{"id":86584,"date":"2000-07-08T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2000-07-07T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/dhannalal-vs-kalawatibai-ors-on-8-july-2000-2"},"modified":"2019-04-11T18:32:21","modified_gmt":"2019-04-11T13:02:21","slug":"dhannalal-vs-kalawatibai-ors-on-8-july-2000-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/dhannalal-vs-kalawatibai-ors-on-8-july-2000-2","title":{"rendered":"Dhannalal vs Kalawatibai &amp; Ors on 8 July, 2000"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"docsource_main\">Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_title\">Dhannalal vs Kalawatibai &amp; Ors on 8 July, 2000<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_author\">Author: R Lahoti<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_bench\">Bench: R.C. Lahoti, B.N. Agrawal.<\/div>\n<pre>           CASE NO.:\nAppeal (civil) 3652  of  2002\nAppeal (civil)\t3653\t of  2002\n\n\n\nPETITIONER:\nDHANNALAL\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nKALAWATIBAI &amp; ORS.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\t08\/07\/2000\n\nBENCH:\nR.C. LAHOTI,  B.N. AGRAWAL.\n\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n<p>R.C. Lahoti, J.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tLeave granted.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tThe suit premises in these two appeals are two shops situated in<br \/>\nM.T. Cloth Market, Indore on the ground-floor of a building.  The<br \/>\nproperty was owned by late Krishnadas.\tHe inducted the two<br \/>\nappellants in the two shops as tenants for non-residential purpose.<br \/>\nKrishnadas died on 8.7.1995.  His ownership and right of reversion as<br \/>\nlandlord have devolved on his widow &#8211; Smt. Kalawatibai and two sons\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8211; Govinda and Hemant. These three are the respondents in these<br \/>\nappeals.  They initiated the proceedings for eviction of the two<br \/>\nappellants in December 1995.  The case of the respondents is that the<br \/>\nshop in the occupation of appellant Dhannalal is required bona fide<br \/>\nfor starting the business of Govinda, the respondent no.2, while the<br \/>\nshop in the occupation of the other appellant, M\/s Tulsidas<br \/>\nSureshchandra is required by the respondent Hemant for shifting and<br \/>\ncontinuing his readymade garments business which he is presently<br \/>\nrunning in a rented accommodation situated in Gorakund locality, at a<br \/>\nlittle distance from the building in question. It is alleged that the<br \/>\nrespondents do not own or possess any other accommodation of their<br \/>\nown suitable to satisfy their alleged requirement.  These proceedings<br \/>\nfor eviction were initiated under Chapter III-A of M.P.<br \/>\nAccommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter the Act, for short) by<br \/>\nfiling applications before the Rent Controlling Authority, Indore<br \/>\n(RCA, for short).  The two appellants contested the claim preferred by<br \/>\nthe  respondents.    However,  the  R.C.A. found the claims for<br \/>\neviction proved and directed the two appellants to be evicted.\tBoth<br \/>\nthe appellants preferred revision petitions under Section 23-E of the<br \/>\nAct before the High Court.  The High Court, having dealt with each of<br \/>\nthe contentions raised on behalf of the revision petitioners, has<br \/>\ndismissed the revision petitions upholding the orders of the R.C.A.<br \/>\nFeeling aggrieved thereby these appeals have been filed by special<br \/>\nleave.\n<\/p>\n<p>Two questions arise for decision in these appeals: firstly,<br \/>\nwhether looking at the nature of requirement pleaded by the landlord-<br \/>\nrespondents in their applications the forum of Rent Controlling<br \/>\nAuthority was available to the respondents under Chapter III-A of the<br \/>\nAct or whether they were required to have recourse to the jurisdiction<br \/>\nof Civil Court by filing suits for eviction under Section 12 of the Act;<br \/>\nand secondly, whether the landlords have succeeded in making out<br \/>\ncase of bona fide requirement of the suit premises within the meaning<br \/>\nof clause (b) of Section 23-A of the Act.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tM.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 is a legislation<br \/>\nproviding for regulation and control of letting and rent of<br \/>\naccommodations and generally to regulate the control of eviction of<br \/>\ntenants from accommodations and for other matters connected<br \/>\ntherewith or incidental thereto.  It also provides for expeditious trial of<br \/>\neviction cases on ground of bona fide requirement of certain<br \/>\ncategories of landlords.  Section 12 of the Act, which opens with a<br \/>\nnon-obstante clause, provides for no suit against a tenant for his<br \/>\neviction from any accommodation being filed in any Civil Court<br \/>\nexcept on one or more of the grounds enumerated therein.  Thus the<br \/>\nrights, obligations and protection of the tenants in the matter of<br \/>\neviction from accommodations are governed principally by Section 12<br \/>\nof the Act and suit against tenant seeking eviction can be filed only in<br \/>\nCivil Court.  The procedure applicable and the remedy of appeal and<br \/>\nrevision are those as enumerated in the Code of Civil Procedure.  The<br \/>\nM.P. Amendment Act No. 27 of 1983 w.e.f. 16.8.1983 inserted in the<br \/>\nAct Chapter III-A entitled &#8220;Eviction of tenants on grounds of<br \/>\n&#8216;bonafide&#8217; requirement&#8221; making provision for a special and summary<br \/>\nprocedure for dealing with claims for eviction of tenants founded on<br \/>\nthe ground of bona fide requirement for all the landlords generally.<br \/>\nCorresponding amendment was made in Section 12 of the Act so as to<br \/>\ndo away with jurisdiction of Civil Court so far as claim for eviction on<br \/>\nthe ground of bona fide requirement, residential or non-residential, is<br \/>\nconcerned.  Within a short range of time the Legislature gave a second<br \/>\nthought and in its wisdom considered it appropriate to not to extend<br \/>\nthe benefit of the provisions contained in Chapter III-A to all<br \/>\nlandlords generally but to keep it confined to such specified categories<br \/>\nof landlords who on account of certain handicap, adversity or a<br \/>\npeculiar position in which they are placed need to be dealt with on a<br \/>\ndifferent pedestal and given advantage of a summary, quick and<br \/>\nexpeditious remedy of seeking eviction on the ground of personal<br \/>\nrequirement.  Chapter III-A was hence amended by M.P. Act No. 7 of<br \/>\n1985 w.e.f. 16.1.1985.\tWe are concerned  with the provisions of<br \/>\nChapter III-A as amended.  Chapter III-A, as it stands now (since<br \/>\n16.1.1985), makes provision for proceedings for eviction of tenants,<br \/>\non the ground of bonafide requirement for residential or non-<br \/>\nresidential purpose, being initiated in the forum of Rent Controlling<br \/>\nAuthority only by specified categories of landlords (and not by any<br \/>\nlandlord generally).\n<\/p>\n<p>\tSection 12 of the Act, placed in Chapter III dealing with control<br \/>\nof eviction of tenants, provides (by relevant part thereof) as under :<br \/>\nSec.12. Restriction on eviction of tenants.  (1)<br \/>\nNotwithstanding anything to the contrary<br \/>\ncontained in any other law or contract, no suit shall<br \/>\nbe filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his<br \/>\neviction from any accommodation except on one<br \/>\nor more of the following grounds only namely:-\n<\/p>\n<p>\txxx\txxx\t\txxx\t\t\txxx<\/p>\n<p>\txxx\txxx\t\txxx\t\t\txxx<\/p>\n<p>(e)\tthat the accommodation let for residential<br \/>\npurposes is required bona-fide by the<br \/>\nlandlord for occupation as a residence for<br \/>\nhimself or for any member of his family, if<br \/>\nhe is the owner thereof or for any person for<br \/>\nwhose benefit the accommodation is held<br \/>\nand that the landlord or such person has no<br \/>\nother reasonably suitably residential<br \/>\naccommodation of his own his occupation in<br \/>\nthe city or town concerned;\n<\/p>\n<p>(f)\tthat the accommodation let for non-\n<\/p>\n<p>residential purposes is required bona-fide by<br \/>\nthe landlord for the purpose of continuing or<br \/>\nstarting his business or that any of his major<br \/>\nsons or unmarried daughters if he is the<br \/>\nowner thereof or of any person for whose<br \/>\nbenefit the accommodation is held and that<br \/>\nthe landlord or such person has no other<br \/>\nreasonably suitably non-residential<br \/>\naccommodation of his own in his occupation<br \/>\nin the city or town concerned.\n<\/p>\n<p>The abovesaid provision needs to be read in juxtaposition with<br \/>\nSection 23-A of the Act placed in Chapter III-A of the Act which<br \/>\nreads as under:\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;23-A.\tSpecial provision for eviction of<br \/>\ntenant on ground of bona fide<br \/>\nrequirement.___ Notwithstanding anything<br \/>\ncontained in any other law for the time being in<br \/>\nforce or contract to the contrary, a landlord<br \/>\nmay submit an application, signed and verified<br \/>\nin a manner provided in rules 14 and 15 of<br \/>\nOrder VI of the First Schedule to the Code of<br \/>\nCivil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) as if it were<br \/>\na plaint to the Rent Controlling Authority on<br \/>\none or more of the following grounds for an<br \/>\norder directing the tenant to put the landlord in<br \/>\npossession of the accommodation, namely:-\n<\/p>\n<p>(a)\tthat the accommodation let for<br \/>\nresidential purposes is required &#8220;bona<br \/>\nfide&#8221; by the landlord for occupation<br \/>\nas residence for himself or for any<br \/>\nmember of his family, or for any<br \/>\nperson for whose benefit, the<br \/>\naccommodation is held and that the<br \/>\nlandlord or such person has no other<br \/>\nreasonably suitable residential<br \/>\naccommodation of his own in his<br \/>\noccupation  in the city or town<br \/>\nconcerned.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\tExplanation.For the purposes of this clause,<br \/>\n&#8220;accommodation let for residential purposes&#8221;<br \/>\nincludes<\/p>\n<p>(i)\tany accommodation which having been<br \/>\nlet for use as a residence is without the<br \/>\nexpress consent of the landlord, used<br \/>\nwholly or partly for any non-residential<br \/>\npurpose;\n<\/p>\n<p>(ii)\tany accommodation which has not been<br \/>\nlet under an express provision of contract<br \/>\nfor non-residential purpose;\n<\/p>\n<p>       (b)\tthat the accommodation let for non-\n<\/p>\n<p>residential purposes is required &#8220;bona<br \/>\nfide&#8221; by the landlord for the purpose of<br \/>\ncontinuing or starting his business or that<br \/>\nof any of his major sons or unmarried<br \/>\ndaughters, if he is the owner thereof or<br \/>\nfor any person for whose benefit the<br \/>\naccommodation is held and that the<br \/>\nlandlord or such person as no other<br \/>\nreasonably suitable non-residential<br \/>\naccommodation of his own in his<br \/>\noccupation in the city or town concerned:\n<\/p>\n<p>The specified categories of landlords by whom proceedings can<br \/>\nbe initiated under Chapter III-A are  defined in Section 23-J which<br \/>\nreads as under:-\n<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;Sec.23J.   Definition of landlord for the<br \/>\npurposes of Chapter III-A.___For the purposes of<br \/>\nthis Chapter &#8220;landlord&#8221; means a landlord who is ___<\/p>\n<p>(i)\ta retired servant of any Government<br \/>\nincluding a retired member of<br \/>\nDefence Services; or<\/p>\n<p>(ii)\ta retired servant of a company owned<br \/>\nor controlled wither by the Central or<br \/>\nState Government; or<\/p>\n<p>(iii)\ta widow or a divorced wife; or<\/p>\n<p>(iv)\tphysically handicapped person; or<\/p>\n<p>(v)\ta servant of any Government<br \/>\nincluding a member of defence<br \/>\nservices who, according to his service<br \/>\nconditions, is not entitled to<br \/>\nGovernment accommodation on his<br \/>\nposting to a place where he owns a<br \/>\nhouse or is entitled to such<br \/>\naccommodation only on payment of a<br \/>\npenal rent on his posting to such<br \/>\nplace.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\tSuch a landlord seeking eviction of his or her tenant on the<br \/>\nground of bona fide requirement of residential or non residential<br \/>\naccommodation, the ground as defined in Section 23-A of the Act,<br \/>\nmust have recourse to Chapter III-A only.  Section 11-A of the Act<br \/>\nprovides that the provisions of Chapter III so far as they relate to<br \/>\nmatter specially provided in Chapter III-A shall not apply to the<br \/>\nlandlord defined in Section 23-J.  Section 45 of the Act also provides<br \/>\nthat as to the matters which the Rent Controlling Authority is<br \/>\nempowered by or under the Act to decide are not entertainable by<br \/>\nCivil Court.  The effect of these provisions is that a landlord as<br \/>\ndefined in Section 23-J of the Act cannot have recourse to the forum<br \/>\nof Civil Court.\n<\/p>\n<p>Broadly speaking, the main features of Chapter III-A are that it<br \/>\nprovides a summary procedure for the hearing of applications on the<br \/>\nlines similar to those contained in Order 37 of the CPC. The tenant<br \/>\ncannot contest the prayer for eviction from accommodation unless<br \/>\nleave to defend is sought for by moving an application within the<br \/>\nprescribed period of time and allowed.\tDefault in appearance or<br \/>\nrefusal of leave results in the statement made by the landlord in the<br \/>\napplication for eviction being deemed to have been admitted by the<br \/>\ntenant obliging the Rent Controlling Authority to pass an order of<br \/>\neviction.  Where leave is granted to the tenant to contest the<br \/>\napplication, the Rent Controlling Authority shall hold an enquiry<br \/>\nconsistently with the practice and procedure of a Court of Small<br \/>\nCauses.\t The requirement of the landlord is  presumed to be bona fide<br \/>\nunless the contrary is proved, that is to say, the burden of proof is<br \/>\nplaced on the tenant to rebut the case of the landlord contrary to the<br \/>\nordinary procedure in a Civil Court where the burden of proof lies on<br \/>\nthe landlord. As against an order of eviction passed by the RCA, a<br \/>\nrevision lies to the High Court and the remedy of appeal is excluded.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tThe submission of Shri S.S. Ray, the learned senior counsel for<br \/>\nthe appellants, has been that the procedure and remedy provided by<br \/>\nChapter III-A are summary and onerous to the tenant.  Mainly<br \/>\nspeaking, the tenant is not entitled to defend himself as of right, the<br \/>\nburden of proof is shifted on him from the very inception and he does<br \/>\nnot have a right of appeal.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tAt the very outset, we may point out that the issue as to the<br \/>\nconstitutional validity of the provisions contained in Chapter III-A of<br \/>\nthe Act is not before us.  The proceedings have originated in the<br \/>\njurisdiction of Rent Controlling Authority where the question of vires<br \/>\ncould not have been raised and gone into.  Before the High Court,<br \/>\nduring the hearing of revision filed by the appellants, the plea was<br \/>\nfaintly raised and urged but turned down.  In the absence of proper<br \/>\npleadings and the Advocate General of the State having been put on<br \/>\nnotice, we do not deem it proper to enter into the question of<br \/>\nconstitutional validity.  However, it needs to be noted that the<br \/>\ncontroversy as to the constitutional validity of Chapter III-A on the<br \/>\nground of being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as<br \/>\nconferring benefit of special procedure for eviction of tenant on<br \/>\ncertain classified landlords and the classification suffering from<br \/>\ninvidious discrimination is a beaten track.  All these questions have<br \/>\nbeen exhaustively gone into by a Division Bench of the High Court of<br \/>\nMadhya Pradesh presided over by J.S. Verma, J. (as His Lordship<br \/>\nthen was) in B. Johnson Vs. C.S. Naidu, AIR 1986 MP 72, and the<br \/>\nchallenge was turned down.  In\tKewal Singh Vs. Lajwanti, (1980) 1<br \/>\nSCC 290, a similar challenge laid against similar provisions of the<br \/>\nDelhi Rent Control Act, 1958, was rejected.  Similarly in Ravi Dutt<br \/>\nSharma Vs. Ratanlal Bhargava, (1984) 2 SCC 75, challenge to the<br \/>\nclassification between landlords in order to provide benefit of the<br \/>\nspecial procedure only to some of them constituting a distinct class<br \/>\nwas upheld as permissible and reasonable classification.  Both these<br \/>\ndecisions were relied on by the Division Bench of the High Court of<br \/>\nMadhya Pradesh in B. Johnson&#8217;s case (supra).  To the same effect is<br \/>\na later Full Bench decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in<br \/>\nKunjulal Yadu Vs. Parasram Sharma, 2000 (II) MPJR 123.\tSo<br \/>\nmuch observation would suffice for the purpose of the present case as<br \/>\nin our opinion, the present one is not a fit case, on the basis of the<br \/>\npleadings and material available, to examine the question of<br \/>\nconstitutional validity of Chapter III-A of the Act.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tThe principal issue is that out of three co-landlords, the<br \/>\nrespondents herein, one is a widow falling within the definition of<br \/>\n&#8216;landlord&#8217; as defined in Section 23-J of the Act and hence entitled to<br \/>\nhave recourse to the provisions of Chapter III-A while other two co-<br \/>\nlandlords do not fall within the definition of &#8216;landlord&#8217; in Section 23-<br \/>\nJ.  Though the requirement pleaded is of all the landlords, i.e. the<br \/>\nwidow as also  the other two co-landlords, it is only the widow who<br \/>\ncan take advantage of the special procedure for eviction but the others<br \/>\ntwo, who actually require the premises for their non-residential use,<br \/>\nshould have gone to Civil Court and cannot, under the law, have<br \/>\nrecourse to the forum of Rent Controlling Authority.\n<\/p>\n<p>The submission of Shri S.S. Ray, the learned senior counsel for<br \/>\nthe appellants, is that inasmuch as the requirement is of non-classified<br \/>\nlandlords to whom the forum of Civil Court under Section 12 of the<br \/>\nAct is open, they could not have invoked Chapter III-A to their<br \/>\nadvantage and to the prejudice of the tenant-appellants and should<br \/>\nhave filed their suits for eviction before the Civil Court.  It is further<br \/>\nsubmitted that unless that view is taken the provisions of Chapter III-<br \/>\nA would be liable to be struck down as violative of Article 14 of the<br \/>\nConstitution and, therefore, the provisions of Chapter III-A should be<br \/>\nso read as to save them from constitutional invalidity.\t The submission<br \/>\nmade by the learned senior counsel for the appellants, though<br \/>\nattractive, is liable to be discarded on scrutiny of its merit.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tWe will first note how the issue has been dealt with by the High<br \/>\nCourt of Madhya Pradesh.  In  Shivraj Jat Vs. Smt. Asha Lata Yadav<br \/>\nand Ors.-   1989 MPJR HC 336, a widow filed an application under<br \/>\nSection 23-A of the Act for eviction of the tenant from the leased<br \/>\npremises on the ground that the same was bona fide required for the<br \/>\npurpose of starting the business of her major son who was also<br \/>\narrayed as a co-plaintiff.   One of the pleas raised on behalf of the<br \/>\ntenant was that only one of the applicants being a widow  a<br \/>\n&#8216;landlord&#8217; as defined by Section 23-J of the Act, while the other<br \/>\napplicant was not such a landlord, the special procedure provided by<br \/>\nSection 23-A of the Act was not available to them.  It was held by the<br \/>\nDivision Bench that the provisions of Section 23-A (b) were<br \/>\nunambiguous. The legislation enables a &#8220;landlord&#8221; to seek eviction if<br \/>\nthe leased premises are bona fide required by the landlord for starting<br \/>\nthe business of a major son or daughter of the landlord; there can be<br \/>\nno logic or justification for denying that relief to the landlord because<br \/>\nthe major son or daughter of the landlord also happens to be co-owner<br \/>\nof the leased premises.\t The case was held to be covered by Section<br \/>\n23-A(b) of the Act.  A similar issue arose for consideration by a Full<br \/>\nBench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Harbans Singh Vs. Smt.<br \/>\nMargrat G. Bhingardive\tAIR 1990 MP 191.  The question posed<br \/>\nbefore the Full Bench  was : &#8220;Whether out of  several landlords of an<br \/>\naccommodation including a widow, an application for eviction of the<br \/>\ntenant by the widow alone, on the ground of her own bona fide need<br \/>\nor joint need of herself and that of her married sons and their children,<br \/>\nwould be competent before the Rent Controlling Authority under<br \/>\nSection 23-A(a) read with Section 23-J(iii) of the Act&#8221;.  The premises<br \/>\nin question were let out by the late husband of the landlady and after<br \/>\nhis death the widow as well as her children succeeded to the tenanted<br \/>\npremises by inheritance and therefore the widow and her children all<br \/>\nbecame co-owners and joint landlords thereof.  The application for<br \/>\neviction was filed by the widow alone.\tIt was urged that the widow<br \/>\nalone cannot maintain an application under Section 23-A of the Act<br \/>\neither for her own bona fide need or for the joint need of herself and<br \/>\nher married sons who are also joint landlords but do not belong to the<br \/>\nspecial class envisaged in Section 23-J of the Act and have not joined<br \/>\nthe widow in making application for eviction.  The Full Bench held<br \/>\nthat application filed by the widow alone as one of the landlords was<br \/>\ncompetent.  The Full Bench further held :-\n<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;If we examine the language of<br \/>\nSection 23-A and clause (a) thereof it would<br \/>\nbe clear from the plain and unambiguous<br \/>\nwords and language used\t therein that they<br \/>\nare capable of only one construction that the<br \/>\nperson who falls in the category of special<br \/>\nclass of landlords is authorized to take<br \/>\naction for eviction of the tenant either for his<br \/>\nown bona fide need or for the bona fide need<br \/>\nof any member of his family who may not<br \/>\nbelong to any of the special class of<br \/>\nlandlords.  If we accept the submissions<br \/>\nadvanced by the learned counsel for the<br \/>\ntenant\/applicant then in that event we would<br \/>\nbe doing violence to the plain language and<br \/>\nwords used in the provisions under<br \/>\nconsideration by reading into the said<br \/>\nprovisions  the words that the member of the<br \/>\nfamily for whose bona fide need, the<br \/>\napplication has been filed by the special<br \/>\nclass of landlord, should also belong to that<br \/>\ncategory. But law of Interpretation of Statute<br \/>\ndoes not permit such a course.\n<\/p>\n<p>Consequently the result is that the<br \/>\napplication made by the widow\/non-\n<\/p>\n<p>applicant under S.23-A(a) of the Act for<br \/>\neviction of the tenant\/applicant herein on the<br \/>\nground of her bona fide need and that of her<br \/>\nmarried sons who are members of his family<br \/>\nis competent and maintainable before the<br \/>\nRent Controlling Authority&#8221;(para 17).\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;.out of several landlords of an<br \/>\naccommodation  including a widow, an<br \/>\napplication for eviction of the tenant by the<br \/>\nwidow alone, on the ground of her own bona<br \/>\nfide need or joint need of herself and that of<br \/>\nher married sons and their children, who are<br \/>\nmembers of his family would be competent<br \/>\nbefore the Rent Controlling Authority under<br \/>\nS.23-A(a) read with S.23-J of the Act&#8221; (para\n<\/p>\n<p>18).\n<\/p>\n<p>   We  find ourselves in agreement with the view of the law<br \/>\ntaken by the High Court of M.P. in Shivraj Jat&#8217;s case (supra) and<br \/>\nHarbans Singh&#8217;s case (supra).  An analysis of Section 23-A(b) of the<br \/>\nAct  shows that an application seeking eviction of tenant thereunder is<br \/>\nmaintainable if :- (i) the accommodation is let for non-residential<br \/>\npurpose; (ii) it is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of<br \/>\ncontinuing or starting (a) his business, or (b) business of any of his<br \/>\nmajor sons or unmarried daughters; (iii) the landlord is the owner of<br \/>\nsuch accommodation or is holding accommodation for benefit of any<br \/>\nperson who requires the accommodation; and (iv) the landlord or such<br \/>\nperson has no other reasonably suitable non-residential<br \/>\naccommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town<br \/>\nconcerned.\n<\/p>\n<p>It is well settled by  at least three decisions of this Court,<br \/>\nnamely, Sri Ram Pasricha Vs. Jagannath and Ors.\t (1976) 4 SCC<br \/>\n184, Kanta Goel Vs. B.P. Pathan and Ors.-   (1977) 2 SCC 814 and<br \/>\nPal Singh Vs. Sunder Singh (dead) by Lrs. and Ors.  (1989) 1 SCC<br \/>\n444 that one of the co-owners can alone and in his own right file a suit<br \/>\nfor ejectment of tenant and it is  no defence open to tenant to question<br \/>\nthe maintainability of the suit on the ground that other co-owners were<br \/>\nnot joined as parties to the suit. When the property forming subject<br \/>\nmatter of eviction proceedings is owned by several owners, every co-<br \/>\nowner owns every part and every bit of the joint property along with<br \/>\nothers and it cannot be said that he is only a part owner or a fractional<br \/>\nowner of the property so long as the property has not been partitioned.<br \/>\nHe can alone maintain a suit for eviction of tenant without joining the<br \/>\nother co-owners if such other co-owners do not object.\t\tIn Shri Ram<br \/>\nPasricha&#8217;s case (supra) reliance was placed by the tenant on the<br \/>\nEnglish rule that if two or more landlords institute a suit for<br \/>\npossession on the ground that a dwelling house is required for<br \/>\noccupation of one of them as a residence the suit would fail; the<br \/>\nrequirement must be of all the landlords. The Court noted that the<br \/>\nEnglish rule was not followed by the High Courts of Calcutta and<br \/>\nGujarat which High Courts have respectfully dissented from the rule<br \/>\nof English law.\t This Court held that a decree could be passed in<br \/>\nfavour of the plaintiff though he was not the absolute and full owner<br \/>\nof the premises because he required the premises for his own use and<br \/>\nalso satisfied the requirement of being &#8220;if he is the owner&#8221;, the<br \/>\nexpression as employed by Section 13(1)(f) of W.B. Premises<br \/>\nTenancy Act, 1956.\n<\/p>\n<p>It follows that a widow, who is a co-owner and landlady of the<br \/>\npremises can in her own right initiate proceedings for eviction under<br \/>\nSection 23-A(b), as analysed hereinbefore, without joining other co-<br \/>\nowners\/co-landlords as party to the proceedings if they do not object<br \/>\nto the initiation of proceedings by such landlady, because she is the<br \/>\nowner of the property and requires the tenanted accommodation for<br \/>\nthe purpose of continuing or starting the business of any of her major<br \/>\nsons.  The major sons though co-owners\/co-landlords may not have<br \/>\nbeen joined as party to the proceedings but it would not adversely<br \/>\naffect the maintainability of the proceedings.\tIt would also not make<br \/>\nany difference if they are also joined as party to the proceedings.<br \/>\nTheir presence in the proceedings is suggestive of their concurrence<br \/>\nwith the widow landlady maintaining the proceedings in her own<br \/>\nright.\tThe presence of such co-landlords, as co-plaintiffs or co-<br \/>\napplicants, as are not classified landlords as defined in Section 23-J of<br \/>\nthe Act does not alter the nature of claim preferred by the widow<br \/>\nlandlady and therefore does not take the proceedings out of the scope<br \/>\nof Section 23-A (b).  Conversely, the major sons or any of them suing<br \/>\nalone without joining a widow co-landlord as party to the proceedings<br \/>\nmay institute a suit before a Civil Court under Section 12 of the Act<br \/>\npleading that the non-residential premises were required bona fide by<br \/>\nthem or any of them for the purpose of continuing or starting their<br \/>\nown or his own business as they would be owners thereof and the<br \/>\nrequirement will be theirs.  It would not make any material difference<br \/>\nif the widow co-landlord was joined as party to the proceedings either<br \/>\nas plaintiff or as co-applicant\t because the case pleaded in the plaint<br \/>\nwould squarely fall within the ambit of clause (f) sub-Section (1) of<br \/>\nSection 12 of the Act.\n<\/p>\n<p>Here we may divert a little and refer to a decision of this Court<br \/>\nin Messrs. Importers and Manufacturers Ltd. Vs. Pheroze Framroze<br \/>\nTaraporewala and Ors.  AIR 1953 SC 73.\tThe local law (applicable<br \/>\nto Bombay) provided for a suit between landlord and tenant being<br \/>\nfiled in the Small Causes Court.  In the suit filed by the landlord<br \/>\nagainst the tenant, the sub-tenant was also impleaded as a party.  The<br \/>\ndefendant objected to the maintainability of the suit before the Small<br \/>\nCauses Court submitting that the suit being not one between landlord<br \/>\nand tenant alone it would not be within the competence of the Small<br \/>\nCauses Court to try the same.  This Court held that a sub-tenant was a<br \/>\nproper party in a suit for ejectment between landlord and tenant.  The<br \/>\njoinder of such a proper party cannot alter the character of the suit and<br \/>\ndoes not make the suit any the less a suit between the landlord and the<br \/>\ntenant; to hold otherwise will be to encourage multiplicity of the suits<br \/>\nwhich will result in no end of inconvenience and confusion.  It is clear<br \/>\nfrom the ratio of this decision that presence of proper party does not<br \/>\nalter the basic character of the suit and availability of forum is to be<br \/>\ndetermined by examining the essential nature of the suit.\n<\/p>\n<p>The submission of the learned senior counsel for the tenant-<br \/>\nappellants if accepted may create a diabolical situation.  The<br \/>\nrequirement pleaded is the requirement of a widow landlady for<br \/>\ncontinuing or starting the business of her major sons.\tIn proceedings<br \/>\nfor eviction of a tenant it is permissible for all the co-owner landlords<br \/>\nto join as plaintiffs. Rather, this is normally done.  Now, if they all file<br \/>\na claim before the Civil Court an objection may possibly be raised on<br \/>\nbehalf of the tenant-defendant that the widow landlady being one of<br \/>\nthe claimants for eviction she must go to the Rent Controlling<br \/>\nAuthority under Chapter III-A.\tIf they collectively join in initiating<br \/>\nthe proceedings for eviction of the tenant before the Rent Controlling<br \/>\nAuthority under Chapter III-A the tenant-defendant may object that<br \/>\nthe requirement being that of the major sons who are themselves<br \/>\nlandlord-applicants the claim should have been filed before the Civil<br \/>\nCourt, as is the plea before us.   How such dilemma can be resolved?\n<\/p>\n<p>Both the learned senior counsel for the parties stated that there<br \/>\nis no specific statutory provision nor a binding precedent available<br \/>\nproviding resolution to the problem posed.  Procedural law cannot<br \/>\nbetray the substantive law by submitting to subordination of<br \/>\ncomplexity.  Courts equipped with power to interpret law are often<br \/>\nposed with queries which may be ultimate.  The judicial steps of judge<br \/>\nthen do stir to solve novel problems by neat innovations.  When the<br \/>\nstatute does not provide the path and precedents abstain to lead, then<br \/>\nthey are the sound logic, rational reasoning, common sense and urge<br \/>\nfor public good which play as guides of those who decide. Wrong<br \/>\nmust not be left unredeemed and right not left unenforced.  Forum<br \/>\nought to be revealed when it does not clearly exist or when it is<br \/>\ndoubted where it exists.  When the law\tprocedural or substantive<br \/>\ndoes not debar any two seekers of justice from joining hands and<br \/>\nmoving together, they must have a common path.\tMultiplicity of<br \/>\nproceedings should be avoided and same cause of action available to<br \/>\ntwo at a time must not be forced to split and tried in two different fora<br \/>\nas far as practicable and permissible.\n<\/p>\n<p>Reference to, or deriving aid from, certain legal maxims will be<br \/>\nuseful.\t Ubi jus ibi remedium  there is no wrong without a remedy.<br \/>\nWhere there is a right there is a forum for its enforcement. According<br \/>\nto Broom&#8217;s Legal Maxims (Tenth Edition, pp.118-119), the maxim<br \/>\nhas been considered so valuable that it led to the invention of the form<br \/>\nof action called an action on the case.\t Where no precedent of a writ<br \/>\ncan be produced,  the clerks in Chancery shall agree in forming a new<br \/>\none.  The principle adopted by courts of law accordingly is, that the<br \/>\nnovelty of the particular complaint alleged in an action on the case is<br \/>\nno objection, provided that an injury cognizable by law be shown to<br \/>\nhave been inflicted on the plaintiff, in which case, although there be<br \/>\nno precedent, the common law will judge according to the law of<br \/>\nnature and the public good.  If a man has a right, he must, &#8220;have a<br \/>\nmeans to vindicate and maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured in the<br \/>\nexercise and enjoyment of it, and, indeed, it is vain thing to imagine a<br \/>\nright without a remedy, for want of right and want of remedy are<br \/>\nreciprocal&#8221;.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tAs held in Smt. Ganga Bai Vs. Vijay Kumar and Ors.<br \/>\n(1974) 2  SCC 393 there is an inherent right in every person to bring a<br \/>\nsuit of a civil nature and unless the suit is barred by statute one may,<br \/>\nat one&#8217;s peril, bring a suit of one&#8217;s choice.  It is no answer to a suit,<br \/>\nhowsoever frivolous the claim, that the law confers no such right to<br \/>\nsue.  A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is<br \/>\nenough that no statute bars the suit.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tPlaintiff is dominus litis, that is, master of, or having dominion<br \/>\nover, the case.\t  He is the person who has carriage and control of an<br \/>\naction. In case of conflict of jurisdiction the choice ought to lie with<br \/>\nthe plaintiff to choose the forum best suited to him unless there be a<br \/>\nrule of law excluding access to a forum of plaintiff&#8217;s choice or<br \/>\npermitting recourse to a forum will be opposed to public policy or will<br \/>\nbe an abuse of the process of law.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tReference may also be had to Section 17 of CPC which<br \/>\nprovides that where a suit is to obtain relief respecting immoveable<br \/>\nproperty situate within the jurisdiction of different Courts, the suit<br \/>\nmay be instituted in any Court within the local limits of whose<br \/>\njurisdiction any portion of the property is situated; provided that, in<br \/>\nrespect of the value of the subject-matter of the suit, the entire claim is<br \/>\ncongnisable by such Court.  The provision confers right on plaintiff<br \/>\nsuing on consolidate cause of action to choose one out of several fora<br \/>\navailable to him and it is his convenience and sweet will which will<br \/>\nprevail.  The provision is not\tan answer to the problem posed\tin the<br \/>\npresent case; nevertheless the principle underlying thereunder can be<br \/>\nread out and pressed in service.  In Nrisingha Charan Nandy<br \/>\nChoudhry Vs. Rajniti Prasad Singh and Ors.  AIR 1936 PC 189,<br \/>\ntheir Lordships referred to Section 17 of the CPC and termed it as  the<br \/>\nordinary rule for determining the Court which can take congnizance of<br \/>\na suit for immoveable property situated within the local limits of two<br \/>\nor more tribunals.  Where cause of action is one against several<br \/>\ndefendants and they reside in different jurisdictions, the plaintiff may,<br \/>\nunder Section 20 of CPC file the suit in a court within whose<br \/>\njurisdiction any one of the  defendants, at the time of the<br \/>\ncommencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides.  Thus in<br \/>\ncase of a cause of action being triable in more than one forum it may<br \/>\nbe tried by any one forum subject to any other provision or rule of<br \/>\nlaw.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tReverting back to the issue before us, the cause of action is one<br \/>\n requirement of a major son, who himself is a co-owner. It is capable<br \/>\nof being construed in two ways, depending on from the point of view<br \/>\nof which of the landlords we look at.  From the point of view of the<br \/>\nwidow landlady and owner it is a case of the accommodation let for<br \/>\nnon-residential purpose required bona fide by the landlady for the<br \/>\npurpose of continuing or staring the business of any of her major sons,<br \/>\nwithin the meaning of Section 23-A(b) of the Act.  From the point of<br \/>\nview of the major son himself, who is also himself an owner, it is a<br \/>\ncase of the accommodation let for non-residential purpose required<br \/>\nbona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his<br \/>\nbusiness as he is owner thereof, within the meaning of Section<br \/>\n12(1)(f) of the Act.  In the former case the cause of action is triable by<br \/>\nway of an application before R.C.A. In the latter case the cause of<br \/>\naction is triable in a suit instituted in Civil Court.\tAny one of them<br \/>\nmay singally commence the proceedings without impleading the other<br \/>\nor by impleading the other as a non-applicant or defendant in pro-<br \/>\nforma capacity in which case the choice of forum would present no<br \/>\ndifficulty.  The former shall go to R.C.A.  The latter shall go to Civil<br \/>\nCourt.\tHowever, the law does not prevent the co-owner landlords<br \/>\nfrom joining together to sue on the cause of action common to them<br \/>\nall.  And if they do so the conflict of jurisdiction arises.  The choice of<br \/>\nforum, in such a case, must of necessity be left open to the plaintiffs.<br \/>\nOtherwise they will be left without remedy.  Keeping in view the<br \/>\nthree relevant principles (i) that every wrong must have a remedy and<br \/>\nevery right to relief must have a forum for enforcement, (ii) that<br \/>\nplaintiff is dominus litis, and (iii) that one co-owner\/landlord can file a<br \/>\nsuit for ejectment of tenant and it is not necessary that all co-<br \/>\nowner\/landlords must jointly sue for ejectment though they are not<br \/>\nprevented from\trather entitled to  joining together and suing jointly<br \/>\nif they wish to do so, we proceed to state our conclusions as under :-\n<\/p>\n<p>(i) where a claim for eviction is filed by a landlord, or a co-landlord,<br \/>\nbelonging to any one of the five categories defined in Section 23-J of<br \/>\nthe Act, as  the sole applicant without objection by other co-landlords<br \/>\nwho have not joined as co-applicants and the nature of claim for<br \/>\neviction is covered by Section 23-A(b) of the Act, the proceedings<br \/>\nwould lie only before the Rent Controlling Authority;\n<\/p>\n<p>(ii) where a claim for eviction is filed by a landlord or by such a co-<br \/>\nlandlord who does not belong to any of the categories defined by<br \/>\nSection 23-J and the other co-landlord\/landlady falling in one of the<br \/>\ncategories defined in Section 23-J is not joined as co-plaintiff the<br \/>\nclaim shall have to be filed only by way of a suit instituted in a Civil<br \/>\nCourt;\n<\/p>\n<p>(iii) if the proceedings are initiated by such co-owner landlords, one or<br \/>\nmore of whom belong to Section 23-J category while some others are<br \/>\nthose not falling within the definition of &#8216;landlord&#8217; under Section 23-J<br \/>\nand the requirement pleaded provides a cause of action\tcollectively to<br \/>\nall the landlords arrayed as plaintiffs or applicants, the choice of<br \/>\nforum lies with the landlords.\tThey may file an application before<br \/>\nR.C.A. under Chapter III-A or may file a civil suit in a Civil Court<br \/>\nunder Section 12 of the Act; in either case the proceedings would be<br \/>\ncompetent and maintainable.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tWe are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no merit in the<br \/>\nplea raised on behalf of the appellants that the three respondents, one<br \/>\nwidow and her two major sons, could not have initiated proceedings<br \/>\nfor eviction before the Rent Controlling Authority.  We have carefully<br \/>\nperused the two applications for eviction filed by the respondents. The<br \/>\nbonafide requirement pleaded is of the widow landlady, the<br \/>\nrespondent no.1, who requires the suit premises for Govinda,<br \/>\nrespondent no.2 for starting his business and that of another son<br \/>\nHemant, the respondent no.3 for continuing the business which<br \/>\npresently he is carrying on in rented premises.\t Respondents 2 and 3<br \/>\nbeing major sons of the widow respondent no.1,\tsuch requirement<br \/>\nclearly falls also within the purview of Section 23-A (b) of the Act.<br \/>\nThe proceedings initiated before R.C.A. do not suffer from want of<br \/>\njurisdictional competence.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tSo far as the challenge to proof of requirement is concerned it<br \/>\nmerits\t a summary   dismissal.\t     The  Rent Controlling Authority<br \/>\nand the High Court, both, have on a meticulous evaluation of evidence<br \/>\nfound the requirement proved.  None of the landlords is possessed of<br \/>\nany other suitable alternative accommodation of his or her own to<br \/>\nsatisfy the requirement found proved.  A landlord cannot be<br \/>\ncompelled to carry on business in rented premises and the proved<br \/>\nrequirement cannot be defeated by the tenant submitting that the<br \/>\nlandlord can start or comfortably continue to run his business in<br \/>\nrented premises.  It has come in evidence that the landlords have<br \/>\nsecured possession of some premises in Ahilyapura locality situated at<br \/>\na short distance from the suit premises but the Ahilyapura<br \/>\naccommodation is again a tenanted accommodation and hence<br \/>\nirrelevant for defeating the claim of the landlords. To be an alternative<br \/>\naccommodation relevant within the meaning of Section 12(1)(f) or<br \/>\nSection\t 23-A(b) it must be &#8216;of his own&#8217;, that is, the one &#8216;owned&#8217; by<br \/>\nthe landlord.  Another alternative accommodation pointed out by the<br \/>\ntenant is the one  situated on the first floor of the building. It has come<br \/>\nin the evidence that the second floor of the building is used for<br \/>\nresidence of the landlords while the first floor is used partly as a<br \/>\ngodown and partly for stitching\t the clothes which are sold as<br \/>\nreadymade garments in the shop of respondent no.3.   To amount to an<br \/>\nalternate non-residential accommodation so as to defeat the<br \/>\nrequirement of the landlord for the suit premises, it should be<br \/>\nreasonably suitable non-residential accommodation.  It should be<br \/>\nsuitable in all respects as the suit accommodation is.\tIn Shiv Sarup<br \/>\nGupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta  (1999) 6 SCC 222 this Court<br \/>\nhas held that an alternative accommodation, to entail denial of the<br \/>\nclaim of the landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in<br \/>\ncomparison with the suit accommodation wherefrom the landlord is<br \/>\nseeking eviction.  The availability of another accommodation, suitable<br \/>\nand convenient in all respects as the suit accommodation, may have an<br \/>\nadverse bearing on the finding as to bona fides of the landlord if he<br \/>\nunreasonably refuses to occupy the available premises to satisfy his<br \/>\nalleged need.  The bona fides of the need of the landlord for the<br \/>\npremises or additional premises have to be determined by the Court<br \/>\nby applying objective standards and once the Court is satisfied of such<br \/>\nbona fides then in the matter of choosing out of more<br \/>\naccommodations than one available to the landlord, his subjective<br \/>\nchoice shall be respected by the Court.\t For the business, which the<br \/>\nrespondents no.2 and 3 propose to start or continue respectively, an<br \/>\naccommodation situated on the first floor cannot be said to be an<br \/>\nalternative suitable accommodation in comparison with the shops<br \/>\nsituated on the ground floor.  A shop on the first floor cannot attract<br \/>\nthe same number of customers and earn the same business as a shop<br \/>\nsituated on the ground floor would do.\tMoreover, there is no evidence<br \/>\nadduced by the appellants to show that in M.T. Cloth market shops are<br \/>\nalso situated on first floor of buildings and attract the same business as<br \/>\nthe shops on ground floor do.  The High Court and the R.C.A. have<br \/>\nheld none of the premises pointed out by the tenant-appellants such<br \/>\nalternate accommodation as may defeat the respondents&#8217; claim.  We<br \/>\nfind no reason to take a different view.  Between the years 1987 and<br \/>\n1989 late Krishna Das, the then sole owner of the building, had sold<br \/>\nthree shops but that was an event which had taken place in the life-<br \/>\ntime of late Krishna Das and cannot have relevance for denying the<br \/>\nclaim of the respondent-landlords filed in the year 1995.\n<\/p>\n<p>For all the foregoing reasons we find the appeals devoid of any<br \/>\nmerit and liable to be dismissed.  They are dismissed with costs.<br \/>\nHowever, each of the appellants is allowed four months time  for<br \/>\nvacating the suit premises subject to each of them clearing all arrears<br \/>\nof rent and filing usual undertaking, within a period of four weeks<br \/>\nfrom today.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Supreme Court of India Dhannalal vs Kalawatibai &amp; Ors on 8 July, 2000 Author: R Lahoti Bench: R.C. Lahoti, B.N. Agrawal. CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 3652 of 2002 Appeal (civil) 3653 of 2002 PETITIONER: DHANNALAL Vs. RESPONDENT: KALAWATIBAI &amp; ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08\/07\/2000 BENCH: R.C. LAHOTI, B.N. AGRAWAL. JUDGMENT: R.C. Lahoti, J. Leave granted. [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-86584","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.6 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Dhannalal vs Kalawatibai &amp; Ors on 8 July, 2000 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/dhannalal-vs-kalawatibai-ors-on-8-july-2000-2\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Dhannalal vs Kalawatibai &amp; 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