{"id":93305,"date":"2010-10-14T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2010-10-13T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/mariyam-akhter-anr-vs-wazir-mohd-on-14-october-2010"},"modified":"2016-01-02T21:47:55","modified_gmt":"2016-01-02T16:17:55","slug":"mariyam-akhter-anr-vs-wazir-mohd-on-14-october-2010","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/mariyam-akhter-anr-vs-wazir-mohd-on-14-october-2010","title":{"rendered":"Mariyam Akhter &amp; Anr vs Wazir Mohd on 14 October, 2010"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"docsource_main\">Jammu High Court<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_title\">Mariyam Akhter &amp; Anr vs Wazir Mohd on 14 October, 2010<\/div>\n<pre>       \n\n  \n\n  \n\n \n\n \n \n HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AT JAMMU.            \nCr Rev No. 51 OF 2005 AND Cr M P No. 15 OF 2005    \nMariyam Akhter &amp; anr \nPetitioners\nWazir Mohd  \nRespondent  \n!Mr. Nirmal Kotwal, Advocate\n^Mr. S. S. Ahmed, Advocate \n\nHonble Mr. Justice Dr. Aftab H. Saikia, Chief Justice\nDate: 14.10.2010 \n:J U D G M E N T :\n<\/pre>\n<p>Introduction:\n<\/p>\n<p>Before delving upon to resolve the issue raised in the instant revision petition, it is<br \/>\nconsidered that the judgment will be benefited if the status of Muslim women, vis-<br \/>\n`-vis, the scope and effect of valid divorce as mandated under the Mohammadan<br \/>\nlaw is highlighted. The same is, accordingly, discussed hereinunder.\n<\/p>\n<p>During the early period of Islam, Muslim women were held in high esteem and they<br \/>\noccupied exalted positions and in the days of Holy Prophet Mohammad, a Muslim<br \/>\nwoman was given in the society a position of equality with the opposite gender.<br \/>\nEqual treatments were meted out to the women. The ladies of the family of the<br \/>\nProphet were noted for their learning, their virtue, courage and their strength of<br \/>\ncharacter. (See S.A.Kaders Muslim Law of Marriage and Succession in India, p.<br \/>\n80-81)<\/p>\n<p> Even, in the terms of modern concept of giving gender justice, which is essential,<br \/>\nintegral and inseparable part of human rights, women, who form one half of the<br \/>\nhuman race, have every right to claim equality before law and equal protection of<br \/>\nlaws as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.\n<\/p>\n<p>Therefore, when women have the right to marry, they have also the right to be<br \/>\nmaintained by their husbands. This right  has been emphasized in Article 6(1) of<br \/>\nUniversal Declaration of Human Rights adopted and proclaimed by the General<br \/>\nAssembly of the United Nations on 10th December 1948 declares thus:-<br \/>\nMen and women, of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or<br \/>\nreligion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal<br \/>\nrights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.<\/p>\n<p>5.      The Verse 35 Sura Al-Ahzab (35) of the Holy Quran would clearly show that<br \/>\nhow the women were treated as equals with men. The Verse 35 reads thus-\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>                For Muslim men and women,<br \/>\n                For believing men and women,<br \/>\n                For devout men and women,<br \/>\n                For true men and women,<br \/>\n                For men and women who are<br \/>\n                Patient and constant, for men<br \/>\n                And women who humble themselves,<br \/>\n                For men and women who give<br \/>\n                In charity, for men and women<br \/>\n                Who fast<br \/>\n                For men and women who<br \/>\n                Guard their chastity, and<br \/>\n                For men and women who<br \/>\n                Engage much in Allahs remembrance<br \/>\n                For them has Allah prepared<br \/>\n                Forgiveness and great reward.<\/p>\n<p>However, in post-Islamic period, it is seen that the degradation and degeneration set<br \/>\nin, in the status of women. In male-dominated world,  Muslim women were pushed<br \/>\nto the whims and fancies  of the men- folk and this is reflected  primarily in the case<br \/>\nof dissolution of marriage, i.e., divorce, which is known as Talaq in Arabic<br \/>\nmeaning. The doctrine of talaq-ul-bidet (triple talaq-one form of talaq) was evolved<br \/>\nas a convenient divorce to dissolve the marriage at the will and whims of the<br \/>\nMuslim husband.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>None the less, it is incumbent on the part of Muslim husband to maintain his wife so<br \/>\nlong as she is loyal and faithful to him and obeys his reasonable orders. But once<br \/>\nshe is divorced, she is entitled to maintenance as per law being in force in India, i.e.,<br \/>\nMuslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.\n<\/p>\n<p>In the above background, it is to be considered that under what circumstances a<br \/>\nMuslim married woman can be divorced and what are the essential conditions for<br \/>\ncausing divorce and procedure to be followed to effect a valid divorce.\n<\/p>\n<p>The instant revision petition witnesses the deliberation of these fundamental issues<br \/>\npertaining to the validity of the pronouncement of the divorce to a Muslim woman,<br \/>\nvis-`-vis, her entitlement to maintenance, as married woman. Maintenance<br \/>\nincludes food, raiment and lodging (Mulla-Mohammedan Law, para-369)  <\/p>\n<p>Factual Matrix in brief outlined:\n<\/p>\n<p>The petitioner herein was married to the respondent on 12.5.1991 and the marriage<br \/>\nbetween them was solemnized according to Muslim rites (Sharah Mohmdi) at Incha<br \/>\nMohra Kula Tehsil Ramnagar. After marriage, both of them lived like husband and<br \/>\nwife at the respondents residence. As  luck would have it, the petitioners marriage<br \/>\nlife experienced turbulence. She was meted out ill-treatment by the respondent. The<br \/>\nrespondent used to beat her and made false allegations of unchastity on her.\n<\/p>\n<p>Eventually, she was driven out of her husbands house five and half months after<br \/>\nthe marriage and, on the relevant time, she was pregnant. The respondent also<br \/>\nsnatched her ornaments and clothes and did not care to look after her till date and<br \/>\nshe was compelled to stay at her parental house, since she was turned out from her<br \/>\nmatrimonial house.\n<\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile, she had born the respondent a female child. Even after the birth of their<br \/>\ndaughter, the respondent refused to pay any maintenance either to the petitioner or<br \/>\nto her baby child.\n<\/p>\n<p>Finding no other alternative, the petitioner initiated proceeding under Section 488<br \/>\nof the Code of Criminal Procedure Svt. 1989 (for short Cr. P. C) for granting<br \/>\nmaintenance allowance of Rs. 1000\/-  per month to her and Rs. 500\/- per month to<br \/>\nher daughter against the respondent-husband before the Court of Sub-Judge(Judicial<br \/>\nMagistrate Ist Class), Ramnagar.\n<\/p>\n<p>It is on record that on 22.6.1994, the respondent, on being noticed, appeared before<br \/>\nthe Court and granted opportunities to file objections from 22.6.1994 to 24.9.1994.\n<\/p>\n<p>On 17.10.1994, being an adjourned date, neither the respondent nor his engaged<br \/>\ncounsel appeared in the Court and their absence resulted in ex-parte proceedings<br \/>\nagainst the respondent.\n<\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile, the respondent moved a revision petition before this High Court for<br \/>\ntransfer of the present petition, but the same was dismissed by the High Court on<br \/>\n6.5.1995 with a direction to the Court of Sub-Judge (Judicial Magistrate Ist Class),<br \/>\nRamnagar to decide the claim of the petitioner within a period of three months,<br \/>\ndirecting the parties to appear before the Court on 29.5.1995.\n<\/p>\n<p>But on 29.5.1995 also, neither the respondent nor his counsel appeared before the<br \/>\nCourt despite directions given by the High Court and, ultimately, the matter was<br \/>\nfixed on 2.6.1995, on which date also the respondent preferred not to appear in<br \/>\nperson or through counsel.\n<\/p>\n<p>Finally, the matter was heard on 24.6.1995 and after having considered the evidence<br \/>\nand arguments on behalf of the petitioner, maintenance allowance of Rs. 350\/- per<br \/>\nmonth and Rs. 250\/- per month were granted to the petitioner as well as petitioner<br \/>\nno. 2, daughter of the petitioner respectively.\n<\/p>\n<p>Being dis-satisfied with the granting of such maintenance, respondent-husband<br \/>\nmoved the Court of Sessions, Judge, Udhampur by filing a revision petition being<br \/>\nno. 3\/1996, which was dismissed by the learned Judge by his order dated<br \/>\n19.12.1997.\n<\/p>\n<p>It is pertinent to mention herein that meanwhile, the respondent has contracted<br \/>\nsecond marriage and has been living with his second wife and a daughter has been<br \/>\nborn to his second wife from him.\n<\/p>\n<p>Be it also noted herein that the respondent, on 8.8.1995, made an application before<br \/>\nthe Magistrate for setting aside the ex-parte order of maintenance granted by order<br \/>\ndated 24.6.1995 in file no. 17\/Misc of 1995. The application for setting aside the<br \/>\nex-parte order  of maintenance is extracted below:\n<\/p>\n<p>The respondent applicant most respectfully submits this application as under:-<br \/>\nThat the above titled proceedings were pending in this court against the applicant<br \/>\nrespondent for maintenance.\n<\/p>\n<p>That the applicant had filed a Criminal Transfer application No. 66 of 1994 in the<br \/>\nHigh Court to transfer the said proceedings to any court at Jammu because the<br \/>\napplicant respondent apprehended harm at the hands of the relatives of the<br \/>\npetitioner in this above titled maintenance application.<br \/>\nThat the Criminal Transfer application of the applicant respondent was dismissed<br \/>\nby the Honble Court on 6th May, 1995. The applicant was not personally present in<br \/>\nthe Honble High Court when the order was made. A photo copy of the order is<br \/>\nfiled and marked Annexure-1.\n<\/p>\n<p>That the applicant received information by post from the advocate vide his letter<br \/>\ndated 16th June, 1995 photo copy whereof isw filed and marked Annexure-2.<br \/>\nThat therefore the applicant did not know that the applicant had to appear in this<br \/>\ncourt on 29th of May, 1995 and was, therefore, not present on that day in this court.<br \/>\nThat it appears that the advocate of the applicant did not take steps to inform the<br \/>\napplicant respondent in the above proceedings because his clerk was absent and he<br \/>\nwas busy. In any case, for the negligence of the advocate,  the applicant should not<br \/>\nsuffer because the applicant had properly instructed and engaged the said advocate.<br \/>\nThat the absence of the applicant respondent  was, therefore, for the reasons beyond<br \/>\nthe control of the applicant respondent who all along remained under the impression<br \/>\nthat the transfer matter is still pending in the High Court. The absence of the<br \/>\napplicant  respondent was, therefore,  not deliberate and the applicant had,<br \/>\ntherefore, not been absent wilfully or deliberately.\n<\/p>\n<p>That, however, it appears that the exparte proceedings were ordered against the<br \/>\napplicant herein on 2nd June, 1995 and exparte order directing the payment of<br \/>\nmaintenance was made on 24th of June, 1995.\n<\/p>\n<p>That the applicant Marriyam Akhtar in the absence of the applicant respondent<br \/>\nconcealed the fact that she had been divorced vide divorce deed dated 18.5.1992. A<br \/>\nlegible copy of the divorce deed is also filed herewith for ready reference.<br \/>\nThat in this court Shri Sudesh Kumar Advocate represented the applicant<br \/>\nrespondent. However, it appears that no notice was sent to him by this court after<br \/>\nthe file was received from the Honble Court.\n<\/p>\n<p>That all the proceedings under Sec. 488 Cr. P. C had to be conducted in the<br \/>\npresence of respondent. However, in this case the respondent has been proceeded<br \/>\nagainst exparte and as stated above the absence was neither wilful nor deliberate.\n<\/p>\n<p>An affidavit duly sworn in is enclosed herewith in support of this application.\n<\/p>\n<p>                                        IN THE PREMISES<br \/>\nIt is most respectfully prayed that your honour may be pleased to allow this<br \/>\napplication and to set aside the exparte order dated 24.6.95 and to afford the<br \/>\napplicant an opportunity  to appear and contest the application of the petitioner<br \/>\nreferred above.\n<\/p>\n<p>                                                Sd\/-\n<\/p>\n<p>                                        Applicant-respondent<br \/>\n                                              through counsel<br \/>\n                                  Dated 1.8.1995.<\/p>\n<p>Having failed to get any relief against the order of granting of maintenance<br \/>\nallowance, the respondent preferred an application under Section 489 of the Cr. P.<br \/>\nC being file no. 19-A\/Misc before the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Ramnagar for<br \/>\ncancellation  of the Courts order  dated 24.6.1995, which awarded monthly<br \/>\nmaintenance allowance to the petitioner and her child,  claiming that she was not<br \/>\nentitled for any maintenance  for the reasons that:\n<\/p>\n<p>the respondent  divorced the petitioner through written divorce executed on<br \/>\n18.5.1992, which was duly  communicated to her through registered post;<br \/>\nsuch divorce was admitted by the petitioner by executing an agreement on 4.1.1993;<br \/>\nand<br \/>\nthe petitioner admitted voluntarily to be divorcee while making a statement before<br \/>\nthe Tehsildar, Ramnagar in a proceeding for seeking Residents of Backward Area<br \/>\nCertificate for her.\n<\/p>\n<p>The learned Magistrate by order dated 22.2.2002, having considered  the statements<br \/>\nmade in the application as well as upon hearing the parties, found that the petitioner<br \/>\nwas divorced on 8.8.1995 or on 18.5.1992 as stated in para 9 of the application for<br \/>\nseeking to set aside the exparte order dated 24.6.1995, as quoted herein above at<br \/>\nparagraph 22 of the judgement and the Ruling that  the respondent-husband had<br \/>\nunfettered power of divorce and, accordingly, it was held that the petitioner, being<br \/>\nthe divorcee wife, should have no claim to maintenance after 8.8.1995. However,<br \/>\naccording to Court, the child would continue to get the maintenance, as awarded.\n<\/p>\n<p>The order dated 22.2.2002 was carried to the High Court by the petitioner in Cr.<br \/>\nRev. no. 27\/2002. This Court vide order dated 10.12.2002 refraining itself from<br \/>\nrendering any decision as to whether there was a valid divorce against the<br \/>\npetitioner, only dealt with the quantum of maintenance and modified the<br \/>\nmaintenance allowance  granted under order dated 22.2.2002 holding that the<br \/>\ndaughter  would be held entitled to interim maintenance at the rate of Rs. 1000\/- per<br \/>\nmonth to the exclusion of the petitioner. It was further held as under:-<br \/>\nAs to whether  valid divorce or not, parties are left free to put this aspect<br \/>\nbefore the Court below. This issue would be settled and the parties can lead<br \/>\nevidence. Parties  would appear before the trial Court on 24th of January, 2003.<br \/>\nFurther maintenance would depend on the final verdict of the Court.<\/p>\n<p>With the above directions, this Court remitted the matter back to the Court below.\n<\/p>\n<p>The learned Magistrate on receipt of the order of the High Court and in compliance<br \/>\nof the directions to resolve the issue of divorce between the parties, proceeded to<br \/>\ndecide the application  and examined three witnesses adduced by the petitioner-<br \/>\nwife, when  two witnesses were examined  for the respondent-husband.<br \/>\nHaving appreciated the evidence so recorded and also  upon hearing the learned<br \/>\ncounsel for the parties,  learned Magistrate came to the conclusion  that the<br \/>\nrespondent-husband divorced his wife\/ the petitioner  in accordance  with the<br \/>\nMohammadan Law, and, as such,  the petitioner is not entitled to claim maintenance<br \/>\nfrom the respondent being the divorcee wife. Accordingly, the application under<br \/>\nSection 489 Cr. P. C was disposed of, maintaining the modified order passed by the<br \/>\nHigh Court on 10.12.2002, as regard the maintenance allowance to petitioner no. 2,<br \/>\ntheir daughter<\/p>\n<p>(C)     Order under challenge:\n<\/p>\n<p>Order dated 26.2.2005, as mentioned above, has been assailed by the petitioner<br \/>\npleading that:\n<\/p>\n<p>There is no valid divorce ever pronounced by the respondent against her;<br \/>\nThe procedure  of divorce, i.e., Talaq has not been strictly followed; and<br \/>\nPetitioner, being continued to be wife, is entitled to get the maintenance.\n<\/p>\n<p>In consideration of the above, it is the case of the petitioner that the impugned order<br \/>\nis liable to be set aside and quashed.\n<\/p>\n<p>(D) Arguments Against the impugned order:\n<\/p>\n<p>Mr. Nirmal Kotwal, learned counsel representing the wife-petitioner has<br \/>\nvehemently contended that the learned Magistrate committed error both in law and<br \/>\non facts in entertaining the application under Section 489 Cr. P. C. itself and<br \/>\nthereby disentitling the petitioner from getting maintenance. According to him, such<br \/>\nfinding was legally incorrect, based on no evidence, and against the basic principles<br \/>\nof Muslim law.\n<\/p>\n<p>Rejecting the divorce, at the very outset, the learned counsel has submitted that no<br \/>\ndivorce was ever pronounced by the respondent to the petitioner at any point of<br \/>\ntime. The divorce deed dated 18.5.1992 produced by the respondent and relied by<br \/>\nthe Magistrate was never received by the petitioner and the same has already been<br \/>\ndisputed and rejected by her. The finding of the learned Magistrate to the effect that<br \/>\nthe divorce was pronounced by the husband   much earlier  before the maintenance<br \/>\nproceedings, i.e., the divorce was pronounced on 18.5.1992 and  the petition for<br \/>\nmaintenance was instituted on 4.11.1992, i.e., after six months, cannot be legally<br \/>\naccepted, for the simple reason that it is on the record that after institution of<br \/>\npetition for maintenance on 4.11.1992, due notices were sent to the respondent and<br \/>\nhe, for the reasons best known to him, neither appeared  nor filed any written<br \/>\nstatement through which he could have informed the court the factum of divorce<br \/>\nagainst his wife. Instead, he preferred an application before the Honble High Court<br \/>\nfor transfer of the case from Ramnagar to Jammu in Cr. Revision no. 63\/1994 on<br \/>\nthe ground that it was not convenient for him to go to Ramnagar and faced a threat<br \/>\nto his life from his wife\/ the petitioner and the said application was rejected by the<br \/>\nHigh Court by order dated 6.5.1995. Conveniently the respondent did no mention or<br \/>\ndivorce caused on 18.5.1992 in the said application so as to bring it to the<br \/>\nknowledge of the petitioner.\n<\/p>\n<p>The submissions of the learned counsel is that the respondent having got ample<br \/>\nopportunities to file written statement, neither he appeared before the Court  nor did<br \/>\nhe file the written statement.\n<\/p>\n<p>It is further contended that  reliance on the cutting of the daily English newspaper<br \/>\nKashmir Times as a proof of factum of divorce and its knowledge to the petitioner<br \/>\nby the court below is not tenable under law. The petitioner, being a lady from<br \/>\nRamnagar, did not have any knowledge about such paper publication not being<br \/>\nprominently exhibited in the concerned newspaper which was not in wide<br \/>\ncirculation in the area where the petitioner did reside and the same is clearly evident<br \/>\nfrom such publication itself. In a case of divorce, of present nature, such publication<br \/>\nis not acceptable under the law.\n<\/p>\n<p>As regards the finding of the learned Magistrate pertaining  to the admission made<br \/>\nbefore the Tehsildar, Ramnagar by the petitioner on her  divorce, it is contended<br \/>\nthat  said admission  is valid in law because the same was not made in any<br \/>\nproceedings in the Court of law and was not to be put any cross-examination. Even<br \/>\nthe Tehsildar, before whom such statement was made, was not examined by the<br \/>\nrespondent to prove the said factum.  According to the learned counsel this is not<br \/>\nacceptable under the law of evidence.  Mere making of such statement before a<br \/>\nTehsildar  in a matter of  seeking Residence of Backward Area Certificate  will not<br \/>\ngo to show that the petitioner was a divorcee and thereby   to make her<br \/>\ndisentitlement from getting maintenance.\n<\/p>\n<p>The last contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner  is that the alleged divorce<br \/>\nwas not pronounced in terms of the provisions of Muslim law based on Quranic<br \/>\ninjunction and, as such, the instant divorce, genuineness of which has been strongly<br \/>\nobjected and refuted by the petitioner, is not a divorce in the eye of law.<br \/>\nIn order to bolster up his submission, Mr. Kotwal has relied  on the following<br \/>\njudicial authorities of the Supreme Court and of this Court:-<br \/>\n<a href=\"\/doc\/332673\/\">Shamim Ara v. State of U. P. and<\/a> anr (AIR 2002 SC 3551);\n<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"\/doc\/1637760\/\">Manzoor Ahmad Khan v. Mst. Saja and<\/a> ors (2003 (II) SLJ 619); and<br \/>\n<a href=\"\/doc\/332870\/\">Mst. Amina Banoo v. Abdul Majid Ganai<\/a> (2005 (I) SLJ 341).\n<\/p>\n<p>(E)   Submission and contention in support of the   impugned judgment:\n<\/p>\n<p>supporting of the impugned judgment, Mr. S. S. Ahmed, learned counsel for the<br \/>\nrespondent has forcefully argued that under the Muslim Law, right of pronouncing<br \/>\ndivorce has been absolutely bestowed upon the husband who can only pronounce<br \/>\nthe Talaq in any form as Mohammadan law does not prescribe any particular form<br \/>\nfor causing divorce. A divorce can be effected either by orally by spoken word or<br \/>\nby written document. In the instant case, the petitioner was divorced by written<br \/>\ndivorce deed on 18.5.1992, six months  before the initiation of the maintenance<br \/>\nproceedings  by the petitioner on 4.11.1992. Even thereafter also, divorce was<br \/>\neffected by an agreement executed by both the parties on 4.1.1993 and the<br \/>\npetitioner was very much aware of both the written documents, more particularly<br \/>\nagreement of 4.1.1993, where she was a party.\n<\/p>\n<p>His further contention is that assuming, divorce was not effected by those above<br \/>\nmentioned documents, it is the petitioner, who herself admitted about her divorce<br \/>\nby making a statement in file no. 143\/NB dated 28.7.1995, wherein her statement<br \/>\nwas recorded on 21.12.1997 by the Tehsildar, Ramnagar, before whom she sought<br \/>\nfor a Residence of Backward Area certificate, to the effect that she was a divorcee.<br \/>\nHer this statement itself was sufficient to prove that the petitioner was divorced by<br \/>\nthe respondent.\n<\/p>\n<p>To substantiate his submission, he has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in a<br \/>\ncase of <a href=\"\/doc\/936101\/\">Thiru John v. The Returning Officer and<\/a> ors, reported  as AIR 1977 SC<br \/>\n1724, wherein in paragraph 15,  it was held that it was well settled that a party s<br \/>\nadmission as defined in Sections 17 to 20 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (the Act)<br \/>\nfulfilling the requirements of Section 21, of the Act, was substantive evidence<br \/>\nproprio vigore. An admission, if clearly and unequivocally made was the best<br \/>\nevidence against the party making it and though not conclusive, shifted the onus on<br \/>\nto the maker on the principle that what a party himself admits to be true may<br \/>\nreasonably be presumed to be so and until the fact admitted was rebutted the fact<br \/>\nadmitted must be taken to be established.\n<\/p>\n<p>(F)     Issues to be decided:\n<\/p>\n<p>39.     Having heard learned counsel for the parties  at length as well as on<br \/>\nthorough  scrutiny of the factual situation emerged from the arguments advanced on<br \/>\nbehalf of the parties, the basic questions that have arisen for resolution in this case,<br \/>\nare:\n<\/p>\n<p>Whether there had been a divorced duly effected under the Mohammadan law<br \/>\nagainst the petitioner.\n<\/p>\n<p>Whether the divorce was proved.\n<\/p>\n<p>(G)     Tenets of  Mohammadan Law on Divorce:\n<\/p>\n<p>40.     According to Mulla in his Principles of Mohammadan law (19th Edition)  By<br \/>\nM. Hidayatullah and Arshad Hidayatullah, the contract of marriage under<br \/>\nMohammadan law may be dissolved  in any one of the following ways : (1) by the<br \/>\nhusband  at his will, without the intervention of a Court; (2) by mutual consent of<br \/>\nthe husband and wife, without the intervention of a Court; (3) by a judicial decree at<br \/>\nthe suit of the husband or wife. However, the wife cannot divorce herself from her<br \/>\nhusband without his consent, except under a contract whether made before or after<br \/>\nmarriage, but she may, in some cases, obtain a divorce by judicial decree( Section<br \/>\n307 page 258).\n<\/p>\n<p>41.     When the divorce proceeds from the husband, it is called  talak; when it is<br \/>\neffected by mutual consent, it is called khula or mubaraat, according to the terms of<br \/>\nthe contract between the parties.{ (Mullas Principles of Mohammadan Law<br \/>\n(supra) (Section 307)  By M. Hidayatullah and Arshad Hidayatullah at page 258)}.\n<\/p>\n<p>42.     A talak may be effected (1) Orally (by spoken words) or (2) by a written<br \/>\ndocument called a talaknama. So far  oral talak is concerned, no particular form of<br \/>\nwords is prescribed for effecting a talak. If the words are express (saheeh) or well<br \/>\nunderstood as implying  divorce, no proof of intention is required. If words are<br \/>\nambiguous (kinayat), the intention must be proved. It is not necessary that talak<br \/>\nshould be pronounced in presence of the wife or even addressed to her.\n<\/p>\n<p>43.     As regards talak in writing, talak can be effected by a written document<br \/>\ncalled talaknama. It is required that such type of deed may be executed in presence<br \/>\nof the kazi or of the wifes father or of the other witnesses. The deed is said to be in<br \/>\nthe customary form if it is properly superscribed and addressed so as to show the<br \/>\nname of the writer and the person addressed. If it is in customary form it is called<br \/>\nmanifest provided that it can be easily read and comprehended.  If the deed is in<br \/>\ncustomary form and manifest the intention to divorce is presumed. Otherwise, the<br \/>\nintention to divorce must be proved. {Mullas Principles of Mohammadan Law<br \/>\n(supra) (Section 310 page 259)}.\n<\/p>\n<p>44.     There are two kinds of talaq as recognized under HanafIs Mohammedan<br \/>\nLaw namely; (i) Talaq-us-sunnat and (ii) Talaq-ul-bidat or (iii) Talaq-ul-badai.<br \/>\nTalaq-us-sunnat is effected in accordance with the rules laid down in the traditions,<br \/>\ni.e., Prophet Sunnat  headed down by him or by his principle disciples. On the other<br \/>\nhand, the talaq-ul-bidat is heretical or irregular  mode of divorce which was<br \/>\nintroduced in 2nd Century of Mohammedan era. In this kind of talaq, as a matter of<br \/>\nfact, there is capricious  and irregular power of divorce ,which was, in the<br \/>\nbeginning, left  to the husband, was strongly disapproved by the Prophet.\n<\/p>\n<p>45.     Talaq-us-sunnat is either Talaq Ashan or Talaq Hasan. The mode of giving<br \/>\nthis talaq may be discussed as under:-\n<\/p>\n<p>(1) Talak ashan, which consists of a single pronouncement of divoce made during a<br \/>\ntuhr (period between menstruations) followed by abstinence from sexual<br \/>\nintercourse for the period of iddat.\n<\/p>\n<p>(2). Talak hasan that  consists of  three pronouncements made during successive<br \/>\ntuhrs, no intercourse taking place during any of the three tuhrs. And<\/p>\n<p>(3)  Talak-ul bidaat or talak-i-badai  which consists of  three pronouncements made<br \/>\nduring a single tuhr either in one sentence, e.g.,  I divorce thee thrice, &#8211; or in a<br \/>\nseparate sentences, e.g.,  I divorce thee, I divorce thee, I divorce thee.\n<\/p>\n<p>  The above proposition of law as regards divorce  or talaq primarily emerged  from<br \/>\nthe text of Holy Quran, which is the primary source of  Muslim law on the<br \/>\nrelationship between the husband and the wife as well as pronouncement of divorce<br \/>\nby the husband against the wife.\n<\/p>\n<p> The mode and procedure to effect a valid divorce has been mandated in the Holy<br \/>\nQuran. The Holy Quran ordains in clear and  un-equivocal terms for re-conciliation<br \/>\nto effect a valid divorce in Sura Nisa (4). In this regard Verses Nos. 128 to 130,<br \/>\nbeing relevant, may be quoted as under:-\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>                128.  If a wife fears<br \/>\n                         Cruelty or desertion<br \/>\n                         On her husbands part,<br \/>\n                         There is no blame on them<br \/>\n                         If they arrange<br \/>\n An amicable settlement<br \/>\n                         Between themselves;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>                         And such settlement is based;<br \/>\n                         Even though mens souls<br \/>\n                         Are swayed by greed.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>                         But if ye do good<br \/>\n                         And practice self-restraint,<br \/>\n                         Allah is well-acquainted<br \/>\n                         With all that ye do.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>129.   Ye are never able<br \/>\n         To do justice<br \/>\n         Between wives<br \/>\n         Even if it is<br \/>\n         Your ardent desire;\n<\/p>\n<p>         But turn not away<br \/>\n         (From a woman) altogether,<br \/>\n         So as to leave her<br \/>\n(as it were)<br \/>\n         Hanging (in the air).\n<\/p>\n<p>         If ye come to a friendly<br \/>\n         Understanding, and practice<br \/>\n         Self-restraint, Allah is<br \/>\n         Oft-forgiving,<br \/>\n Most merciful.\n<\/p>\n<p> But if they separate<br \/>\n Allah will provide abundance<br \/>\n For each of them from His<br \/>\n All-reaching pounty;\n<\/p>\n<p> For Allah is He<br \/>\n That careth for all<br \/>\n And is wise.\n<\/p>\n<p>(see the Holy Quran English Translation  of the<br \/>\nMeaning and the Commentary (Revised and Edited) by<br \/>\nthe Presidency of Islamic Researchers, IFTA, Mushaf Al-Madinah).<\/p>\n<p>48.     Even recognition of the institution of marriage is manifest from the Quranic<br \/>\nVerses in Sura Nisa (4). In Verse No. 1 wherein, it is mandated as under:\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>                          1.   O mankind ! fear<br \/>\n                                Your Guardian Lord,<br \/>\n                                 Who created you<br \/>\n From a single Person,<br \/>\n                         Created, out of it,<br \/>\n                         His mate, and from them twain<br \/>\n                         Scattered (like seeds)<br \/>\n                         Countless men and women;-<br \/>\n                         Fear Allah, through Whom<br \/>\n                         Ye demand your mutual (rights),<br \/>\n                         And be heedful of the wombs<br \/>\n                         (That bore you): for Allah<br \/>\n                         Ever watches over you.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>               {see the Holy Quran (Supra)}.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>49.     The learned Commentator Yousuf Ali in his Book Translation and<br \/>\nCommentary  of Holy Quran at note 254 page 90, commenting on the subject of<br \/>\ntalaq has observed;-\n<\/p>\n<p>Islam tried to maintain the married state as far as possible. Especially where<br \/>\nchildren are concerned, but it is against the restriction of the liberty of men and<br \/>\nwomen in such vitally important matters  as love and family life.  It will check hasty<br \/>\naction as far as possible and leave the door to reconciliation open at many stages.<br \/>\nEven after divorce a suggestion of reconciliation is made, subject to certain<br \/>\nprecautions against thoughtless action. A period of waiting (iddet) for three<br \/>\nmonthly courses is prescribed in order to see if the marriage conditionally dissolved<br \/>\nis likely to result in issue. But this is not necessary where the divorced woman is<br \/>\nvirgin: it is definitely declared that woman and man shall have similar rights<br \/>\nagainst each other.\n<\/p>\n<p>        Yousuf Ali (Supra at note 256 page 90) has further observed:\n<\/p>\n<p>Where divorce for mutual incompatibility  is allowed, there is danger that the<br \/>\nparties might act hastly, then repent, and again wish to separate. To prevent such<br \/>\ncapricious action repeatedly, a limit is prescribed. Two divorce (with a<br \/>\nreconciliation between) are allowed after that the parties must unitedly make up<br \/>\ntheir minds , either to dissolve their union permanently or to leave  honourable lives<br \/>\ntogether in mutual love and forbearance to hold together or equitable terms,<br \/>\nneither  party worrying the order nor grumbling nor evading the duties and<br \/>\nresponsibilities of marriage.<\/p>\n<p>        Yousuf Ali  proceeds:\n<\/p>\n<p>        All the prohibitions and limits prescribed here are in the interest of good<br \/>\nand honourable lives for both sides, and in the interest s of a clean and honourable<br \/>\nsocial life without public or private scandals..<\/p>\n<p>50.     The Holy Quran lays down the procedure for effecting a           re-<br \/>\nconciliation. Verse No. 35 Sura Nisa (4) provides as under:-\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>        35.    If ye fear a breach<br \/>\n                Between them twain,<br \/>\n                        Appoint (two) arbiters,<br \/>\n                One from his family,<br \/>\n                And other from hers;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>                If they seek to set thighs aright,<br \/>\n                Allah will cause<br \/>\n                Their reconciliation:<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>                For Allah hath full knowledge,<br \/>\n                And is acquainted<br \/>\nWith all things.<\/p>\n<p>51.     In the above verses, the Holy Quran stipulated a condition precedent  to<br \/>\ndivorce. Yusuf Ali, the great Jurist and Commentator (Supra) at Note 549 page 191,<br \/>\nobserved  about the above those verses as follows:\n<\/p>\n<p>An excellent plan for settling family disputes, without too much publicity or mud-<br \/>\nthrowing, or resort to the chicaneries  of the law. The Latin countries recognize this<br \/>\nplan in their legal system. It is a pity that Muslim do not resort to it universally, as<br \/>\nthey should. The arbiters from each family would know the idiosyncraeies  of both<br \/>\nparties, and would be able, with Gods help, effect a real reconciliation.<\/p>\n<p>Maulana Mohammad Ali in his book Religion  of Islam at page 671 commented<br \/>\nthat:\n<\/p>\n<p>This verse lays down the procedure to be adopted when a case for divorce arises. It<br \/>\nis not for the husband to put away his wife; it is the business of the judge to decide<br \/>\nthe case. Nor should the divorce case be made too public. The Judge is required to<br \/>\nappoint two arbitrators, one belong to the wifes family and the other to the<br \/>\nhusbands. These two arbitrators will find out the facts but their objective must be<br \/>\nto effect a reconciliation between the parties. If all hopes of reconciliation fail a<br \/>\ndivorce is allowed. But the final decision rests with the judge who is legally entitled<br \/>\nto pronounce a divorce. Cases were decided in accordance with the directions<br \/>\ncontained in this verse in the early days of Islam.<\/p>\n<p>53.     Commenting further on these verses, Maulana Mohammad Ali (Supra)<br \/>\nobserved:\n<\/p>\n<p>From what has been said above, it is clear that not only must there be a good cause<br \/>\nfor divorce, but that all means to effect reconciliation must have been exhausted<br \/>\nbefore resort is had to this extreme measure. The impression that a Muslim husband<br \/>\nmay put away his wife at his mere caprice, is a grave distortion of the Islamic<br \/>\ninstitution of divorce.<\/p>\n<p>Keeping in view these teachings of the Holy Quran, the Prophet declared divorce to<br \/>\nbe a most hateful of all things permitted. The mentality of the Muslim is to face<br \/>\ndifficulties of the married life along with its comforts and to avoid disturbing the<br \/>\ndisruption of the family relations as long as possible, turning to divorce only as a<br \/>\nlast resort.\n<\/p>\n<p>A close perusal of our Quranic verses as quoted above and commentaries thereon<br \/>\nby well recognised scholars of great eminence would come to indicate that no<br \/>\ndivorce is duly effected if it is in violation of injunction of Holy Quran. Ameer Ali<br \/>\nin his treaties on Mohammedan Law  observed :\n<\/p>\n<p>The Prophet pronounced talak to be a most destable thing before the Almighty<br \/>\nGod of all permitted things. If talak is given without  any reason it is stupidity and<br \/>\ningratitude to God.<\/p>\n<p>(I)      Judicial Interpretation:\n<\/p>\n<p>It is said that talaq is a sword which is brandished by the Muslim husband against<br \/>\nhis wife with whims and caprice. Even  judicial authorities gave in the past its nod<br \/>\nto  this concept of talaq to be exercised by the husband.\n<\/p>\n<p>In the case of Ahmad Kasim Mulla  v. Khatun Bibi, reported in ILR 59 Calcutta 833,<br \/>\nwhich has  so long been regarded as a leading case on the law of divorce, Justice<br \/>\nCostello held as under:-\n<\/p>\n<p>Upon that point (divorce), there are a number if authorities and I have carefully<br \/>\nconsidered this point as dealt with in the very early authorities to see whether I am<br \/>\nin agreement with the mere recent decisions of the Courts. I regret that I have to<br \/>\ncome to the conclusion that as the law stands at present, any Mohamedan may<br \/>\ndivorce his wife at his mere whim and caprice.<\/p>\n<p>In another case of  Sarabai v. Babiabai (ILR 30 Bombay 537),  while observing that<br \/>\ndivorce can be effected mere on whims, held:\n<\/p>\n<p>It is good in law, though bad in theology.\n<\/p>\n<p>59.     However, the whole approach  to Muslim divorce has started changing with<br \/>\nthe deeper study of the subject that discloses significantly realistic, rational and<br \/>\nmodern law divorce. Those are effectively reflected in the judicial decisions of the<br \/>\nrecent years.  The Kerala High Court speaking through Krishna Ayer, J (as the then)<br \/>\nin case of A. Yusuf Rawther v. Sawramma, reported in AIR 1971 Kerala 261, took a<br \/>\nrevolutionary view as regards divorce of Muslim women. In paragraphs 6 &amp; 7 it<br \/>\nwas held as under:-\n<\/p>\n<p>6. The interpretation of a legislation, obviously intended to protect a weaker<br \/>\nsection of the community, like women, must be informed by the social perspective<br \/>\nand purpose and, within its grammatical flexibility, must further the beneficent<br \/>\nobject. And so we must appreciate the Islamic ethos and the general sociological<br \/>\nbackground which inspired the enactment of the law before locating the precise<br \/>\nconnotation of the words used in the statute.\n<\/p>\n<p>        .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .       .\n<\/p>\n<p>Since infallibility is not an attribute of the judiciary, the view has been ventured by<br \/>\nMuslim jurists that the Indo-anglian judicial exposition of the Islamic law of<br \/>\ndivorce has not exactly been just to the Holy Prophet or the Holy Book. Marginal<br \/>\ndistortions are inevitable when the Judicial Committee in Downing Street has to<br \/>\ninterpret Manu and Muhammad of India and Arabia. The soul of a culture-law is<br \/>\nlargely the formalised and enforceable expression of a communitys cultural norms-<br \/>\ncannot be fully understood by alien minds. The view that the Muslim husband<br \/>\nenjoys an arbitrary, unilateral power to inflict instant divorce does not accord with<br \/>\nIslamic injunctionsIndeed, a deeper study of the subject discloses a<br \/>\nsurprisingly rational, realistic and modern law of divorce..It is a popular<br \/>\nfallacy that a Muslim male enjoys, under the Quaranic law, unbridled authority to<br \/>\nliquidate the marriage. the whole Quoran expressly forbids a man to seek pretexts<br \/>\nfor divorcing his wife, so long as she remains faithful and obedient to him, if they<br \/>\n(namely, women) obey you, then do not seek a way against them Quoran IV:<br \/>\n34..\n<\/p>\n<p>        Commentators on the Quoran have rightly observed and this tallies with the<br \/>\nlaw now administered    in some Muslim countries like Iraq _ that the<br \/>\n        husband must satisfy the Court about the        reasons for divorce. However,<br \/>\nMuslim law, as supplied in India, has taken a course contrary to the spirit of what<br \/>\nthe Prophet or the Holy Quoran laid down and the same misconception vitiates the<br \/>\nlaw dealing with the wives right to divorce<\/p>\n<p>        Quoting Dr. Galwash, the learned Judge opined :\n<\/p>\n<p>        Marriage being regarded as a civil contract and as such not indissoluble,<br \/>\nthe Islamic law naturally recognises the right in both the parties, to dissolve the<br \/>\ncontract under certain given circumstances. Divorce, then, is a natural corollary to<br \/>\nthe conception of marriage as a contract,.<br \/>\nIt is clear, then, that Islam discourages divorce in principle, and permits it only<br \/>\nwhen it has become altogether impossible for the parties, to live together in peace<br \/>\nand harmony. It avoids, therefore, greater evil by choosing the lesser one, and opens<br \/>\na way for the parties to seek agreeable companions and, thus, to accommodate<br \/>\nthemselves more comfortably in their new homes.<br \/>\nDr. Galwash, as observed by this Court, concluded that divorce is permissible in<br \/>\nIslam in cases of extreme emergency.. <\/p>\n<p>60.     The Gauhati High Court in a  case of Jiauddin Ahmed v. Mrs. Anwara<br \/>\nBegum, reported as (1981) 1 Gauhati Law Reports 358, authored by Bahorul Islam,<br \/>\nJ (the then),  following  A. Yusuf Rawthers case (Supra), categorically held that a<br \/>\ntalaq could not be exercised at a caprice and whim of the husband and an attempt of<br \/>\nreconciliation was  a condition precedent to divorce.\n<\/p>\n<p>61.     The ratio of Jiauddin Ahmeds case (supra) approved by  Division Bench of<br \/>\nGauhati High Court  in (1) Rukia Khatun v. Abdul Khalique Laskar, reported in<br \/>\n(1981) 1 GLR 375; (2)  <a href=\"\/doc\/188350\/\">Zeenat Fatima v. Mohd Iqbal Anwar,<\/a> reported in 1993 GLR<br \/>\nSupp 256.\n<\/p>\n<p>62.     The Supreme Court  in Shamim Aras case (supra)  following A. Yusuf<br \/>\nRawther case (supra) , Jiauddin Ahmed v. Anwara Begum (supra), Rukia Khatuns<br \/>\ncase (supra), and relying to observations made in <a href=\"\/doc\/359354\/\">Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussian (AIR<\/a><br \/>\n1979 SC 362) wherein the right of maintenance of  a Muslim divorcee was dealt,<br \/>\nwas in full agreement with the observations made on this judicial proceedings to the<br \/>\neffect that:\n<\/p>\n<p>Talak must be of reasonable cause ; and<br \/>\nThat must be proceeded by an attempt of reconciliation between the husband and<br \/>\nthe wife by two arbiters, one  chosen by the wife from her family and the other by<br \/>\nthe husband from his family.\n<\/p>\n<p>In paragraph 14, at page 3556 of Shamim Ara (Supra), the Apex Court  observed:<br \/>\nWe are in respectful agreement with the above said observations made by the<br \/>\nlearned Judges of High Court. We must note that the observations were made 20-30<br \/>\nyears before and out country has in recent times marched steps ahead in all walks of<br \/>\nlife including progressive interpretation of laws which cannot be lost sight of except<br \/>\nby compromising with regressive tends. What this Court observed in <a href=\"\/doc\/359354\/\">Bia Tahira v.<br \/>\nAli Hussain, AIR<\/a> 1979 SC 362 dealing with right to maintenance of a Muslim<br \/>\ndivorcee is noteworthy. To quote:\n<\/p>\n<p>The meaning of meanings is derived from values in a given society and its legal<br \/>\nsystem. Article 15(3) has compelling compassionate relevance in the context of S.<br \/>\n125 and the benefit of doubt, if any, in statutory interpretation belongs to the ill-<br \/>\nused wife and the derelict divorcee. This social perspective granted, the resolution<br \/>\nof all the disputes projected is easy. Surely, Parliament, in keeping with Art. 15(3)<br \/>\nand deliberate by design, made a special provision to help women in distress cast<br \/>\naway by divorce. Protection against moral and material abandonment manifest in<br \/>\nArt.39 is part of social and economic justice, specificated in Art.38, fulfilment of<br \/>\nwhich is fundamental to the governance of the county (Art.37). From this coign of<br \/>\nvantage we must view the printed text of the particular Code.<br \/>\nLaw is dynamic and its meaning cannot be pedantic but purposeful.<\/p>\n<p>63.     This Court in Manzoor Ahmed Khans (supra) and Mst. Amina Banoos<br \/>\ncase (supra) took the same view, as indicated above. It will be apt to quote relevant<br \/>\nportions of the reasons and findings recorded in Manzoor Ahmed Khans (supra).<br \/>\nRelevant Paragraph i.e; 11 is quoted herein below:\n<\/p>\n<p>The law on Talaq as ordained by Holy Quran is (i) that talaq must be for a<br \/>\nreasonable cause and (ii) that must be preceded by an attempt of reconciliation<br \/>\nbetween her husband and the wife by two arbiters, one chosen by the wife from her<br \/>\nfamily and the other by the husband from his. The issue has been subject matter of<br \/>\njudicial scrutiny since long. <a href=\"\/doc\/332673\/\">IN Shamim Ara v. State of U.P.<\/a> (supra), the Apex<br \/>\nCourt has relied upon and quoted the passages from various judgments of various<br \/>\nHigh Courts which are eye openers for those who think that a Muslim man can<br \/>\ndivorce his wife merely at whim or on caprice. One of those illuminating judgments<br \/>\nwas recorded by Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer as Judge of the High Court of Kerala (as<br \/>\nhis lordship then was) in A. Yousuf Rawther v. Sowramma, AIR 1971 Ker 261. The<br \/>\nSupreme Court, while relying on this judgment, has observed that it is virtually a<br \/>\nresearch document. While commenting on the above judgment in A. Yousuf<br \/>\nRawther v. Sowramma, Tahir Mahmood in his book The Muslim Law of India<br \/>\n(third edition 2002 New Version), in Chapter 6 on Divorce has stated as under:\n<\/p>\n<p>                                1.     Policy of Islamic Divorce Law:\n<\/p>\n<p>Noting the view of some Muslim scholars that the Indo-Anglican judicial exposition<br \/>\nof the Islamic law of divorce has not been just to its original tests, a learned Judge<br \/>\nof India has observed that indeed a deeper study of the subject discloses a<br \/>\nsurprisingly rational, realistic and modern law of divorce.\n<\/p>\n<p>                This observation presents a correct, unbiased   and authentic<br \/>\nview of the Islamic law of divorce.\n<\/p>\n<p>(I)     Reasons and Findings:\n<\/p>\n<p>64.     At the very outset it should be noted that the question of talak to be<br \/>\npronounced by the husband in case of oral divorce does not involve here in this<br \/>\ncase. It is no bodys case that the petitioner was divorced  by pronouncement of<br \/>\nspoken word  by the husband against her.  The basic case made out by the<br \/>\nrespondent-husband against the petitioner  herein is that he divorced his wife by a<br \/>\nwritten divorce on 18.5.1992 and, that too, prior to the institution of the<br \/>\nmaintenance proceedings by the wife on 4.11.1992. According to him, there was an<br \/>\nanother agreement executed on 4.1.1993. The case of the respondent is that written<br \/>\ndivorce deed dated 18.5.1992 was also sent to the petitioner through registered post.<br \/>\nThat apart, the petitioner voluntarily admitted before the Tehsildar, Ramnagar on<br \/>\n28.7.1995, before whom, she filed an application seeking for Resident of Backward<br \/>\nArea certificate, stating therein that she was a divorcee. It was also the case of the<br \/>\nrespondent that the factum of divorce was published in daily newspaper Kashmir<br \/>\nTimes on 9.11.1992.\n<\/p>\n<p>65.     So the entire matter revolves around  as to whether the divorce has been<br \/>\nduly effected by the above written divorce deeds or by her admission before the<br \/>\nTehsildar, Ramnagar or by publication in the newspaper Kashmir Times.\n<\/p>\n<p>66.     In support of their respective claims, both parties adduced evidence<br \/>\nexamining the witnesses.\n<\/p>\n<p>67.     The petitioner has strongly objected and refuted both the agreement of<br \/>\ndivorce as well as the written divorce deed. According to her,  she has never<br \/>\nexecuted any agreement of divorce  on 4.1.1993, as claimed by the respondent nor<br \/>\nhad she received any written divorce deed dated 18.5.1992 by registered post.\n<\/p>\n<p>68.     Records placed before this Court do not reveal any document  to show that<br \/>\nthe written divorce deed dated 18.5.1992 was ever sent by registered post. In fact, in<br \/>\nthe instant case, the respondent\/ husband, as it appears, did not make any attempt to<br \/>\nprove those documents relied upon by him.\n<\/p>\n<p>69.     Amazingly,  from a close perusal of the record, it transpires that  the<br \/>\nrespondent did not appear before the proceedings  initiated by the petitioner against<br \/>\nhim for granting maintenance on 4.11.1992 in her favour and in favour of her<br \/>\ndaughter nor had he preferred any written statement. By filing  written statement<br \/>\nbefore the Court, he would have brought on record  the written divorce deed dated<br \/>\n18.5.1992. In that case, a written statement stating of divorce filed by the husband<br \/>\nwould have been amounted to divorce.\n<\/p>\n<p>70.     It is on the record and also appears from the submissions and contentions<br \/>\nthat instead of filing written statement, he having  taken this plea  or that plea ,<br \/>\nmoved the higher forum either for transfer of the case or  for cancellation of the<br \/>\nmaintenance allowance having been granted by the Magistrate.\n<\/p>\n<p>71.     This Court has also considered the submissions put forward on behalf of the<br \/>\nparties as regards the paper publication, as noted above, by which the respondent<br \/>\nhas declared that he has divorced the petitioner. Carefully perused the paper cutting,<br \/>\nin question, published in daily newspaper Kashmir Times which has been placed<br \/>\nas Exhibit before the Court. The said paper cutting itself would indicate that the<br \/>\nsame lacks adequate and prominent exhibition in the space of the newspaper which<br \/>\ncan easily be skipped from the sight of an ordinary reader. Besides, the nature of<br \/>\npublication, as noticed, would not help the husband\/respondent to prove that the<br \/>\ndivorce was effectively executed.\n<\/p>\n<p>72.     The plea of admission made before the Tehsildar, Ramnagar has also been<br \/>\ngiven due consideration. The admission, as claimed on behalf of the respondent, is<br \/>\nnot an admission made in a proceeding.  In this regard, the judicial authority<br \/>\nreported in Thiru Johns case (Supra) relied upon to support the contention of<br \/>\nadmission by the petitioner as she is a divorcee, in our opinion is not applicable in<br \/>\nthe case in hand. Reason is that in the cited case, at paragraph 15 at page 1726 the<br \/>\nSupreme Court observed that it was well settled that a partys admission as defined<br \/>\nin Sections 17 to 21 of the Evidence Act, fulfilling the requirements of Section 21<br \/>\nof the Evidence Act. In the instant case, the so called admission, ex-facie does not<br \/>\nfulfil the provisions of Section 21 of the said Act. In this connection, it would be<br \/>\nproper and necessary to quote Section 21 of the said Act.\n<\/p>\n<p>        21. Proof of admissions against persons making them, and by or on their<br \/>\nbehalf-admissions are relevant and may be proved as against the persons who<br \/>\nmakes them, or his representative in interest; but they  cannot be proved by or on<br \/>\nbehalf of the persons who makes them or by his representative in interest, except in<br \/>\nthe following cases:-\n<\/p>\n<p>An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the persons making it, when it is of<br \/>\nsuch a nature that, if the person making it were dead, it would be relevant as<br \/>\nbetween third persons under section 32.\n<\/p>\n<p>An admission may be proved by or on behalf of a person making it, when it consists<br \/>\nof statement of the existence of any state of mind or body, relevant or in issue,<br \/>\nmade at or about the time when such state of mind or body existed, as is<br \/>\naccompanied by conduct rendering its falsehood improbable.<br \/>\nAn admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person making it, if it is<br \/>\nrelevant otherwise than as an admission.<\/p>\n<p>The Supreme Court in a case of Biswanath Prasad and others v. Dwarka Prasad &amp;<br \/>\nOrs. reported in AIR 1974 SC 117, at para 8 ruled that:\n<\/p>\n<p>There is no merit even in the contention that because these three statements  Exs.<br \/>\nG, G2 and H- had not been put to the first plaintiff when he was in the witness box<br \/>\nor to the eighth defendant although he had discreetly kept away from giving<br \/>\nevidence, they cannot be used agasint him. counsel drew out attention to S.145 of<br \/>\nthe Indian Evidence Act. There is a cardinal distinction between a party who is the<br \/>\nauthor of a prior statement and a witness who is examined and is sought to be<br \/>\ndiscredited by use of his prior statement. In the former case an admission by a party<br \/>\nis substantive evidence, if it fulfils the requirements of S.21 of the Evidence Act: in<br \/>\nthe latter case a prior statement is used to discredit the credibility of the witness and<br \/>\ndoes not become substantive evidence. In the former, there is no necessary<br \/>\nrequirement of the statement containing the admission having to be put to the party<br \/>\nbecause it is evidence proprio vigore: in the latter case the Court cannot be invited<br \/>\nto disbelieve a witness on the strength of prior contradictory statement unless it has<br \/>\nbeen put to him, as required by S.145 of the Evidence Act, this distinction has been<br \/>\nclearly brought out in the ruling in Bharat Singhs case (1966) 1 SCR 606; 615-<br \/>\n16=(AIR 1966 SC 405). This Court dispose of a similar argument with the<br \/>\nfollowing observations:\n<\/p>\n<p>        Admissions are substantive evidence by themselves, in view of Sections 17<br \/>\n&amp; 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, though they are not conclusive proof of the<br \/>\nmatters admitted. We are of the opinion that the admissions duly proved are<br \/>\nadmissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the<br \/>\nwitness box or not and whether  that party when appearing as witness was<br \/>\nconfronted with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those<br \/>\nadmissions. The purpose  of contradicting the witness under S.145 of the Evidence<br \/>\nAct is very much different from the purpose of proving the admission. Admission is<br \/>\nsubstantive evidence of the fact admitted while a previous statement used to<br \/>\ncontradict a witness does not become substantive evidence and merely serves the<br \/>\npurpose of throwing doubt on the veracity of the witness. What weight is to be<br \/>\nattached to an admission made by a party is a matter different from its use as<br \/>\nadmissible evidence.\n<\/p>\n<p>74.     In the light of above precedent, the present admission cannot be said to be<br \/>\nthe admission for the purpose of making it substantial evidence. Proof is<br \/>\nestablishment of fact  by evidence or matters before the Court or legal Tribunal.<br \/>\nSuch admission made before an officer seeking certain certificate does not<br \/>\nconstitute evidence.  Since the admission was not  be made in any proceeding<br \/>\nhaving scope of cross-examination,  the same cannot be relied upon by the<br \/>\nrespondent in  support of a case  raising the issue  as to whether the respondent has<br \/>\nduly divorced the petitioner.\n<\/p>\n<p>75.     The most important point which has also taken note by the leaned<br \/>\nMagistrate is the question of reconciliation between the parties. Learned Magistrate<br \/>\nhas categorically observed in his finding that the mediation and reconciliation<br \/>\nmeeting between the parties were also proved by the statement of one witness<br \/>\nnamely Ghulam Rasool, who was examined as PW-3 on petitioners side but<br \/>\nsurprisingly on going through the statement of PW-3 Ghulam Rasool, which has<br \/>\nbeen quoted in the impugned judgment itself, it is seen that there is even no whisper<br \/>\nas regards having such reconciliation. For the sake of convenience the statement<br \/>\nrecorded in the judgment itself may be reproduced herein below:<br \/>\nPW-3 Ghulam Rasool; has deposed that the parties to the petition are husband and<br \/>\nwife. The petitioner had divorced by the respondent. He has heard about the divorce<br \/>\nbut does not possess personal knowledge. In his presence, the dowry articles were<br \/>\nreturned to the petitioner. At the time of handing over the dowry articles, he had<br \/>\nstood a witness to that document. He has identified his signatures. The dowry<br \/>\narticles were brought from Latti, the house of the respondent and the same were<br \/>\ndelivered to the petitioner. He had acted on the mutual consent of the parties.\n<\/p>\n<p>        On cross-examination he has deposed that parties were not divorced in his<br \/>\npresence. Now the parties are living separately and the respondent has contracted<br \/>\nsecond marriage. There is a custom in our community that divorce may be<br \/>\npronounced either orally or written and in the Court. The original list of property<br \/>\nproduced by the respondent has been admitted by him as true but denied its<br \/>\ncontents.<\/p>\n<p>76.     Be that as it may, having closely scrutinized the basic concept of divorce,<br \/>\nmandate of Holy Quran and commentaries of the jurists as legal authorities, it is<br \/>\nseen that the action taken and procedure adopted by the respondent to divorce his<br \/>\nwife, is not permissible under the law.  No reasonable cause has been shown for<br \/>\ndivorcing the petitioner and, such divorce was not preceded by nor has any attempt<br \/>\non reconciliation  ever been made between them by the two arbiters, as required<br \/>\nunder the law.\n<\/p>\n<p>77.     In terms of the above discussion, this Court is of the view that all those basic<br \/>\nquestions  taken up for consideration  have been appropriately answered and it can<br \/>\nunhesitatingly be held that :\n<\/p>\n<p>the divorce was not properly effected;\n<\/p>\n<p>ii.  the divorce was not validly proved.\n<\/p>\n<p>78.     The basic concept of law on divorce in the modern trend of thinking is to put<br \/>\nrestrictions on the caprice and whim of the husband to give  talak to his wife at any<br \/>\ntime without giving any reason whatsoever.  It must be exclusively dealt with  in<br \/>\naccordance with the Quranic injunction. If the relationship between the husband and<br \/>\nwife becomes strained, there should be two persons, one from each of the parties,<br \/>\nchosen as arbiters, who shall endeavour to cause reconciliation between the<br \/>\nhusband and wife and, if the same is not possible, then the divorce or talak may be<br \/>\neffected.  In other words, an attempt for reconciliation by the two relations, one<br \/>\neach of the parties is an essential condition precedent to divorce. {see also Jiauddin<br \/>\nAhmeds case (supra) at para 4}.\n<\/p>\n<p>79.     Having regard to the Quranic mandate, commentaries of the eminent jurists<br \/>\nof Mohammedan law as well as  the judicial authorities pronounced by the highest<br \/>\nand higher Courts, this Court held that divorce  is allowed only for a reasonable<br \/>\ncause and, secondly,  it must be preceded by an attempt to reconciliation  between<br \/>\nthe husband and the wife by two arbiters, one chosen by the wife from her family<br \/>\nand the other by the husband from his family.  If such reconciliation  fails only then<br \/>\nthere can be a valid divorce.\n<\/p>\n<p>(J)     The concept of  Reconciliation:\n<\/p>\n<p>80.     Blacks Law Dictionary (7th Edition) defines reconciliation as follows:<br \/>\n1. Restoration of harmony between persons or things that   had been in conflict <a> 2. Family law. Voluntary resumption after a separation of full<br \/>\nmarital relations between spouses 3&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;.<\/p>\n<p>81.     The concept of reconciliation, the meaning of which has been noticed<br \/>\nhereinabove and as has been emanated from the basic source of Muslim law, as<br \/>\ndiscussed above, has got its acceptability in the modern litigations specially<br \/>\npertaining to the matrimonial disputes. The reconciliation has become an effective<br \/>\nand important tool and mechanism for resolution of disputes particularly in<br \/>\ndissolution of marriages.\n<\/p>\n<p>82.     In Hindu Marriage Act, which is enacted in 1995 has already contained such<br \/>\nprovisions of reconciliation in Section 23 (2) wherein a duty has been cast on the<br \/>\nCourt to make an endeavour for reconciliation between the parties at the very initial<br \/>\nstage. Provision of Section 23(2) is quoted as follows:\n<\/p>\n<p>        23. (2) Before proceeding to grant any relief under this Act, it shall be the<br \/>\nduty of the Court in the first instance, in every case where it is possible so to do<br \/>\nconsistently with the nature and circumstances of the case, to make every endeavour<br \/>\nto bring about a reconciliation between the parties;\n<\/p>\n<p>83.     Similarly, in The Family Courts Act, 1984, Section 9 provides that it is the<br \/>\nduty of the Family Court to make efforts for settlement and the same reads as under:\n<\/p>\n<p>                        9. Duty of Family Court to make efforts for settlement._(1)<br \/>\nin every suit or proceeding, endeavour shall be made by the Family Court in the<br \/>\nfirst instance, where it is possible to do so consistent with the nature and<br \/>\ncircumstances of the case, to assist and persuade the parties in arriving at a<br \/>\nsettlement in respect of the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding and for this<br \/>\npurpose a Family Court may, subject to any Rules made by the High Court follow<br \/>\nsuch procedure as it may deem fit.\n<\/p>\n<p>84.     In 2002 by amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Section 89 has<br \/>\nbeen incorporated providing  for settlement of the disputes, outside the Court by<br \/>\nadopting primarily four methods, namely, (a) arbitration; (b) conciliation; (c)<br \/>\njudicial settlement including settlement through Lok Adalat, or (d) mediation,<br \/>\nwhich are popularly coined as alternative dispute resolution(ADR) mechanism. So<br \/>\nit is evident that the process of reconciliation has to be given priority as well as<br \/>\nimportance in the present days. In view  of above, it is essential that a dissolution of<br \/>\nMuslim marriage by way of divorce or talaq must be based on reconciliation as<br \/>\nmandated by Quranic text followed by commentaries on the topic by the various<br \/>\neminent legal personalities.\n<\/p>\n<p> (K)    Conclusion:\n<\/p>\n<p>85.     In consideration of what has been stated, observed and discussed, the<br \/>\nimpugned judgment and order being not in consonance with  law explained and<br \/>\nhighlighted above, deserves  interference  and the same is, accordingly, set aside<br \/>\nand quashed.\n<\/p>\n<p>86.     It is, consequently, held that the petitioner is not a Muslim divorcee of the<br \/>\nhusband\/respondent and she is entitled to get her maintenance in terms of Section<br \/>\n488 Cr. P. C and this Court does, accordingly, uphold the maintenance granted to<br \/>\nthe petitioner by the learned Magistrate by its initial order dated 24.6.1995.\n<\/p>\n<p>87.     It is further provided that order dated 10.12.2002 passed by this Court as<br \/>\nregards granting interim maintenance to respondent no. 2, daughter of the parties, is<br \/>\nhereby made absolute.\n<\/p>\n<p>88.     Liberty is also granted to petitioner no. 1 to approach the appropriate<br \/>\nForum\/Authority, if she desires further increase in her maintenance allowance, if so<br \/>\nadvised.\n<\/p>\n<p>89.     In the result, the revision petition is, accordingly, allowed.\n<\/p>\n<p>(L) Remarks:\n<\/p>\n<p>90.     Before parting with the judgment, it is necessary to put on record certain<br \/>\nobservations.\n<\/p>\n<p>91.     The learned Judicial Officers while quoting cited judgments and judicial<br \/>\nauthorities, shall extract the relevant paragraphs of the judgment referred to with<br \/>\nclear mention of the said paragraph\/paragraphs therein instead of quoting the Head<br \/>\nnotes of a particular judgment.  In the instant case, on perusal of the impugned<br \/>\njudgment and order, it appears that the learned Magistrate has quoted the Head<br \/>\nNotes only of the judgment referred to or relied upon. Be it noted that Head Notes<br \/>\nare not the ratio or operative part of the judgment. It is simply an editorial comment<br \/>\nand, accordingly,   attempt should be made to avoid quoting the Head Notes only.\n<\/p>\n<p>                                                                     Sd\/-\n<\/p>\n<p>                                                          (Dr. Aftab H. Saikia)<br \/>\n                                                                          Chief Justice<br \/>\nJammu:\n<\/p>\n<p>14 .10.2010<br \/>\nTilak, Secy.\n<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Jammu High Court Mariyam Akhter &amp; Anr vs Wazir Mohd on 14 October, 2010 HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AT JAMMU. Cr Rev No. 51 OF 2005 AND Cr M P No. 15 OF 2005 Mariyam Akhter &amp; anr Petitioners Wazir Mohd Respondent !Mr. Nirmal Kotwal, Advocate ^Mr. S. S. Ahmed, Advocate Honble Mr. [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,17],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-93305","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-high-court","category-jammu-high-court"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.0 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Mariyam Akhter &amp; Anr vs Wazir Mohd on 14 October, 2010 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/mariyam-akhter-anr-vs-wazir-mohd-on-14-october-2010\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Mariyam Akhter &amp; 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