{"id":88503,"date":"2002-03-21T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2002-03-20T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2"},"modified":"2015-05-15T02:00:20","modified_gmt":"2015-05-14T20:30:20","slug":"anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2","title":{"rendered":"Anaimalai National Estate vs The Planter’S Association on 21 March, 2002"},"content":{"rendered":"
Madras High Court<\/div>\n
Anaimalai National Estate vs The Planter’S Association on 21 March, 2002<\/div>\n
       \n\n  \n\n  \n\n \n \n  IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS          \n\n DATED:  21.03.2002  \n\n CORAM   \n\nTHE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K.P.SIVASUBRAMANIAM              \n\n WRIT PETITION Nos.4884 to 4887 of 2002 and WRIT PETITION Nos.5651 of 2002     \n\nand \n\nW.P.M.P.Nos.6906 to 6909  and 7853 of 2002   \n\n\n Anaimalai National Estate\nWorkers Union represented \nby its General Secretary,\nValparai.                       Petitioner in W.P.No.4884 of 2002\n\n\nAnaimalai Ambedkhar Thotta  \nMakkal Sangam represented   \nby its General Secretary,\nValparai.                       Petitioner in W.P.No.4885 of 2002\n\n\nAnaimalai Dravida Thozhilalar\nMunnetra Sangam (LPF),  \nValparai, represented by its\nGeneral Secretary.              Petitioner in W.P.No.4886 of 2002\n\n\nTamil Nadu Plantation Worker's\nUnion, represented by its\nGeneral Secretary,\nCoonoor.                        Petitioner in W.P.No.4887 of 2002\n\n\nEdayadeivam M.G.R.Thotta Thozhilalar  \nSangam, represented by its President,\nValparai.                       Petitioner in W.P.No.5651 of 2002\n\n\/versus\/\n\n\n 1.The Planter's Association\nof Tamil Nadu, Coimbatore.\n\n2.Stanmore Estate, \nrepresented by its Manager,\nValparai.\n\n3.Injiparai Estate\nrepresented by its Manager,\nValparai.\n\n4.Siricundra Estate,\nrepresented by its Manager,\n(M\/s.Hindustan Levers Ltd.),\nValparai.\n\n5.Panchamalai Estate, \nrepresented by its Manager,\nValparai.\n\n6.Valparai Estate,\nrepresented by its Manager,\nValparai.\n\n7.Veloni Estate,\nrepresented by its Manager,\nValparai\n\n8.Urilikal Estate,\nrepresented by its Manager,\nM\/s.Tata Tea Ltd.\nUrilikal Estate Post,\nValparai.\n\n9.Pannimedu Estate, \n  represented by its Manager,\n  M\/s.Tata Tea Ltd.,\n  Pannimedu Estate Post, \n  Valparai.\n\n10.Sholayar Estate,\n   represented by its Manager,\n   Sholayar Estate (P.O.),\n   Valparai.\n\n11.Kallar Estate,\n   represented by its Manager,\n  M\/s.Jay Shree Tea and \n  Industries Ltd.,\n  Sholayar Estate (P.O.)\n\n12.Water falls Estate-East,\n   represented by its Manager,\n   Water falls Estate (PO).\n\n13.Water falls Estate-West,\n   Water falls Estate (PO).\n\n14.Iyerpadi Estate,\n   represented by its Manager,\n   (M\/s.Parry Agro Industries Ltd.),\n   Iyerpadi Estate (PO).\n\n15.Paralai Estate,\n   represented by its Manager,\n   (M\/s.Parry Agro Industries Ltd.),\n   Iyerpadi Estate (PO).\n\n16.Murugally Estate,\n   represented by its Manager,\n   (M\/s.Parry Agro Industries Ltd.),\n   Murugally Bazaar (PO).\n\n17.Sheikal Mudi Estate,\n   represented by its Manager,\n   (M\/s.Parry Agro Industries Ltd.),\n   Murugally Bazaar (PO).\n\n18.Mukkottumudi Estate, \n   by its Group Manager,\n   Mudis Group,\n   M\/s.Bombay Burmah Trading  \n   Corporation Ltd.,\n   Mudis Post.\n\n\n19.Thonimudi Estate, \n   by its Group Manager,\n   Mudis Group,\n   M\/s.Bombay Burmah Trading Corpn. Ltd., \n   Mudis Post.\n\n20.Thayamudi Estate, \n   by its Group Manager,\n   Mudis Group,\n   M\/s.Bombay Burmah Trading Corpn. Ltd., \n   Mudis Post.\n\n21.Gajamudi Estate, \n   by its Group Manager,\n   Mudis Group,\n   M\/s.Bombay Burmah Trading Corpn. Ltd., \n   Mudis Post.\n\n22.Anamudi Estate, \n   by its Group Manager,\n   Mudis Group,\n   M\/s.Bombay Burmah Trading Corpn. Ltd., \n   Mudis Post.\n\n23.Karamalai Estate,\n   represented by its Manager,\n   (M\/s.Periya Karamalai Tea\n   & Produce Company Ltd.), \n   Karamalai Bazaar Post,\n   Valparai.\n\n24.Akamalai Estate, \n     represented by its Manager,\n   (M\/s.Periya Karamalai Tea\n   & Produce Company Ltd.), \n   Karamalai Bazaar Post,\n   Valparai.\n\n25.Vellamalai Estate,\n     represented by its Manager,\n   (M\/s.Periya Karamalai Tea\n   & Produce Company Ltd.), \n   Karamalai Bazaar Post,\n   Valparai.\n\n26.Nadumalai Estate, \n   represented by its Manager,\n   (M\/s.Periya Karamalai Tea\n   & Produce Company Ltd.), \n   Karamalai Bazaar Post,\n   Valparai.\n\n\n27.Waverly Estate,\n   represented by its General Manager,\n   NEPC Tea Garden,  \n   Water falls Estate Post,\n   Valparai.\n\n28.Mount Stuart Tea Estate,\n   represented by its General Manager,\n   NEPC Tea Garden,  \n   Water falls Estate,\n   Valparai.\n\n\n29.Commissioner of Labour, \n   Teynampet,\nChennai  600 006.              Respondents in all      \n                                cases. \n\n30.PASI Tea Research Foundation,  \n   represented by its Director,\n   Nirar Dam BPO, \n   Valparai,\nCoimbatore District.            R.29 in WP.4885\/2002  \n\n\n\n\n For petitioners in all cases   : Mr.K.Chandru,\n                                Senior Counsel, for\n                                Mr.D.Hariparanthaman in \n                                WP.Nos.4884 to 4887 of 2002  \n                                Mr.S.Saravanan, in\n                                WP.No.5651 of 2002  \n\n For 1st respondent             :  Mr.Vijay Narayan\n\nFor 2nd respondent              :  Mr.A.L.Somayaji,\n                                Senior Counsel for\n                                Mr.T.S.Gopalan \n\nFor 12th respondent             :  Mr.R.T.Doraisami\n\n:                                    ORDER \n<\/pre>\n
                These writ petitions have been  filed  by  the  different
\nTrade Unions registered under the Trade Unions Act,1926, representing the
\nPlantation Workmen employed in the various Estates in Valparai, Anaimalai
\nareas in  Coimbatore  District.  According to them there are about 24,000
\npermanent workmen and about 26,000  temporary  workmen  and  daily  rated
\nworkmen employed  in  the  Estate\/respondents  2 to 28.  Considering that
\nidentical issues are raised in  all  the  above  writ  petitions,  it  is
\nconvenient to refer to the facts stated in W.P.No.4884 of 2002.\n<\/p>\n
                2.According   to  the  petitioner,  the  Union  has  been
\nentering into various settlements from  time  to  time  right  from  1962
\nseparately  for  each category of workmen regarding the wages and working
\nconditions.  The last of such settlement was entered into between  Unions
\nand  the  first respondent under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes
\nAct ( hereinafter called “the Act”) on 10.7.1996`.  Though the period  of
\nsettlement  was  for  three years, ending on 31.12.1998, the terms of the
\nsettlements stand automatically extended even after the  said  period  in
\nterms of  Section 19(2) of the Act.  Regarding wages of Supervisory staff
\nand the skilled workers  also,  similar  settlement  was  arrived  at  on
\n2.5.2000  for  the  period  commencing  from 1.9.1999 and for the general
\ncategory on 12\/13.1.2000 for  the  period  commencing  from  1.1.1999  to
\n31.12.2001.\n<\/p>\n
                3.In  terms  of  such  settlement the employees have also
\nbeen receiving apart from wages, Dearness Allowance, incentive etc.    On
\ncompletion of the period of settlement, they had demanded revision of the
\nwages considering  the  price  of  essential  commodities.   But to their
\nsurprise and shock the Planters Association  of  Tamil  Nadu,  the  first
\nrespondent   herein   (P.A.T.)  issued  three  individual  notices  dated
\n24.10.2001 informing their intention to terminate  the  settlement  dated
\n10.7.199 6, 2.5.2000 and 12\/13.1.2000 with effect from 31.12.2001.\n<\/p>\n
                4.On  receipt of such notices almost all the Unions wrote
\nletters objecting to  the  proposals  and  requested  withdrawal  of  the
\nproposals.  Instead of holding talks and arriving at a mutual settlement,
\nrespondents  2 to 28 sent individuals notices on 30.11.2001 and 8.12.2001
\nto all Unions under Section 9-A of the Act seeking  to  withdraw,  alter,
\nmodify the  existing  benefits  flowing  from  the  said settlement.  The
\nchanges thus contemplated not only  result  in  reduction  of  wages  and
\nincentives,  but  also changes in the work pattern resulting in increased
\nwork load.  A conciliation notice dated 7.12.2001 was received  from  the
\nCommissioner of  Labour,  29th  respondent.    The  Union  and  the first
\nrespondent Association took part in the Conciliation proceedings and  the
\n29th respondent advised respondents 2 to 28 not to give the effect to the
\nproposed  changes and also both parties to have bilateral negotiations to
\nresolve issues amicably.  As on the  date  of  the  writ  petition,  nine
\nrounds  of  talks  were  held,  but  the  first respondent was adamant in
\nimplementing the proposed change in working conditions.  Respondents 2 to
\n28 have also notified that the wages and other benefits for the month  of
\nJanuary,  2002 would be paid only in accordance with the changes proposed
\nin the notice issued under Section 9-A of the Act.  The  disbursement  of
\nwages  will be made with effect from 7th or 10th of every month depending
\non the strength of the workers in each of the estate.  According  to  the
\npetitioner Union, as per the proposed change each workmen will lose about
\n30 to  40  per  cent.  Consequently, the workers refused to receive wages
\nfor the month of January, 2002.  It is further stated that the settlement
\ncannot come to an end without following the procedure under Section 19(2)
\nof the Act.  It was also not open to the management to change  the  terms
\nand conditions of service during the pendency of the dispute.\n<\/p>\n
                5.In their counter, the  Planters  Association  have  not
\ndisputed  the  details  relating  to  the  execution of the settlement as
\narrived at between the parties as pleaded by the petitioners;  but  would
\nstate that the agreements were terminated by issuing notice under Section
\n19(2) of  the  Act  with  effect from 31.12.2001.  Thereafter, individual
\nnotices have been issued by each of the Estate separately  under  Section
\n9-A of  the  Act and not by the Association.  It is also pleaded that the
\nwrit petition is not maintainable since  the  individual  Estate  or  the
\nPlanters  Association  is  not a State or Instrumentality of the State in
\nterms of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and  hence  no  mandamus
\ncan be  issued against respondents 1 to 28.  As a result of the financial
\ncrisis faced by  the  Tea  industry  and  the  Plantation,  the  proposed
\nrevision  of  wages  was  imminent and necessary and in fact a High Level
\nMeeting of the  representatives  of  the  employers  and  the  Union  was
\nconvened  and  also  a  meeting  took place with the Hon’ble Minister for
\nLabour and pursuant to the said meeting  they  had  requested  the  Joint
\nCommissioner of Labour by their letter dated 29.11.2001 to convene a High
\nLevel meeting.    Notice  under  Section 9-A of the Act was given between
\n30.11.2001 and 8.12.2001.  Notice of Conciliation was given by the  Joint
\nCommissioner on  7.12.200 1.  Even prior to 1.1.2002 (when the changes in
\nthe condition of service were to take effect) on  18.12.2001  itself  the
\nCommissioner   directed   both  parties  to  hold  direct  talks  between
\nthemselves.  Such talks did commence on 1.1.2002 and continued on several
\ndates.  Therefore,  there  was  no  Conciliation  proceeding  pending  on
\n1.2.2002 or  subsequently.  It is further stated that the Association has
\nonly a representative status and hence the intimation given by the Labour
\nCommissioner to the Association cannot be treated as notice to individual
\nemployers.  The parties are still carrying on by-partite negotiations  in
\nwhich the  petitioner’s  Union  are  also  taking  part.    There  is  no
\ncontravention of Section 33 of the Act in any manner.  Even assuming that
\na Conciliation proceeding was pending as alleged by the  petitioners  and
\nthat  there  was  any violation of Section 33 of the Act, the petitioners
\nshould have filed a complaint under Section  33-A  of  the  Act  and  the
\nConciliation Officer should have held discussions in an attempt to arrive
\nat an  interim  arrangement.   Section 33-A of the Act itself provides an
\nalternative and efficacious remedy and hence, there was no  justification
\nto  invoke  the  jurisdiction  of  this  Court  under  Article 226 of the
\nConstitution of India.\n<\/p>\n
                6.It  is  further  stated that earlier there was a direct
\nindustrywise negotiation covering all the areas and because of the delay,
\nthe Unions operating in Nilgiris District, has expressed desire to arrive
\nat a settlement in respect of their areas, covering  plantations  in  the
\nTaluks of Udhagamandalam, Kotagiri, Coonoor.  A settlement was arrived at
\nagreeing  on  fixing  wages  at  Rs.70\/- per day plus Attendance bonus of
\nRs.2\/- per day and thus in respect of a major Plantation area, settlement
\nhad been arrived at.  The settlement was to remain  in  operation  for  a
\nperiod of  three  years.  It is further stated that the settlement covers
\nmore than 12,000 workmen.  In fact, the Unions affiliated to the  Central
\nFederations   to  which  some  of  the  present  petitioner’s  Union  are
\naffiliated, are also signatories to the said settlement.\n<\/p>\n
                7.In the counter, further details have  also  been  given
\nwhich according to the first respondent, would provide more than adequate
\nreasons to  justify  the downward revision of wages as contemplated.  The
\ncircumstances  thus   expressed   include   various   factors   such   as
\nLiberalisation  policy  of  Government  of  India, Trade policy allegedly
\ndictated by the World Trade Organisation (W.T.O.), general  recession  in
\nthe industries  etc.    Considering the issues which are relevant for the
\ndisposal of these writ petitions, there is  no  need  to  go  into  those
\ndetails.\n<\/p>\n
                8.Separate  counter  affidavits  have  been  filed by the
\nvarious Estates (i) 12th respondent  (ii)  Respondents  14  to  17  (iii)
\nRespondents 23  to  26.   The defence taken therein are almost similar to
\nthat of the counter filed by the Association.   In  addition,  they  have
\nalso pleaded reasons for justifying the downward revision of the wages.\n<\/p>\n
                9.Mr.K.Chandru,    learned   Senior   Counsel   for   the
\npetitioners submits that the  proposed  revision  affects  not  only  the
\nservice  conditions,  but  also  the very living conditions of the labour
\nforce in the area.  Cut in the wages and allowances were so drastic  that
\nit was not possible for the petitioners\/workers to survive.  There was no
\njustification  in  comparing the workers in Nilgiris area as most of them
\nare natives of the said area while the workers in Anaimalai and  Valparai
\nareas are migrants from other Districts.  He would also state that if the
\nvery  same  Unions had agreed for the settlement in the Nilgiris area and
\nthey are not agreeing for Valparai area, it cannot be due to any ulterior
\nmotive.  The objections are based only due to peculiar conditions of  one
\narea and therefore, it was neither proper for comparing one area with the
\nother  nor to contend that the petitioner’s Unions were unnecessarily and
\ndeliberately refusing to arrive at a settlement.\n<\/p>\n
                10.It is further  contended  that  the  existing  service
\nconditions  as covered by the settlement can be altered only by following
\nprocedure under Section 19(2) of the Act.  It was the  employer  who  had
\ngiven  notice  under  Section  9-A of the Act and had also approached the
\nauthorities under the Act and had commenced the Conciliation proceedings.
\nThat being so, it was  not  open  for  the  respondents  to  violate  the
\nprovisions  of  Section 33(1) of the Act and seek to alter the conditions
\nof service to the disadvantage of the employees during  the  pendency  of
\nthe Conciliation   proceedings.    Such  conduct  not  only  amounted  to
\nnon-compliance of the statutory  provisions,  but  also  attracted  penal
\nprovisions.    Therefore,   respondents  cannot  be  permitted  to  raise
\ntechnical objections such as alternative remedy or the maintainability of
\na writ of mandamus.\n<\/p>\n
                11.Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned Senior Counsel  for  some  of
\nthe  employers contends that the writ petition itself is not maintainable
\nas against a Private Company.  It is further stated  that  there  was  no
\nConciliation  Proceeding pending as on date, in view of the fact that the
\nCommissioner had directed bipartite talks among  the  parties  and  talks
\nwere taking  place.  Hence, Conciliation proceedings have come to an end.
\nThe Conciliation Proceeding was no more subsisting.    The  roll  of  the
\nConciliation Officer was only to bring about a settlement and he does not
\ndecide rights  of  parties.    He would further submit that even assuming
\nthat Conciliation was pending, the Unions had the alternative  remedy  of
\ninvoking  Section  33-A  of  the  Act  to  implement the existing service
\nconditions or to invoke Section 33(c) of the Act.  The alleged  violation
\nof  Section  33(1)  cannot justify invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of
\nthis Court.  Facts and figures were  also  furnished  by  learned  Senior
\nCounsel to support the contention that the Plantation industry was facing
\na crisis  and  it  was  no more possible to comply with the old wages.  I
\nwould be subsequently dealing with the rulings cited  by  learned  Senior
\nCounsel in the context of the above submissions.\n<\/p>\n
                12.Mr.Vijay Narayan learned counsel appearing for the PAT
\ncontended  that it was within the rights of the management to give effect
\nto the changes contemplated under the notice under Section 9-A of the Act
\nafter notice is given.  The effect of the provision under  Section  33(1)
\nof  the  Act has to be considered in the light of the other provisions of
\nthe Act.  The duties of the Conciliation Officer in the context of public
\nutility services were dealt with under Section 12 of the Act.  His duties
\nin the context of other institutions cannot also vary and  his  duty  was
\nonly  to bring about a settlement if possible and he was not deciding the
\nrights of parties.  Learned counsel also very  strenuously  pleaded  that
\nthe very survival of the plantations was becoming impossible and in fact,
\nthe  labour  wing were fully aware of the position and that is the reason
\nwhy the Union in other areas had come to amicable settlement agreeing for
\nbringing down the wage structure.  This is not an industry which  can  be
\nclosed  down  or  be subject to lay-off, as in the case of other types of
\nindustries.  Therefore, the labour force should realise that the survival
\nof both would depend upon each other and being alive to the realities  of
\nthe financial  constraints  on the management.  He would also submit that
\nnotice of Conciliation was not given to the  employers  individually  and
\nhence,  cannot  be  construed  as  a  Conciliation  proceeding within the
\nmeaning of Section 33 of the Act.  The notice given  to  the  Association
\ncannot be  construed  as notice to the individual employer.  On the facts
\nof the  case,  the  Conciliation  Proceedings  cannot  be  said  to  have
\ncommenced.   He  would further submit that even in a case where no notice
\nunder Section 9-A of the Act was given, it is  not  in  every  case,  the
\nCourt would  be inclined to interfere.  There is no public duty cast upon
\nthe employer.  The issues are purely contractual.  It is  further  stated
\nthat the negotiations were proceeding in the right direction and if there
\nshould be interruption by the Court now at this stage, it might result in
\nscuttling an amicable settlement.\n<\/p>\n
                13.Mr.R.T.Doraisamy,  appearing  for  the 12th respondent
\ncontended  that  the  employees  had  acted  bona  fide   by   initiating
\nproceedings for Conciliation and genuine attempts were being made to find
\nout proper  solution.  It is only a minority section of the employees who
\nwere opposing the settlement.\n<\/p>\n
                14.In  reply,  Mr.K.Chandru,  learned   Senior   Counsel,
\ncontended  that  both  the management and the labour were not at the same
\nbargaining level.  The very survival of the workers was at  stakes.    If
\ncertain concessions have been announced in the present Central Budget, it
\nwas due to joint-lobbying with the Government which shows that the labour
\nwas very  much  interested  in  the  survival  of  the  Plantation.   The
\nmanagement was aiming only at keeping up its  proportion  of  profits  by
\nreducing  the salary unmindful of the consequential adverse effects which
\ncannot be borne by the labour.  This  was  a  labour  intensive  industry
\nwhich  cannot  contemplate  reduction  of  the work force and that is the
\nreason why the employers have thought  it  fit  to  cut  down  the  wages
\nunmindful of  its  grave effects on the workers.  As regards the issue as
\nto whether Conciliation Proceedings could be stated to be pending or not,
\nlearned Senior Counsel referred  to  the  pleadings  of  the  respondents
\nthemselves  to  support  his contention that the proceeding was very much
\npending.\n<\/p>\n
                15.I have considered the submissions of  both  sides  and
\ngiven my  utmost  consideration.    The  points  for determination can be
\nbroadly formulated as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
                (a) Maintainability of the writ petition;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                (b) Alternative remedy and monstrosity of the issue;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                (c) Whether as on date the Conciliation Proceeding is
\n                pending? <\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                (d)  Whether  the  notice  given  to  the  Association is
\nsufficient to bind the individual employer\/Estate.\n<\/p>\n
                16.MAINTAINABILITY:\n<\/p>\n
                The contention that a writ of mandamus cannot  be  issued
\nas  against a Private Company especially where no public duty is involved
\nin the discharge of duties, is  mainly  based  on  the  judgment  of  the
\nSupreme Court in V.S.T.INDUSTRIES  LTD.    v.  V.S.T.  INDUSTRIS WORKERS’
\nUNION (200  1  (1)  S.C.C.,  298).    Much  reliance  is  placed  on  the
\nobservations  contained  in  paragraph  No.8 of the judgement which is as
\nfollows:\n<\/p>\n
                “The High Court has relied very strongly on the  decision
\nof  a learned single Judge in T.GATTAIAH CASE where in it was stated that
\na writ may lie under Article 226 of the Constitution  against  a  company
\nincorporated  under the Companies Act, 1956 as it is permissible to issue
\na writ against any person.  Prima facie, therefore, a private  person  or
\nan   incorporated   company   cannot  be  taken  out  of  the  sweep  and
\ncontemplation of Article 226 of the Constitution.  That decision does not
\ntake note of the fact as to the nature of the functions that a person  or
\nan  incorporated  company should be performing to attract judicial review
\nunder Article 26 of the Constitution.  In ANANDI MUKTA  CASE  this  Court
\nexamined the various aspects and the distinction between an authority and
\na person and after analysis of the decisions referred in that regard came
\nto the conclusion that it is only in the circumstances when the authority
\nor the person performs a public function or discharges a public duty that
\nArticle 226 of the Constitution can be invoked.  In the present case, the
\nappellant   is  engaged  in  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  cigarettes.
\nManufacture and sale of cigarettes will not involve any public  function.
\nIncidental  to  that  activity there is an obligation under Section 46 of
\nthe Act to set up a canteen when the  establishment  has  more  than  250
\nworkmen.   That  means,  it  is  a  condition of service in relation to a
\nworkman providing better facilities to workmen to discharge their  duties
\nproperly and maintain their own health or welfare.  In other words, it is
\nonly  a  labour  welfare device for the benefit of its workforce unlike a
\nprovision where the Pollution Control Act makes it obligatory even  on  a
\nprivate company not to discharge certain effluents.  In such cases public
\nduty  is owed to the public in general and not specifically to any person
\nor group of persons.  Further the damage that  would  be  caused  in  not
\nobserving them  is  immense.  If merely, what can be considered a part of
\nthe conditions of service of a workman is violated then we do  not  think
\nthere  is  any  justification  to  hold that such activity will amount to
\npublic duty.  Thus, we are of the view that  the  High  Court  fell  into
\nerror that the appellant is amenable to writ jurisdiction.”\n<\/p>\n
                        17.Mr.A.L.Somayaji,  also  relies  on  few  other
\njudgments in support of the same contentions.\n<\/p>\n
                        18.The statement of law  thus  expressed  by  the
\nSupreme Court  in  V.    S.T.INDUSTRIES  case,  supra,  had  already been
\npronounced by the Supreme Court in PRAGA TOOLS CORPORATION  v.    IMANUAL<\/a>
\n(1969 (2) L.L.J., 749).\n<\/p>\n
                        19.In  that case also, the Supreme Court observed
\nthat mandamus would lie to secure the performance of a statutory duty and
\nas such the condition precedent for the issue of a mandamus is that there
\nshould be legal right in the petitioner and also could  be  issued  to  a
\nperson  or  to  a  Corporation  to  do a particular thing which is in the
\nnature of public duty.  Therefore, we have to see whether the  principles<\/p>\n
stated in PRAGA TOOLS case, and VST INDUSTRIES case, supra, would nonsuit
\nthe  petitioners  in  seeking  for direction to the respondents to comply
\nwith their statutory duties and obligations.\n<\/p>\n
                        20.The power of  the  writ  Court  to  issue  the
\nprerogative writs  is  well  known.    There  is  no controversy over the
\nposition that it is an extra-ordinary and plenary power to  be  exercised
\nby  the  Supreme  Court  and  the  High Courts and could be issued to any
\nperson inclusive of a  private  individual.    Whatever  restrictions  or
\nembargo  which  are  placed against the exercise of such power are only a
\nseries of self imposed restrictions which the Courts  have  imposed  upon
\nthemselves considering that it is a discretionary remedy.  Normally writs
\nwill  not  be  issued  in  situations such as availability of alternative
\nremedy, parties approaching the Court very belatedly, notices  which  are
\nin  the  nature  of  show-cause  notices,  Executive  functions which are
\nadministrative and discretionary in nature and based  on  the  subjective
\nsatisfaction of  the  authorities  etc.    Likewise,  for  issuing  writs
\npositively, notwithstanding any  of  the  above  mentioned  self  imposed
\nrestrictions,  writs  can  be  issued  for  securing ends of justice, the
\nExecutive  Authority  acting  without  application  of  mind  or  without
\njurisdiction  and  deliberately  violating statutory obligations and last
\nbut not the least when the action of  respondents  may  be  described  as
\n“monstrous”.   What is to be characterised as monstrous is no doubt to be
\nleft to the judicial conscience in the exercise of its discretion in  the
\nfacts and circumstances of each case.\n<\/p>\n
                        21.The question whether a writ can be issued to a
\nprivate  person and a Private Company is positively answered in the above
\ntwo judgments themselves relied on by  the  employers  namely,  in  PRAGA
\nTOOLS’s case  and VST.INDUSTRIES case, supra.  It is made clear that writ
\ncan be issued to a private individual or a Corporate body or Company  and
\nsuch  category of persons need not be discharging any public or statutory
\nduty.  Distinction is made only on the basis as to whether  the  impugned
\naction  of the respondents is in relation to any public duty or statutory
\nduty.  In VST.INDUSTRIES case, supra,  in  spite  of  the  Supreme  Court
\nhaving found that the Company was not involved in any public duty, at the
\nsame  time  made  it  clear  that  if  the same Company was violating the
\nprovisions  of  the  Pollution  control  Act,  a  writ  can  be   issued.
\nTherefore, there is no question of any blind or universal embargo against
\nissuing a  writ  against  a  private  individual  or  a Company.  If they
\nviolate statutory or public duties or indulge  in  monstrous  activities,
\nwrit can be issued.\n<\/p>\n
                        22.While attempting to interpret the judgments of
\nthe  Supreme  Court  in PRAGA TOOLS case, supra, and VST.INDUSTRIES case,
\nsupra, it is needless to emphasise that the first principle  of  rule  of
\nprecedents  is  that  a decision is an authority for only what it decides
\nand what it specifically deals with.  The ratio of a decision  cannot  be
\noperative  to  all  situations  by  ignoring  the background in which the
\njudgment had been rendered.  It is also settled proposition of law that a
\njudgment cannot be interpreted as an Act of Legislature, but would govern
\nonly the specific, legal and factual issues dealt with by the judgments.\n<\/p>\n
                        23.In PRAGA TOOLS case, supra,  two  rival  Trade
\nUnions  had  executed  two different agreements with the management under
\nSection 18 of the Act.  One group of workmen approached  the  High  Court
\nunder Article 2 26 of the Constitution of India questioning the agreement
\nexecuted by  the  rival group.  A mandamus was sought for to restrain the
\nCompany from implementing the agreement.  Needless to say that the  issue
\nwas  purely  contractual  and  there was no statutory violation much less
\ntransgression of any public  duty.    Likewise  in  VST.INDUSTRIES  case,
\nsupra,  the  issue was as regards the provisions of the Factories Act and
\nnot about the obligations arising under the Industrial Disputes Act.  The
\nprayer was for a mandamus to treat the employees of the canteen of one of
\nthe factories belonging to the  Company,  as  employees  of  the  Company
\nitself.   This  plea  was rejected by the Supreme Court in the context of
\nSection 46 of the Factories Act, 1948 and it was  rightly  held  that  no
\npublic duty was involved in the running of the canteen.  This judgment is
\nonly a restatement of the law on the subject.\n<\/p>\n
                        24.In GENERAL  UNION  v.    K.M.DESAI<\/a>  (1990  (1)
\nL.L.N., 181, a learned single Judge of Bombay High Court  held  that  the
\nemployees  of a canteen under a contractor do not become direct employees
\nof the Company.\n<\/p>\n
                        25.In WORKMEN OF ASHOK LEYLAND LTD.   v.    ASHOK
\nLEYLAND  &  OTHERS<\/a>  (199 1 (2) L.L.J., 12, a Division Bench of this Court
\nheld that such employees of the canteen do not become  the  employees  of
\nthe Company or the occupier of the factory.\n<\/p>\n
                        26.In WORKMEN, S.R.F.LTD.   v.    GOVT.  OF TAMIL
\nNADU<\/a> (1995 (1) L.L.N., 485, again a Division Bench  of  this  Court  held
\nthat  there was no obligation on the part of the industrial establishment
\nto run a canteen by itself by employing its own workmen.\n<\/p>\n
                        27.In WORKMEN v.  ASHOK LEYLAND LTD.<\/a>  (1986  (II)
\nL.L.N.,  1035,  it  was held that where a canteen ceased to function as a
\nresult of heavy  loss,  the  factory  was  not  bound  to  re-employ  the
\nerstwhile employees of the canteen.\n<\/p>\n
                        28.The  above judgments have been rendered in the
\ncontext of the scope of the provisions of the Factories  Act,1948,  which
\nis  only a Legislative measure aimed at securing better living conditions
\nto the worker.  A perusal of the statement of objects and  reasons  shows
\nthat  the  Act  “provides  for  health, safety, welfare, other aspects of
\nworkers in factories.” The obligations of the  employer  under  that  Act
\ncannot  be  over stated or compared with the provisions of the Industrial
\nDisputes Act.\n<\/p>\n
                        29.In  contrast  with  the  provisions   of   the
\nFactories  Act,  the  scope of the Industrial Disputes Act is well-known.
\nThe Industrial Disputes Act deals with the basic obligations, fundamental
\nrights,  duties,  obligations  and  liabilities  of   both   labour   and
\nmanagement.   The  scope  of  disputes  involve not only that of a single
\nindividual worker and the management alone.    With  the  recognition  of
\nTrade  Unions  and  their  rights to raise disputes in the context of not
\nonly individual grievances, but also collective demands and grievances of
\nlarge number of workers, the issues have impact on the industrial  peace,
\nlaw and order, productivity and consequent wastage and thus affect public
\ninterest to a very great extent.\n<\/p>\n
                        30.The  public  interest  involved  in the issues
\ncovered under the Industrial  Disputes  Act  has  been  very  effectively
\nstated  by  the  Constitution  Bench of the Supreme Court 50 years ago in
\nD.N.BANERJI v.  P.R.  MUKHERJEE (A.I.R.1953 S.C.,<\/a> 58) as follows:
\n“It is therefore incumbent on us to ascertain what the statute  means  by
\n“industry”  and  “industrial dispute”, leaving aside the original meaning
\nattributed to the words in a simpler state of society, when we  had  only
\none  employer  perhaps,  doing  a  particular  trade  or  carrying  on  a
\nparticular business with the help of his own tools material and skill and
\nemploying a few workmen in the process of production or manufacture,  and
\nwhen such disputes that occurred did not go behind individual levels into
\nacute  fights  between  rival organisations of workmen and employers, and
\nwhen large scale strikes and lock-outs throwing society  into  chaos  and
\nconfusion  were practically unknown Legislation had to keep pace with the
\nmarch of times and to provide for new situations.  Social evolution is  a
\nprocess  of  constant  growth, and the State cannot afford to stand still
\nwithout taking adequate measures by means of legislation to  solve  large
\nand momentous problems that arise in the industrial field from day to day
\nalmost.”\n<\/p>\n
                31.If the introduction of the Industrial Disputes Act was
\na  product  of  social evolution and was meant to meet the changes in the
\nsociety, throwing society into chaos and confusion, I fail to  appreciate
\nhow  to  term  the  Industrial Disputes Act as a mere legislation dealing
\nwith only personal or individual rights and to hold that no  public  duty
\nwas involved in the proceedings under the Act.  It is true that in a case
\nof  a  dispute  between  a  single  workman and the management, no public
\ninterest would be involved.  But in a case of  the  present  type,  which
\ninvolves  the  question  of  wages  due  to  thousands of workers and the
\npotential dangers  to  which  the  society  would  be  exposed  if  their
\ngrievances  are  not  sorted  out,  definitely  the  issue affects public
\ninterest and a corresponding public duty is cast upon both the management
\nand the labour to ensure public peace.  It is also a  fact  that  on  the
\nvery  same issue, peace, law and order in the areas where the Tea estates
\nare located have been greatly affected and public peace, tranquility  had
\nbeen very  much  disturbed.  The public interest and public duty involved
\nis as much as that of violation of the Pollution Control Act,  which  has
\nbeen  pointed out by the Supreme Court as an instance which would justify
\ninvocation of Article 226 of the Constitution of  India,  notwithstanding
\nthe  fact  that  the  respondent may be only a private individual and not
\nbeing involved in the discharge of any public duty,  vide  VST.INDUSTRIES
\ncase.\n<\/p>\n
                32.In  the  very  same judgment of the Constitution Bench
\ncited above, the Supreme Court went further to point out that  industrial
\ndisputes  could  affect  large groups of workmen and employees arrayed on
\nopposite sides on certain common issues such as wages,  bonus  etc.,  and
\nobserved as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
“Such  widespread extension of labour unrest is not a rare phenomenon but
\nis of frequent occurrence.  In such a case, even an industrial dispute in
\na particular business becomes a large scale industrial dispute, which the
\nGovernment cannot afford to ignore as  a  minor  trouble  to  be  settled
\nbetween particular employer and workman.”\n<\/p>\n
                33.In BALLARPUR COLLIERIES  CO.    v.  PRESIDING OFFICER,
\nDHANBAD<\/a> (1972 (2) S.C.C.,27), the Supreme Court dealt with the  scope  of
\nthe Industrial Disputes Act and held as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
“In  this  connection  it  has  to  be  borne in mind that proceedings of
\nindustrial adjudication are not considered as proceedings purely  between
\ntwo private  parties  having  no  impact  on  the industry as such.  Such
\nproceedings involve larger public interest in which the industry as  such
\n(including the  employer  and  the  labour)  is  vitally interested.  The
\nscheme  of  the  law  of  industrial  adjudication  designed  to  promote
\nindustrial  peace  and harmony so as to incre ase production and help the
\ngrowth and progress of national economy  has  to  be  considered  in  the
\nbackground  of our constitutional set-up according to which the State has
\nto strive to secure and effectively  protect  a  social  order  in  which
\nsocial,  economic  and  political justice must inform all institutions of
\nnational life  and  the  material  resources  of  the  community  are  so
\ndistributed as best to sub-serve the common good.”\n<\/p>\n
                34.This  is  precisely  the  situation  now  faced in the
\npresent case and therefore, I find it difficult to accept the contentions
\nthat Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be  invoked  and  no
\nmandamus can be issued.\n<\/p>\n
                35.   For the very same reasons, as above, I am unable to
\naccept the comparison which Mr.A.L.Somayaji was drawing  as  regards  the
\nRent  Control  Act,  namely,  if  every statutory violation could justify
\ninvocation of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, then  a  landlord
\nor  a tenant could do so complaining that the opposite party had violated
\nthe provisions of the Rent Control Act.  Firstly, the wider and pervasive
\nnature of the disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act  had  been  very
\nsuccinctly described  by  the  Constitution  Bench  as  above.   The Rent
\nControl Act which  deals  with  the  individual  and  mutual  contractual
\nobligations between one landlord and one tenant (or at the most a five or
\nsix  tenants)  cannot  at  all  be  compared  with  the range of disputes
\ncontemplated under the Industrial Disputes Act.  Secondly, I had  already
\nmentioned  that in a given case a dispute raised by a single worker or as
\nagainst the single worker, public interest or public  duty  will  not  be
\ninvolved.   But  in  the  present  case, we are confronted with a dispute
\nbetween thousands of workers and about 30 Tea Estates.\n<\/p>\n
                36.  A Division Bench of this Court when confronted  with
\nsimilar objections  in  MADRAS  LABOUR  UNION v.  BINNY LIMITED<\/a> (1995 (1)
\nC.T.C.,73) had dealt with the issue in detail with reference  to  several
\nrulings of the Supreme Court and had ultimately concluded that a mandamus
\ncan be issued as against a private body in the context of gross violation
\nof  statute  or  public  duty  and  if the monstrosity of the facts would
\njustify intervention by the Court.\n<\/p>\n
                37.Therefore, I am inclined to hold that the  above  writ
\npetitions are maintainable and the judgment in VST.INDUSTRIES case supra,
\ndoes not  in any manner affect the facts of the case.  On the other hand,
\nthe said judgment is positive that a writ can be issued even as against a
\nprivate individual the impugned issue relates to a public duty or  public
\ninterest.\n<\/p>\n
                38.ALTERNATE REMEDY AND MONSTROSITY OF THE ISSUE The
\nissue  of  alternate  remedy is inter related with the monstrosity of the
\nissue and would also be relevant for the issue of  maintainability  which
\nhas been considered above.  Both Mr.A.L.Somayaji and Mr.Vijay Narayan had
\nemphasised  at  length  that  the  forums  constituted under the act were
\neffective remedies and as such writ petitions cannot be entertained.   It
\nis  further  stated  that  Section 33-A of the Act entitles the aggrieved
\nparty to complain against violation of Section 33(1)(a) of the Act and as
\nsuch the petitioners were not entitled to invoke the  writ  jurisdiction.
\nIt  is  true  that Section 33-A of the Act deals with the situation of an
\nemployer contravening the provisions of Section 33 of the Act during  the
\npendency of  the  proceedings  before  the authorities under the Act.  An
\nemployee aggrieved by the contravention may make a complaint  in  writing
\nto the concerned authority and such authority shall adjudicate upon it as
\nif it were a dispute pending before it.  To appreciate this objection, it
\nis necessary to extract Section 33(1) of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
“33.Conditions of  service,  etc.    To  remain  unchanged  under certain
\ncircumstances during pendency of proceedings
\n(1)During  the  pendency  of  any  conciliation   proceeding   before   a
\nconciliation  officer  or  a  Board  or  of  any  proceeding  before  (an
\narbitrator or) a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect
\nof an industrial dispute, no employer shall-\n<\/p>\n
(a)     in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the
\nprejudice of the workmen concerned in such  dispute,  the  conditions  of
\nservice  applicable  to  them immediately before the commencement of such
\nproceeding; or\n<\/p>\n
(b)     for any misconduct  connected  with  the  dispute,  discharge  or
\npunish,  whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workmen concerned in such
\ndispute,
\nsave with the express permission in writing of the authority before which
\nthe proceeding is pending;”\n<\/p>\n
                39.Section 33(1) makes it mandatory that during  pendency
\nof  the  proceedings  under  the  Act, the existing conditions of service
\nshall not be altered to the disadvantage of the employee  save  with  the
\nexpress   permission  in  writing  of  the  authority  before  which  the
\nproceeding is pending.  If there  is  violation  of  the  said  mandatory
\nrequirement  then  the  employee  has the right to complain under Section
\n33-A of the Act which will  be  treated  as  a  dispute  and  dealt  with
\naccordingly.\n<\/p>\n
                40.To  appreciate  the  objections  of the respondents as
\nregards this contention, it is necessary  to  recall  the  background  in
\nwhich the issue went before the Conciliation Officer after issuing notice
\nto the  Unions  under  Section  9-A  of the Act.  The first respondent by
\ntheir  letter  to  the  Joint  Commissioner  of  Labour  Chennai,   dated
\n29.11.2001  informed  the  issue  of notice under Section 9-A of the Act.
\nThe Joint Commissioner, Coimbatore, on receipt of the said notice by  his
\nletter  dated  7.12.2001  informed  the  first  respondent as well as the
\nLabour Unions that negotiations will take place before  the  Commissioner
\nof  Labour  on  18.12.2001  and that the said notice was sent in terms of
\nSection 12(1) of the Act and Rules 23 and 37 of the  Industrial  Disputes
\nRules.\n<\/p>\n
                41.It  is  very important to bear in mind that it was the
\nemployer who chose to raise  the  dispute  and  it  is  expected  of  the
\nmanagement to adhere to the statutory obligations under Section 33 of the
\nAct  in  terms  of  which  the employer shall not be entitled to vary the
\nexisting terms of employment to the disadvantage of  the  workers.    The
\nrights  of the workers thus incorporated under Section 33 of the Act is a
\nvery valuable right and imposes a duty on the employer not to  alter  the
\nconditions of service.\n<\/p>\n
                42.The  right  of  the worker under Section 33 of the Act
\nshould also be viewed along side their right to go on a lawful strike  by
\ncomplying  with  the  provisions  of the Act and the conditions envisaged
\nthereunder.  It is a right which is statutorily recognised and  does  not
\nrequire  citing  a plethora of precedents in support of the said accepted
\nrights of the workers and the right of the employer to resort to a lawful
\nlock-out.  But Sections 22 and 23 of the Act place an embargo on  such  a
\nright under  the circumstances specified thereunder.  While Section 22 of
\nthe Act deals with strike  and  lock  out  in  public  utility  services,
\nSection 23 deals with general prohibition of strikes and lock-out.\n<\/p>\n
                43.Section  23  of  the  Act  prohibits  workmen going on
\nstrike during the pendency  of  Conciliation  proceedings  or  a  dispute
\nbefore   the   Labour  Court,  Industrial  Tribunal  or  the  Arbitration
\nproceedings and during any period  when  a  settlement  or  award  is  in
\noperation.  In the present case, the period of settlement is over and the
\nmanagement  not  being  satisfied by expressing their intention to reduce
\nthe wages by issuing statutory notice, had  also  initiated  Conciliation
\nproceedings before the Commissioner, thereby depriving the valuable right
\nof  the  workers  to resort to a legal strike which is the only method of
\ntheir exercising the bargaining power.  At the same time, the  management
\nwill not also condescend to move the appropriate authority for permission
\nand  would  violate the mandate that they should not alter the conditions
\nof service to the detriment of the employees resulting in  the  following
\nseries  of consequences, thus pushing the workers into an inequitable and
\nunfairly disadvantageous position as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
        (a)Giving notice for reducing the existing wage  structure  which
\nitself is a justifiable grievance for the workers which ought not to have
\nbeen resorted to except by way of settlement or by an award.\n<\/p>\n
        (b)Not seeking permission before the Conciliation Officer to vary
\nthe  terms  of  service  thereby  intentionally  violating  mandate under
\nSection 31(1) of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
        (c)Having failed  to  comply  with  the  requirement  of  seeking
\npermission under Section 33(1) of the Act raising an untenable contention
\nthat  the  workers,  if  they wish they may raise a dispute under Section
\n33-A of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
        (d)If the workers in a helpless situation invoke jurisdiction  of
\nthis Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the management
\nraising a contention that the writ is not maintainable.\n<\/p>\n
        (e)Having   themselves   initiated  a  dispute,  raising  further
\nuntenable technical contentions regarding the pendency of the dispute and
\nthe individual estates not being a party etc., which have  neither  legal
\nnor moral basis as explained below.\n<\/p>\n
                44.The  above  mentioned series of conduct on the part of
\nthe management would be sufficient to indicate not only the  unreasonable
\nattitude  of  the  employers,  but also the “monstrosity” of the existing
\nsituation.  Reducing the existing wage structure is itself an unusual and
\nrare feature to be proposed by the management considering the  spiralling
\ncost of  living.    I  do  not  propose  to  say that such a variation is
\nimpermissible, but is a rare proposal which could be  justified  only  by
\nadducing   proper   and  convincing  materials  before  the  authorities.
\nTherefore, to reduce the wages to which the workers  are  accustomed  to,
\nwithout even seeking the statutory permission from the authorities before
\nwhom  the  dispute  is  pending as required under the Act, would be in my
\nopinion sufficient to estop the management from raising the contention of
\nalternate remedy.\n<\/p>\n
                45.The necessity of seeking permission of  the  authority
\nduring  the  pendency  of  the  dispute  is a mandatory requirement and a
\nprecondition before the management could seek to alter the conditions  of
\nservice.  It  is  intended  to  maintain  status  quo.  In PUNJ.N.BANK v.
\nA.I.P.N.   B.E.FEDERATION  (A.I.R.1980  S.C.,  160),  the  Supreme  Court
\nhighlighted the mandatory nature of the ban as follows:-
\n“The object  of  the Legislature in enacting this section is obvious.  By
\nimposing the ban  S.33  attempts  to  provide  for  the  continuance  and
\ntermination   of   the  pending  proceedings  in  a  peaceful  atmosphere
\nundisturbed by any causes  of  friction  between  the  employer  and  his
\nemployees.   In  substance  it insists upon the maintenance of the status
\nquo pending the disposal of the industrial dispute between  the  parties;
\nnevertheless it recognises that occasions may arise when the employer may
\nbe  justified in discharging or punishing by dismissal his employees, and
\nso it allows the employer to take such action subject  to  the  condition
\nthat  before doing so he must obtain the express permission in writing of
\nthe Tribunal.  It is true that the ban is  imposed  in  terms  which  are
\nmandatory  and  S.31(1) makes the contravention of the provisions of S.33
\nan offence punishable as prescribed therein.”\n<\/p>\n
                46.It is true that Section 33-A entitles the  workmen  to
\nraise a  complaint.  Reliance is placed on the following judgments by the
\nemployers in support of their contention that the workers  should  resort
\nto  that  remedy,  which are in my opinion not applicable to the facts of
\nthe present case.\n<\/p>\n
                47.In SREE SEETHA VENKATESH MILLS EMP.  UNION v.    GOVT.
\nOF T.N.<\/a>    (200 1(II) L.L.J.,185) (which was also confirmed by a Division
\nBench in Writ Appeal No.151 of 2001).    F.M.Ibrahim  Kalifulla,J.    was
\nconfronted  with  the  situation  where  the Conciliation proceedings had
\nended in a failure report and no reference had been made  to  the  Labour
\nCourt.   It  is  at that stage, the Union filed the writ petition praying
\nfor the issue of a writ of mandamus to direct the Government to refer the
\ndispute for adjudication and in the mean time to direct the  employer  to
\nmaintain status  quo.   In other words, it was a case where no proceeding
\nwas pending before any of the authorities under the  Act  when  the  writ
\npetition was resorted to.\n<\/p>\n
                48.The  judgment  of  another  Division  Bench  in GORDON
\nWOODROFFE EMP.  UNION v.  STATE OF T.N.<\/a>   (1988  (I)  L.L.N.,  196)  also
\narose under the same circumstances, namely, the Conciliation had ended in
\nfailure and the Union came forward with a writ to prohibit the management
\nfrom altering  the  conditions  of service.  Therefore, the said judgment
\nalso will not apply.\n<\/p>\n
                49.Both the decisions  as  aforementioned  are  perfectly
\nunderstandable  having  regard  to Section 20 of the Act which deals with
\ncommencement and conclusion of the proceedings.  Under Section  20(2)  of
\nthe  Act,  a  conciliation  proceeding  shall be deemed to have concluded
\nwhere no settlement is arrived at and when the report of the Conciliation
\nOfficer is received by the appropriate Government.  Therefore,  when  the
\nwrit  petitions  were  filed  in  those  cases, no proceeding was pending
\nbefore any authority.\n<\/p>\n
                50.The  judgment   of   the   Division   Bench   in   SUN
\nPHARMACEUTICAL INDS.  LTD.    v.    S.P.I.L.STAFF UNION<\/a> (2000 (4) L.L.N.,\n<\/p>\n
932) also deals with a case under different  circumstances.    The  Union
\nfiled the writ petition for the issue of a writ of mandamus to direct the
\nConciliation  Officer  to  complete  the  proceedings and also sought for
\ninterim injunction restraining the employer from shifting  the  machinery
\nor transferring the employees.  The Division Bench held on facts that the
\nattempt  on  the  part  of the Union was premature and also amounted to a
\nplea to maintain status quo ante.  The Division Bench did not go into the
\nissue of the obligations of the management to move the authority to grant
\npermission to alter the conditions of service.  On facts also it was held
\nthat there was no monstrous situation requiring the intervention  of  the
\nCourt.\n<\/p>\n
                51.The nature and scope of the enquiry under Section 33-A
\nof  the  Act,  would in my opinion render the provision as an ineffective
\nremedy and cannot be pleaded an effective alternative  remedy  so  as  to
\nprevent  the  Union to seek for the issue of a writ of mandamus to compel
\nthe employer to comply  with  the  mandatory  requirement  under  Section
\n33-(1) of  the  Act.    Resort to Section 33-A of the Act is nothing more
\nthan a fresh reference and another dispute and is not an effective remedy
\nto maintain the status quo.  In  the  following  judgments,  the  Supreme
\nCourt had clearly held that the proceedings under Section 33-A of the Act
\nis  not different from a dispute arising out of a reference under Section
\n10 of the Act.  For instance, in the case of dismissal of an employee  in
\ncontravention of Section 33 of the Act, on a complaint under Section 33-A
\nof  the  Act,  the  Tribunal  has  to  separately  deal with not only the
\nquestion of contravention, but also  the  merits  of  the  order  of  the
\ndismissal.\n<\/p>\n
(i)PUNJ.N.BANK v.  A.I.P.N.B.E.FEDERATION (A.I.R 1960 S.C., 160);\n<\/p>\n
(ii)DELHI CLOTH & GENERAL MILLS v.  RAMESHWAR (A.I.R.1961 S.C.,<\/a> 689)\n<\/p>\n
(iii)BHAVNAGAR MUNICIPALITY v.  A.KARIMBAI (1977 (34) F.L.R., 279).
\nTherefore,  resort  to Section 33-A of the Act is not at all an effective
\nor an alternate remedy.  It is in fact more complicated and long  winding
\nthan the  main  dispute  itself  which  is  awaiting  adjudication.   The
\nmanagement which intentionally and with impunity violates  Section  33(1)
\nof  the  Act  cannot be heard to plead that Section 33-A of the Act is an
\neffective alternative remedy.  The object of invocation of Article 226 of
\nthe Constitution of India in a monstrous situation is intended to  secure
\ntimely justice and a p lea of alternative remedy cannot be entertained at
\nthe instance of a defaulting party.\n<\/p>\n
                52.The  more  appropriate ruling in this context would be
\nthe latest judgment of a Constitutional Bench of  the  Supreme  Court  in
\nJAIPUR ZILA SAHAKARI BHOOMI VIKAS BANK LTD.  v RAM GOPAL SHARMA (2002 (2)
\nS.C.C., 244).    In  that  case, the Supreme Court dealt with a provision
\nsimilar to Section 33(1) of the Act namely, Section 33 (2)(b) of the  Act
\nwhich  requires  the  management to seek for approval of the discharge or
\ndismissal of an employee during the pendency of  the  proceedings.    The
\nmanagement  took  the stand that the Union can only raise another dispute
\nor forward a complaint under Section 31(1) or  33-a  of  the  Act.    The
\nConstitution  Bench came down heavily on such a plea and held that such a
\nperson who contravenes the provision “cannot be rewarded by relieving him
\nof the statutory obligations created on him to make such an application.”
\nThe Supreme Court went further to observe as follows:-
\n“Section 31 speaks of penalty in respect of the offences stated  therein.
\nThis  provision  is  not  intended  to  give  any  remedy to an aggrieved
\nemployee.  It is only to punish the offender.  The argument that  Section
\n31  provides  a  remedy to an employee for contravention of Section 33 is
\nunacceptable.  Merely because penal provision is available or  a  workman
\nhas  a  further  remedy  under  Section  33-A  to  challenge the approval
\ngranted, it cannot be said that the order of discharge or dismissal  does
\nnot  become  inoperative  or invalid unless set aside under Section 33-A.
\nThere is nothing in Sections 31,33 and 33-A  to  suggest  otherwise  even
\nreading them  together  in  the  context.  These sections are intended to
\nserve different purposes.”\n<\/p>\n
                53.My conclusions as above are  therefore,  fortified  by
\nthe  observations  of the Constitution Bench and the plea of Section 33-A
\nas being an alternate remedy cannot be sustained, more so in a case where
\nit is the management which went before the Conciliation Officer.    I  am
\ninclined  to  hold  that  the facts stated above and the situation having
\nbeen brought about by the management itself, are more than sufficient  to
\nhold  that  the  situation  is  a  monstrous  one  enough  to  invoke the
\njurisdiction of this Court.\n<\/p>\n
                54.As regards alternate remedy,  it  is  also  a  settled
\nproposition  of  law  that  it  is  only a rule of policy convenience and
\ndiscretion and not one of bar of jurisdiction under Article  226  of  the
\nConstitution  of  India,  vide  the judgment of the Constitution Bench in
\nU.P.STATE v.  MOHMMAD NOOH (A.I.R.<\/a>  1958 S.C., 86)      <\/p>\n
                55.Whether as on  date  the  Conciliation  proceeding  is
\npending:\n<\/p>\n
                The  contention on behalf of the respondents is that as a
\nresult of the Commissioner of Labour having suggested  the  issue  to  be
\ndiscussed  between  the  Union and the Planter’s Association by bilateral
\ntalks, the process of conciliation is over and does not subsist any more.
\nThe role of the Conciliation Officer is only to  mediate  and  he  cannot
\ndecide the rights of the parties.  Therefore, in directing the parties to
\nnegotiate  between  themselves,  the Conciliation Proceeding is deemed to
\nhave come to an end.\n<\/p>\n
                56.I am unable to accept the aforesaid contention.    The
\nCommissioner,  after sending the letter dated 7.12.2001, calling upon all
\nthe  parties  to  attend  the  Conciliation  on  18.12.2001,   admittedly
\nproceeded with  the  Conciliation  talks.    The suggestion for bipartite
\ntalks is nothing more than an  attempt  to  facilitate  both  parties  to
\nnarrow  down  the area of difference and such a step or suggestion cannot
\nbe deemed as abandoning  or  closing  the  Conciliation  or  Conciliation
\nOfficer loosing  his  jurisdiction.  It is nothing more than a Court or a
\nTribunal, adjourning the hearing to enable  the  parties  to  come  to  a
\nsettlement.  In fact, that is how the employers themselves had understood
\nthe issue.    By  letter 29.12.2001 the Planters Association had reported
\nabout the progress of bipartite talks and that further  discussions  were
\nto continue  on  4.10.2001.    This  was followed by similar letter dated
\n7.1.2002.  The Commissioner by his letter dated 11.1.2002, had asked  the
\nAssociation  to  intimate  the  present  stage  of the bilateral talks by
\nreturn fax in order  to  proceed  further  in  the  matter.    There  was
\nabsolutely no need for either the Commissioner or the Association to have
\ngone   through   such   correspondence,  if  the  Conciliation  had  been
\nterminated.  This was followed by  a  series  of  similar  letters  dated
\n12.1.2002,   15.1.200   2,  19.1.2002,  25.1.2002,  31.1.2002,  5.2.2002,
\n14.2.2002 and 22.2.2002 to the Commissioner stating that the  talks  were
\nin   progress   and   further   developments  will  be  reported  to  the
\nCommissioner.  If the Conciliation was closed, there was no need for such
\nan exercise.  In the mean time, the Association also addressed  a  letter
\nto  the  Collector, Coimbatore, requesting the District Administration to
\ngive protection to maintain law and order.  The District Collector by his
\nletter dated 6.2.2002, had in  fact  referred  to  the  pendency  of  the
\nConciliation proceedings before the Commissioner of Labour and as such no
\nunilateral change can be effected by the planters and that therefore, the
\nmembers of  the  Association  may  not  precipitate  this  issue.    I am
\nreferring to this letter only to the limited  extent  as  reflecting  the
\nfactual position  of  the  pendency of the Conciliation proceedings.  The
\nPAT did not  raise  a  contention  that  conciliation  was  not  pending.
\nTherefore,  the  mere  circumstance of the parties having been allowed to
\nhold  talks  between  themselves  cannot  result   in   terminating   the
\nConciliation proceedings.   In fact as referred to earlier, under Section
\n20 of the Act, a Conciliation proceeding can be stated to have  concluded
\nonly  where settlement is arrived at and signed by the parties or when no<\/p>\n
settlement is arrived at, and the  failure  report  is  received  by  the
\nappropriate Government.      There   is  no  other  process  by  which  a
\nConciliation proceeding can be stated to have concluded.\n<\/p>\n
                57.Apart from the aforesaid circumstances, a  perusal  of
\nthe  counter  affidavits filed by the respondents themselves disclose how
\nthey themselves have understood about  the  position.    In  the  counter
\naffidavit,  it  is  admitted  that  the respondents had given a letter to
\ninitiate Conciliation proceedings.  In fact the very  pleading  that  the
\nUnion should have invoked a complaint under Section 33-A of the Act leads
\nto  the  presumption  about the pendency of the Conciliation proceedings.
\nIf no proceeding is pending, then there is  no  possibility  of  invoking
\nSection 33-A of the Act at all.\n<\/p>\n
                58.Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention
\nthat the Conciliation proceeding is not pending.\n<\/p>\n
                59.  WHETHER NOTICE GIVEN TO THE P.A.T.  IS SUFFICIENT TO
\nBIND THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYER\/ESTATE?\n<\/p>\n
        This  point  is  urged  by  the respondents\/employers again in an
\nattempt to wriggle out of the situation which they themselves created  by
\nhaving initiated  Conciliation  proceedings.  I do not find any basis for
\nthis objection.  It is pertinent to  note  that  all  the  employers  are
\nmembers of the PAT.  This position is not in dispute.  All the talks have
\nbeen proceeding  only  with PAT and not with the individual planters.  It
\nis most important to note that agreements or settlements have  also  been
\nentered into  only  by  PAT as representing the planters.  In fact, it is
\nthe PAT which had  given  notice  under  Section  19(2)  of  the  Act  to
\nterminate  the  continued  operation of the existing settlement after its
\nexpiry on 31.12.2001.  It is only on the advise of PAT the format of  the
\nnotice  under  Section 9-A of the Act as prescribed by the PAT vide their
\nletter dated 29.11.2001 was sent to the individual employers as  well  as
\nto  the  Joint  Commissioner,  Labour,  and  thus  the  conciliation  was
\ninitiated.  The process of  negotiation  commenced  with  PAT  writing  a
\nletter  to  the  Hon’ble  Minister  for  Labour  which  was  followed  by
\nsubsequent talks with him.    A  perusal  of  the  notice  given  by  the
\nemployers  for  change of service condition also discloses that reference
\nis made only to the agreement arrived at by the PAT on their  behalf  and
\nPAT  having  given notice of termination on 24.10.2001 on behalf of their
\nmembers\/estates.  Therefore, the role played by PAT was  well  understood
\nby the PAT as well as the individual estates.\n<\/p>\n
                60.The most crucial feature is the notice of Conciliation
\nwhich  was  sent  by  the Joint Commissioner on 7.12.2001 only to the PAT
\nunder Section 12(1) of the Act read with Rules 23 and  37  of  the  Tamil
\nNadu Rules.    Rule  23  of the Rules enables the Conciliation Officer to
\nintimate  to  the  parties  declaring  his  intention  to  commence   the
\nConciliation proceedings.    Rule  37  deals  with  service of summons or
\nnotice where there are numerous persons as parties to the proceedings and
\nwhen such persons are members of the any Trade Union or Association,  the
\nservice  of  notice on the Secretary or the Principal Office of the Union
\nor Association shall be deemed to be service on such  persons.    Such  a
\nservice  shall  also  be  considered as sufficient in the case of parties
\nrepresented by such Unions or Associations.\n<\/p>\n
                61.It  is  pertinent  to  note  that  neither   PAT   nor
\nindividual  employer  at  any time raised any demur when the Commissioner
\nsent his notice only to PAT specifically quoting  Rules  23  and  37  nor
\nduring discussions  with him.  The negotiations have been taking place on
\nnumerous occasions to the knowledge of the individual employers only with
\nthe PAT representing all the employers.  Therefore, the  present  defence
\nwhich is now taken only in these writ petitions by PAT and the individual
\nestates, is not at all fair.\n<\/p>\n
                62.Mr.Vijay Narayan was at pains to emphasise that in the
\nabsence  of  individual authorisation by the members, the PAT cannot be a
\nproperly constituted representative.  Reliance  is  placed  on  Rule  46.
\nRule  46  is  in  relation  to a worker or workers authorising another to
\nrepresent him or them.  The said Rule can have no relevance to  a  notice
\nwhich had  been issued under Rule 37.  An argument was also advanced that
\nRule 37 may not strictly apply to the employers, but would apply only  to
\nthe Trade  Unions.    I  am  afraid  that  there  is  no basis for such a
\ndistinction.\n<\/p>\n
                63.As stated earlier, it is the PAT which has always been
\nnegotiating with the Unions, executing agreements, holding talks with the
\nMinister after the present dispute arose and the Commissioner  of  Labour
\nand  corresponding  with  the  Commissioner  on behalf of the estates and
\ncorresponding with the District Collector at all stages.  Therefore,  the
\ndefence now raised is obviously resorted to as a desperate remedy without
\nbasis.\n<\/p>\n
                64.The  very  claim  by  the  employers  that the earlier
\nsettlements are no more effective and not binding on them is based on the
\nnotice issued by PAT under Section 19(2) on 24.10.2001.   Agreements  are
\nexecuted with  PAT  only and notice of termination is issued by PAT.  PAT
\ninitiates conciliation proceeding and conciliation is proceeded with only
\nPAT representing all the estates.  No objection is raised at any stage by
\nPAT or the individual employer that PAT is not representing them,  or  by
\nthe PAT that they are not representing the individual Estates.\n<\/p>\n
                65.In conclusion, I find  that  the  writ  petitions  are
\nmaintainable and  the petitioners are entitled to the relief.  It is true
\nthat the difficulties expressed  by  both  Mr.A.L.Somayaji  and  Mr.Vijay
\nNarayan,  on  behalf of the Estates regarding the problems experienced by
\nthe Plantation Industry may be correct to a  considerable  extent.    But
\nwhen  the statute requires that the existing service conditions cannot be
\naltered to the disadvantage of the workers without a  written  permission
\nfrom  the authorities before whom the proceeding is pending, the employer
\ncannot be heard to violate the same  and  to  drive  the  workers  to  an
\ninequitable position.    It  is  only to enable the employer to alter the
\nconditions of service even  during  the  pendency  of  the  dispute,  the
\nemployer  is  given the liberty and statutory right to move the authority
\nfor the said purpose.  When such a petition is filed,  the  authority  is
\nbound to pass a considered order by taking into account all the materials
\nand circumstances objectively.  The authority would be performing a quasi
\njudicial  function  and  therefore, bound to pass a reasoned order and if
\nthe PAT has enough materials to substantiate their claims, there need not
\nbe any hesitation on their part.  The fact that the Unions in other areas
\nhad come to amicable settlement will also be  an  added  ground  for  the
\nemployer  to justify their proposed action which cannot be ignored by the
\nauthority without proper material.  When the statute prescribes a certain
\nmode or procedure, the party who is  obliged  to  comply  with  the  same
\ncannot be heard to violate the same and plead otherwise.\n<\/p>\n
                66.Therefore, the above writ petitions are  allowed  with
\nliberty   to  the  respondents  to  move  the  Conciliation  Officer  for
\npermission under Section 33(1) of the Act before altering the  conditions
\nof  service  and  till then, the respondents are bound to comply with the
\nexisting terms of the service conditions.  No costs.  Connected  W.P.M.Ps
\nare closed as unnecessary.\n<\/p>\n
Index:  Yes.\n<\/p>\n
21.03.2002
\nInternet:  Yes.\n<\/p>\n
sai\/-\n<\/p>\n
K.P.SIVASUBRAMANIAM,J.\n<\/p>\n
Order in
\nW.P.No.4884 to 4887 of 2002
\nand 5651 of 2002
\nDelivered on:  21.03.2002<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Madras High Court Anaimalai National Estate vs The Planter’S Association on 21 March, 2002 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 21.03.2002 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K.P.SIVASUBRAMANIAM WRIT PETITION Nos.4884 to 4887 of 2002 and WRIT PETITION Nos.5651 of 2002 and W.P.M.P.Nos.6906 to 6909 and 7853 of 2002 Anaimalai National Estate Workers […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,13],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-88503","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-high-court","category-madras-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nAnaimalai National Estate vs The Planter'S Association on 21 March, 2002 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Anaimalai National Estate vs The Planter'S Association on 21 March, 2002 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2002-03-20T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2015-05-14T20:30:20+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"50 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Anaimalai National Estate vs The Planter’S Association on 21 March, 2002\",\"datePublished\":\"2002-03-20T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2015-05-14T20:30:20+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2\"},\"wordCount\":9486,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"High Court\",\"Madras High Court\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2\",\"name\":\"Anaimalai National Estate vs The Planter'S Association on 21 March, 2002 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2002-03-20T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2015-05-14T20:30:20+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Anaimalai National Estate vs The Planter’S Association on 21 March, 2002\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Anaimalai National Estate vs The Planter'S Association on 21 March, 2002 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Anaimalai National Estate vs The Planter'S Association on 21 March, 2002 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"2002-03-20T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2015-05-14T20:30:20+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"50 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Anaimalai National Estate vs The Planter’S Association on 21 March, 2002","datePublished":"2002-03-20T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2015-05-14T20:30:20+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2"},"wordCount":9486,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["High Court","Madras High Court"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2","name":"Anaimalai National Estate vs The Planter'S Association on 21 March, 2002 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"2002-03-20T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2015-05-14T20:30:20+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/anaimalai-national-estate-vs-the-planters-association-on-21-march-2002-2#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Anaimalai National Estate vs The Planter’S Association on 21 March, 2002"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/88503","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=88503"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/88503\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=88503"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=88503"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=88503"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}