on account of the
\ndefective charge.\n<\/p>\n
        3.4.  After this, the Management took a peculiar step of holding a  de
\nnovo enquiry.    They revoked the dismissal order against the respondent, paid
\nthe respondent full salary from the  date  of  suspension  till  the  date  of
\nrevoking  the dimissal order and issued a fresh show cause notice on 27-6-1996
\nunder Sec.20(1)(d).  It was  alleged  that  the  workman  along  with  Murugan
\njointly or  independently stolen three transformers.  Similar charge-sheet was
\nserved on Murugan also and ultimately a common enquiry was again held  against
\nboth.\n<\/p>\n
        3.5.   The  Management examined five witnesses, including the one, who
\nhad seen Murugan carrying the parcel.  He also deposed that  when  questioned,
\nMurugan  admitted  that  the  three  new  transformers  were  given  to him by
\nRamasamy, the present respondent.  On the basis of the evidence of  the  other
\nwitnesses,  the  enquiry  officer  came to the conclusion that both Murugan as
\nwell as the present respondent were guilty of theft and they were  ordered  to
\nbe dismissed by the order dated 29-12-1986.\n<\/p>\n
        3.6.   Again  the  approval  was  sought before the Labour Court under
\nSec.33(2)(b) of the I.D.  Act, which was numbered as A.P.  No.36 of 1987.   It
\nseems  that  Murugan was not interested and he has compromised the matter with
\nthe Management.  The Labour Court again refused to grant the approval  against
\nwhich,  the Management p roceeded to file a writ petition, which was dismissed
\nby the learned single Judge, necessitating the present appeal.\n<\/p>\n
                4.  Shri Sanjay Mohan, learned counsel appearing on behalf  of
\nthe  Management,  contends  that  the  order  passed  by  the  Labour Court is
\ncompletely without jurisdiction.  Considering the language of  Sec.33(2)(  b),
\nhe  points out that the jurisdiction was not an appellate jurisdiction and the
\nonly task of the court under Sec.33(2)(b) was to see whether there was a prima
\nfacie case for dismissal and in  that  the  court  could  interfere  with  the
\nfindings  of  the  enquiry  officer  only  if  the  findings  are perverse and
\nunsupported by evidence.  He points out that the Labour Court had exceeded the
\njurisdiction and has almost acted  as  an  appellate  authority  and  recorded
\ncontrary findings  to  the  findings  given  in the domestic enquiry.  Learned
\ncounsel  further  suggests  that  the  learned  single  Judge  has  also   not
\nappreciated  this  error of jurisdiction committed by the labour court and has
\nmechanically confirmed the finding, which was also  an  incorrect  finding  of
\nfact on merits.\n<\/p>\n
                5.   We  were  taken  through the order of the Labour Court in
\nextenso and were also taken through the evidence.\n<\/p>\n
                6.   As  against  this,  Shri  Viduthalai,   learned   counsel
\nappearing  on  behalf  of the respondent-workman, suggests that a full-fledged
\nenquiry was completed, culminating into the order of dismissal.   An  approval
\nwas  sought  to  be  obtained in respect of that order of dismissal and it was
\nrefused.  Learned counsel pointed out that the  order  of  the  tribunal,  who
\nrefused  the  approval, remained unchallenged and became final and, therefore,
\nunder the circumstances, the second enquiry on the  same  incident,  with  the
\nsame  witnesses,  could  not have been conducted and the dismissal order could
\nnot have been passed and further  no  such  approval  could  be  sought  under
\nSec.33(2)(b).   Learned  counsel  further  argues  that  it  is  now a settled
\nposition in law by the  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  that  such  second
\nopportunity cannot be given to the Management to hold successive enquiries and
\neventually to  seek successive approvals.  Learned counsel, however, said that
\neven otherwise, it cannot be said that the Tribunal had in any manner exceeded
\nits jurisdiction under Sec.33(2)(b).\n<\/p>\n
                7.  Sec.3(3(2)(b) reads as under:\n<\/p>\n
“33.  Conditions  of  service,  etc.    to  remain  unchanged  under   certain
\ncircumstances during pendency of proceedings<\/p>\n
        (1) Not relevant
\n        (2)  During  the  pendency  of  any  such  proceeding in respect of an
\nindustrial dispute, the employer  may,  in  accordance  with  standing  orders
\napplicable  to a workman concerned in such dispute or, where there are no such
\nstanding orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express
\nor implied, between him and the workman-\n<\/p>\n
        (a) not relevant\n<\/p>\n
        (b) for any misconduct not connected with the   dispute, discharge  or
\npunish, whether by
\ndismissal or otherwise, that workman:\n<\/p>\n
PROVIDED  that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has
\nbeen paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer
\nto the authority before which the proceeding is pending for  approval  of  the
\naction taken by the employer.”\n<\/p>\n
                8.   Since, Shri Viduthalai, has raised an objection regarding
\nthe tenability of the second disciplinary enquiry and  the  consequent  second
\napplication  for  approval  under Sec.33(2)(b), it will be better to see as to
\nwhether such second application was at all possible in law.  Shri  Viduthalai,
\nvery  heavily  relies  on  the  two judgments of the Supreme Court, they being
\nSTATE OF ASSAM v.  J.N.  ROY BISWAS (AIR<\/a> 1975 SC 2277); and UNION OF INDIA  v.
\nK.D.  PANDEY AND ANOTHER<\/a> (2003 -3- LLJ 557).\n<\/p>\n
                9.   In the first aforementioned decision, the learned counsel
\nrelies on the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraphs 3  and  4  which
\nsuggest  that  it  is  a  settled  law  that  where  a first enquiry against a
\nGovernment servant is found bad on account of  some  technical  or  procedural
\ngrounds, the  second  enquiry  cannot  at  all be launched.  The Supreme Court
\nsuggests that  the  second  enquiry  can  be  launched.    However,  where   a
\ndisciplinary  case  has been closed, the official reinstated on account of his
\nfull exoneration, the Government cannot re-start the exercise in  the  absence
\nof a specific power to review or revise vested by the rules in some authority.
\nLearned  counsel  points  out  that  there  was  no  such  authority here and,
\ntherefore, the second enquiry could not have been held.    These  observations
\nwere  made in respect of a Government servant and that too, in connection with
\nArt.311 of the Constitution of India.  However, the general principle  therein
\nhas  to be noted that there has to be a specific power in the rules to start a
\nfresh enquiry where the first enquiry has been held to be bad.\n<\/p>\n
                10.  The next case relied upon by Shri Viduthalai  is  also  a
\ncase  of  a  domestic  enquiry  where the Supreme Court has held that a second
\nenquiry, on the same set of charges and material on record, was impermissible.
\nThis was a case under the labour jurisdiction where  the  Industrial  Tribunal
\npassed an award setting aside the order of dismissal of a workman and directed
\nthe reinstatement.   The Railway board, which was the employer, challenged the
\naward in the writ petition.  However, that was dismissed.    These  concurrent
\norders were  challenged.    While  dismissing  the  appeal,  the Supreme Court
\nobserved in paragraph 5 as follows:\n<\/p>\n
“In fact, from the order made by the Railway Board as well as from  that  part
\nof  the  file  where the inquiry report made earlier is discussed, it is clear
\nthat specific findings have been given in respect of each of the charges after
\ndiscussing the matter and, if that is so, we fail  to  understand  as  to  how
\nthere  could  have  been a remit to the inquiry authority for further inquiry.
\nIndeed this resulted in second inquiry and not in a further  inquiry  on  same
\nset of  charges  and  the  material on record.  If this process is allowed the
\ninquiries can go on perpetually until the view of the inquiry authority is  in
\naccord  with  that  of  the  disciplinary  authority and would be abuse of the
\nprocess of law.  …  …  …”\n<\/p>\n
Learned counsel very heavily relies on this judgment  to  suggest  that  there
\ncannot be a fresh enquiry on the same charges and on the same set of facts.\n<\/p>\n
                11.   The third decision relied upon by the learned counsel in
\nINDIAN TELEPHONE INDUSTRIES LIMITED AND ANOTHER v.  PRABHAKAR H.  MANJARE  AND
\nANOTHER<\/a>  (2002  (4) CTC 748) is also of the Supreme Court wherein the question
\nof the second application for approval came directly for  consideration.    It
\nwould be  interesting  to  note  the facts.  The workman in this case was kept
\nunder suspension and was  thereafter  dismissed.    The  employer  sought  the
\napproval of the dismissal under Sec.33(2)( b).  It was held that the dismissal
\nwas  invalid  for  non-compliance of the provisions of Sec.33(2)(b) of the Act
\nsince the  wages  for  one  month  were  not  paid.    This   order   remained
\nunchallenged.   The  Management  treated  this  non-compliance  to  be  a mere
\ntechnical breach and, therefore, passed orders of  dismissal  for  the  second
\ntime  without any further or fresh enquiry and without paying the wages to the
\nrespondents for the period from the first dismissal order to the date when the
\nsecond dismissal order was passed.  Again an application came to be moved  for
\napproval of the orders of dismissal.  This time, however, the Tribunal granted
\nthe  approval,  relying  on  the  Supreme  Court  judgment in PUNJAB BEVERAGES
\nPRIVATE LIMITED, CHANDIGARH v.  SURESH CHAND AND ANOTHER<\/a> (1978 (2)  SCC  144).
\nThe order of the Tribunal was upheld by the High Court.  However, the Division
\nBench  allowed the appeals and set aside the order of the learned single Judge
\nand held that the  second  application  of  approval  was  not  possible  more
\nparticularly in view of the fact that the order refusing the first application
\nfor approval  which  remained  unchallenged.    Learned  counsel  invited  our
\nattention to the following observations in paragraph 9 of this judgment:
\n“Having not challenged the earlier order dated 1-9-1987, it was  not  open  to
\nthe petitioners to make a second application seeking approval for the order of
\ndismissal of the respondent, that too without paying full wages.  The Division
\nBench  of the High Court has found that the second order of dismissal amounted
\nto unfair labour practice and victimization.  The Tribunal was  not  justified
\nin  allowing the second application seeking approval by ignoring the dismissal
\nof the earlier application made by the management for  non-compliance  of  the
\nmandatory provisions  of  law.   The Tribunal proceeded on the ground that the
\nearlier application was not decided on merits and held that it was open to the
\npetitioners to file a second application.  This is  clearly  contrary  to  the
\ndecision of  the  Constitution  Bench.   It appears to us that the petitioners
\ndesigned to defeat the claim of the respondents by making a second application
\nwhen the order suffered by them on the first application had become final.”
\nThe learned counsel, therefore, very forcefully  argues  that  this  decision,
\nwhich  was  following  the  decision  of the Constitution Bench in JAIPUR ZILA
\nSAHAKARI BHOOMI VIKAS BANK LTD.  v.  RAM GOPAL SHARMA AND OTHERS<\/a> (2002 (2) SCC\n<\/p>\n
244) is the final word on the issue and,  therefore,  the  second  application
\nitself could not have been made particularly because the first order, refusing
\nthe approval was suffered by the Management by not challenging the same.\n<\/p>\n
                12.   Shri  Sanjay  Mohan  tried  to get out this situation by
\npressing a very novel argument.  According to the learned counsel, firstly the
\njudgment did not apply on facts and secondly, the ratio of  the  judgment  was
\nnot   as   was   being   interpreted   by   the   learned   counsel   for  the
\nrespondent-workman.  Learned counsel points out that it  is  not  specifically
\nheld by  the  Supreme  Court that a second enquiry is not possible at all.  He
\npoints out that in that instant case, the first application for  approval  was
\nrejected  as  Sec.33(2)(b)  was  not followed since one month’s salary was not
\ngiven to the employee and thereafter also, there was no  second  enquiry  held
\nbut only a second application came to be made on the fresh order of dismis sal
\npassed  after  having  complied  with  the  condition  of payment of one month
\nsalary.  It was under those circumstances,  the  Supreme  Court  came  to  the
\nconclusion that  the  second  application  was  not possible.  Learned counsel
\nfurther argues that in this case, after the first enquiry was rejected on  the
\ntechnical ground of defect in the charge and the manner of enquiry, it was for
\nthe  Management  to  hold  a  proper  enquiry as even the same could have been
\nproved before the Member of the Tribunal also.  Learned counsel makes  out  as
\nif  instead of proving the charge, or leading evidence in support of it before
\nthe Tribunal, the Management had chosen to hold  an  independent  enquiry  and
\nthat  too  after  paying  the  salary  for  the  interregnum  period and after
\nreinstating the workman and, therefore, there was nothing wrong if the  second
\nenquiry was  conducted  though  with an amended charge and procedure.  Learned
\ncounsel heavily relied on paragraph 8 where the Supreme Court had  found  that
\nthe  earlier judgment, refusing the approval by the Tribunal, had become final
\nand, therefore, the dismissal of the employee therein, had become void and yet<\/p>\n
the second  order  came  to  be  passed  without  paying  the  wages  for  the
\ninterregnum  period  between  the  first  and  the  second order of dismissal.
\nLearned counsel urged that such was not the case in the present situation.\n<\/p>\n
                13.  It is no doubt true  that  in  the  present  matter,  the
\nworkman  has  been  given  his  wages  and his dismissal order also came to be
\nwithdrawn and only thereafter  the  fresh  dismissal  order  has  been  given.
\nHowever, the ratio does not appear to be permitting the second enquiry and the
\nsecond  application for approval where the first enquiry was rendered null and
\nvoid on account of  the  technical  defects.    The  Supreme  Court  has  very
\ncategorically  stated  in  paragraph  9  that  the  Tribunal had held that the
\nearlier application was not decided  on  merits  and,  therefore,  the  second
\napplication was  possible.  The Supreme Court found that the view expressed by
\nthe Tribunal is contrary to the decision of the Constitution Bench  in  JAIPUR
\nZILA SAHAKARI  BHOOMI  VIKAS  BANK  case,  cited  supra.    The Supreme Court,
\nthereafter also points out that making a second application for approval, even
\nafter suffering the first order of refusal, amounted to a design to defeat the
\nclaim of the workman.  We have deliberately quoted  the  observations  of  the
\nSupreme Court  in  the earlier part of the judgment.  Those observations would
\nsuggest that the Supreme Court did not permit the second application where the
\ndecision refusing the approval of the first application remained unchallenged.
\nThe situation is no different in our case.  Here also, the first order of  the
\nTribunal has actually remained unchallenged.\n<\/p>\n
                14.   We  have  closely  gone through the order of the Special
\nIndustrial Tribunal wherefrom it can be seen that the approval was not refused
\nmerely for the technical reasons  of  the  defects  in  enquiry.    There  are
\nspecific findings  in  that  judgment  touching the merits of the matter.  The
\nTribunal in that case first criticised holding of the separate enquiry against
\nMurugan and Ramasamy, respondent herein.  It pointed out that while the charge
\nagainst Murugan that he alone had committed the theft of transformers and  had
\nattempted to remove from the factory, there was also a charge against Ramasamy
\nsimilar  in  the  nature  and  the  charges  against both the delinquents were
\nmutually exclusive.  The labour court  had  also  found  that  very  strangely
\nMurugan,  who  was  himself allegedly caught with the stolen transformers, was
\nalso used as a witness against Ramasamy while he himself was facing the charge
\nof theft separately where he alone was  alleged  to  be  responsible  for  the
\ntheft.  There is a specific reference made to the admission made by Murugan in
\nhis statement and the finding is in the following words:
\n“I  need  only  add,  that such evidence of the delinquent Murugan is the only
\npiece of evidence to connect the delinquent  Ramasamy  with  the  incident  of
\ntheft and the attempted removal of transformers from the mill premises.  I may
\nat  once  point  out,  that  in  its  earliest  statement  (Ex.M-17)  the said
\ndelinquent Murugan had stated, that he had implicated delinquent Ramasamy only
\nwith a view to offer some explanation to the Sub Manager, in the event of  the
\nlatter questioning him as to how he came to possess the transformers recovered
\nfrom him.    If  the  above detailed facts are given due credence, it would be
\nclear that the action of the Management in not arraying both  the  delinquents
\nin a single proceeding had very much prejudiced the defence of the delinquents
\nand  had even occasioned the framing of mutually contradictory charges against
\nboth the delinquents.”\n<\/p>\n
Ultimately, the learned Member gave a finding at the end of paragraph  7  that
\nby  such  mishandling  by  the  Management  in  initiating and prosecuting the
\ndisciplinary proceedings against the two  delinquents,  they  had  suffered  a
\nprejudice in their defence.\n<\/p>\n
                15.   The  Tribunal  also  found fault with a very significant
\nfact wherein it was shown as if the order of dismissal was made  on  25-1-1986
\nwhereas,  the findings of the enquiry officer were, however, dated 28-1 -1986.
\nThe Tribunal also gave a finding that an attempt on the part of the Management
\nto suggest that it was merely a mistake and  in  fact,  the  findings  of  the
\nenquiry  officer were actually given only on 25-1-1986 was also futile because
\nthe version of the witnesses examined was wholly unacceptable to the  Tribunal
\nthereby  the Tribunal clearly held that there was an element of victimiza tion
\nand that even before the findings were received by the disciplinary authority,
\nthe order of dismissal, however, was ready and issued.\n<\/p>\n
                16.  The Tribunal also scoffed at the fact that the  order  of
\nthe enquiry officer was not on his own but, he had also sought the approval of
\nhis finding  by  the  law  officer  of  the  employer.  Thus, the Tribunal had
\nactually come to the conclusion that the findings of the enquiry officer  were
\nnot  worthy the paper on which they were written and they did not amount to an
\nindependent judgment of the  enquiry  officer  but  were  the  views  and  the
\nopinions of  the  law  officer  of the employer.  In fact, that was found as a
\ndefinite design to implicate the workman somehow or the other.\n<\/p>\n
                17.  This judgment has remained unchallenged  admittedly  and,
\ntherefore,  it  is obvious that the Management has accepted by not challenging
\nthis judgment.  It cannot be said under the  circumstances  that  the  earlier
\napproval was rejected only on technical grounds of defects in the inquiry.  We
\nfind  that  even in the present enquiry, the same Murugan, who has compromised
\nhis dispute with the Management, was examined as a witness against the present
\nrespondent-workman on the basis of which, a fresh order of dismissal had  been
\npassed against the workman.  We cannot, therefore, accept the argument of Shri
\nSanjay  Mohan  that  the  first enquiry was rejected on technical grounds and,
\ntherefore, the second enquiry was possible.    We  have  not  been  shown  any
\nprecedent  wherein  a  second  enquiry  has  been held permissible on the same
\ncharge, facts and materials.  We could  understand  the  situation  where  the
\nTribunal  itself had permitted a further enquiry, which would be nothing but a
\ncontinuation of the earlier enquiry but, such is not the case and the  finding
\nof  the  Tribunal  that the dismissal of the workman was a foregone conclusion
\nand the enquiry was only a design to obtain that result, was  staring  at  the
\nManagement having remained unchallenged.  On this backdrop atleast, the second
\nenquiry  was  not possible at all, nor was the application on the basis of the
\nfresh dismissal.\n<\/p>\n
                18.  Two more judgments were cited before us they being, STATE
\nBANK OF INDIA v.  THE ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER FOR WORKMEN<\/a>S  COMPENSATION  AND
\nANOTHER (1975 I LLJ  159)  and SMT.  N.  RADHA BAI v.  UNION OF INDIA (1987 II
\nLLN 305) but, they are under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments  Act  and
\nare not apposite to the controversy involved in the present case.\n<\/p>\n
                19.  In that view, we are of the clear opinion that the second
\nenquiry was not possible in this case and consequently, the second application
\non the  same  material  in  the facts of this case, was also not possible.  It
\nwill not be, therefore, necessary for us to take stock of the argument of  the
\nlearned  counsel that the order of the Tribunal was beyond the jurisdiction as
\nthe Tribunal has chosen to act as an appellate court to the  findings  of  the
\nenquiry officer.   However, in order to complete the record, we would consider
\neven that argument.\n<\/p>\n
                20.  Learned counsel relied on the celebrated judgment of  the
\nSupreme Court  in  PUNJAB  NATIONAL BANK LIMITED v.  ALL INDIA PUBJAB NATIONAL
\nBANK EMPLOYEES<\/a>  FEDERATION  (AIR  1960  SC  160)  and  pointed  out  that  in
\nparagraphs  24  and 25 thereof, the Supreme Court has cautioned that where the
\nenquiry was held to be proper then, the Tribunals jurisdiction would be  only
\nto see  as  to  whether the workman was prima facie guilty of the charge.  The
\nsecond condition is that it  should  not  appear  to  the  Tribunal  that  the
\nemployer was guilty of victimization or any unfair labour practice and as such
\nthe Tribunal is generally reluctant to interfere with the impugned order.\n<\/p>\n
                21.   Learned  counsel  also  cited  before  us  the  reported
\ndecision in MARTIN BURN LIMITED v.  BANERJEE<\/a> (1958 I LLJ 247) to show that  in
\nsuch enquiries only a prima facie view has to be taken and the Tribunal or the
\nLabour  Court, as the case may be, cannot go into the appreciation of evidence
\naspect.\n<\/p>\n
                22.  We were also taken through the judgment  of  the  Supreme
\nCourt in BHARAT IRON WORKS v.  BHAGUBHAI (AIR<\/a> 1976 SC 98) as also LORD KRISHNA
\nTEXTILE MILLS v.   ITS WORKMEN<\/a> (1961 I LLJ 211).  There can be no dispute that
\nin such enquiries the Tribunal has to first see whether the action by  way  of
\nvictimization  or  by way of unfair labour practice; it has to secondly see as
\nto whether the domestic enquiry is fair and proper and if it is found to be so
\nthen, the Tribunal has only to see the  prima  facie  case  and  in  that  the
\nTribunal cannot act as an appellate court.  However, it does not mean that the
\nTribunal has  no  jurisdiction  to refer to the evidence at all.  It can still
\nrefer to the evidence to see as to whether the  action  on  the  part  of  the
\nManagement-employer was   by  way  of  victimization  or  otherwise.    Merely
\nreferring to the evidence of the witnesses, as has been done by  the  Tribunal
\nin  this case, would not by itself throw it outside the arena of jurisdiction.
\nWhat has actually been done by the Tribunal in this case is only to  find  out
\nas  to  whether  there were prima facie findings and in that it cannot be said
\nthat it could not have seen the correctness  of  the  finding,  atleast  prima
\nfacie.\n<\/p>\n
                23.   We  have  seen the order of the Tribunal very carefully.
\nIt is true that the evidence of Murugan has been referred to.  However, it  is
\nobvious that Murugan, who himself was caught with the stolen articles has been
\nused as a witness against Ramasamy, the present respondent, to suggest that it
\nwas Ramasamy  who had stolen the articles and gave them to Murugan.  It was on
\nthis backdrop that the evidence was liable to be considered as to whether this
\nsuggested a pure victimisation.  This was nothing but the user of one employee
\nagainst the other.  We do not think, therefore, that the  learned  counsel  is
\njustified  in  dubbing  the  Labour  Courts  order as an appellate order and,
\nhence, being without jurisdiction.  In that view, we are of the clear  opinion
\nthat  the  order of the Labour Court in refusing the approval is correct order
\nin law as well as on facts and the confirmation of that order by  the  learned
\nsingle Judge  is  also  correct.   The learned single Judge has found that the
\nLabour Court had correctly  held  that  there  was  no  prima  facie  material
\navailable  because Anbazagan, who was a witness, had not taken the name of the
\nrespondent-workman herein in his report dated 21-12-1985.\n<\/p>\n
                24.  We find no force in the appeal and dismiss the same  with
\nthe cost of Rs.2,000\/-.  Connected C.M.P.  No.10225 of 2000 is closed.\n<\/p>\n
Index:  Yes
\nWebsite:Yes<\/p>\n
Jai<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Madras High Court Madura Coats Limited vs The Presiding Officer on 11 December, 2003 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS Dated: 11\/12\/2003 Coram The Honourable Mr. Justice V.S. SIRPURKAR and The Honourable Mr. Justice N. KANNADASAN W.A. No.721 OF 1999 Madura Coats Limited Ambasamudram rep. by its Group Industrial Relations Manager … Appellant […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,13],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-79648","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-high-court","category-madras-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nMadura Coats Limited vs The Presiding Officer on 11 December, 2003 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Madura Coats Limited vs The Presiding Officer on 11 December, 2003 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2003-12-10T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2014-07-31T05:42:42+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"22 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Madura Coats Limited vs The Presiding Officer on 11 December, 2003\",\"datePublished\":\"2003-12-10T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2014-07-31T05:42:42+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003\"},\"wordCount\":4297,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"High Court\",\"Madras High Court\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003\",\"name\":\"Madura Coats Limited vs The Presiding Officer on 11 December, 2003 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2003-12-10T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2014-07-31T05:42:42+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Madura Coats Limited vs The Presiding Officer on 11 December, 2003\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Madura Coats Limited vs The Presiding Officer on 11 December, 2003 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Madura Coats Limited vs The Presiding Officer on 11 December, 2003 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"2003-12-10T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2014-07-31T05:42:42+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"22 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Madura Coats Limited vs The Presiding Officer on 11 December, 2003","datePublished":"2003-12-10T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2014-07-31T05:42:42+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003"},"wordCount":4297,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["High Court","Madras High Court"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003","name":"Madura Coats Limited vs The Presiding Officer on 11 December, 2003 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"2003-12-10T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2014-07-31T05:42:42+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/madura-coats-limited-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-11-december-2003#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Madura Coats Limited vs The Presiding Officer on 11 December, 2003"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/79648","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=79648"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/79648\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=79648"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=79648"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=79648"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}