{"id":89565,"date":"1997-11-26T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1997-11-25T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997"},"modified":"2017-01-07T21:46:24","modified_gmt":"2017-01-07T16:16:24","slug":"ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997","title":{"rendered":"Ravi Sood And Another vs Vir Bala Sharma on 26 November, 1997"},"content":{"rendered":"
Delhi High Court<\/div>\n
Ravi Sood And Another vs Vir Bala Sharma on 26 November, 1997<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1998 IAD Delhi 533, 71 (1998) DLT 254, 1998 (44) DRJ 361<\/div>\n
Author: C Nayar<\/div>\n
Bench: C Nayar<\/div>\n<\/p>\n
<\/pre>\n
ORDER<\/p>\n
 C.M. Nayar, J. <\/p>\n
 1.     The  present suit has been filed by the plaintiffs for  specific  performance  of agreement to sell dated May 10, 1978 entered into between  the defendant  as  the Vendor and the plaintiffs as Vendees in respect  of  the property known as plot No. G-47 Block No.6. Green Park, New Delhi.\n<\/p>\n
 2.   The facts as enumerated in the plaint are that the defendant by  means of  an  agreement dated May 10, 1978 agreed to make sale of  the  aforesaid plot  to  the plaintiff for total consideration of Rs.  1,70,000\/-  out  of which a sum of Rs. 5,000\/- was paid by means of cheque No. SB\/031386  dated May 8, 1978 drawn on Punjab & Sind Bank, Sector 17-C, Chandigarh. The  said payment was made as alleged earnest money and part sale consideration which was  accepted  by  the defendant. The agreement to sell  was  entered  into between  the parties in writing and signed by plaintiff No. 1 for self  and on behalf of his wife plaintiff No. 2 and the defendant appended the signatures  on each page of the agreement. The defendant encashed the  aforesaid chaque  of Rs. 5,000\/- and acknowledged having received the amount in  consideration of the agreement to sell. In terms of the covenants contained in the  agreement, defendant was to obtain the necessary permission  from  the Competent  Authority and was to deliver actual and physical  possession  of
\nthe property to the plaintiff at the time of registration of the sale  deed and  was  to  receive the balance consideration amount  of  Rs.  1,65,000\/- before  the Sub Registrar at the time of presentation of the Sale Deed  for its  admission of execution and egistration. The defendant assured  plaintiffs that the plot in question was self acquired and free all encumbrances and  there was no charge, lien etc, in respect of the same.  The  defendant
\nfurther  undertook that she would obtain No Objection Certificate from  the Competent  Authority  as envisaged in terms of the Urban  Land  (Ceiling  & Regulations) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and she would obtain  necessary income tax clearance from the authorities  concerned  and after having obtained the same she would intimate to the plaintiffs accordingly  and  would get the sale deed executed from the said  date  within  a period  of 30 days thereof. The relevant facts and pleadings are  contained
\nin  paragraphs 9,10,11,12 and 13 of the plaint which may be  reproduced  as follows:\n<\/p>\n
       “9.  That the defendant as required made application for  seeking
\nnecessary  permission from the competent Authority in  accordance with  the  Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations)  Act,  1976.  The application  was  made under the signatures of the  parties.  She came  to  Delhi as aforesaid, received a sum of  Rs.  5,000\/-  on
\n15.5.1978  and  on the same very day she made  application  after having  duly filled the necessary forms for obtaining the  necessary permission form the competent Authority. It was categorically stated in the said application for obtaining necessary permission  that the property was to be sold to the plaintiffs and  the signatures  of  the plaintiffs were also  obtained,  as  required under law. It is pertinent to note that the original application was  filled in the hands of the plaintiff No. 1 though  it  might not have been much relevant but it has its own significance  since thereafter a fraud has been played and manipulation in the record has  been made by the defendant who has also been summoned as  an accused  in the criminal proceedings and she is being  prosecuted for the same in the circumstances as shall be referred to herein after.  As  required she also filed an affidavit along  with  the application dated 15.5.1978 stating therein that she did not  own any other property except the plot in question.\n<\/p>\n
      10. That when the petition was submitted on 15.5.1978 for seeking permission  under section 27(2) of the Act a receipt  was  issued from the office of the competent Authority to that effect and she
\nwas  directed  to appear on 12.6.1978 at 11 A.M.  with  necessary documents  in original. The plaintiffs rely on the  said  record. The  plaintiffs  have also obtained certified copy  of  the  said receipt. Thereafter the plaintiffs have also obtained photo  copy
\nof  the said application u\/s 27(2) of the Act after the same  has been  tempered within the circumstances stated below. The  plaintiffs  could obtain photo copy since thereafter, in  the  circumstances  as shall be referred to hereinafter, the plaintiff  came to  know  that she has played fraud and has made perjury  in  the record of the Competent Authority and manipulated dates and other writing  in  the original application with intention  to  have  a refusal of grant of permission by playing fraud. The same came to light,  as  the plaintiff No.1 piled criminal  complaint  and  he
\nsummoned  record  in the court of shri  S.M.Chopra,  metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi and when the record was brought the  plaintiff  No. 1 was stunt to find that per jury has been made in  the said  record  and manipulation was made in  the  application  and filed an affidavit of subsequent date as 15.1.1979 showing therein  though falsely that she was holding other  properties.  These informations  were false and were made only to have an  order  of refusal  of permission. Plaintiff No. 1 sought permission of  the court  to  have photo copy of the application as  she  also  made manipulation in changing the date of application from 15.5.78  to 15.1.79  and other manipulations were made. She changed the  date on  the  front page of the said application and also  made  other additions but as usual the forgery has left its traces, as on the back  side of the said application, the date which  was  original written  as  15.5.78 and the application was  actually  submitted
\nbefore the Competent Authority on the said date was not  changed. It  seems that in collusion with some officials of the  said  Department  she  tried to show that ubsequently she  applied  for permission  and  so changed the date etc. and new  file  was  got made.\n<\/p>\n
      11.  That  as aforesaid originally the application  was  made  on 15.5.78  for obtaining necessary permission and she was  directed to  appear  before the Competent Authority on  12.6.1978  but  it seems  that  during this period she became  dishonest  and  never wanted  to transfer the title of the plot. It looks that she  has dishonest intention right from the beginning and wanted to  cheat the  plaintiff  so  she did not appear on  the  date  fixed  i.e. 12.6.78. She was being requested by the plaintiffs to take appropriate  steps before the Competent Authority to obtain  necessary permission to comply with her part of the obligations in terms of the agreement to sell as aforesaid. \/P> <\/p>\n
      12. That suddenly the plaintiff received the letter dated 26.8.78    from the defendant while indicating therein the plaintiffs should    treat  the agreement to sell as revoked. On receipt of  the  said    letter the plaintiff No.1 by means of registered A.D.letter dated    26.9.78 pointed out to her that her act was illegal. She was  not    competent  to  revoke  the agreement to sell  and  otherwise  the    plaintiff  was always ready and willing to perform their part  of    the  contract in terms or the agreement to sell and even  to  the    extent that he has made arrangement and got a sum of Rs. 2  lakhs from  sufficient long time in his account for the payment of  the    balance  sale  consideration amount and to meet  other  necessary    stamp,  registration and miscellaneous expenses. He also  pointed    out  to  her that he has sustained loss because of  keeping  huge    amount  in the bank and because of her act of not  following  the    matter and requested her to perform her part of the contract  and    to  do  the needful and to obtain the  necessary  permission,  to    execute the sale deed.\n<\/p>\n
      13.  That thereafter the plaintiff has been approaching  the  defendant with the request to take appropriate steps and to execute    the Sale Deed. It was transpired that she was avoiding to do  so.    The plaintiff No.1 while believing under bona fide impression  as was  told by her that the permission has not been granted by  1st  week  or March in 1979 and it was conveyed in the first  week  of  March, 1979 to plaintiff No.1 Who believed the same to be correct  (though  later  on it was found the same was wrong),  an  act  of  fraud  was found, the plaintiff got served a legal  notice  dated  9.3.1979  on the defendant through the counsel. It was bona  fide  impression on the part of the plaintiff that she has been refused  permission  on  the  basis  of  the  original  application  dated  15.5.78. It is at the cost of repetition sated that in the application as well as in the affidavit attached with the said  application  dated  15.5.78  she communicated that she  has  no  other  property  so there was no legal bar or legal impediment in  grant  of permission to make sale of the said plot unto the  plaintiffs.  The  plaintiff was under bonafide impression that the  permission  has  been  refused  for valid reasoned to  dependent  though  the  plaintiff have all intentions to have the plot and not  compensation and no amount of compensation in any manner would compensate  the  desire  of  the plaintiffs to have plot  means  of  specific  performance  of the contract, though the plaintiff has no  intention  in any manner to give up their right and to enjoy right  of  specific performance but with invention to cause threatening  and  compel  the  defendant to specifically perform the  contract,  no  doubt certain amount were asked for, but it was with intention to  compel  the defendant to take appropriate action  for  performing  the contract. It is mentioned that the said notice through  counsel  was sent under bonafide belief to the aforesaid aspect  specially  that the permission was not granted on original  application dated 15.5.1978 accompanied with affidavit of the same  date  filed with the said application dated 15.5.78 though the same was  not correct position.\n<\/p>\n
 3.   It  is  next alleged the plaintiff received a notice dated  March  29, 1979  through counsel for the defendant whereby she came with the  position for the first time that she was not going to execute the sale deed and this act  of defendant had been alleged as tantamount to refusal to execute  the Deed. The plaintiff pleaded that the defendants had played fraud on them as also on the competent Authority by managing and maneuvering the refusal  of permission under the provisions of the Act and as a consequence the  plaintiff  filed a compliant under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code  against the  defendant on the grounds that she had chanted the plaintiff. The  complaint subsequently in the ultimate analysis was dismissed and the  defendant was discharged by the Court of Shri O.P.Gogne, Metropolitan  Magistrate Delhi vide his judgment dated August 30, 1984.\n<\/p>\n
 4.   It  is  argued that since the defendant is not ready  and  willing  to perform  her part of the contract and refused to execute the Sale  Deed  by taking  the plea of having been refused permission by the Authorities,  the refusal  cannot  be considered to be refusal in law and  the  defendant  is bound to make proper application disclosing true facts and obtain necessary orders  for  grant of permission and declaration. The cause of  action  for institution  of  the suit has accrued to the plaintiff on  or  about  4\/5th April,  1979  when the intention of the defendant was made  clear  and  she refused  to execute the sale deed and also refused to perform her  part  of the  contract by means of communication dated March 27, 1979 as pleaded  in paragraph 25 of the plaint.\n<\/p>\n
 5.   Defendant filed the written statement wherein in substance the following pleas have been taken:\n<\/p>\n
 (A)  The sale of the urban property is subject to statutory obligation.  In
\nthe  present  case as per the agreement to sell the defendant  was  to take  permission from the Competent Authority under the Act to  execute the  sale  deed as the total property told by the defendant  was  more than the ceiling limit. As per the terms of the agreement to sell, the defendant  applied to the competent Authority and the  said Authority refused  permission  on  the ground that the defendant  held  7  other properties and  plots and according to Section 4(9) of the  Act,  the
\nplot  in  question was in excess of the prescribed  ceiling  limit  as envisaged  under the Act. The said order passed by the  Competent  Authority  is dated 5.2.1979 and on 5.2.1979 the defendant informed  the plaintiff that the competent Authority has refused permission to  sell the plot in question. The defendant also delivered cheque No.284351 of Rs. 5000\/- in lieu of the earnest money received by the defendant from the plaintiff as per the terms of the agreement to sell. It is further stated that the agreement to sell was executed in the ignorance of law and  is  void ab initial being contrary to the provision  of  law  and
\ntherefore, cannot be enforced.\n<\/p>\n
 (B)  The present suit for specific performance is not maintainable  as  the plaintiffs  vide  notice  dated 9th march, 1979  through  his  counsel claimed  damages and waived the specific performance of the  contract. The relevant para of the notice reads as under :\n<\/p>\n
      “5.  You are, therefore, required to take notice that you  should
\n     pay the above mentioned amounts to my clients within 15 days from the  receipt hereof, failing which my salients shall file a  suit for  the recovery thereof and in which case you shall  be  liable for all costs and consequences.”\n<\/p>\n
 (C)  The suit is time carried and the same may be dismissed on  this  short ground  alone. It is submitted that on 23rd July, 1978  the  defendant issued  and delivered a cheque No. 284351 dated 20.7.78 for  Rs.5000\/- drawn on Punjab National Bank, Sector 19, Chandigarh to Smt Raj  Sood, the  plaintiff  No.2,  in lieu of the earnest money  received  by  the defendant and the other cheque No.031387 dated 15.5.78 for Rs.  5000\/- delivered by the plaintiff was also returned by defendant to plaintiff No.2.  The  defendant  specifically informed the  plaintiff  vide  his letter dated 26.8.78 that the agreement to sell stands revoked as  per legal  advice given to the defendant. The plaintiff No.1 received  the said  letter dated 26.8.1978 on 2.9.78. It is further  submitted  that
\n the  defendant  vide her letter dated 5.2.79 informed  the  plaintiffs that  the  permission  has been denied by shri  G.K.Dikshit  the  then competent  authority, vide order dated 1.2.1979 and the same was  duly received  by the plaintiff No.1 on 10.2.79. The lapse of 3  years  and is, therefore, barred by Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963.\n<\/p>\n
 (D)  No cause of action wholly or in part, has arisen to the  plaintiff  in the territorial jurisdiction as the agreement to sell was executed  at Chandigarh,  and the defendant actually resided at Chandigarh.  It  is submitted that this court has no territorial jurisdiction to try  this suit.\n<\/p>\n
 (E)  The  suit is bad on account of non-joinder of necessary party.  It  is submitted  that  the  allegations have been  made  by  the  plaintiffs against the Competent Authority and, therefore, the Competent Authority  is a necessary party and in the absence of the Authority the  suit cannot be decided.\n<\/p>\n
 (F) The defendant entered into an agreement with the plaintiff for  selling plot No. G-47, Block No.6, Green Park, New Delhi for a total consideration  of Rs.1.70 lacs on 10th day of May, 1978. It may  be  mentioned that in the agreement to sell there was a clause which reads as under:\n<\/p>\n
      “And  whereas the vendor undertakes to secure the necessary  permission  from the competent authority within a stipulated  period and  if  for  any reason beyond the control of  the  vendor,  the vendor Smt. Vir Bala Sharma will be liable to refund the  earnest money.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      It  is  stated that the defendant submitted on 15.1.79  a  notice  u\/s
\n     26(1) of the Act to the then Competent Authority and the said Authority vide his order dated 1.2.79 refused the permission. It is submitted that when the defendant came to know that permission cannot be  granted,  the  defendant  issued a cheque in favour of  the  plaintiff  for Rs.5000\/- vide cheque No. 284351 dated 20.7.78 drawn on Punjab National  Bank,  Sector 19, Chandigarh in-lieu of the earnest money  as  received.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
 (G)  Plaintiff No. 1 assured the defendant that he will obtain the  permission  for the defendant and asked the defendant to give  an  affidavit declaring  vacant  land in Delhi to the effect that she has  the  only vacant  plot in question in Delhi. The defendant on the advice of  the plaintiff  and his Advocate declared her only vacant land in Delhi  in
\nthe  affidavit and gave the same to the plaintiffs. It is denied  that any  fraud  whatsoever  has been played by the defendant  or  she  has manipulated  any of the records. Plaintiff No.1 filed a  complaint  in the court of Metropolitan Magistrate (Hauz Khas) New Delhi on  17.9.79 and  the same was dismissed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate  on
\n7.1.1981  against which revision before the sessions Court  was  filed and  the  learned Judge without notice to the defendant  remanded  the case  back to the learned Magistrate’s court. The defendant  was  then summoned in the case and on the basis of the plaintiff’s own  letters, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Shri O.P.Gogne had discharged the
\ndefendant  vide judgment dated 30.8.84. It is stated that  these  proceedings  were initiated to harass the defendant and to compel her  to illegally execute the sale deed.\n<\/p>\n
 6.   Replication  is filed by the plaintiff and the averments made  in  the plaint  are reiterated. The parties went for trial on the following  issues which were framed on May 19, 1986:\n<\/p>\n
      1. Whether the suit is barred by time?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      2. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      3. Whether the plaintiffs have been ready and willing to  perform their part of the agreement?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      4. Whether the defendant committed the breach of contract?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      5. Whether the agreement to sell is enforceable in the absence of permission  to  sell by the Competent Authority under  the  Urban Land Coiling Act?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      6. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance of the  agreement  to  sell in the facts and  circumstances  of  the present case?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      7. Whether the plaintiffs have waived the specific performance of the agreement?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      8. Relief.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
 7.   At  this stage the terms of the Agreement to sell dated May  10,  1978 which have not been disputed by the parties may be reproduced as follows:\n<\/p>\n
                AGREEMENT TO SELL  <\/p>\n
      This  agreement to sell made this 10th day of May,  1978  between   Smt.  Vir Bala Sharma, w\/o Shri Brahm Prakash Lakhanpal  resident   of  House No.72, Sector 27\/A, Chandigarh, hereinafter called  the   Vendor which expression shall unless repugnant to the context  be   deemed  to mean and include the said Vendor, her  heirs,  successors,  legal representatives, administrators, executors  and  assigns,  the  party of the First part; and Shri Ravi Sood  son  of   shri Asa Nand and Smt. Raj Sood, D\/o L. Krishan Chand & w\/o  Shri   Ravi  Sood,  resident of 1\/5 Sariva Priya  Vihar,  New  Delhi-16,   hereinafter called the Vendee, which expression unless  repugnant   to  the  context be deemed to mean and  include  his  successors,   legal representatives, administrators, executors and assigns, the   party of the Second part.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      WHEREAS  the Vendor is seized and possessed of in her own  rights  as  full and absolute owner and otherwise well  and  sufficiently  entitled  to own and in possession of plot No.47, Block No. G  of  land  in Schedule ‘A’ mentioned situated in village Kharera,  now  known  as Green Park on the main Mehrauli Road, New Delhi – in- tended hereby to be sold and transferred, boundaries whereof  are  detailed as under and which plot of land is free from all  encumbrances  including  all sorts of lease,  attachment,  injunction,  notices,  mandatory prohibitory charges, demands, liabilities  or  any legal disputes whereof the vendor assures the vendee and that  the  vendor  has an unrestricted right and power  to  convey  and  transfer her property vide title and interest therein;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      AND  WHEREAS the Vendor has agreed with the Vendee for the  absolute  sale of the said plot No.47, Block No. ‘G’, in  Green  Park measuring  200  hundred  square  yards  for  a  consideration  of Rs.1,70,000\/- (Rs. one lac seventy thousand only). <\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      AND WHEREAS the vendee has paid an amount of Rs.5,000\/- (Rs. five thousand only) through Cheque No. SB 031386 dated the 8th of May, 1978  drawn on the Punjab and Sind Bank, Sector 17\/C,  Chandigarh in favour of the vendor Smt. Vir Bala Sharma aforesaid as earnest
\nmoney which will be adjusted and the balance of the consideration of  Rs.1,65,000  (Rs. one lac sixty five thousand only)  will  be paid before the concerned Registrar New Delhi at the time of  the registration of the sale deed;\n<\/p>\n
      AND WHEREAS the Vendor undertakes to secure the necessary permission from the Competent Authority within a stipulated period  and if  for any reason beyond the control of the Vendor,  the  Vendor Smt. Vir Bala Sharma will be lilable to refund the earnest money.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      AND  WHEREAS  the vendor will be under an obligation  to  provide every  type of facilities for the due execution of the sale  deed and will also fulfilll the legal requirements, if need be.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      AND  WHEREAS the Vendor has hereby agreed to deliver  the  actual possession  of the said plot to the Vendee at the time of  registration of the sale deed; <\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      AND  WHEREAS  the vendor hereby declares and assures  the  vendee that the said plot is self-acquired property and the same is free from  all sorts of charges and encumbrances, liens,  claims,  demands,  liabilities,  injunction, legal  flaws,  disputes, sale, mortgage, gift etc. <\/p>\n
      AND  WHEREAS the Vendor hereby will do all such acts, things  and deeds  as may be necessary to obtain “No  Objection  Certificate” from  the Competent Authority in terms of the provisions  of  the Urban  Ceiling  Land Regulation Act, 1976. The vendor  will  also
\nobtain  permission  from  the Income Tax  Authorities.  When  the Vendor  has obtained the necessary permission from the  Competent Authorities, the Vendor will call upon the vendee to complete the sale before the Registrar, New Delhi within 30 days from the date of  such call. In case of default by the vendee, it shall  be  at the  option of the vendor to execute or not to execute  the  sale deed in favour of the vendee or his nominee.\n<\/p>\n
      AND WHEREAS the expenses of the stamp papers for the purposes  of the  sale  deed will be borne by the Vendee and  other  ancillary expenses will be also borne by the vendee.\n<\/p>\n
      IN  WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have set their signature on  the day, month and year mentioned above.\n<\/p>\n
   SCHEDULE ‘A’ <\/p>\n
      Plot No.47, Block No. G <\/p>\n
     Village Kharera, <\/p>\n
     now known as Green Park  <\/p>\n
      The issues framed in the suit may now be examined.\n<\/p>\n
      ISSUE NO. 1   <\/span><\/p>\n
 8.   The learned counsel for the defendant has contended that the defendant could not obtain permission under the provisions of the Act and,  therefore sent  a communication to the plaintiffs on February 5, 1979. The  suit  was filed  on March 29, 1982 i.e. beyond the period of three years as  provided under  Article 54 of the Limitation Act and the same is,  accordingly  time barred.\n<\/p>\n
 9.   It  is not disputed that the limitation is governed by the  provisions of Article 54 which prescribes a period of three years. This provision  may be reproduced as follows:\n<\/p>\n
      54.  For specific Three Years      The date fixed for the \n          performance of a              performance, or, if no such \n          contract.                     date is fixed, when the \n                                        plaintiff has notice that \n                                        performance is refused.\n \n\n<\/pre>\n
      The notice dated March 29, 1979 was sent to the counsel for the plaintiffs to reiterate that the performance of the contract had become impossible  by refusal of permission to sell the plot by the  Competent  Authority which was specifically refused by order dated February 1, 1979.  Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this communication which is Exhibit PW1\/D-5 may be reproduced as follows:\n<\/p>\n
      “3.  In  reply  to para 3 of your notice it is admitted  that  my
\nclient applied for grant of permission to the Competent Authority but it is incorrect that she did not pursue the said application. Permission  was specifically refused by the Competent  Authority, Delhi vide the order dated 1.2.79, a true copy of which order  is
\nattached herewith.\n<\/p>\n
      4.   In reply to para 4 of your notice I state that my client has not  failed to perform her part of the contract of sale  but  the performance has been made impossible by refusal of permission  to sell  by the Competent Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling  & Regulations)  Act, 1976. My client is not liable to pay any  damages  as she has not refused to perform her part of the  contract but the performance of the contract has become impossible in view of  the  non-grant  of the permission to sell  by  the  Competent
\nAuthority.  The damages claimed by you on behalf of  your  client are imaginary and my client is not responsible for payment of any damages at all to your clients.\n<\/p>\n
      5.   In  reply to para 5 of your notice I am instructed to  state that  as stated above my client is not liable to pay any  damages at  all to your clients and if your clients rush to the court  of law  and  file a suit for recovery of any amount as  damages  the same  shall be contested and in that event your clients shall  be liable for the costs that my client may have to incur in  defending any such suit.”\n<\/p>\n
      The  above reply to the notice of the plaintiff will clearly  indicate that  the defendant took the plea that the performance of the contract  had been  made  impossible by refusal of permission to sell  by  the  Competent Authority. The plea of damages, as a consequence, was denied. The  evidence of  PW1 Ravi Sood also proves the above said communication and  denies  the letter dated February 5, 1979 purported to have been sent by the  defendant though he specifically admits that the address given on AD Card was correct
\nbut he denied the signatures on the same. It cannot be positively said that the  defendant did not return the cheque though the actual refusal  may  be interpreted to be on the basis of the reply of notice dated March 29, 1979, as  referred to above. The suit having been filed within three  years  from that date is held to be within time. The issue is decided in favour of  the plaintiffs.\n<\/p>\n
      ISSUE NO. 2  <\/span><\/p>\n
 10.  This  issue  was not seriously contested by learned  counsel  for  the parties  which  obviously will imply that the suit cannot be held  bad  for non-joinder  of Competent Authority as the order passed by  this  Authority refusing  to  grant permission under the Act is not in  dispute.  The  said Authority  is,  accordingly, not a necessary party and this issue  is  also decided in favour of the plaintiffs.\n<\/p>\n
      ISSUE NO. 3  <\/span><\/p>\n
 11.  The  question now arises as to whether the plaintiffs have been  ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement. The following facts may be considered:\n<\/p>\n
      (a) the execution of the Agreement is not denied;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (b)  the parties signed an application on May 15, 1978 which  was submitted before the Urban Land Ceiling Authority. It was alleged that a further amount of Rs.5,000\/- was paid by cheque on May 15, 1978 which, however, was not encashed;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (c)  Exhibit D-10 is the communication dated September  26,  1978 which  reiterates  that plaintiff No. 1 had kept a  sum  of  Rs.2 lakhs  in his Bank Account ready for payment for transfer of  the plot.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The plaintiffs have also filed subsequent Bank statements which though did not relate to the relevant period would indicate that they were  people of substance and could arrange for the payment of the balance amount at the time  of  conclusion of the contract. The defendant has  not  produced  any evidence to enable the Court to hold otherwise. In view of the above  facts it is held that the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform then  part of the contract. This issue is decided in favour of the plaintiffs.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      ISSUE NO. 4,5,6 & 7  <\/span><\/p>\n
 12.  The  question now arises as to whether the defendant committed  breach of the contract and whether the Agreement to Sell could be enforced in  the absence of permission to sell by the Competent Authority under the Act. The reading  of the Agreement makes it clear that the necessary permission  had to be obtained by the defendant before effecting transfer of the plot.  The following clauses from the Agreement may be reproduced as follows:\n<\/p>\n
      “AND  WHEREAS the Vendor undertakes to secure the necessary  permission  from the Competent Authority within a stipulated  period and  if  for  any reason beyond the control of  the  Vendor,  the Vendor Smt. Vir Bala Sharma will be liable to refund the  earnest money.\n<\/p>\n
      AND  WHEREAS the Vendor hereby will do all such acts, things  and deeds  as may be necessary to obtain “No  Objection  Certificate” from  the Competent Authority in terms of the provisions  of  the Urban  Ceiling  Land Regulation Act, 1976. The vendor  will  also
\nobtain  permission  from  the Income Tax  Authorities.  When  the Vendor  has obtained the necessary permission from the  Competent Authorities, the Vendor will call upon the vendee to complete the sale before the Registrar, New Delhi within 30 days from the date of  such call. In case of default by the vendee, it shall  be  at the  option of the vendor to execute or not to execute  the  sale deed in favour of the vendee of his nominee.”\n<\/p>\n
      The  reading of the above provisions would clearly reiterate that  the defendant  was  obliged  to take necessary permission under  law  from  the Competent  Authority and was under obligation to do all acts to obtain  ‘No Objection  Certificate’ in this regard. It was further stipulated  that  if for  any  reason  the permission was not granted  the  venders,  plaintiffs herein  were to receive the refund of their earnest money. The  application in  this case was first moved by the defendant on 15th May, 1978 which  was
\nalso  signed  by the plaintiffs as the prospective  transferees  which  was dismissed  in default on June 12, 1978. Subsequently, the date was  changed on the first page of the application which was re-submitted by dating it to January 15, 1979. The same was rejected when the following order was passed by the Competent Authority, Delhi:\n<\/p>\n
      “OFFICE OF SHRI G.K.DISHIT: ADDL. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE (LA)\/COMPETENT  AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 26 & 27 OF THE URBAN LAND  (CEILING AND REGULATION) ACT: 1976.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      ORDER   <\/p>\n
      Smt. Vir Bala Sharma  <\/p>\n
     w\/o Shri B.P. Lakhanpal  <\/p>\n
     resident of Sector 27-A,  <\/p>\n
     House No.72, Chandigarh  <\/p>\n
      submitted  on  15.1.1979  a notice u\/s 26(1) of  the  Urban  Land (Ceiling  and Regulation) Act, 1976 intending to sell the  vacant land described below:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      DESCRIPTION OF VACANT LAND <\/p>\n
     G-47, Green Park, New Delhi  <\/p>\n
     (Area : 200 S.Yds.) <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
      2.  Plot in question is proposed to be sold by the  applicant  in favour  of  Shri  Ravi  Sood  and Mrs. Raj  Sood  for  a  sum  of Rs.1,70,000\/-. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      3. From the affidavit filed by the applicant, it is revealed that apart from plot in question, the applicant holds 7 other  properties,  the applicant holds 7 other properties and plots  and  according  to section 4(9) of the Act, the plot in question  is  in excess  of  the prescribed ceiling limit as envisaged  under  the
\nUrban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976.\n<\/p>\n
      Since the applicant holds excess vacant land, she cannot sell the plot in question unless she files a return u\/s 6(1) of the  Urban
\nland (Celling & Regulation) Act, 1976 and the plot in question is exempted to her by the State Government.\n<\/p>\n
      SD\/-\n<\/p>\n
     (G.K. DIKSHIT) <\/p>\n
     COMPETENT AUTHORITY; DELHI <\/p>\n
     DT.1.2.1979″\n<\/p>\n
 13.  The  defendant had earlier filed her return before the  Competent  Authority,  Ludhiana on September 30, 1976 under the relevant  provisions  of law which was disposed of only on March 20, 1985. This is filed as  Exhibit D-17.  Therefore, the defendant could not obtain the permission  under  the Act and was not able to transfer the plot in favour of the plaintiffs.  She informed them immediately or soon thereafter on such refusal and lastly  in reply  to  the  notice dated March 29, 1979. The  plaintiffs  continued  to
\npersist in the matter but took no steps to file an appeal or to request the defendant  to  file  an appeal against the Order passed  by  the  Competent Authority. All these facts are not denied and even the statement of  plaintiff  No.  1  as PW1 categorically will indicate that  the  defendant  took adequate  steps to get the permission and did not at any stage mislead  the plaintiff in this regard. The following portions from cross-examination  of
\nthis witness may be reproduced as follows:\n<\/p>\n
      “Before  the  agreement to sell was executed,  negotiations  took
\nplace  between me and the husband of the defendant. We  had  also exchanged correspondence between us. At the time of  negotiations the  husband of the defendant had told me that the defendant  was possessed of a property at Ludhiana but he had not told me  about
\nthe other properties. We had discussed at the time of negotiating the  deal that there could be a difficulty in getting  permission from  the competent authority. In so far as the other  properties are  concerned I was told about them after the execution  of  the
\nagreement to sell. it was wrong to suggest that I was told  about the  other properties at the time of negotiations and before  the agreement to sell was executed. I had not consulted any lawyer in this regard to the matter of grant of permission by the competent
\nauthority.  It  was correct that in my letter dated  February  8, 1978 (Ext. D\/1) I had stated that the deal could not be closed on account  of technical hitch in respect of urban ceiling.  I  have seen  letter dated April 13, 1978 Ext. D\/2. It is correct that  I had  stated in that letter that I had got in touch with some  one who  would  follow up the matter and see that the  permission  is granted.  At  this stage I do not remember who  was  the  contact about which I was referring to in the letter. After looking at my letter dated April 29, 1980 Ext.D\/3 I recollect that I had got in touch  with  Mr.  Rajender Prakash, Advocate,  for  securing  the permission at Delhi from the competent authority on behalf of the defendant. The opinion given by Shri Rajender Prakash,  Advocate, was sent to the husband of the defendant. Ext.D\/15 is the copy of the  opinion  given by Shri Rajender Prakash,  Advocate.  Various columns of the first application which was on the requisite  form  were  filled up by me and not by Mr. Rajender Prakash,  Advocate. By  that time he had gone out of the picture. Ext.PW 1\/D3 is  not the  form  which was filed by me. However, the  application  was submitted  in the form similar to Ext. PW 1\/D3. Columns  of  this
\nform  and the form filled up by me are more or less the  same.  I did not ask the defendant for a copy of the application submitted to the competent authority. I was pursuing the matter relating to the  permission before the competent authority. After filing  the
\napplication  before  the competent authority on May 15,  1978,  I wrote  to the defendant on May 17, 1978 vide Ext.D\/5. I had  mentioned  in that letter that the application under section  26  of the Urban Land Ceiling Act should also be filed. I was made aware by  the office of the competent authority that the first  application  was  not valid and no permission would be  granted  by  the competent authority. The contents of Ext. D-6 dated May 20,  1978 are correct and I am not disputing the same. It is correct that I had  by  my  letter dated May 26, 1978,  (Ext.D\/7)  informed  the defendant that I would withdraw the first application as the same
\nwas  incomplete and there was no point in getting the  same  dismissed.  If the defendant had appeared before the  competent  authority  on June 12, 1978, we would have filed a second  application in the prescribed form. I think I had gone to the office  of
\nthe  competent  authority on June 12, 1978. I, however,  did  not appear before the competent authority dismissing the  application was  not passed in my presence. On telephone I had told  the  defendant that she should be present before the competent authority on June 12, 1978 so that another application could be filed and I would  also be present at that time. However, I have not  written any letter to the defendant in this regard. I do not remember  as to  whether two sets of applications – one under section  26  and the  other  under section 27 of the Urban Land Ceiling  Act  were prepared on May 15, 1978.\n<\/p>\n
      Earlier to the admission\/denial of documents I had not seen  Ext. PW1\/D2.  I am not aware that in the application under section  27 one is required to give the details of all the properties, whether located in Delhi or elsewhere. Affidavit Ext. PW1\/D1  accompanying  the application Ext. PW1\/D2 was not in my  knowledge.  The      defendant or her husband never came to my house after the permission  was refused by the competent authority. It is incorrect  to suggest  that my wife was told that the permission had  not  been granted  and that the cheque of Rs.5,000\/- issued by me  was  returned as uncashed and another cheque of Rs.5,000\/- was issued by the defendant towards refund of earnest money.\n<\/p>\n
      It  is incorrect that on July 23, 1978 the defendant came  to  my  house and handed over cheque No. 284351 dated 20.7.1978 which was  for  a  sum  of Rs.5000\/- and the other  cheque  No.031387  dated  15.5.1978 in the sum of Rs.5000\/- to my wife. I never had a  talk  with my wife about the return of the aforesaid cheques and  about  the  visit of the defendant. After receipt of the letter  of  the  defendant dated 26th August, 1978 Ex.D-8, I may have talked to my  wife  about the aforesaid cheques and the visit of the  defendant  to our house. I do not remember whether my wife told me that  the  aforesaid  cheques were handed over to her. Ex. D-10 is my  reply  to  Ex.D8.  In this letter, I have not denied the fact  that  the  aforesaid  cheques have not been received by my wife. It is correct  that in notice Ex.D-12 I have claimed only damages and  not  specific performance of the contract. After the dismissal of  the  first  application, I asked the defendant to file an  application  under section 26 of the Urban Land
\nCeiling Act. It was my  understanding with the defendant that nothing would be concealed  from  the Competent Authority. It is correct that I received a copy  of  the order of the Competent Authority declining permission  alongwith  Ex.PW1\/D-5. I have seen letter dated February 5, 1979  purported  to have been written by the defendant to me. I  deny  the  receipt  of the said letter. The letter is marked ‘A’. A.D.  card  mark  ‘B’ does not bear my signatures. However, my address  given  on  the  A.D.  card is correct. After I came to  know  about  the  dismissal  of  the application, I did not ask  the  defendant  to  appeal  against the order of the Competent Authority. I also  did  not  challenge the order of the Competent Authority. I have  seen  Ex.D-12  dated 9th March, 1979. Before 9th March, 1979 there  was  an  amount  of Rs.2 lakhs in my account which I  was  maintaining  with  Punjab & Sind Bank, Kailash Colony, New Delhi. I  have  not  filed  the statement of account of Punjab & Sind Bank  pertaining  to the period before & upto 9th March, 1979. I am not sure whether I have got pass book pertaining to this account. This  account  may  be  alive but I have not operated it for  the  last  several  years. I have not made any attempt to obtain a copy of the statement  of account relating to the aforesaid bank upto  9th  March,  1979. It is wrong to suggest that on the aforesaid date and prior  to it, I did not have a sum of Rs.2 lakhs in the said account  in  the aforesaid Bank. In fact, I had several lakhs of rupees in  my  account  in the aforesaid Bank. After the reply of the notice  by  the  defendant,  I did not have any talk or  correspondence  with  her.  I had filed a criminal complaint against the  defendant  on  the  ground  that there was tampering in the  second  application  which  was filed before the Competent Authority. I had moved  the  criminal Court, as the date on the application was tampered with.  I  do  not remember whether I had made an allegation  before  the  criminal  Court about the change of the name in  the  application  against  Column No.7 thereof. Column No. 7 should have  contained  my  name and my wife’s name of the defendant. After  receipt  of,  the  reply to the notice, I did not have any correspondence  with  the  defendant  but  through common friends all the  time  I  was  approaching the defendant to complete the deal. I do not remember  the  dates  when the common friends approached the  defendant.  I  also  do not remember whether such efforts were made  during  the  course  of  the  criminal case. I had  approached  the  defendant  through  Mr.  Yashpal Chadha who is a common friend of  both  the  parties. It is wrong to suggest that I had instituted the suit as  a  matter  of gamble. It is incorrect that I did  not  have  the  requisite amount up to 9th March, 1979 to purchase the property.”\n<\/p>\n
 14.  Though  the receipt of the letter dated February 5, 1979 is denied  by this  witness, the agreement was terminated by the defendant on  notice  to plaintiff No.1 in her reply dated March 29, 1979. The defendant was dragged
\nto  the criminal court on the charges framed under Sections 406\/420IPC  and
\nhad  to suffer unnecessary hardship and harassment till she was  ultimately
\ndischarged by the court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi on August 30, 1984. The operative part of this order may be reproduced as follows:\n<\/p>\n
      “It may be noted here that the agreement to sell was between  the  accused on the one hand and the complainant and his wife Smt. Raj  Sood on the other hand. Complainant referred to the letter  dated  26.8.78 of the accused wrote to her that he studied the agreement  to  sell and there was no provision for the accused to  back  out  from  there. He further added that he had made an advance of  Rs.  5000\/- which has been with the accused for several months.\n<\/p>\n
      Again another letter was written by the accused to the  complainant  and his wife on 5.2.79 informing that the sanction for  sale  of  plot of land has not been granted by the competent  authority  and as such complainant may get the cheque dated 20.7.78 for  Rs.  5000\/-  delivered  to his wife revalidated for  encashment.  Complainant  in his cross-examination had submitted that he may  not  have  disputed  the  receipt of two cheques referred  to  in  the  letter  mark-X dated 26.8.78. However, he denied the  receipt  of  the letter dt. 5.2.79. In any case complainant has not  categorically denied the receipt of the two cheques issued by the accused  to  him  and  handed over to his wife because  the  letter  dated  26.8.78  has been acknowledged by him when he wrote a letter  Ex.  P.11.  Now  the moving of the application dated  15.1.79  by  the  accused  was  again an attempt to seek the  permission  from  the  competent  authority  for the sale of plot of land but  that  was  rejected  by the competent authority on the ground that she  possessed  7 other properties and plots and, therefore, the plot  in  question  is in excess of the prescribed ceiling limit.  Copy  of  the order mark PE is on record. The contention of the complainant  that  the  application  has been rejected on the  ground  of  her  having other properties and his deriving the dishonest  intention  on  the  part  of the accused does not seek to  have  any  force.  Accused  was  bound to detail the other properties  held  by  her  while making an application to the competent authority. If it  is  rejected,  there is no fault on her part. Further  her  intention  appears  to be bonafide when she handed over two cheques  to  the  wife of the complainant as mentioned in her letter dated 26.8.78.\n<\/p>\n
  As  I  have already observed above, there is no evidence  of  any forgery  against the accused in respect of the over  writings  in the application Ex. CA. This court is not to go in that aspect.\n<\/p>\n
 In  view of the above discussion, after perusing the evidence,  I do  not find any ground for framing charge against  the  accused. Accordingly accused is discharged.”\n<\/p>\n
 15.  The learned counsel for the plaintiff has contended that it was mandatory on the part of the defendant to obtain necessary permission under  the provisions  of the Act and since time was not the essence of the  contract, the conditional decree can be passed on the facts and circumstances of  the case  as admittedly, the refusal of permission by the  Competent  Authority was only a conditional one. He has cited the Judgment of the Supreme  Court as  reported  in  Mrs. Chandnee Widya Vati Madden Vs.  Dr.  C.L.Katial  and
\nothers  may be referred to as under:\n<\/p>\n
   4. The main ground of attack on this appeal is that the contract  is not enforceable being of a contingent nature and the contingency not having been fulfillled. In our opinion, there is no  substance in this contention. So far as the parties to the contract are concerned, they had agreed to bind themselves by the  terms of the document executed between them. Under that document  it was for the defendant-vendor to make the necessary application  for the permission to the Chief Commissioner. She had as a matter  of fact made such an application but for reasons of her own  decided to withdraw the same. On the findings that the plaintiffs  have always been ready and willing to perform their part of the  contract and that it was the defendant who willfully refused to  perform her part of the contract, and that time was not of the  essence of the contract the Court has got to enforce the terms of  the contract and to enjoin upon the defendant-appellant to make  the necessary application to the Chief Commissioner. It will be  for the Chief Commissioner to decide whether or not to grant the  necessary sanction.\n<\/p>\n
 5. In this view of the matter, the High Court was entirely correct in decreeing the suit for specific performance of the contract. the High Court should have further directed the defendant to make the necessary application for permission to the chief Commissioner, which was implied in the contract between the parties. As the defendant-vendor, without any sufficient reasons, withdrew the application already made to the Chief Commissioner, the decree to be prepared by this Court will add the clause that the defendant, within one month from today, shall make the necessary application to the Chief Commissioner or to such other competent authority as may have been empowered to grant the necessary sanction to transfers like the one in question, and further that within one month of the receipt of that sanction she shall convey to the plaintiffs the property in suit. In the event of the sanction being refused, the plaintiffs shall be entitled to the damages as decreed by the High court. the appellant sought to raise certain other pleas which had not been raised in the High Court; for example, that this was not a fit case in which specific performance of contract should be enforced by the Court. this plea was not specifically raised in the High Court and the necessary facts were not pleaded in the pleadings. It is manifest that this Court should not allow such a plea to be raised her for the first time.”\n<\/p>\n
 16.  Reference is next made to the judgement as reported is Ramesh  Chandra
\nChandiok and another Vs. Chuni Lal Sabharwal (Dead) by his legal  representatives  and others  which also lays  down  that readiness  and  willingness  has to be construed and  determined  from  the entirety  of facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and  conduct of  the  parties  concerned and a decree for specific  performance  can  be granted taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case.\n<\/p>\n
Paragraphs 6 and 7 of this judgement read as follows:\n<\/p>\n
 6. We are unable to concur with the reasoning or the conclusions of the High Court on the above main points. It is significant that the lease deed was not executed in favour of the respondents by the Government until May 21, 1956. So long as their own title was incomplete there was no question of the sale being completed. It is also undisputed that according to the conditions of the lease the respondents were bound to obtain the sanction of the Rehabilitation Ministry before transferring the plot to anyone else. The respondents were fully aware and conscious of this situation much earlier and that is the reason why on 11-8-1995 it was agreed while extending the period for execution of the sale deed that the same shall be got executed after receipt of the sanction. The statement contained in Exhibit P-7 that that the execution of the sale deed “by us cannot be completed without the said sanction” was unqualified and unequivocal. The respondents further undertook to inform the appellants as soon as sanction was received and thereafter the sale deed had to be executed within a week and got registered on payment of the balance amount of consideration. We are wholly unable to understand how in the presence of Exhibit P7 it was possible to hold that the appellants were bound to get the sale completed even before any information was received from the respondents about the sanction having been obtained. It is quite obvious from the letter Exhibit P-8 dated June 15, 1956 that the respondents were having second thoughts and wanted to wriggle out of the agreement because presumably they wanted to transfer it for better consideration to some one else or to transfer it in favour of their own relation as is stated to have been done later. The respondents never applied for any sanction after August 11, 1955 and took up the position that they were not prepared to wait indefinitely in the matter and were therefore can celling the agreement “for want of certainty.” We are completely at a loss to understand this attitude nor has any light been thrown on the uncertainty contemplated in the aforesaid letter. It does not appear that there would have been any difficulty in obtaining the sanction if the respondents had made any attempt to obtain it. This is obvious from the fact that when they actually applied for sanction on November 11, 1956 it was granted after almost a week. The statement contained in Exhibit P-10 dated July 4, 1956 that the sanction was not forth coming has not been substantiated by any cogent evidence as no document was placed on the record to show that any attempt was made to obtain sanction prior to November 11, 1956. Be that as it may the respondents could not call upon the appellants to complete the sale and pay the balance money until the undertaking given in Exhibit P-7 dated August 11, 1955 had been fulfillled by them. the sanction was given in November 1956 and even then the respondents did not inform the appellants about it so as to enable them to perform their part of the agreement of sale. There was no question of time having ever been made the essence of the contract by the letters sent by the respondents nor could it be said that the appellants had failed to perform their part of the agreement within a reasonable time.”\n<\/p>\n
 7. On behalf of the respondents it has been urged that in spite of the letters of the respondent by which the agreement has been cancelled the appellants did not treat the agreement of sale as having come to an end and kept it alive. They were therefore bound to send a draft of the conveyance and call upon the respondents to execute the sale deed and get it registered on payment of the balance of the sale price as soon as they came to know directly from the Housing and Rent Officer that sanction had been granted. This they failed to do and it must be inferred that they were not ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement. Our attention has been invited to a statement in Halsbury’s Laws of England Col.34. Third Edn. at page that in the absence of agreement to the contrary it is the purchaser who has to prepare the draft conveyance and submit it to the vendor for approval. No such point was raised at any prior stage and in any case we do not consider that after the cancellation of the agreement by the respondents it was necessary or incumbent on the appellants to send any draft conveyance. The very fact that they promptly filed the suit shows their keenness and readiness in the matter of acquiring the plot by purchase. It must be remembered that the appellants had not only put in an advertisement in newspapers about the existence of the agreement but had also sent a letter Exhibit P-13 on September 12, 1956 declaring their readiness and willingness to pay the balance of the purchase price on the respondents procuring the sanction. The appellants further made enquiries directly from the authorities concerned about the sanction. Readiness and willingness cannot be treated as a strait-jacket formula. These have to be determined from the entirety of facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned. In our judgment there was nothing to indicate that the appellants at any stage were not ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. The High Court had taken another aspect of readiness and willingness into consideration, namely, the possession of sufficient funds by the appellants at the materials time for payment of the balance of the sale price. Romesh Chand P.W.6 had stated that his father was a Head Master since 1922 in a High School and he was also doing import business. He gave up service in 1934. The son joined-the father in his business in the year 1928 and his other brother appellants No.2 also joined that business some years ago. The bank account was produced which showed that between July 18, 1955, and December 31, 1955 the appellants’ father had in his account a credit of over Rs.15,000\/- but thereafter between January 1956 and March 1956 an amount of Rupees 16,000\/- odd had been withdrawn. According to the High Court after these dates there was nothing to show that the appellants had any funds. The evidence of Ramesh Chand P.W.6 that the family had an amount of Rs.40,000\/- lying at their house was not believed. Now in the first place the relevant period for determining whether the appellants were in a position to pay the balance of the sale price was after November 1956 when sanction had been obtained by the respondents for transfer of the plot from the Rehabilitation Ministry. The appellants had admittedly paid without any difficulty Rs.7,500\/- as earnest money and the bank account of the father showed various credit and debit entries from time to time. On March 5, 1956 an amount of Rs.12,720\/- had been withdrawn by a cheque in favour of Romesh Chand P.W.6. According to his statement this amount was withdrawn because his father was very ill and it was decided to withdraw the amount at that time. It was deposited with his mother and remained with her throughout. There is no material or evidence to show that this amount had been expended or spent and that the statement of Romesh Chand was false on the point. Even if the version false on the point. Even if the version that Rs.40,000\/- in cash were lying at the house of the appellant is discarded at least an amount of Rs.12,720\/- must have been available at the material and relevant time. The appellants were carrying on business and there is nothing to indicate that they were not in a position to arrange for the remaining sum to make up the total of Rs.15,000\/-. We are, therefore, unable to accept that the appellants, who had all along been trying their utmost to purchase the plot, did not have the necessary funds or could not arrange for them when the sale deed had to be executed and registered after the sanction had been obtained.”\n<\/p>\n
 17.  The  judgment of the Full Bench of Gujarat High Court as  reported  in Shah Jitendra Nanalal, Ahmedabad Vs. Patel Lallubhai Ishverbhai,  Ahmedabad and  others   is cited to reiterate that it  is  always open  for  the court to pass conditional decree  for  specific  performance subject  to  exemption being granted by the Urban Land  Ceiling  Authority. Paragraph 13 of this judgment may be reproduced as follows:\n<\/p>\n
       “In this view, in answer to the second question referred to us we hold  that a conditional decree for specific performance  subject to  exemption being obtained under Section 20 of the  Urban  Land
\n(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (Act No.33 of 1976) is permissible.  As we have said earlier, we do not propose to answer  the first question as it may not be necessary. The case will be  sent back  to the Division Bench for disposal in accordance  with  the      decision herein and in accordance with law.”\n<\/p>\n
 18.  The  learned counsel for the defendant has argued that the  plaintiffs had  waived their right to enforce specific performance as will be  evident from  the  communication dated March 9, 1979 (Exhibit  D-12)  wherein  they claimed  damages  for the amount of Rs.40,670\/- only  whereas  the  learned counsel  for  the plaintiff has contended that waiver cannot  be  construed from  legal notice and the plaintiff are entitled to specific  performance. Reference  is  made to the judgments as reported as Dawsons Bank  Ltd.  Vs.
\nNippon Menkwa Kabushihi Kaish (Japan Cotton Trading Co. Ltd)  and Mademsetty Satyanarayana Vs. G.Yelloji Rao and  others   of the later judgment may  be  reproduced as below:\n<\/p>\n
      “(6).  At the outset we shall construe the relevant  sections  of
\n     the  Specific  Relief Act and the Limitation  Act  unhampered  by judicial decisions.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      Specific  Relief  Act: Section 22. – The jurisdiction to  decree specific performance is discretionary and the Court is not  bound to  grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do  so:  but the  discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and  reasonable  guided by judicial principles and capable of  correction by a Court of appeal.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      The following are cases in which the Court may properly  exercise a discretion not to decree specific performance:-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      “I. Where the circumstances under which the contract is made  are such  as to give the plaintiff an unfair advantage over  the  defendant, though there may be no fraud or misrepresentation on the plaintiff’s part.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      Illustrations  <\/p>\n
      II.  Where  the performance of the contract  would  involve  some hardship  on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas  its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      Illustrations  <\/p>\n
      The following in a case in which the Court may properly  exercise a discretion to decree specific performance:-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      III.  Where the plaintiff has done substantial acts  or  suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific  performance. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n \n\n      Illustrations  \n \n\n      The First Schedule to the Limitation Act   \n      Description         Period         Time from\n     of suit             of             which period\n                         limitation     begins to run\n     Art.113.For         Three          The date fixed\n     specific            years          for the performance,\n     performance                        or, if no such date is\n     of a contract                      fixed, when the plaintiff\n                                        has notice that \n                                        performance is refused.\"\n  \n\n      time, we do so. Learned counsel for the plaintiff says that  when \n     the parties. \n \n\n      the scope of the discretion, after excluding the cases  mentioned in S.22 of the Specific Relief Act, be confined to waiver,  abandoment of estoppel. If one of these three circumstances is established,  no question of discretion arises, for either there  will \n<\/pre>\n
be no subsisting right or there will be a bar against its  assertion,  So, there must be some discretionary field  unoccupied  by the  three cases, otherwise the substantive section becomes  otiose. It is really difficult to define that field. Diverse  situations  may  arise which may induce a court not  to  exercise  the discretion  in  favour of the plaintiff. It may  better  be  left undefined except to state what the section says, namely,  discretion  of  the Court is not arbitrary, but  sound  and  reasonable
\nguided  by  judicial principles and capable of  correction  by  a Court of appear.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
 19.  The  above  passage clearly states that cases in which the  Court  may exercise discretion not to grant decree for specific performance.  Similarly,  in  the judgment as reported in Kanshi Ram Vs. Om  Prakash  Jawal  and others  , the Court clearly hold  that  the discretion  should  be exercised in accordance with justice,  equity,  good conscience  and fairness to both the parties. Paragraph 5 of this  judgment reads as under:\n<\/p>\n
      “Having regard to the facts of this case and the arguments addressed by the learned counsel, the question that arises for consideration is; whether it would be just, fair and equitable to grant the decree for specific performance? It is true that the rise in prices of the property during the pendency of the suit may not be the sole consideration for refusing to decree the suit for specific performance. But it is equally settled law that granting decree for specific performance of a contract of immovable properly is not automatic. It is one of discretion to be exercised on sound principles. When the court gets into equity jurisdiction, it would be guided by justice, equity, good conscience and fairness to both the parties. Considered from this perspective, in view of the fact that the respondent himself had claimed alternative relief for damages, we think that the courts would have been well justified in granting alternative decree for damages, instead of ordering specific performance which would be unrealistic and unfair. Under these circumstances, we hold that the decree for specific performance is inequitable and unjust to the appellant.”\n<\/p>\n
 20.  Similarly, the Supreme Court in N.P.Thirugnanam (D) by L.Rs., Vs.  Dr. R.Jagan  Mohan  Rao and others   highlighted  the proposition that specific performance is an suitable remedy. Paragraph 5 of this judgment may be reproduced as follows:\n<\/p>\n
       “It  is  settled law that remedy for specific performance  is  an     equitable  remedy  and is in the discretion of the  court,  which discretion requires to be exercised according to settled  principles of law and not arbitrarily as adumbrated under Section 20 of the  Specific Relief Act 1963 (for short, `the Act’). Under  Section 20, the court is not bound to grant the relief just  because there  was  valid  agreement of sale. Section 16(c)  of  the  Act
\nenvisages  that plaintiff must plead and prove that he  had  performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential  terms  of the contract which are to the  performed  by  him   other than those terms the performance of which has been prevented  or  waived  by the defendant. The  continuous  readiness  and   willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent   to grant the relief of specific performance. This circumstance in   material  and  relevant and is required to be considered  by  the   court  while  granting  or refusing to grant the  relief  of  the   plaintiff  fails to either aver or prove the same, he must  fail.   To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to  perform   his part of the contract, the court must take into  consideration   the  conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the  filing   of the suit along with other attending circusmtances. The  amount   of  consideration  which he has to pay to the defendant  must  of   necessity  be proved to be available. Right from the date of  the   execution till date of the decree he must prove that he is  ready   and has always been willing to perform his part of the  contract.   As stated, the factum of his readiness and willingness to perform   his part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to  the   conduct  of the party and the attending circumstances. The  court   may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the  plaintiff   was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of   the contract.”\n<\/p>\n
 21.  In  the present case the facts and evidence would establish  that  the  specific  performance was conditional on the grant of permission under  the  provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulations) Act. The defendant, as  has  been stated in the earlier part of this judgment, clearly applied  for  such  permission and the application was duly signed not by  the  defendant  but also by the plaintiffs. The permission was declined and the  plaintiffs  did not pursue the matter further for initiating filing of appeal and taking  steps  for grant of such permission. They knocked the door of the  Criminal  Court  by  filing  complaint case against the  defendant  and  that  matter  dragged  for number of years though the remedy available to the  plaintiffs  was  of civil nature and no criminal proceedings could have been  initiated  in  the facts and circumstances of the present case. The defendant did  not  loose  time and was soon as the permission by the Competent  Authority  was  declined wrote to plaintiff No.1 that she was not able to go ahead with the  agreement and allegedly returned even the earnest money of Rs.5,000\/-.  The  plaintiff took no steps in the matter and approached this Court only in the  year 1982 by means of filing and present suit. It is well settled that when  sale is contingent on the Authorities granting sanction and permission, the  contract cannot be enforced when there is no sanction. The Supreme Court in  K.S.Vidyanadam  Vs.  Vairavan 1997 II AD S.C.368 had held that  even  where  time is not the essence of the contract, the plaintiffs must perform  their  part of the contract within a reasonable time and reasonable time should be  determined  looking  at  all the surrounding  circumstances  including  the  express  terms of the contract and nature of the property.  Paragraphs  11,  12, 13 and 14 of this judgment may be reproduced as follows:\n<\/p>\n
       “11.  Sri Sivasubramanium cited the decision of the  Madras  High
\nCourt  in S.V.Sankaraninga Nadar Vs. P.T.S.Ratnaswamy Nadar   holding that mere rise in prices is  no  ground
\nfor denying the specific performance. With great respect, we  are   unable to agree if the said decision is understood as saying that   the  said  factor is not at all to be taken  into  account  while   exercising  the discretion vested in the court by law. We  cannot   be  oblivious  to  the reality and the reality  is  constant  and   continuous  rise  in the values of  urban  properties-fuelled  by   larger-scale  migration of people from rural areas to urban  centres  and  by inflation. Take this very case. The  plaintiff  had   agreed  to  pay  the balance consideration,  purchase  the  stamp   papers  and  ask for the execution of sale deed and  delivery  of   possession  within  six months. He did nothing of the  sort.  The   agreement  expressly  provides  that if the  plaintiff  fails  in   performing his part of the contract, the defendants are  entitled   to  forfeit the earnest money of Rs.5,000\/- and that if  the  defendants  fail  to perform their part of the contract,  they  are   liable  to  pay double the said amount. Except paying  the  small   amount  of  Rs.5,000\/-  as against  the  total  consideration  of   Rs.60,000\/-  the plaintiff did nothing until he issued  the  suit   notice  2 1\/2 years after the agreement. Indeed, we are  inclined   to think that the rigor of the rule evolved by courts that  time   is  not of the essence of the contract in the case  of  immovable   properties  evolved in times when prices and values  were  stable   and  inflation was unknown-requires to be relaxed, if  not  modified, particularly in the case of urban immovable properties.  It   is  high time, we do so. Learned counsel for the  plaintiff  says   that  when the parties entered into the contract, they knew  that   prices  are  rising; hence, he says, rise in prices cannot  be  a   ground for denying specific performance. May be, the parties knew   of the said circumstances but they have also specified six months   as  the period within which the transaction should be  completed.   The said time limit may not amount to making time the essence  of   the  contract but it must yet have some meaning. Not for  nothing   could  such  time  limit would have been prescribed.  Can  it  be   stated  as a rule of law or rule of prudence that where  time  is   not  made the essence of the contract, well stipulations of  time   provided in the contract have no significance or meaning or  that   they are as good as non-existent? All this only means that  while   exercising  its  discretion, the court should also bear  in  mind   that when the parties prescribe certain time-limit(s) for  taking   steps  by one or the other party, it must have some  significance   and  that the said time-limit(s) cannot be ignored altogether  on   the  ground that time has not been made the essence of  the  contract relating to immovable properties.\n<\/p>\n
      12. Sri Sivasubramanium relied upon the decision of this Court in     Satyanarayana  Vs. Yellogi Rao  wherein  it  has been held:\n<\/p>\n
      “As  Article 113 of the Limitation Act prescribes a period  of  3   years from the date fixed thereunder for specific performance  of   a contract, it follows that mere delay without more extending  up   to  the  said period cannot possibly be a reason for a  court  to   exercise  its  discretion  against giving a  relief  of  specific   performance. Nor can the scope of the discretion, after excluding   the cases mentioned in Section 22 of the Specific Relief ACt,  be   confined  to  Waiver, abandonment or estoppel. If  one  of  these   three  circumstances  is established, no question  of  discretion   arises,  for  either there will be no subsisting right  or  there   will  be  a  bar against the assertion. So, there  must  be  some   discretionary field unoccupied by the, three cases, otherwise the   substantive  section  becomes otiose. It is really  difficult  be   define that field Diverse situation may arise which may induce  a   court not to exercise the discretion in favour of the  plaintiff.   It may better be left undefined except to state what the  section   says, namely, discretion of the court is not arbitrary, but sound   and  reasonably  guided  by judicial principles  and  capably  of   correction by a court of appeal.”\n<\/p>\n
      Subha Rao, J. speaking for the Bench, pointed out the distinction   between Indian Law and the English Law on the subject and  stated   the  conclusion in the following words; “while in  England,  mere   delay or laches may be a ground for refusing to give a relief  of   specific performance in India mere delay without such conduct  on   the part of the plaintiff as would cause prejudice to the defendant does not empower a court to refuse such a relief…It is  not   possible or desirable to lay down the circumstances under which a   court can exercise its discretion against the plaintiff. But they   must be such that the representation by or the conduct or neglect   of the plaintiff is directly responsible in inducing the  defendants to change his position to his prejudice or such as to  bring   about  a  situation when it would be inequitable to give  such  a   relief.”\n<\/p>\n
      13. In the case before us, it is not mere delay. It is a case  of   total  inaction on the part of the plaintiff for 2 1\/2  years  in   clear  violation of the term of agreement which required  him  to   pay  the  balance,  purchase the stamp papers and  then  ask  for   execution  of sale deed within six months. Further, the delay  is   coupled  with substantial rise in prices – according to  the  defendants,  three  times  between the date of agreement  and  the   date of suit notice. The delay has brought about a situation more   it  would be inequitable to give the relief of specific  performance be the plaintiff.\n<\/p>\n
      14. Sri Sivasubramanium then relied upon the decision in Dr.Jiwan   Lal & Ors. Vs. Brij Mohan Mehra & Anr. 1979(2) S.C.R.2301 to show   that  the  delay of two years is not a ground  to  deny  specific   performance. But a perusal of the judgment shows that there  were   good  reasons for the plaintiff to wait in that case  because  of   the pendency of an appeal against the order of requisition of the   suit  property. We may reiterate that the true principle  is  the   one  stated by the Constitution Bench in Chand Rani.  Even  where   time  is not of the essence of the contract, the  plaintiff  must   perform  his  part of the contract within a reasonable  time  and   reasonable  time should be determined by looking at all the  sur-  rounding  circumstances including the express terms of  the  con-  tract and the nature of the property.”\n<\/p>\n
 22.  The  facts of the present case would clearly show that  the  defendant applied for permission under the provisions of the Act and this application was signed by plaintiff No.1 as well. Therefore, it is established that all requisite steps were taken by the defendant and the plaintiffs even did not pursue  the  remedy to file the appeal against the order of  the  Competent Authority  and merely resorted by criminal proceedings which were not  permissible  in law. There was no delay in informing the plaintiffs  that  the
\nagreement  to sell could not be given effect to and the defendant  informed the  plaintiffs  that  the same stood revoked and refunded  the  amount  of Rs.5,000\/-  by  means  of cheque which was, however, not  encashed  by  the plaintiffs.  The  time period which elapsed between the  execution  of  the agreement  and revocation of the same by the defendant is not that much  as to  cause  any mala fide aspersions to the conduct of  the  defendant.  The circumstances  will not, therefore, call for an order of specific  perform-\n<\/p>\n
ance in favour of the plaintiffs and they are not entitled to any relief in this suit. Issues 4, 5, 6 and 7 are decided accordingly.\n<\/p>\n
 23.  In view of the above, the present suit is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Delhi High Court Ravi Sood And Another vs Vir Bala Sharma on 26 November, 1997 Equivalent citations: 1998 IAD Delhi 533, 71 (1998) DLT 254, 1998 (44) DRJ 361 Author: C Nayar Bench: C Nayar ORDER C.M. Nayar, J. 1. The present suit has been filed by the plaintiffs for specific performance of agreement to […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14,8],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-89565","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-delhi-high-court","category-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nRavi Sood And Another vs Vir Bala Sharma on 26 November, 1997 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Ravi Sood And Another vs Vir Bala Sharma on 26 November, 1997 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1997-11-25T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2017-01-07T16:16:24+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"61 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Ravi Sood And Another vs Vir Bala Sharma on 26 November, 1997\",\"datePublished\":\"1997-11-25T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2017-01-07T16:16:24+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997\"},\"wordCount\":12081,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Delhi High Court\",\"High Court\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997\",\"name\":\"Ravi Sood And Another vs Vir Bala Sharma on 26 November, 1997 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1997-11-25T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2017-01-07T16:16:24+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Ravi Sood And Another vs Vir Bala Sharma on 26 November, 1997\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Ravi Sood And Another vs Vir Bala Sharma on 26 November, 1997 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Ravi Sood And Another vs Vir Bala Sharma on 26 November, 1997 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1997-11-25T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2017-01-07T16:16:24+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"61 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Ravi Sood And Another vs Vir Bala Sharma on 26 November, 1997","datePublished":"1997-11-25T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2017-01-07T16:16:24+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997"},"wordCount":12081,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Delhi High Court","High Court"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997","name":"Ravi Sood And Another vs Vir Bala Sharma on 26 November, 1997 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1997-11-25T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2017-01-07T16:16:24+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ravi-sood-and-another-vs-vir-bala-sharma-on-26-november-1997#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Ravi Sood And Another vs Vir Bala Sharma on 26 November, 1997"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/89565","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=89565"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/89565\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=89565"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=89565"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=89565"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}