{"id":85070,"date":"2004-12-16T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-12-15T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/damoh-panna-sagar-rural-reg-vs-munna-lal-jain-on-16-december-2004-3"},"modified":"2018-07-18T20:43:49","modified_gmt":"2018-07-18T15:13:49","slug":"damoh-panna-sagar-rural-reg-vs-munna-lal-jain-on-16-december-2004-3","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/damoh-panna-sagar-rural-reg-vs-munna-lal-jain-on-16-december-2004-3","title":{"rendered":"Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Reg. … vs Munna Lal Jain on 16 December, 2004"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Reg. … vs Munna Lal Jain on 16 December, 2004<\/div>\n
Author: A Pasayat<\/div>\n
Bench: Arijit Pasayat, S.H.Kapadia<\/div>\n
           CASE NO.:\nAppeal (civil)  8258 of 2004\n\nPETITIONER:\nDamoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank & Anr.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nMunna Lal Jain\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT: 16\/12\/2004\n\nBENCH:\nARIJIT PASAYAT & S.H. KAPADIA\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
J U D G M E N T<\/p>\n
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) 19412\/2004)<\/p>\n
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.\n<\/p>\n
\tLeave granted.\n<\/p>\n
\tDamoh Panna Sagar, Rural Regional Bank- the appellant no.1
\n(hereinafter referred to as the ’employer’) calls in question legality
\nof the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High
\nCourt at Jabalpur directing the Board of Directors of the employer Bank
\n(in short the ‘Board’) to reconsider the matter and pass any punishment
\nother than dismissal, removal or termination of the respondent  Munna
\nLal Jain (hereinafter referred to as the ’employee’).\n<\/p>\n
Background facts in a nutshell are as follows :\n<\/p>\n
\tOn the allegation that while temporarily functioning as the
\nBranch manager of Kabra Branch, the respondent-employee withdrew a sum
\nof Rs.25,000\/- unauthorisedly and such act amounted to misconduct
\nwarranting serious penalty.  Because of such unauthorized withdrawal,
\ncharges were framed against him by charge sheet dated 14.10.1992
\nalleging that he had withdrawn a sum of Rs.25,000\/- on 6.5.1992 for his
\npersonal use.  The respondent-employee filed his explanation.  Though
\nnot disputing the factum of withdrawal, plea was taken by him that
\nduring the relevant period condition of his wife had deteriorated and
\nrequired immediate surgical interference.  He had informed about
\nwithdrawal to the Head Office at Damoh. The explanation was not
\naccepted, an enquiry officer was appointed who submitted his report on
\n20.7.1993 holding that the employee was guilty of the charges. The
\ndisciplinary authority concurred with the findings of the Enquiry
\nOfficer and after following the formalities i.e. issuance of show-cause
\nnotice, passed the order of removal. In appeal the said order of
\nremoval was maintained. Against the aforesaid order the employee
\npreferred Writ Petition No. 2719 of 1995.  Learned Single Judge held
\nthat the charges levelled have been duly brought home, but remitted the
\nmatter to the appellate authority for re-consideration with regard to
\nthe quantum of punishment.  Pursuant to the direction, the matter was
\nagain considered by the Board and it was held that the order of removal
\ndid not require reconsideration. Employee filed a Writ Petition (W.P.
\nNo. 4812 of 1998). Learned Single Judge, who heard the matter, held
\nthat the Board had not considered the matter from all angles keeping in
\nview the observations made in the earlier order dated 13.5.1998.
\nDirection was given to the Board to re-consider the penalty of removal.
\nThe matter was again re-considered and the Board refused to interfere
\nwith the quantum of punishment. The said order was assailed in Writ
\nPetition No. 5236 of 2000. Learned Single judge declined to interfere
\non the ground that the charges had been proved and the Board had passed
\na detailed order.  Learned Single Judge further held that the factum of
\nillness of the wife had not been proved as no documents had been filed.\n<\/p>\n
\tThe matter was carried in a Letters Patent Appeal before the
\nDivision Bench.  It was stand of the employee before the Division Bench
\nthat the money was withdrawn because of an emergency and he had some of
\nmoney in his Provident Fund account.  In any event, the money had been
\ndeposited in the bank with 24% interest which was much higher than the
\nrate of interest that is payable on loan availed without security i.e.
\noverdraft.\n<\/p>\n
In response, it was submitted by the learned counsel appearing
\nfor the employer, that there was no scope for interference with the
\nquantum of punishment.\n<\/p>\n
The High Court observed that ordinarily the High Court should not
\ninterfere with the order of learned Single Judge. It, however, noticed
\nthat the amount has been repaid with 24% interest.  It was observed
\nthat though adequate material was not placed to establish the wife’s
\nillness that could not be a ground to uphold the punishment of removal,
\nparticularly when he had paid back the amount with 24% interest.  There
\nwas no allegation that earlier he had committed any kind of
\ndelinquency.  It was noted that antecedents do not play positive role
\nin all cases, but in certain cases they cannot be totally ignored.
\nReference was made to decision of this Court in Kailash Nath Gupta v.
\nEnquiry Officer (R.K. Rai) Allahabad Bank and others (AIR<\/a> 2003 SC
\n1377).  It was also observed that in the said case this Court has taken
\nnote of the fact that a sum of       Rs.46,000\/-has already been repaid
\nand no loss was caused to the bank.  Though factual matrix was noticed
\nto be different, yet it was held that the Branch Manager in a difficult
\nsituation had withdrawn the money and repaid with 24% interest.  There
\nwas no loss caused.  Again the High Court observed that it hastened to
\nadd that it was not its view that unless there is any loss there cannot
\nbe any misconduct.  Ultimately it was concluded that this was a fit
\ncase where the Board should be compassionate and gracious enough to
\nreconsider employee’s case to pass any other punishment other than
\ndismissal, removal or termination.  It was held that there was
\nirregularity but not such an irregularity as to attract the punishment
\nof removal.  It was also indicated that even if lesser punishment is
\nawarded the employee would not be entitled to any kind of back wages.\n<\/p>\n
\tIn support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant
\nsubmitted that the High Court’s judgment is full of contradictions.
\nHaving accepted that there was practically no scope of interference
\nwith the quantum of punishment, yet on irrelevant considerations High
\nCourt directed that punishment of removal, termination or dismissal
\nshould not be passed.  The scope for interference with quantum of
\npunishment has been highlighted by this Court in many cases and this is
\na case where no interference was called for.  It has been found as a
\nfact that the defence taken by the employee was false. Though he
\nclaimed that the amount was withdrawn on 9.5.1992, in fact it was
\nwithdrawn on 6.5.1992.  There was no evidence adduced regarding the
\nwife’s ailment.\n<\/p>\n
\tIn response, learned counsel for the respondent-employee
\nsubmitted that the appeal was not maintainable and the appeal was
\nreally unnecessary one.  Ordinarily this Court should not interfere in
\nservice matters by appreciating evidence. The respondent-employee had
\nintimated the head office about the withdrawal which is bonafide and he
\nhad repaid the amount with 24% interest.\n<\/p>\n
The scope of interference with quantum of punishment has been the
\nsubject-matter of various decisions of this Court.  Such interference
\ncannot be a routine matter.\n<\/p>\n
Lord Greene said in 1948 in the famous Wednesbury case (1948 (1)
\nKB 223) that when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take
\na decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited.  He said
\nthat interference was not permissible unless one or the other of the
\nfollowing conditions was satisfied, namely the order was contrary to
\nlaw, or relevant factors were not considered, or irrelevant factors
\nwere considered; or the decision was one which no reasonable person
\ncould have taken.  These principles were consistently followed in the
\nUK and in India to judge the validity of administrative action.  It is
\nequally well known that in 1983, Lord Diplock in Council for Civil
\nServices Union v. Minister of Civil Service [(1983) 1 AC 768] (called
\nthe CCSU case) summarized the principles of judicial review of
\nadministrative action as based upon one or other of the following viz.,
\nillegality, procedural irregularity and irrationality.  He, however,
\nopined that “proportionality” was a “future possibility”.\n<\/p>\n
In Om Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India<\/a> (2001 (2) SCC 386), this
\nCourt observed, inter alia, as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“The principle originated in Prussia in the
\nnineteenth century and has since been adopted in
\nGermany, France and other European countries.  The
\nEuropean Court of Justice at Luxembourg and the
\nEuropean Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg have
\napplied the principle while judging the validity of
\nadministrative action.  But even long before that,
\nthe Indian Supreme Court has applied the principle of
\n“proportionality” to legislative action since 1950,
\nas stated in detail below.\n<\/p>\n
\tBy “proportionality”, we mean the question
\nwhether, while regulating exercise of fundamental
\nrights, the appropriate or least-restrictive choice
\nof measures has been made by the legislature or the
\nadministrator so as to achieve the object of the
\nlegislation or the purpose of the administrative
\norder, as the case may be.  Under the principle, the
\ncourt will see that the legislature and the
\nadministrative authority “maintain a proper balance
\nbetween the adverse effects which the legislation or
\nthe administrative order may have on the rights,
\nliberties or interests of persons keeping in mind the
\npurpose which they were intended to serve”.  The
\nlegislature and the administrative authority are,
\nhowever, given an area of discretion or a range of
\nchoices but as to whether the choice made infringes
\nthe rights excessively or not is for the court. That
\nis what is meant by proportionality.\n<\/p>\n
xxx\t\txxx\t\txxx\t\txxx\t\txxx<\/p>\n
\tThe development of the principle of “strict
\nscrutiny” or “proportionality” in administrative law
\nin England is, however, recent. Administrative action
\nwas traditionally being tested on Wednesbury grounds.
\nBut in the last few years, administrative action
\naffecting the freedom of expression or liberty has
\nbeen declared invalid in several cases applying the
\nprinciple of “strict scrutiny”.  In the case of these
\nfreedoms, Wednesbury principles are no longer
\napplied.  The courts in England could not expressly
\napply proportionality in the absence of the
\nconvention but tried to safeguard the rights
\nzealously by treating the said rights as basic to the
\ncommon law and the courts then applied the strict
\nscrutiny test.  In the Spycatcher case Attorney
\nGeneral v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No.2) (1990) 1
\nAC 109 (at pp. 283-284), Lord Goff stated that there
\nwas no inconsistency between the convention and the
\ncommon law.  In Derbyshire County Council v. Times
\nNewspapers Ltd. (1993) AC 534, Lord Keith treated
\nfreedom of expression as part of common law.
\nRecently, in R. v. Secy. Of State for Home Deptt., ex
\np. Simms (1999) 3 All ER 400 (HL), the right of a
\nprisoner to grant an interview to a journalist was
\nupheld treating the right as part of the common law.
\nLord Hobhouse held that the policy of the
\nadministrator was disproportionate.  The need for a
\nmore intense and anxious judicial scrutiny in
\nadministrative decisions which engage fundamental
\nhuman rights was re-emphasised in in R. v. Lord
\nSaville ex p (1999) 4 All ER 860 (CA), at pp.870,872)
\n. In all these cases, the English Courts applied the
\n“strict scrutiny” test rather than describe the test
\nas one of “proportionality”.  But, in any event, in
\nrespect of these rights “Wednesbury” rule has ceased
\nto apply.\n<\/p>\n
\tHowever, the principle of “strict scrutiny” or
\n“proportionality” and primary review came to be
\nexplained in R. v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt.
\nex p Brind (1991) 1 AC 696.  That case related to
\ndirections given by the Home Secretary under the
\nBroadcasting Act, 1981 requiring BBC and IBA to
\nrefrain from broadcasting certain matters through
\npersons who represented organizations which were
\nproscribed under legislation concerning the
\nprevention of terrorism.  The extent of prohibition
\nwas linked with the direct statement made by the
\nmembers of the organizations.  It did not however,
\nfor example, preclude the broadcasting by such
\npersons through the medium of a film, provided there
\nwas a “voice-over” account, paraphrasing what they
\nsaid.  The applicant’s claim was based directly on
\nthe European Convention of Human Rights. Lord Bridge
\nnoticed that the Convention rights were not still
\nexpressly engrafted into English law but stated that
\nfreedom of expression was basic to the Common law and
\nthat, even in the absence of the Convention, English
\nCourts could go into the question (see p. 748-49).\n<\/p>\n
“…..whether the Secretary of State, in the
\nexercise of his discretion, could reasonably
\nimpose the restriction he has imposed on the
\nbroadcasting organisations”\n<\/p>\n
and that the courts were<\/p>\n
“not perfectly entitled to start from the
\npremise that any restriction of the right to
\nfreedom of expression requires to be justified
\nand nothing less than an important public
\ninterest will be sufficient to justify it”.\n<\/p>\n
Lord Templeman also said in the above case that the
\ncourts could go into the question whether a
\nreasonable minister could reasonably have concluded
\nthat the interference with this freedom was
\njustifiable.  He said that “in terms of the
\nConvention” any such interference must be both
\nnecessary and proportionate (ibid pp. 750-51).\n<\/p>\n
\tIn the famous passage, the seeds of the
\nprinciple of primary and secondary review by courts
\nwere planted in the administrative law by Lord Bridge
\nin the Brind case (1991) 1 AC 696.  Where Convention
\nrights were in question the courts could exercise a
\nright of primary review.  However, the courts would
\nexercise a right of secondary review based only on
\nWednesbury principles in cases not affecting the
\nrights under the Convention.  Adverting to cases
\nwhere fundamental freedoms were not invoked and where
\nadministrative action was questioned, it was said
\nthat the courts were then confined only to a
\nsecondary review while the primary decision would be
\nwith the administrator. Lord Bridge explained the
\nprimary and secondary review as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“The primary judgment as to whether the
\nparticular competing public interest justifying
\nthe particular restriction imposed falls to be
\nmade by the Secretary of State to whom
\nParliament has entrusted the discretion.  But,
\nwe are entitled to exercise a secondary
\njudgment by asking whether a reasonable
\nSecretary of State, on the material before him,
\ncould reasonably make the primary judgment.”\n<\/p>\n
\tBut where an administrative action is
\nchallenged as “arbitrary” under Article 14 on the
\nbasis of Royappa (1974) 4 SCC 3 (as in cases where
\npunishments in disciplinary cases are challenged),
\nthe question will be whether the administrative order
\nis “rational” or “reasonable” and the test then is
\nthe Wednesbury test.  The courts would then be
\nconfined only to a secondary role and will only have
\nto see whether the administrator has done well in his
\nprimary role, whether he has acted illegally or has
\nomitted relevant factors from consideration or has
\ntaken irrelevant factors into consideration or
\nwhether his view is one which no reasonable person
\ncould have taken.  If his action does not satisfy
\nthese rules, it is to be treated as arbitrary. In
\nG.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council<\/a> (1991) 3
\nSCC 91 at p. 111 Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was)
\npointed out that “reasonableness” of the
\nadministrator under Article 14 in the context of
\nadministrative law has to be judged from the stand
\npoint of Wednesbury rules. In Tata Cellular v. Union
\nof India<\/a> (1994) 6 SCC 651 at pp. 679-80), Indian
\nExpress Newspapers Bombay (P) Ltd. v. Union of India<\/a>
\n(1985) 1 SCC 641 at p.691), Supreme Court Employees’
\nWelfare Assn. V. Union of India<\/a> (1989) 4 SCC 187 at
\np. 241) and U.P. Financial Corpn. V. Gem Cap<\/a>(India)
\n(P) Ltd. (1993) 2 SCC 299 at p. 307) while judging
\nwhether the administrative action is “arbitrary”
\nunder Article 14 (i.e. otherwise then being
\ndiscriminatory), this Court has confined itself to a
\nWednesbury review always.\n<\/p>\n
\tThe principles explained in the last preceding
\nparagraph in respect of Article 14 are now to be
\napplied here where the question of “arbitrariness” of
\nthe order of punishment is questioned under Article\n<\/p>\n
14.<\/p>\n
xxx\t\txxx\t\txxx\t\txxx\t\txxx<\/p>\n
\tThus, from the above principles and decided
\ncases, it must be held that where an administrative
\ndecision relating to punishment in disciplinary cases
\nis questioned as “arbitrary” under Article 14, the
\ncourt is confined to Wednesbury principles as a
\nsecondary reviewing authority.  The court will not
\napply proportionality as a primary reviewing court
\nbecause no issue of fundamental freedoms nor of
\ndiscrimination under Article 14 applies in such a
\ncontext.  The court while reviewing punishment and if
\nit is satisfied that Wednesbury principles are
\nviolated, it has normally to remit the matter to the
\nadministrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum
\nof punishment.  Only in rare cases where there has
\nbeen long delay in the time taken by the disciplinary
\nproceedings and in the time taken in the courts, and
\nsuch extreme or rare cases can the court substitute
\nits own view as to the quantum of punishment.”\n<\/p>\n
In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors.<\/a> (1995 [6] SCC 749)
\nit was observed:\n<\/p>\n
“A review of the above legal position would
\nestablish that the disciplinary authority, and on
\nappeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding
\nauthorities have exclusive power to consider the
\nevidence with a view to maintain discipline.  They
\nare invested with the discretion to impose
\nappropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude
\nor gravity of the misconduct.  The High
\nCourt\/Tribunal, while exercising the power of
\njudicial review, cannot normally substitute its own
\nconclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty.
\nIf the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
\nauthority or the appellate authority shocks the
\nconscience of the High Court\/Tribunal, it would
\nappropriately mould the relief, either directing the
\ndisciplinary\/appellate authority to reconsider the
\npenalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may
\nitself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose
\nappropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support
\nthereof.”\n<\/p>\n
In Union of India and Anr. v. G. Ganayutham<\/a> (1997 [7] SCC 463),
\nthis Court summed up the position relating to proportionality in
\nparagraphs 31 and 32, which read as follows:\n<\/p>\n
“The current position of proportionality in
\nadministrative law in England and India can be
\nsummarized as follows:\n<\/p>\n
(1) To judge the validity of any
\nadministrative order or statutory discretion,
\nnormally the Wednesbury test is to be applied
\nto find out if the decision was illegal or
\nsuffered from procedural improprieties or was
\none which no sensible decision-maker could, on
\nthe material before him and within the
\nframework of the law, have arrived at.  The
\ncourt would consider whether relevant matters
\nhad not been taken into account or whether
\nirrelevant matters had been taken into account
\nor whether the action was not bona fide.  The
\ncourt would also consider whether the decision
\nwas absurd or perverse. The court would not
\nhowever go into the correctness of the choice
\nmade by the administrator amongst the various
\nalternatives open to him.  Nor could the court
\nsubstitute its decision to that of the
\nadministrator.  This is the Wednesbury (1948 1
\nKB 223) test.\n<\/p>\n
(2) The court would not interfere with
\nthe administrator’s decision unless it was
\nillegal or suffered from procedural impropriety
\nor was irrational  in the sense that it was in
\noutrageous defiance of logic or moral
\nstandards.  The possibility of other tests,
\nincluding proportionality being brought into
\nEnglish administrative law in future is not
\nruled out.  These are the CCSU (1985 AC 374)
\nprinciples.\n<\/p>\n
(3)(a) As per Bugdaycay (1987 AC 514),
\nBrind (1991 (1) AC 696) and Smith (1996 (1) All
\nER 257) as long as the Convention is not
\nincorporated into English law, the English
\ncourts merely exercise a secondary judgment to
\nfind out if the decision-maker could have, on
\nthe material before him, arrived at the primary
\njudgment in the manner he has done.\n<\/p>\n
(3)(b) If the Convention is incorporated
\nin England making available the principle of
\nproportionality, then the English courts will
\nrender primary judgment on the validity of the
\nadministrative action and find out if the
\nrestriction is disproportionate or excessive or
\nis not based upon a fair balancing of the
\nfundamental freedom and the need for the
\nrestriction thereupon.\n<\/p>\n
(4)(a) The position in our country, in
\nadministrative law, where no fundamental
\nfreedoms as aforesaid are involved, is that the
\ncourts\/tribunals will only play a secondary
\nrole while the primary judgment as to
\nreasonableness will remain with the executive
\nor administrative authority.  The secondary
\njudgment of the court is to be based on
\nWednesbury and CCSU principles as stated by
\nLord Greene and Lord Diplock respectively to
\nfind if the executive or administrative
\nauthority has reasonably arrived at his
\ndecision as the primary authority.\n<\/p>\n
(4)(b) Whether in the case of
\nadministrative or executive action affecting
\nfundamental freedoms, the courts in our country
\nwill apply the principle of “proportionality”
\nand assume a primary role, is left open, to be
\ndecided in an appropriate case where such
\naction is alleged to offend fundamental
\nfreedoms. It will be then necessary to decide
\nwhether the courts will have a primary role
\nonly if the freedoms under Articles 19, 21 etc.
\nare involved and not for Article 14.\n<\/p>\n
\tFinally, we come to the present case.  It is
\nnot contended before us that any fundamental freedom
\nis affected.  We need not therefore go into the
\nquestion of “proportionality”.  There is no
\ncontention that the punishment imposed is illegal or
\nvitiated by procedural impropriety.  As to
\n“irrationality”, there is no finding by the Tribunal
\nthat the decision is one which no sensible person who
\nweighed the pros and cons could have arrived at nor
\nis there a finding, based on material, that the
\npunishment is in “outrageous” defiance of logic.
\nNeither Wednesbury nor CCSU tests are satisfied.  We
\nhave still to explain “Ranjit Thakur (1987 [4] SCC\n<\/p>\n
611)”.\n<\/p>\n
The common thread running through in all these decisions is that
\nthe Court should not interfere with the administrator’s decision unless
\nit was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking
\nto the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of
\nlogic or moral standards.  In view of what has been stated in the
\nWednesbury’s case (supra) the Court would not go into the correctness
\nof the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court
\nshould not  substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The
\nscope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-
\nmaking process and not the decision.\n<\/p>\n
To put differently unless the punishment imposed by the
\nDisciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience
\nof the Court\/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference.  Further to
\nshorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose
\nappropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof.
\nIn a normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly
\ndisproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary
\nAuthority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.\n<\/p>\n
In the case at hand the High Court did not record any reason as
\nto how and why it found the punishment shockingly disproportionate.
\nEven there is no discussion on this aspect.\n<\/p>\n
A Bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of
\nhonesty and integrity.  He deals with money of the depositors and the
\ncustomers. Every officer\/employee of the Bank is required to take all
\npossible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge
\nhis duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and
\nto do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer. Good conduct and
\ndiscipline are inseparable from the functioning of every
\nofficer\/employee of the Bank. As was observed by this Court in
\nDisciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik<\/a>
\n(1996 (9) SCC 69), it is no defence available to say that there was no
\nloss or profit resulted in case, when the officer\/employee acted
\nwithout authority. The very discipline of an organization more
\nparticularly a Bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers
\nacting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one’s
\nauthority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The
\ncharges against the employee were not casual in nature and were
\nserious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the
\nHigh Court.\n<\/p>\n
It needs no emphasis that when a Court feels that the punishment
\nis shockingly disproportionate, it must record reasons for coming to
\nsuch a conclusion. Mere expression that the punishment is shockingly
\ndisproportionate would not meet the requirement of law. Even in respect
\nof administrative orders Lord Denning M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated
\nEngineering Union (1971 (1) All E.R. 1148) observed “The giving of
\nreasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration”. In
\nAlexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree (1974 LCR 120) it was
\nobserved: “Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice”.
\nReasons are live links between the mind of the decision taker to the
\ncontroversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at”.
\nReasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on
\nrecording reasons is that if the decision reveals the “inscrutable face
\nof the sphinx”, it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible
\nfor the Courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the
\npower of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision.
\nRight to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system.
\nAnother rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision
\nhas gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural
\njustice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a
\nspeaking out. The “inscrutable face of a sphinx” is ordinarily
\nincongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.\n<\/p>\n
These aspects were highlighted in Chairman and Managing Director,
\nUnited Commercial Bank and Others v. P.C. Kakkar<\/a> (2003 (4) SCC 364).\n<\/p>\n
\tIn the case at hand, the High Court’s judgment is full of ifs and
\nbuts.  There is no definite finding recorded that the punishment is
\nsuffering from any infirmity.  No basis has been indicated to direct
\nre-consideration of the quantum of punishment.  It is to be noted that
\nthe respondent had miserably failed to prove bonafides. Though he took
\nthe stand that he had informed the head office about the withdrawal, no
\nmaterial was placed before any of the authorities to prove it.  It is
\nto be noted that on the basis of material on record, it was concluded
\nthat the withdrawal was on 6.5.1992 and not on 9.5.1992 as was claimed.
\nThe respondent-employee has withdrawn a sum of Rs.20,000\/- from the
\naccount of bank with the State Bank of India on 6.5.1992 and had
\nwithdrawn a further sum of Rs.5,000\/- from the cash.\n<\/p>\n
\tAbove being the position the impugned judgment of the High Court
\ncannot be maintained and the same is set aside.  The Writ Petition
\nfiled by the respondent-employee, stands dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
\tThe appeal is allowed.  No costs.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Reg. … vs Munna Lal Jain on 16 December, 2004 Author: A Pasayat Bench: Arijit Pasayat, S.H.Kapadia CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 8258 of 2004 PETITIONER: Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank & Anr. RESPONDENT: Munna Lal Jain DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16\/12\/2004 BENCH: ARIJIT PASAYAT & S.H. KAPADIA […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-85070","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nDamoh Panna Sagar Rural Reg. ... vs Munna Lal Jain on 16 December, 2004 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/damoh-panna-sagar-rural-reg-vs-munna-lal-jain-on-16-december-2004-3\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Reg. ... vs Munna Lal Jain on 16 December, 2004 - 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