{"id":9508,"date":"1961-12-05T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1961-12-04T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/karimbil-kunhikoman-vs-state-of-kerala-on-5-december-1961"},"modified":"2019-01-14T15:12:21","modified_gmt":"2019-01-14T09:42:21","slug":"karimbil-kunhikoman-vs-state-of-kerala-on-5-december-1961","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/karimbil-kunhikoman-vs-state-of-kerala-on-5-december-1961","title":{"rendered":"Karimbil Kunhikoman vs State Of Kerala on 5 December, 1961"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Karimbil Kunhikoman vs State Of Kerala on 5 December, 1961<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1962 AIR 723, \t\t 1962 SCR Supl. (1) 829<\/div>\n
Author: K Wanchoo<\/div>\n
Bench: Gajendragadkar, P.B., Sarkar, A.K., Wanchoo, K.N., Gupta, K.C. Das, Ayyangar, N. Rajagopala<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nKARIMBIL KUNHIKOMAN\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nSTATE OF KERALA\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n05\/12\/1961\n\nBENCH:\nWANCHOO, K.N.\nBENCH:\nWANCHOO, K.N.\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\nSARKAR, A.K.\nGUPTA, K.C. DAS\nAYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA\n\nCITATION:\n 1962 AIR  723\t\t  1962 SCR  Supl. (1) 829\n CITATOR INFO :\n R\t    1964 SC1515\t (1,5,7,8)\n R\t    1965 SC 845\t (12)\n RF\t    1967 SC1643\t (43,65,227,259)\n RF\t    1972 SC 425\t (5)\n R\t    1972 SC2027\t (18,20,27,28,32,34)\n RF\t    1972 SC2240\t (10)\n RF\t    1980 SC1789\t (36)\n RF\t    1980 SC2097\t (10)\n RF\t    1981 SC 234\t (31)\n\n\nACT:\n     Ryotwari\tlands-If   \"estates\"-Compensation-\nProvisions for plantations of tea and coffee etc.,\nif  violative  of  egual  protection  of  laws-The\nKerala Agrarian\t Relations Act, 1961 (IV of 1961),\nss. 3(39), 3(viii), 52,57,58,59,64,80-Constitution\nof India, Arts. 14, 31A (I).\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n     The  Kerala   Agrarian  Relations\t Act   was\nimpugned on various grounds.\n^\n     Held, (per\t Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo  and  Das\nGupta, JJ.) that (1) the bill which was originally\npassed\tby   a\tLegislative   Assembly\twhich\tas\ndissolved and  was reconsidered and re-passed by a\nnew legislative assembly did not lapse and validly\nbecame the  law when  the President assented to it\nafter it  was passed  by  the  second  legislative\nassembly.\n830\n     Purushothaman Nambudiri  v. State\tof Kerala,<\/a>\n[1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 753, followed.\n     (II) The  Act which  made certain\tdeductions\nfrom the  compensation payable\tto the landholders\nunder Ch.  II and  to others  who held excess land\nunder Ch.  III cannot be struck down as a piece of\ncolourable  legislation\t  which\t is   beyond   the\ncompetence of the State Legislature, and it cannot\nbe said\t that any  device has been employed in the\nAct to\ttake away  the moneys of the landowners or\nthe persons  from whom\texcess land  is taken away\nfor the\t purpose of  adding to\tthe revenue of the\nState.\n     Section  80  of  the  Act\tprovides  for  the\nConstitution of\t an  agriculturist  rehabilitation\nfund for  the purpose  of rendering help by way of\nloan, grant  or otherwise  to persons  affected by\nthe Act\t and eligible for the same under the rules\nbut rr.\t 161 (a)  (III) and  161 (b)  (III) are so\nframed as  to take within their scope even persons\nnot affected  by the  Act. Those  rules are  ultra\nvires of s. 80 and must be struck down.\n     (III) The lands held by ryotwari pattadars in\nthe area  which came  to the  State of\tKerala\tby\nvirtue of  the States  Reorganisation Act from the\nState of  Madras  are  not  'estates'  within  the\nmeaning of  Art. 31A(2)(a) of the Constitution and\ntherefore the  Act is not protected under Art. 31A\n(1) from  attack under\tArts. 14, 19 and 31 of the\nConstitution.\n     State of  Bihar v.\t Rameshwar  Pratap  Narain\nSingh, A.I.R.<\/a> 1961 S.C. 1649, referred to.\n     (IV) The  reasons which call for exemption of\ntea, coffee  and rubber\t plantations from  certain\nprovisions of  the Act\tequally apply to areca and\npepper plantations  and there  is no  intelligible\ndifferentia related  to the  object and purpose of\nthe Act which would justify any distinction in the\ncase of\t tea, coffee  and  rubber  plantations\tas\nagainst\t areca\t and   pepper\tplantations.   The\nprovisions in  the Act relating to plantations are\nviolative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n     The provisions relating to plantations cannot\nbe severed  from the  Act and  struck down only by\nthemselves. The\t whole Act  must be struck down as\nviolative of Art. 14 of the Constitution so far as\nit applied to ryotwari lands in those areas of the\nState which  were transferred to it from the State\nof Madras.\n     (V) The  manner in\t which\tceiling\t has  been\nfixed  under   s.  58(1)   is  violative   of  the\nfundamental right  enshrined in\t Art.  14  of  the\nconstitution and  as that  section is the basis of\nentire Ch. III the whole chapter must fall with it\n831\n     (IV) The  manner in  which\t progressive  cuts\nhave been  imposed on  the purchase price under s.\n52 and\tthe market  value under\t s. 64 in order to\ndetermine the  compensation payable  to landowners\nor intermediaries  in one case and to persons from\nwhom excess  land is  taken in another, results in\ndiscrimination and  cannot  be\tjustified  on  any\nintelligible differentia which has any relation to\nthe objects and purposes of the Act. The provision\nas to compensation is all pervasive and the entire\nAct must be struck down as violative of Art. 14 of\nthe Constitution  in its  application to  ryotwari\nlands which  have come to the State of Kerala from\nthe State of Madras.\n     Per Sarkar,  J.-Sections 52 and 64 of the Act\nwhich  provide\tfor  payment  of  Compensation\tat\nprogressively smaller  rates for larger valuations\nof the\tinterests  acquired  are  not  invalid\tas\noffending  Art.\t  14  of   the\tConstitution.  The\nprovisions in  the act\tmaking a discrimination in\nfavour\tof   tea,  coffee,   rubber  and  cardamom\nplantation  and\t  also\t in   favour   of   cashew\nplantations cannot be upheld. Sections 3(viii), 57\n(1) (d)\t and 59\t (2) are  therefore invalid. These\nare however  severable from the other parts of the\nAct and\t the whole  Act cannot\tbe held\t to be bad\nmerely because those provisions are bad.\n     Per Ayyangar,  J.-Properties held on ryotwari\ntenures and the interest of the ryot in such lands\nwould not  be \"estate\"\tfor the\t purposes of  Art.\n31A(2) as it stood even after the Fourth Amendment\nof the Constitution.\n     Where an  existing law  in relation  to land-\ntenures in  force in an area contains a definition\nof an  'estates' and  that definition excludes the\ninterest of  a ryotwari proprietor, the very words\nof Art.\t 31A(2) of  the Constitution negatived the\napplicability of its provisions to that tenure.\n     Ram Ram  Narain Medhi,  v. State  of  Bombay,<\/a>\n[1959] Supp. I S.C.R. 489 and Atma Ram v. State of\nPunjab, [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. 748, referred to.\n     Section 2(39)  which by  definition  excludes\npepper and  areca plantations from the category of\nthe plantations\t named in  it which  are  exempted\nfrom the operative provisions of the impugned Act,\ns. 58  for the\tdetermination of  the  ceiling\tin\nrespect of  different individuals  who are brought\nwithin the  scope of  the enactment and ss. 52 and\n64 for determining the compensation payable to the\nseveral\t classes   of  persons\t whose\tlands  are\nacquired under\tthe Act\t are all  violative of the\nguarantee of  equal protection\tof laws under Art.\n14 of the Constitution.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
     ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 114 and
\n115 of 1961.\n<\/p>\n
     Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
\nIndia for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n<\/p>\n
832<\/span><\/p>\n
     M. K.  Nambiar, M.\t K. Govind  Bhatt,  S.\tN.
\nAndley, and Rameshwar Nath, for the petitioners.\n<\/p>\n
     M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, K.
\nK. Mathew,  Advocate- General  for  the\t State\tof
\nKerala, Sardar Bahadur, George Pudissary and V. A.
\nSeyid Muhammad, for the respondents.\n<\/p>\n
     1961. December  5. The  Judgment of  Gajendra
\ngadkar, Wanchoo\t and Das  Gupta, JJ., was deliverd
\nby  Wanchoo,   J.  Sarkar,  J.\tand  Ayyangar,\tJ.
\ndelivered separate Judgment.\n<\/p>\n
     WANCHOO, J.-  These two  writ petitions which
\nwere heard  along with\tPurushothaman Nambudiri v.\n<\/p>\n
The   State    of    Kerala    (1)    raise    the
\nconstitutionality of the Kerala Agrarina Relations
\nAct, No. IV of 1961 hereinafter referred to as the
\nAct. The  petitioners come  from that  part of the
\nState of  Kerala which\twas formerly  in the South
\nCanara district of the State of Madras and came to
\nthe State  of kerala  by the  State Reorganisation
\nAct of\t1956. Their  lands are\tsituate in Hosdrug
\nand kasargod  Taluks which have now been made part
\nof the\tCannanore District in the State of Kerala.
\nThey hold  large areas of lands, the major part of
\nwhich is  held by  them as  ryotwari parradars, of
\nMadras under  the Board’s  Standing Orders of that
\nState. In  these lands\tthey have areca and pepper
\nplantations besides  rubber plantation.\t They also
\ngrow other  crops on some of the lands. The Act is
\nbeing attacked\ton the\tground that it contravenes
\nArts. 14,  19 and  31 of the Constitution. Besides
\nthis, it  is  also  contended  on  behalf  of  the
\npetitioners that  the Bill  which became  the  Act
\nlapsed under  the provisions  of the Constitution,
\nand therefore  the assent given to the Bill by the
\nPresident was  of no  effect and did not result in
\nthe Bill  becoming an  Act. We\tdo  not\t think\tit
\nnecessary to  set out the details of the attack on
\nthis last  score in  the present  petitions as the
\nmatter
\n833<\/span>
\nhas been considered in full in the judgment in the
\nconnected Writ\tPetition  No.  105  of\t1961.  The
\npetitioners further  submit that their lands which
\nthey hold  as ryotwari\tpattadars are  not estates
\nwithin the  meaning of\tArt.  31A  (2)(a)  of  the
\nConstitution and  therefore the\t Act so\t far as it
\naffects them  is not protected under Art. 31A, and
\nit is  open to\tthem to\t assail it as violative of
\nthe rights  conferred on  them by Arts. 14, 19 and
\n31 of the Constitution. They have attacked the Act
\non  a\tnumber\tof  grounds  as\t ultra\tvires  the
\nConstitution in\t view of  the provisions  of Arts.
\n14,  19\t and  31.  We  do  not\thowever\t think\tit
\nnecessary  to\tdetail\tall  the  attacks  on  the
\nconstitutionality of the Act for present purposes.
\nIt is  enough to  say that  the main attack on the
\nconstitutionality of  the Act has been made on the
\nfollowing six grounds:-\n<\/p>\n
     (1)  The Bill which became the Act had lapsed
\n\t  before  it   was  assented   to  by  the
\n\t  President and\t therefore the\tassent\tof
\n\t  the President to a lapsed bill was of no
\n\t  avail to turn it into law.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (2)  The  Act   is\t a   piece  of\tcolourable
\n\t  legislation  as   it\thas  made  certain
\n\t  deductions from the compensation payable
\n\t  to landholders  under Chap.  II  and\tto
\n\t  others who  held excess land under Chap.
\n\t  III and  this amounts\t to acquisition of
\n\t  money by  the\t State\twhich  it  is  not
\n\t  competent  to\t  do   under   the   power
\n\t  conferred on\tit in  Lists II and III of
\n\t  the\t Seventh     Schedule\t to    the
\n\t  Constitution.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (3)  The properties  of the  petitioners  who
\n\t  are ryotwari\tpattadars are  not estates
\n\t  within the  meaning of  Art. 31A  of the
\n\t  Constitution and  therefore the  Act\tis
\n\t  not protected\t under that Article so far
\n\t  as  it  applies  to  lands  of  ryotwari
\n\t  pattadars like the petitioners.
\n     (4)  The  Act   exempts  plantation  of  tea,
\n\t  coffee, rubber and cardamom from certain
\n834<\/span>
\n\t  provisions   thereof,\t   but\t no   such
\n\t  exemption   has    been    granted\tto
\n\t  plantations of  areca\t and  pepper,  and
\n\t  this is  clearly discriminatory  and\tis
\n\t  violative of Art. 14.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (5)  The manner  in which\tceiling\t is  fixed
\n\t  under the  Act results in discrimination
\n\t  and is therefore violative of Art. 14.
\n     (6)  The compensation  which is payable under
\n\t  Chapters II  and III of the Act has been
\n\t  reduced  by\tprogressive  cuts  as  the
\n\t  amount of compensation increase and this
\n\t  amounts   to\t  discrimination   between
\n\t  persons   similarly\tsituate\t  and\tis
\n\t  therefore violative of Art. 14.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The petitions  have been opposed on behalf of
\nthe State and its contention is, firstly, that the
\nBill did  not lapse and the President’s assent was
\nrightly given  to it rightly became law; secondly,
\nthat the  petitioners’ estates\tlands are  estates
\nwithin the  meaning of Art. 31A (2)(a) and the Act
\nis  therefore\tprotected  under   that\t  Article;
\nthirdly, that the Act is not a piece of colourable
\nlegislation  and   the\t State\t Legislature   was
\ncompetent to  enact the\t Act under item 18 of List
\nII and item 42 of List III of the Seventh Schedule
\nand there  is no acquisition of money by the state
\nunder the  Act and  reference is  made to s. 80 of
\nthe Act\t in this  connection; and lastly, that the
\ndiscrimination\t  alleged    with    respect\tto
\nplantations,  the  fixation  of\t ceiling  and  the
\ndeductions   from   compensation   payable   under
\nChapters II and III is really no discrimination at
\nall and the provisions in that behalf are based on
\nan intelligible differentia which is in accordance
\nwith the object and purpose of the Act.
\nRe. (1).\n<\/p>\n
     The question  whether the\tBill which finally
\nreceived the  assent of\t the President\ton January
\n21,  1961,  had\t lapsed\t because  the  legislative
\nassembly which\toriginally passed it was dissolved
\nand a  new legislative\tassembly which\tcame  into
\nbeing after
\n835<\/span>
\nthe general  elections reconsidered  and re-passed
\nit under  Art. 201  of the  Constitution has  been
\nconsidered by us in Writ Petition No. 105 of 1961,
\njudgment in  which has\tjust been delivered and it
\nhas been  held there  that the\tbill did not lapse
\nand therefore  it  validly  became  law\t when  the
\nPresident assented  to it.  The attack\ton the Act
\ntherefore on this grounds must fail.\n<\/p>\n
     We now  come to the attack made on the Act on
\nthe ground  that  it  is  a  piece  of\tcolourable
\nlegislation beyond  the legislative  competence of
\nthe  State   legislature.   What   is\tcolourable
\nlegislation  is\t  now  well-settled:   see  K.\tC.
\nGajapati Narayan  Deo v.  The State of Orissa (1),
\nwhere it was held “that the question whether a law
\nwas a  colourable legislation and as such void did
\nnot depend  on the  motive or  bona fides  of  the
\nlegislature  in\t passing  the  law  but\t upon  the
\ncompetency  of\t the  legislature   to\tpass  that
\nparticular  law,  and  what  the  courts  have\tto
\ndetermine in  such cases  is  whether  though  the
\nlegislature has purported to act within the limits
\nof its\tpowers, it  has in  substance and  reality
\ntransgressed those  powers, the transgession being
\nveiled by  what appears, on proper examination, to
\nbe a mere pretence or disguise. The whole doctrine
\nof colourable  legislating is based upon the maxim
\nthat you  cannot do  indirectly what you cannot do
\ndirectly.\n<\/p>\n
     The Act has been passed under the legislative
\npowers vested  in the State legislature under item
\n18 of  List II\tand item  42 of\t List III  of  the
\nSeventh Schedule.  Item 18  of List II deals inter
\nalia with “land, that is to say, rights in or over
\nland,  land-tenures   including\t the  relation\tof
\nlandlord and  tenant, and the collection of rents”
\nItem 42\t of list  III deals  with “acquisition and
\nrequisitioning of  property.”  The  contention\ton
\nbehalf of  the petitioners is that in the guise of
\nlegislating under  these two  entries the    State
\nlegislature by the employment of certain
\n836<\/span>
\ndevices has  taken away\t money, which  should have
\ngone to\t land-owners or\t to those from whom excess
\nlands were  being acquired. The attack is based on
\nthe facts  that in  s. 52  of the Act compensation
\npayable to  a  land-owner  is  reduced\tafter  the
\npurchase price\tto be  paid by\tthe tenant to whom
\nthe land  is to\t be assigned has been ascertained,
\nand that  in s.\t 64 of\tthe Act\t the  compensation
\npayable to  a person  from whome  excess  land\tis
\ntaken in  reduced by  certain percentage after the
\nmarket value  of the  land has been determined. It
\nis urged  that\tby  these  devices  the\t State\tis
\nacquiring money which should properly have gone to
\nthe land-owner\tto whome  compensation is  payable
\nunder s.  52 and  to  the  person  who\tsurrenders
\nexcess land to whome compensation is payable under
\ns. 64.\tThere is  no doubt that certain deductions
\nare made  from the  purchase price  payable by the
\ntenant under  s. 45  and  from\tthe  market  value
\nbefore compensation  is arrived\t at for payment to
\nthe land  owner under  s. 52  and  to  the  person
\nsurrendering excess  land under\t s. 64. But if one
\nlooks at the purpose and object of the Act it will
\nbe clear  that the  main provisions of the Act are
\nclearly within\tthe legislative\t competence of the
\nState legislature  under item  18 of  List II  and
\nitem 42\t of List III. The scheme of the Act so far
\nas Chap.  II dealing  with extinction of the land-
\nowner’s right  is  concerned  is  that\tthe  land-
\nowner’s right vested in the State under ss. 41 and
\n42 on  a day  to be  notified by the Government in
\nthat  behalf.  Thereafter,  s.\t43  provides  that
\ncultivating tenants of the lands which have vested
\nin the\tState shall  have a right to assignment of
\nthe right,  title and  interest so  vested in  the
\nState on  payment of  a\t certain  price\t which\tis
\ncalculated under  s. 45 and is called the purchase
\nprice. After the purchase price is determined, the
\ncompensation to\t be  paid  to  the  land-owner\tis
\nprovided by  s. 52  and there  is reduction in the
\npurchase  price\t  for\tthe   purpose\tof   given
\ncompensation.  It  is  however\tobvious\t that  the
\nobject of  Chap. II  is to  vest proprietorship in
\nthe land in the
\n837<\/span>
\ncultivating tenants  and for that purpose Chap. II
\nprovides  for  carrying\t out  the  object  in  two
\nstages. In  the first  stage, the  property of the
\nlandowner is  vested in\t the State. Thereafter the
\ntenant is given the right to acquire that property
\nfrom the  State. What  price the  tenant is to pay
\nfor the\t land is  worked out under s. 45, and what
\ncompensation the State is to pay to the land-owner
\nis worked  out under  s. 52, which however reduces
\nthe purchase  price arrived at under s. 45 for the
\npurpose of  giving  compensation.  It  is  however
\nclear that  tenants are\t not  bound  to\t apply\tto
\nacquire the  land which\t they hold  as tenants and
\nwhere they  do not  do so, s. 44 (3) provides that
\nthey become the tenants of Government and shall be
\nliable to  pay to  the Government the rent payable
\nin respect  of the land from the date on which the
\nright, title  and interest over the land vested in
\nthe Government.\t It cannot  therefore be said that
\nthe scheme  which provides for two stages, namely,
\nfirst  acquisition   by\t Government  and  secondly
\nassignment to  tenants is  a camoflage devised for
\nthe purpose  of taking\taway the money which would
\notherwise have\tbeen payable  to the land-owner in
\ncase the  interest of  the landowner  was directly
\ntransferred to the cultivating tenants. It is also
\nclear that there is bound to be a time lag between
\nthe acquisition\t under\tss.  41\t and  42  and  the
\nassignment  to\t tenants  under\t  s.  43  and  the
\nsubsequent  sections   and  in\tthe  meantime  the
\nGovernment  would  be  the  owner  of  the  rights
\nacquired. Clearly,  therefore Chap.  II of the Act
\nenvisages  first   the\tacquirement  of\t the  land
\nowner’s\t interest   by\t the   State   for   which
\ncompensation is payable under s.52. Thereafter the
\nState will assign to such cultivating\ttenants as
\nmay apply  the rights  acquired by  the State  and
\nthere is  likely to be an interval between the two
\ntransactions. Besides some cultivating tenants may
\nnot apply  at all  and that  part of  the property
\nwill remain  with the  State Government.  In these
\ncircumstances it  cannot be  said that\tthe scheme
\nevolved in Chap. II is a device for
\n838<\/span>
\ntaking away any part of the money to the landowner
\nfrom  the   tenant  to\t whom  his   interest  may
\neventually be  assigned. Besides  the adequacy\tof
\ncompensation provided  under s. 52 for acquisition
\nby the\tState of  the interest\tof the\tland-owner
\ncannot\tbe   challenge\ton  the\t ground\t that  the
\ncompensation provided  by the law is not adequate:
\nSee  Art.   31(2).  It\t is   only   because   the
\ncompensation provided  under s. 52 is a percentage
\nof the\tpurchase price\tas calculated  under s. 45
\nthat it\t appears as  if the State is taking away a
\npart of\t the compensation  due to  the\tlandowner.
\nSection\t 52   is  however   only  a   method   for
\ndetermining    compensation    and    the    whole
\ncompensation due  to the land-owner is to be found
\nin s.  52 and it cannot therefore be said that any
\npart of\t the compensation  is being  taken away by
\nthe State.\n<\/p>\n
     Similarly\tthe  scheme  of\t Chap.\tIII  which
\nprovides a  ceiling is\tthat any land in excess of
\nthe ceiling  shall vest in the Government under s.\n<\/p>\n
62. Thereafter\tthe land  so vested  in Government
\ncan be\tassigned under s. 70 to persons who do not
\npossess any land or possess land less than 5 acres
\nof double crop nilam or its equivalent. It is true
\nthat Government\t may assign the lands to those who
\napply under s. 70 but it is not bound to do so and
\nhere again  there will\tbe a  time lag between the
\nvesting of the excess land in the Government under
\ns.62 and  its assignment to those who are eligible
\nunder s. 70. The charge that in this Chapter there
\nis a  device for  taking away the compensation due
\nto the\tland-owner is based on the fact that s. 72
\nthe person  to whom  the land is assigned under s.
\n70 has\tto pay 55 per cent. Of the market value of
\nthe land  while the  person from  whom the  excess
\nland is\t taken is  not always paid 55 per cent. Of
\nthe market  value, inasmuch as the percentage goes
\ndown to\t 25 per\t cent.\tOf  the\t market\t value\tin
\ncertain\t circumstances.\t  But\there   again   the
\ncompensation is\t provided entirely under s. 64 and
\nit is  that section  which sets\t out the manner in
\nwhich the compensation is to be
\n839<\/span>
\nprovided. The adequacy of that compensation cannot
\nbe questioned in view of Art. 31(2). The fact that
\nunder ss.  70 and  72 when  the Government  in its
\nturn assigns  land to  those who  are eligible for
\nsuch assignment,  a different percentage of market
\nvalue is  fixed would  not make these provisions a
\ndevice to  take away  the money\t due to\t those who
\nsurrender excess land. As we have already said the
\ncompensation to those who surrender excess land is
\nall provided  by s.  64 and  even if  there  is\t a
\ndifference between  the price  payable under s. 72
\nby the\tassignee and  the compensation\tpayable to
\nthe landowner under s. 64 that would not amount to
\ntaking away the money of the landowner by a device
\nparticularly when  the assignment is bound to take
\nplace  sometime\t  after\t the   property\t has  been
\nacquired by Government.\n<\/p>\n
     It\t is   also  clear   from  the\tprovisions
\ncontained in  Chapters II  and III of the Act that
\nthe main  purpose of  the Act  is to  do away with
\nintermediaries and  to fix  a ceiling and give the
\nexcess land,  if any, to the landless or those who
\nhold land  much\t below\tthe  ceiling.  The  method
\nemployed to  carry out\tthis object  is\t first\tto
\nacquire the  land for  the State and thereafter to
\nassign it  to the  cultivating tenants\tor to  the
\nlandless or  to those  with small amounts of land.
\nThe main  provisions  of  the  Act  therefore  are
\nclearly within\tthe legislative\t competence of the
\nState legislature  under item  18 of  List II  and
\nitem 42 of List III and this is not being disputed
\non  behalf  of\tthe  petitioners.  But\twhat  they
\ncontend is  that in the process of doing this, the
\nGovernment has\tby adopting  certain devices taken
\naway the  money which was due to the land-owner or
\nto  the\t person\t from  whom  the  excess  land\tis
\nacquired.  This\t argument  is  however\tfallacious
\nbecause the  compensation due to the land-owner or
\nthe person  from whom  excess land  is acquired is
\nnot what is provided by s. 45 and s 72 but what is
\nprovided in  s. 52  and s 64. The adequacy of that
\ncompensation cannot be
\n840<\/span>
\nchallenged in  view of\tArt. 31(2),  and there\tis
\ntherefore no  justification for\t saying\t that  the
\nmoney due to the landowner or the person from whom
\nthe excess land is acquired is being taken away by
\nthe State. That argument would only be possible if
\nthe compensation  was the  whole amount arrived at
\nunder s.  45 or\t under s.  72 and  from\t that  the
\nGovernment deducted  money due\tto the\tlandowner.
\nThat however  is not  so and  the compensation\tto
\nwhich the  landowner or\t the person  from whom the
\nexcess land is acquired is to be found only in ss.
\n52 and\t64 and there is thus no question of taking
\naway any money due to the landowner.\n<\/p>\n
     Further,  whatever\t unfairness  might  appear
\nbecause of the difference between ss. 45 and 52 on
\nthe one\t hand and  ss. 64  and 72 on the other and
\nthe manner in which the compensation is shown as a
\npercentage of  the purchase  price or  the  market
\nvalue is  removed by the provision in s. 80 of the
\nAct. That section provides for the constitution of
\nan agriculturist  rehabilitation fund in which the
\nsurplus, if  any, of  the purchase price after the
\ndisbursement therefrom\tof the\tcompensation is to
\nbe put\talong with other moneys. This surplus does
\nnot to\tgo to  the revenues  of the  State and the
\nState cannot  be said  to have\ttaken away for its
\nown purpose  any part of the compensation. Further
\ns. 80 provides that the fund shall be utilised for
\nrendering help\tby way of loan, grant or otherwise
\nto persons  affected by\t the Act  who are eligible
\nfor the\t same in  accordance with the rules framed
\nby the\tGovernment.  The  fund\ttherefore  created
\nunder s.  80 of\t the surplus,  if any,\tis  to\tbe
\nutilised for rendering help to persons affected by
\nthe Act.  That in our opinion clearly means either
\nthe landowners\twhose rights are affected by Chap.
\nII or  the persons  from whom excess land is taken
\nunder Chap. III. The surplus money therefore is to
\nbe  utilised   for  the\t benefit  of  the  persons
\naffected by  the  Act  as  indicated  above.  This
\nsection also
\n841<\/span>
\nprovides that the Government will frame rules with
\nrespect\t to   the  persons   affected  and   their
\neligibility for\t help from the fund. Our attention
\nin  this   connection  has   been  drawn   to  the
\neligibility rules  framed under\t this section  for
\nthe administration  of the fund, and in particular
\nto r.  161  which  provides  for  eligibility  for
\ngrants and  loan. That\trule in\t our opinion  goes
\nbeyond the scope of s. 80 in so far as it provides
\nfor   making of\t grants or  loans to  persons  not
\naffected by  the Act.  We may  in this\tconnection
\nrefer to r. 161 (a)(i) and (ii) and r. 161 (b) (i)
\nand (ii)  which are  so framed\tas to  take within
\ntheir scope  even persons not affected by the Act,
\nthough r. 161 (a)(iii) and r. 161(b)(iii) are with
\nrespect to persons who may be affected by the Act.
\nRule 161(a)(i)\tand (ii) and r. 161(b)(i) and (ii)
\nin so  far as they take in persons not affected by
\nthe Act are ultra vires of the provisions of s. 80
\nand must  be struck  down on  that ground  and may
\nhave to\t be replaced  by more  suitable rules. But
\nthe rules which have been actually framed will not
\naffect the  provisions of s. 80 which clearly show
\nthat the  fund is for the benefit of those who are
\naffected  by   the  Act,  namely,  those  who  are
\naffected by  Chapters II and III of the Act, i.e.,
\nthose landowners  whose rights\thave been acquired
\nunder ss.  41 and  42 and  those persons from whom
\nexcess land  is taken away under s. 62. Section 80
\nthus clearly shows that any surplus that may arise
\nis not taken away by the State for its own revenue
\npurposes but  is meant\tto be used for the benefit
\nof those  affected by  the Act\tand therefore even
\nthe apparent  result of the difference between ss.
\n45 and\t62 and\tss 64  and 72 is taken away by the
\nconstitution of\t the fund  under  s.  80,  and\tit
\ncannot be said at all under the circumstances that
\nany device  has been  employed in  the Act to take
\naway the  moneys of  the landowners or the persons
\nfrom whom  excess  land\t is  taken  away  for  the
\npurpose of  adding to the revenue of the State. We
\nare therefore of opinion that
\n842<\/span>
\nthe Act”  cannot be  struck down  as a\tcolourable
\npiece  of   legislation\t which\t is   beyond   the
\ncompetence of the State Legislature.
\nRe. (3).\n<\/p>\n
     Article 31A  was inserted in the Constitution
\nby the\tConstitution (First  Amendment) Act, 1951,
\nwith retrospective  effect  so\tthat  it  must\tbe
\ndeemed to  have been  in the Constitution from the
\nvery  beginning,   i.e.,  January  26,\t1950.  The
\narticle was  further amended  by the  Constitution
\n(Fourth Amendment)  Act, 1955  which was also made
\nretrospective and  therefore Art. 31A as it stands
\ntoday must  be deemed  to have\tbeen part  of  the
\nConstitution right  from the  start, i.e., January
\n26, 1950.  We are  not concerned  in  the  present
\npetitions with\tcl. (1)\t of Art.  31A,\twhich  was
\nextensively amended in 1955 but only with cl. (2).
\nThis clause originally read as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
     “In this article,-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (a) the  expression ‘estate’\tshall,\tin
\n     relation to  any local  area, have\t the  same
\n     meaning  as  that\texpression  or\tits  local
\n     equivalent has  in the  existing law relating
\n     to land-tenures  in force\tin that\t area, and
\n     shall also\t include any  jagir, inam or muafi
\n     or other similar grant.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (b) the  expression ‘right’  in relation
\n     to\t an   estate,  shall  include  any  rights
\n     vesting  in   a  proprietor,  sub-proprietor,
\n     under-proprietor,\ttenure-holder\tor   other
\n     intermediary and  any rights or privileges in
\n     respect of land revenue.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
In 1955,  in sub-cl.  (a) the  words “and  in  the
\nStates of  Madras and Travancore-Cochin any janmam
\nrights ”  were added  at the  end while in sub-cl.\n<\/p>\n
(b) the\t words ”  raiyat under-raiyat ” were added
\nafter the  word ”  tenure-holder ”  and before the
\nwords “or other intermediary”.\n<\/p>\n
843<\/span><\/p>\n
     It will  be seen therefore that so far as the
\nmeaning of  the word  “estate” is concerned, there
\nwas no\tchange in  sub-cl. (a) and the only change
\nwas with  respect to  the inclusive  part  of  the
\ndefinition of  the word “estate”. The word “estate
\nhas all\t along\tbeen  defined  to  have\t the  same
\nmeaning in  relation to\t any local  area  as  that
\nexpression or  its local  equivalent  has  in  the
\nexisting law  relating to  landtenures in force in
\nthat area.  It is  also remarkable  that the  word
\n“intermediary”\tdoes  not  occur  in  sub-cl.  (a)
\nthough it occurs in sub-cl. (b). The definition in
\nsub-cl. (a)  is self-contained\tand  there  is\tno
\nscope for  importing any  idea of  intermediary in
\nthe definition\tfrom sub-cl.  (b). The\treason why
\nthe words “other intermediary” are used in sub-cl.\n<\/p>\n
(b) which defines rights in relation to an estate,
\nis  that     sub-clause\t  mentions  a\tnumber\tof
\nintermediaries\tas   such,  like  sub-proprietors,
\nunder-proprietors,  tenure-holders  but\t does  not
\ngive a\tcomplete enumeration of all intermediaries
\nthat may  be existing in an estates all over India
\nand therefore  uses the words “other intermediary”
\nto bring  in all  kinds of intermediaries existing
\nin an  estate. As  an example  we may mention that
\nformerly in  Uttar Pradesh  there were\tfixed rate
\ntenants in  the permanently  settled districts who
\nwere also intermediaries and it is such persons or
\ntheir likes  who were  brought in within the sweep
\nof the\tdefinition of  rights in  relation  to\tan
\nestate\tby   the   use\t of   the   words   “other
\nintermediary”. Therefore,  when the words “raiyat,
\nunder raiyat  ” were added in sub-cl. (b) in 1955,
\nit was\tfurther enumeration within a class already
\nthere; further\tas held\t in The\t State of Bihar v.
\nRameshwar Pratap Narain Singh<\/a> (1), their inclusion
\nin the circumstances and in the particular setting
\nshowed that  the words “or other intermediary” did
\nnot necessarily\t qualify or  colour the meaning to
\nbe attached  to these  new tenures. The meaning of
\nthe word “estate” has however to be found in
\n844<\/span>
\nsub-cl. (a)  and it is the words used in that sub-
\nclause\tonly  which  will  determine  its  meaning
\nirrespective of\t whether any  intermediary existed
\nin an  estate or  not. The  meaning  of\t the  word
\n“estate” in  sub-cl (a) is the same as it might be
\nin the\texisting law  relating to  land-tenure\tin
\nforce in  a particular area. Where therefore there
\nis an  existing law  in a particular area in which
\nthe word  “estate” as  such is\tdefined\t the  word
\nwould have that meaning for that area and there is
\nno  necessity  then  for  looking  for\tits  local
\nequivalent. But if in existing law of a particular
\narea the word “estate” as such is not defined, but
\nthere is  a definition of some other term which in
\nthat area  is the  local equivalent  of\t the  word
\n“estate” then  the word\t “estate” would\t have  the
\nmeaning assigned  to that term in the existing law
\nin that\t area. In  order, however, that one may be
\nable to\t say that a particular term in an existing
\nlaw in\ta particular area is a local equivalent of
\nthe  word  “estate”  used  in  sub-cl  (a)  it\tis
\nnecessary to  have some\t basic idea of the meaning
\nof the\tword “estate” for that purpose. That basic
\nidea seems  to be  that\t the  person  holding  the
\nestate should  be the  proprietor of  the soil and
\nshould be  in direct  relationship with\t the State
\npaying land-revenue to it, when it is not remitted
\nin whole  or in\t part.\tIf  a  term  therefore\tis
\ndefined in  any existing law in a local area which
\ncorresponds to\tthis basic  idea of an estate that
\nterm would  be a  local\t equivalent  of\t the  word
\n“estate” in that area. It is unnecessary to pursue
\nthe matter further because this aspect of the case
\nhas also  been considered in Writ Petition No. 105
\nof 1961.\n<\/p>\n
     It may be added that as the definition of the
\nword “estate”  came  into  the\tConstitution  from
\nJanuary 26,  1950, and is based on existing law we
\nhave to\t look into  law existing  on  January  26,
\n1950, for  the purpose\tof finding out the meaning
\nof the word “estate” in Art. 31A.\n<\/p>\n
845<\/span><\/p>\n
     Let us  therefore look at state of the law as
\nit was in the State of Madras on January 26, 1950,
\nfor the\t area from  which these petitions come was
\nthen in\t the district  of South\t Canara, which was
\nthen a\tpart of\t the  Province\tof  Madras,  which
\nbecame the  State of  Madras on\t January 26, 1950.
\nThe usual feature of land-tenure in Madras was the
\nryotwari form  but in  some districts,\ta landlord
\nclass had  grown  up  both  in\tthe  northern  and
\nsouthern parts\tof the\tPresidency of Madras as it
\nwas  before   the  Constitution.   The\t permanent
\nsettlement was\tintroduced in a part of the Madras
\nPresidency  in\t 1802.\tThere  were  also  various
\ntenures arising\t out of\t revenue free  grants  all
\nover the  Province (see Chap. IV, Vol. III of land
\nSystems of  British India  by  Baden  Powell)  and
\nsometimes in some districts both kinds of tenures,
\nnamely, landlord  tenures and the ryotwari tenures
\nwere prevalent.\t There were  various Acts in force
\nin  the\t Presidency  of\t Madras\t with  respect\tto
\nlandlord  tenures   while  ryotwari  tenures  were
\ngoverned by  the Standing  orders of  the Board of
\nRevenue.   Eventually,\t in   1908,   the   Madras
\nlegislature passed the Madras Estate Land Act, No.
\n1 of  1908, which  was later  amended from time to
\ntime.  It   contains  a\t definition  of\t the  word
\n“estate”  as   such  in\t  s.  3(2)  and\t when  the
\nConstitution came  into force the relevant part of
\nthe definition was as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
     “Estates’ means:-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (a)\tany  permanently settled estate or
\n     temporarily settled zamindari;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (b)\tany  portion of\t such  permanently
\n     settled   estate\tor   temporarily   settled
\n     zamindari which  is separately  registered in
\n     the office of the Collector;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (c)\tany unsettled palaiyam or jagir;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (d)\tany  inam  village  of\twhich  the
\n     grant has\tbeen made, confirmed or recognised
\n     by the  British  Government,  notwithstanding
\n     that
\n846<\/span>
\n     subsequent to the grant, the village has been
\n     partitioned  among\t  the  grantees\t  or   the
\n     successors-in  title   of\tthe   grantee\tor
\n     grantees.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
This Act  applied  to  the  entire  Presidency\tof
\nMadras except  the Presidency  town of Madras, the
\ndistrict of Malabar and the portion of the Nilgiri
\ndistrict known\tas  South  East\t Wynaad.  It  thus
\napplied to the district of South Canara from where
\nthese petitions\t come. So  far\ttherefore  as  the
\nDistrict of  South Canara was concerned, there was
\nan existing  law which\tdefined the  word “estate”
\nfor  that   local   area.   Shortly   before   the
\nConstitution   came    into   force   the   Madras
\nlegislature  had   passed   the\t  Madras   Estates
\n(Abolition and\tConversion into\t Ryotwari) Act No.
\nXXVI of\t 1948. That Act provided for the abolition
\nof estates  subject to\tcertain restrictions  with
\nwhich we  are not  concerned. It also provided for
\nrepeal\tof   the   Madras   Permanent\tSettlement
\nRegulation, 1802, and the Estates Land Act of 1908
\nto  the\t  extent  and\tfrom  the  date\t on  which
\nnotifications were  made under\ts. 3  of that Act.
\nThere was  thus no  repeal of Act I of 1908 by the
\nAct of 1948, and it is not in dispute that Act No.
\n1 of  1908 was\tin force  on January  26, 1950, in
\nlarge parts  of the  Province of  Madras including
\nSouth Canara,  and is still in force in such parts
\nof it  as have not been notified under s. 3 of the
\nAct of 1948. Therefore, we reach the position that
\nwhen Art.  31 became  applicable from  January 26,
\n1950, Act  No. 1  of 1908  was still  in force\tin
\nlarge parts of the Madras State and it contained a
\ndefinition of  the word “estate” as such. Further,
\nAct I of 1908 was clearly a law of land-tenures as
\na  brief  review  of  its  provisions  will  show.
\nSection 6 of the Act conferred occupancy rights on
\ntenants of  certain lands  in “estates” as defined
\nin the\tAct of\t1908. Chapter  II dealt\t with  the
\ngeneral rights\tof landlords  and tenants. Chapter
\nIII dealt with provisions relating to rate of rent
\npayable by  tenants and\t provided for enhancement,
\nreduction, commutation, alteration
\n847<\/span>
\nand remission  of  rent.  Chapter  IV  dealt  with
\npattas and  muchilikas.\t Chapter  V  provided  for
\npayment of  rent and for realisation of arrears of
\nrent.  Chapter\t VI  provided  the  procedure  for
\nrecovery of  rent. Other Chapters dealt with other
\nmatters\t including   Chap.  X\twhich  dealt  with
\nrelinquishment\tand   ejectment.   It\tis   clear
\ntherefore that\tthe Act of 1908 was a law relating
\nto landtenures.\t Therefore, we\treach the position
\nthat in\t a law\trelating to land-tenures which was
\nin  force   in\tthe   State  of\t Madras\t when  the
\nConstitution came into force the word “estate” was
\nspecifically defined. This law was in force in the
\nwhole of the State of Madras except some parts and
\nwas thus  in force  in the  area  from\twhich  the
\npresent petitions  come. This area was then in the
\nsouth Canara  district of  the State of Madras. We
\nare therefore of opinion that the word “estate” in
\nthe circumstances  can only have the meaning given
\nto it  in the Act of 1908 as amended up to 1950 in
\nthe State  of Madras  as it  was on  the date  the
\nConstitution came into force.\n<\/p>\n
     We have  already said  that the  Act of  1908
\ndealt with  landlord tenures  of Madras and was an
\nexisting law  relating to  land-tenures. The other
\nclass  of   land-tenures  consisted   of  ryotwari
\npattadars  which  were\tgoverned  by  the  Board’s
\nStanding  Orders,   there  being  no  Act  of  the
\nlegislature with  respect to  them. The holders of
\nryotwari pattas\t used to  hold lands on lease from
\nGovernment. The\t basic idea of ryotwari settlement
\nis that every bit of land is assessed to a certain
\nrevenue and  assigned a survey number for a period
\nof  years,   which  is\tusually\t thirty\t and  each
\noccupant of  such land\tholds it  subject  to  his
\npaying the land-revenue fixed on that land. But it
\nis open\t to the occupant to relinquish his land or
\nto take\t new land  which has  been relinquished by
\nsome other  occupant or become otherwise available
\non payment  of assessment,  (see Land  Systems\tof
\nBritish India by Baden-Powell, Vol. III, Chap. IV,
\ns. II,\tp. 128).  Though, theoretically, according
\nto some authorities, the occupant of ryotwari
\n848<\/span>
\nland held  it under an annual lease (see Macleane,
\nVol. I\tRevenue Settlement,  p. 104),  it  appears
\nthat  in  fact\tthe  Collector\thad  no\t power\tto
\nterminate  the\ttenant’s  holding  for\tany  cause
\nwhatever except\t failure to pay the revenue or the
\nryot’s own relinquishment or abandonment. The ryot
\nis generally  called a tenant of Government but he
\nis not\ta tenant,  from year to year and cannot be
\nousted\tas   long  as  he  pays\t the  land-revenue
\nassessed.  He  has  also  the  right  to  sell\tor
\nmortgage or  gift the  land or\tlease it  and  the
\ntransferee becomes  liable in  his place  for  the
\nrevenue.  Further,   the  lessee   of  a  ryotwari
\npattadar has  no  rights  except  those\t conferred
\nunder the  lease and is generally a sub-tenant at-
\nwill liable  to ejectment at the end of each year.
\nIn the\tManual of  Administration,  as\tquoted\tby
\nBadenPowell,  in  Vol.\tIII  of\t Land  Systems\tof
\nBritish India  at p.  129, the\tryotwari tenure is
\nsummarised as  that  of\t a  tenant  of\tthe  State
\nenjoying a  tenant-right which\tcan be\tinherited,
\nsold, or  burdened for\tdebt in precisely the same
\nmanner as  a proprietary  right subject\t always to
\npayment of  the revenue\t due to the State”. Though
\ntherefore the  ryotwari pattadar is virtually like
\na proprietor  and has  many of\tthe advantages\tof
\nsuch a\tproprietor, he\tcould still  relinquish or
\nabandon his  land in  favour of the government. It
\nis because  of this  position  that  the  ryotwari
\npattadar was  never considered a proprietor of the
\nland under  his patta,\tthough he  had many of the
\nadvantages of  a proprietor. Considering, however,
\nthat the  Act of  1908 was  in force  all over the
\nState of Madras but did not apply to lands held on
\nryotwari settlement  and contained a definition of
\nthe  word   “estate”  which  was  also\tapplicable
\nthroughout the\tState of  Madras except\t the areas
\nindicated above,  it is clear that in the existing
\nlaw relating to land-tenures the word “estate” did
\nnot  include  the  lands  of  ryotwari\tpattadars,
\nhowever valuable might be their rights in lands as
\nthey eventually came to be recognised.\n<\/p>\n
849<\/span><\/p>\n
     Turning now  to the  district of South Canara
\nand the\t areas from  which the\tpresent\t petitions
\ncome  it  appears  that\t originally  the  ryotwari
\nsettlement was\tnot in\tforce in this area and two
\nkinds  of   tenures   were   recognised,   namely,
\nmulawargdar and Sarkarigniwargdar. It is, however,
\nunnecessary to\tgo into\t the past  history of  the
\nmatter, for it is not in dispute that the ryotwari
\nsystem was  introduced in South Canara district in
\nthe early  years of this century. The history will
\nbe found  in the  Book “Land Tenures in the Madras
\nPresidency” by S. Sunderaraja Iyengar, IIEdn., pp.
\n45-47,\twhere\tit  is\t said  that   “after   the
\nintroduction of\t the ryotwari  system  into  South
\nCanara, no  distinction\t now  exists  between  the
\nwargadar, the  mnulawargadar and  kudutaledar  and
\nthey are  all ryotwari\tpattadars” Therefore, when
\nthe Constitution  came\tinto  force  the  ryotwari
\npattadars  of\tSouth  Canara  were  on\t the  same
\nposition as  the ryotwari pattadars of the rest of
\nthe State  of Madras.  Further, as the Act of 1908
\nwas in\tforce in  South Canara\talso, though there
\nmay not\t be many estates as defined in that Act in
\nthis area  it follows  that in\tthis area also the
\nword “estate”  would have  the same  meaning as in
\nthe Act\t of 1908  and therefore ryotwari pattadars
\nand their  lands would\tnot be covered by the word
\n“estate”. Further,  there can  be no  question\tof
\nseeking for  a local  equivalent so  far  as  this
\nparts of  the State of Kerala which has come to it
\nfrom the  former State\tof Madras is concerned. We
\nare  therefore\tof  opinion  that  lands  held\tby
\nryotwari pattadars  in this part which has come to
\nthe State  of  Kerala  by  virtue  of  the  States
\nReorganisation Act  from the  State of\tMadras are
\nnot estates  within the meaning of Art. 31A (2)(a)
\nof the\tConstitution and  therefore the Act is not
\nprotected under\t Art. 31A  (I) from  attack  under
\nArts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
850<\/span><\/p>\n
Re. (4).\n<\/p>\n
     The  next\t contention  on\t  behalf  of   the
\npetitioners is that the Act makes a discrimination
\nbetween areca  and pepper  plantations on  the one
\nhand and  certain other\t plantations on\t the other
\nand should  therefore be  struck down as violative
\nof Art.\t 14 of\tthe Constitution. Section 2(39) of
\nthe Act defines “plantation” to mean any land used
\nby a  person principally  for the  cultivation\tof
\ntea, coffee, rubber or cardamom or such other kind
\nof special  crops  as  may  be\tspecified  by  the
\nGovernment by  notification in\tthe gazette. Areca
\nand  pepper  plantations  have\thowever\t not  been
\nincluded in this definition. It is urged on behalf
\nof the\tpetitioners that in this part of the State
\nthere are  a large  number  of\tareca  and  pepper
\nplantations which  are practically run on the same
\nlines as  tea, coffee  and rubber  plantations and
\nthere is  no reason  why discrimination\t should be
\nmade between  areca and\t pepper plantations on the
\nother hand  and tea, coffee and rubber plantations
\non the\tother. The discrimination is said to arise
\nfrom the  provisions of s. 3 and s. 57 of the Act.
\nSection 3(viii)\t which occurs  in Chap. II dealing
\nwith the acquisition of the interest of landowners
\nby  tenants   excepts  tenancies   in  respect\tof
\nplantations exceeding  thirty acres in extent from
\nthe application\t of that  chapter. The\tresult\tof
\nthis is\t that  tenants\tin  plantations\t exceeding
\nthirty acres in extent cannot acquire the interest
\nof the landowners with respect to such plantations
\nand  the   landowners\tcontinue   to\town   such
\nplantations as\tbefore. Further\t s. 57 which is in
\nChap.  III   provides\tfor   exemption\t  of   all
\nplantations  whatever\ttheir  extent\tfrom   the
\nprovisions of  that Chapter. Thus the ceiling area
\nprovided in  s. 58  will not  apply to plantations
\nwhich will  be left out in calculating the ceiling
\narea for  the purpose  of s.58.\t Further,  s.59(2)
\nprovides that  in calculating the ceiling area any
\ncashew estate  if it was a cashew estate on April,
\n11, 1957 and continued as such at the
\n851<\/span>
\ncommencement of\t s. 59 (provided the cashew estate
\nwas principally\t planted with  cashewnuts tree and
\nbe a  contiguous area  not below  10  acres)  will
\ncontinue to be owned or held as before, though the
\nceiling in  such cases would be reduced to half of
\nthat provided in s.58. These provisions inter alia
\nconfer benefits\t on those  who hold plantations as
\ndefined in  s. 2(39)  and also\ton those  who have
\ncashew estates as defined in the Explanation to s.
\n59(2). The contention on behalf of the petitioners
\nis that\t there is  no reason why the same benefits
\nwhich  have   been  conferred  on  plantations\tas
\ndefined in  the Act  should not\t be  conferred\ton
\nthose who  hold areca  and pepper plantations, and
\nthat there  are no  intelligible differentia which
\nwould justify  the State  legislature in  treating
\nthe pepper  and areca plantations differently from
\nrubber, tea and coffee plantations.\n<\/p>\n
     Article  14   has\t been\tthe   subject\tof
\nconsideration  by   this  Court\t on  a\tnumber\tof
\noccasions and  the  principles\twhich  govern  its
\napplication  have  been\t summarised  in\t Shri  Ram
\nKrishna Dalmia\tv. Shri\t Justice S.  R.\t Tendolkar<\/a>
\n(1), in these words:-\n<\/p>\n
     “(a) that a  law may  be constitutional  even
\n\t  though it relates to a single individual
\n\t  if,\ton   account   of   some   special
\n\t  circumstances or  reasons applicable\tto
\n\t  him and  not applicable  to others, that
\n\t  single individual  may be  treated as\t a
\n\t  class by himself;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (b)  that there  is always\t a presumption\tin
\n\t  favour of  the constitutionality  of\tan
\n\t  enactment and the burden is upon him who
\n\t  attacks it to show that there has been a
\n\t  clear\t    transgression      of      the
\n\t  constitutional principles;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (c)  that\tit   must  be  presumed\t that  the
\n\t  legislature  understands  and\t correctly
\n\t  appreciates the  need of its own people,
\n\t  that its laws are directed to problems
\n852<\/span>
\n\t  made manifest by experience and that its
\n\t  discriminations are  based  on  adequate
\n\t  grounds;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (d)  that\tthe   legislature   is\t free\tto
\n\t  recognise  degrees   of  harm\t  and  may
\n\t  confine its  restrictions to those cases
\n\t  where the  need  is  deemed  to  be  the
\n\t  clearest;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (e)  that in order to sustain the presumption
\n\t  of constitutionality\tthe court may take
\n\t  into\tconsideration  matters\tof  common
\n\t  knowledge, matters of common report, the
\n\t  history of  the  times  and  may  assume
\n\t  every\t state\t of  facts  which  can\tbe
\n\t  conceived  existing\tat  the\t  time\tof
\n\t  legislation; and\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (f)  that while  good faith  and knowledge of
\n\t  the existing conditions on the part of a
\n\t  legislature are to be presumed, if there
\n\t  is nothing on the face of the law or the
\n\t  surrounding circumstances brought to the
\n\t  notice  of   the  court   on\twhich  the
\n\t  classification   may\t  reasonably\tbe
\n\t  regarded as  based, the  presumption\tof
\n\t  constitutionality cannot  be carried\tto
\n\t  the extent  of always holding that there
\n\t  must be  some\t undisclosed  and  unknown
\n\t  reasons    for     subjecting\t   certain
\n\t  individuals or  corporations to  hostile
\n\t  or discriminating legislation.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The petitioners rely on cl.(f) of this summary and
\ncontention is that there is nothing to show either
\nin the\tAct or\teven in\t the  affidavit\t filed\ton
\nbehalf of  the State  in reply to the petitions or
\nin the\tcircumstances brought to the notice of the
\ncourt that  the classification\tin this case which
\nexcludes areca and pepper plantations and includes
\ntea, coffee  and rubber\t plantations is\t a  proper
\nclassification based  on intelligible  differentia
\nwhich are  related to  the objects and purposes of
\nthe Act.\n<\/p>\n
853<\/span><\/p>\n
     This brings  us to\t a  consideration  of  the
\nreasons which may have impelled the legislature to
\ntreat plantations  as  a  class\t differently  from
\nother  lands.\tThe  objective\t of  land   reform
\nincluding  the\timposition  of\tceilings  on  land
\nholdings is  to remove all impediments which arise
\nfrom the  agrarian structure  inherited\t from  the
\npast in order to increase agricultural production,
\nand to\tcreate conditions for evolving as speedily
\nas possible  an agrarian economy with a high level
\nof efficiency  and productivity (see p. 178 of the
\nSecond Five  Year Plan). It is with this object in
\nview  that   ceiling  on  land-holdings\t has  been
\nimposed\t in   various  States.\t Even  so,  it\tis
\nrecognised that\t some exemptions  will have  to be
\ngranted from  the ceiling in order that production
\nmay not\t suffer. This was considered in the Second
\nFive Year  Plan at  p. 196  and three main factors
\nwere  taken   into  account   in   deciding   upon
\nexemptions from the ceiling, namely:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  (1)  integrated  nature  of  operations,
\n     especially where  industrial and agricultural
\n     work   are\t   undertaken\tas   a\t composite
\n     enterprise,
\n\t  (2)  specialised\tcharacter\tof
\n     operations, and
\n\t  (3)  from  the  aspect  of  agricultural
\n     production\t  the\t need\tto   ensure   that
\n     efficiently  managed   farms   which   fulfil
\n     certain conditions are not broken up.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Bearing these  criteria in mind it was recommended
\nin the Second Five Year Plan (see p. 196) that the
\nfollowing categories of farms may be exempted from
\nthe operation of ceiling namely:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “(1)tea, coffee and rubber plantation;
\n\t  (2)  orchards\t where\t they\tconstitute
\n     reasonably compact areas;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
854<\/span><\/p>\n
\t  (3)  specialised farms engaged in cattle
\n     breeding, dairying, wool raising etc;
\n\t  (4)  sugarcane farms\toperated by  sugar
\n     factories; and
\n\t  (5)  efficiently  managed   farms  which
\n     consist of\t compact blocks,  on  which  heavy
\n     investment\t   or\t  permanent\tstructural
\n     improvements have\tbeen made and whose break-
\n     up\t is   likely  to   lead\t to   a\t fall\tin
\n     production.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The same  view has been reiterated in Chap. XIV of
\nthe Third  Five Year Plan dealing with Land Reform
\nand ceiling  on agricultural  holdings and para 28
\nthereof\t refers\t  to  the   grounds  of\t exemption
\nenvisaged by  the Second  Five Year  Plan.  It\tis
\nobvious therefore  that when the State legislature
\nin this\t case exempted\ttea,  coffee,  rubber  and
\ncardamom plantations  from the ceiling under Chap.
\nIII and\t treated plantations of over 30 acres as a
\nspecial case  for the purpose of Chap. II, it must
\nhave had  the principles  enunciated above in mind
\nto differentiate them from ordinary cultivation of
\nother  crops.\tIf  that   be  so,   the  question
\nimmediately arises whether there is any reason for
\ntreating areca and pepper plantations differently.
\nIf there  is none and areca and pepper plantations
\nstand so  far as these conditions are concerned on
\nthe  same   footing  as\t tea,  coffee  and  rubber
\nplantations there will clearly be a discrimination
\nagainst them by the provisions of the Act referred
\nto above.\n<\/p>\n
     Turning now  to pepper plantations, first, we
\nmay refer  to the  information contained  in  Farm
\nBulletin No.  55 relating to pepper cultivation in
\nIndia  issued\tby  the\t  Farm\tInformation  Unit,
\nDirectorate of\tExtension, Ministry  of\t Food  and
\nAgriculture,  New  Delhi  in  September\t 1959.\tIt
\nappears from this bulletin that Kerala is the most
\nimportant pepper  producing State  in India, where
\npepper is  cultivated on  an organised\tplantation
\nscale over
\n855<\/span>
\nfairly extensive  areas. There\tare three distinct
\nregions of  the pepper\tgrowing belt,  namely, (1)
\nThe Travancore\tand Cochin region. (2) The Malabar
\nand South  Canara region,  and (3)  the Coorg  and
\nNorth Canara  region. Though pepper is essentially
\na homestead  garden crop,  growers were encouraged
\nto grow it on plantation scale since 1928 when the
\nprice of pepper rose to about Rs. 700\/- per candy.
\nSince then  there has  been a  further rise in the
\nprice of pepper with the result that new homestead
\ngardens and  plantations have sprung up and pepper
\ncultivation has\t extended a  good deal. During the
\nlast fifty  years,  pepper  which  was\tlargely\t a
\nhousehold garden  crop has emerged as a plantation
\ncrop and  fairly large sized plantations of pepper
\nexist in  the submontane  eastern parts\t of  North
\nMalabar and  the Hosdrug  taluk of  South  Canara,
\n(the area  from which  these petitions\tcome).\tIn
\nHosdrug taluk in particular pepper is grown mostly
\non large scale plantations and it is here that the
\nfinest and  the best  organised pepper plantations
\nin India  exist. Some  of the  largest plantations
\namong them  have an  area of  a 100  to 150 acres.
\nPepper vines  commence yielding\t usually from  the
\nthird year,  the yield\tincreasing gradually until
\nthe vines come to full bearing in about ten years.
\nThe economic  life of  a vine varies from place to
\nplace. From  the tenth to the 25th year, the vines
\nare in\tfull bearing,  and  the\t yield\tbegins\tto
\ndecline after the 30th year. The initial outlay on
\npepper plantations  is heavy  and the  pepper crop
\nrequires continuous  attention and care. The total
\narea under  pepper is  over 2  lakhs acres  out of
\nwhich about  20,000 acres  are under  pure  pepper
\nplantations. The initial expenditure on laying out
\na pepper  plantation can  be recovered\tonly after
\nseveral years  and the\tbest  organised\t and  most
\nextensive pepper  plantations of  India are in the
\nHosdrug taluk,\tSouth  Canara  (from  where  these
\npetitions come) and North Malabar.\n<\/p>\n
856<\/span><\/p>\n
     This information  taken from Farm Bulletin 55
\nshows that in the last fifty years pepper in India
\nhas reached the plantation stage and in particular
\nin Hosdrug  taluk from\twhere these petitions come
\nthere are  the best  organized and  most extensive
\npepper plantations  in India.  The initial cost of
\nlaying out  a pepper  plantation is  heavy and the
\npepper vines  yield nothing  for three\tyears  and
\nfull production\t comes only  in\t the  tenth  year.
\nTherefore,  where   pepper  is\t cultivated  as\t a
\nplantation crop on a large scale the cost is heavy
\nand may be comparable to the outlay on large scale
\ntea, coffee and rubber plantations. It is in these
\ncircumstances that  we have  to\t consider  whether
\nthere  has   been  discrimination  against  pepper
\nplantations when  they have  not been  included in
\nthe definition of plantation under s. 2(39) of the
\nAct.\n<\/p>\n
     Turning to arecanut, reference may be made to
\nFarm Bulletin No. 14 issued by the same authority.
\nThe major  arecanut growing belt in India is again
\nthe same  regions, i.e.,  South\t Canara,  Malabar,
\nCoorg and  Travancore-Cochin along  with parts\tof
\nMysore, Bengal\tand Assam.  Arecanut is also grown
\non plantation scale. Since the crop begins to bear
\nfruit after  about eight years, large sums have to
\nbe expended  up to  the bearing\t stage without any
\nincome\ttill   then.  The  estimated  life  of\tan
\narecanut garden\t is about  50 to  60 years, though
\nsome of\t the palms  in the  garden will\t be  dying
\noccasionally or becoming uneconomic and it will be
\nnecessary  to\treplace\t them.\t For  this  reason
\nunderplanting is taken up periodically. It appears
\nfurther from  the Proceedings  of the Ninth Annual
\nGeneral Special\t and Twelfth  Ordinary Meetings of
\nthe Indian  Central  Arecanut  Committee  held\ton
\nJanuary\t 23,   1958,  that  the\t question  whether
\narecanut gardens  should be  put under\tceiling or
\nnot  and  whether  there  would\t be  hampering\tof
\nproduction  which   would  be\tagainst\t  national
\ninterest if a ceiling were imposed on such gardens
\nhad  been   referred  to   a   Sub-committee   for
\nconsideration.\n<\/p>\n
857<\/span><\/p>\n
The Sub-committee  reported that  if areca gardens
\nwere brought  under the\t ceiling it  would  hamper
\nproduction which  would be  against  the  national
\ninterest   and\t recommended   to   the\t  Planning
\nCommission, the\t Central Government  and the State
\nGovernments that,  as  proposed\t by  the  Planning
\nCommission in  respect of  tea, coffee\tand rubber
\nplantations,  orchards,\t  specialised  farms   and
\nefficiently managed  farms,  arecanut  gardens\tbe
\nalso similarly\texempted from  ceiling.\t The  Sub-
\ncommittee also\tnoticed that  arecanut cultivation
\ninvolved heavy\tcapital\t outlay\t in  establishing,
\nmaintaining and\t protecting  the  arecanut  trees.
\nThis recommendation  of the  Sub-committee came up
\nfor  consideration   before  the   Indian  Central
\nArecanut Committee  on January\t23, 1958,  and was
\naccepted.  Thus\t  these\t proceedings   show   that
\nfixation of  ceiling  on  arecanut  gardens  would
\nhamper production  which would\tbe detrimental\tto
\nnational  economy.   It\t is   in  this\tbackground
\ntherefore that\twe have\t to consider  whether  the
\nnon-inclusion of  areca and  pepper plantations in
\nthe definition\tin s.  2(39) with  the result that
\nareca and  pepper plantations do not enjoy similar
\nbenefits as others, is discriminatory.\n<\/p>\n
     From what\twe have said above it has not been
\nshown that  there is  any  appreciable\tdifference
\nbetween the  economics of  tea, coffee\tand rubber
\nplantations and\t areca and  pepper plantations. It
\nis true\t that plantations  in areca and pepper are
\nnot  so\t widespread  as\t tea,  coffee  and  rubber
\nplantations but\t it is\tequally true  that in this
\nparticular area\t from which  these petitions  come
\nareca and  pepper plantations are very common. The
\nfact however that areca and pepper plantations are
\nvery common  only in  this area\t of the\t State\tof
\nKerala is  no reason for treating them differently
\nfrom tea,  coffee and rubber plantations which are
\napparently more\t evenly distributed throughout the
\nState. If  the criteria\t evolved by  the  Planning
\nCommission, as\talready indicated,  apply to  tea,
\ncoffee and rubber
\n858<\/span>
\nplantations in\tour opinion  they equally apply to
\nareca and  pepper  plantations\tand  there  is\tno
\nreason for  differentiating between these two sets
\nof plantations.\t So far\t as areca  is concerned we
\nhave  the  recommendation  of  the  Sub-committee,
\nmentioned above,  endorsed by  the Indian  Central
\nArecanut Committee,  that it  would be detrimental
\nto national  economy not  to extend the benefit of
\nexemption from\tceiling to arecanut plantations in
\nthe same way as is done in the case of tea, coffee
\nand rubber  plantations. As  for pepper we have it
\nfrom Farm  Bulletin No. 55 that the best organised
\nand most extensive pepper plantations of India are
\nin Hosdrug  Taluk of South Canara and that some of
\nthem are  even as  large as 100 to 150 acres each.
\nThe result  of the  application of the ceiling and
\nother provisions  of the Act would mean the break-
\nup of  these plantations and may result in fall in
\nproduction. It\tis to  avoid the  break-up of tea,
\ncoffee and  rubber plantations\tand the consequent
\nfall in\t production  that  ceiling  has\t not  been
\nimposed on  these plantations. The same reasons in
\nour opinion  lead to  the conclusion  that  pepper
\nplantations should  also be  treated similarly. In
\nthis connection\t reference  may\t be  made  to  the
\nopinion expressed  in Farm  Bulletin No.  55 where
\nthe author  has said that it is impossible to keep
\na large\t plantation  of\t pepper\t in  good  tip-top
\ncondition, without incurring heavy expenditure and
\nwithout great  efforts and  has added  that in the
\nexisting conditions  no one  planter  should  have
\nmore than  10 acres  of\t pepper\t plantation.  This
\nwould  seem  to\t suggest  that\t10  acres  is  the
\neconomic optimum  limit for pepper plantations. It
\nis  not\t  clear\t however   on  what   basis   this
\nrecommendation\tis   based,  for  undoubtedly  the
\nbulletin shows\tthat there are plantations of much
\nlarger extent  in this\tarea and  the  plantations
\nhere are the best organised and the most extensive
\nthroughout the\twhole of  India. The  only  reason
\nwhich seems  to have  been given in support of the
\nopinion that
\n859<\/span>
\n10  acres   is\tthe  optimum  area  for\t a  pepper
\nplantation is  that one planter in that region was
\nof the\tview that unless the price of one candy of
\npepper\tremained  at  a\t high  level  of  anything
\nbetween Rs.  1,500\/- and  Rs. 2,000\/-  it will\tbe
\nimpracticable and  unprofitable to  maintain large
\nscale plantations  of pepper in these regions, and
\nif prices  go down  for below  this  level,  large
\nscale pepper  plantations  may\thave  even  to\tbe
\nabandoned. This does not afford a sufficient basis
\nfor holding  that 10  acres is the optimum holding
\nfor a pepper plantation. In the first place, it is
\nmentioned at  p. 8  of the  bulletin  that  pepper
\nbegan to  be grown  on plantation  scale when  the
\nprice rose  to about  Rs. 700\/- per candy in 1928.
\nTherefore  even\t if  the  price\t falls\tbelow  Rs.
\n1,500\/- to  Rs. 2,000\/-\t per  candy  there  is\tno
\nreason why  pepper  cultivation\t on  a\tplantation
\nscale should become impracticable, particularly as
\nit is  unlikely that  the cost of only pepper will
\nfall and  not all  other commodities. At p. 72 the
\nbulletin mentions  that the cost of cultivation of
\npepper can  be brought\tdown only  if the  general
\nprice level  is brought\t down  substantially.  Now
\nthere is  no reason to suppose that there would be
\na catastrophic\tfall in\t the price level of pepper
\nonly which would make all pepper plantations above
\n10 acres  uneconomic and unprofitable. In any case
\nthis is\t not the  reason urged\ton behalf  of  the
\nState  in   support  of\t  not\tincluding   pepper
\nplantations in\tthe definition\tof plantation.\tIn
\nthis connection\t we ought  to add that the counter
\naffidavit  filed   by  the   respondent\t is   very
\nunsatisfactory; no  serious attempt  has been made
\nat all\tto justify  the exclusion  of  pepper  and
\narecanut  from\t the  exemption\t granted  to  tea,
\ncoffee, rubber\tand cardamom;  no facts are stated
\nand no\tdata supplied  in reply\t to  the  detailed
\nallegations made  in the petitions challenging the
\nvalidity of  the classification\t in question.  The
\nonly reason  given by  the State  in  the  counter
\naffidavit is  that a  plantation crop is generally
\nunderstood
\n860<\/span>
\nto refer  only\tto  tea,  coffee  and  rubber  and
\ncardamom. It  is not  quite clear  what exactly is
\nmeant  by   this  one\tsentence  in  the  counter
\naffidavit in  support  of  the\tdefinition.  If\t a
\nplantation crop\t is generally  understood to refer
\nto only\t tea, coffee,  rubber and  cardamom, it is
\nnot understood\twhy the\t definition  provides  for
\nextending the  word “plantation\t to other crops by
\nnotification. The  very fact  that power  has been
\nreserved   for\t extending   the   definition\tby
\nnotification to other crops shows that other crops
\ncan also  be grown  on plantation  scale. In  view
\ntherefore of  what we have said above with respect
\nto the\teconomics of areca and pepper cultivation,
\nit is  obvious that  no sufficient reason has been
\nshown  for   differentiating  areca   and   pepper
\nplantations in\tthis area  from\t tea,  coffee  and
\nrubber plantations  in the  State. Making  all the
\npresumptions in\t favour of the classification made
\nunder s.2(39) it is clear that there is nothing on
\nthe  face   of\tthe   law   or\t the   surrounding
\ncircumstances which has been brought to our notice
\nin this case on which the classification contained
\nin s.  2(39) can  be said  to be reasonably based.
\nConsidering the\t object and purpose of the Act and
\nthe basis  on which  exemption\thas  been  granted
\nunder  Chapters\t II  and  III  to  plantations\tas
\ndefined in  the Act, there appears to be no reason
\nfor making any distinction between tea, coffee and
\nrubber on the one hand and areca and pepper on the
\nother in  this particular  case. It  is not  as if
\ntea, coffee  and rubber\t are grown only on a large
\nscale while areca and pepper are mostly grown on a
\nsmall scale.  We  find\tfrom  the  report  of  the
\nPlantation Inquiry  Commission, 1956,  that  small
\nholdings  exist\t  in  tea,   coffee   and   rubber
\nplantations also  and are  in fact the majority of
\nsuch plantations.  For example,\t in the\t report of
\nthe  Plantation\t Inquiry  Commission  relating\tto
\ncoffee at  pp. 9  and 14  we find  that out of the
\ntotal number of registered estates more than 4,500
\nare between  5 acres and 25 acres while only about
\n2,200
\n861<\/span>
\nestates are above 25 acres. Further there are more
\nthan 24,000 estates below 5 acres. Similarly at p.
\n97, Chap.  XI, Part III of the Report dealing with
\nrubber, out  of the  total of  over 26, 709 rubber
\nestates, 23,300\t are up to 5 acres, 1,900 up to 10
\nacres and  only about  1,500 above 10 acres. So it
\nappears that  the large\t majority  of  plantations
\nwhether they  be of  coffee or rubber are below 10
\nacres and  that is  also the  case with\t area  and
\npepper plantations.  Thus there\t is no\treason for
\ngiving preference  to plantations  of tea,  coffee
\nand rubber over plantations of area and pepper for
\nthe conditions\tin the\ttwo  sets  of  plantations
\nwhether for the purpose of ceiling under Chap. III
\nor for\tthe purpose  of acquisition of landowners’
\nrights under  Chap. II\tare the\t same. The reasons
\ntherefore which\t call for exemption of tea, coffee
\nand rubber  plantations equally apply to areca and
\npepper plantations  and there  is no  intelligible
\ndifferentia related  to the  object and purpose of
\nthe Act which would justify any distinction in the
\ncase of\t tea, coffee  and  rubber  plantations\tas
\nagainst\t area\tand  pepper  plantations.  We  are
\ntherefore of  opinion that the provisions relating
\nto plantations\tare violative  of Art.\t14 of  the
\nConstitution.\n<\/p>\n
     The next question is whether these provisions
\nare severable,\tthat is to say, whether the Kerala
\nlegislature would  have\t passed\t the  Act  without
\nthese provisions.  That depends upon the intention
\nof the legislature and as far as we can judge that
\nintention from the provisions of the Act, it seems
\nclear to  us that  the legislature  did not intend
\nthat the  provisions relating  to  acquisition\tby
\ntenants and  ceilings should  apply to plantations
\nas defined in the Act, so that they may have to be
\nbroken-up with\tconsequent loss\t of production and
\ndetriment to  national economy.\t It seems that the
\nlegislature could  not have  intended in  order to
\ncarry out  the purpose of the legislation to do so
\neven after breaking-up all the plantations which
\n862<\/span>
\nexisted in  the State.\tIt follows  therefore that
\nthe legislature\t would not have passed the rest of
\nthe  Act   without  the\t  provisions  relating\tto
\nplantations. As these provisions affect the entire
\nworking out of Chapter II and III of the Act which
\nare the\t main provisions  thereof, it follows that
\nthese provisions relating to plantations cannot be
\nsevered from  the Act  and  struck  down  only\tby
\nthemselves.  Therefore,\t the  whole  Act  must\tbe
\nstruck\tdown  as  violative  of\t Art.  14  of  the
\nConstitution so\t far as\t it  applies  to  ryotwari
\nlands in  those areas  of  the\tState  which  were
\ntransferred to it from the State of Madras, and we
\norder accordingly.\n<\/p>\n
Re. (5).\n<\/p>\n
     Then we  come to  the attack  that the Act is
\nviolative of  Art. 14  on account of the manner in
\nwhich ceiling  has been fixed under s. 58 thereof.
\nSection\t 2(12)\t defines  a  “family”  as  meaning
\nhusband, wife  and their  unmarried minor children
\nor such of them as exist. There are three kinds of
\nfamilies existing  in this State namely, the joint
\nHindu\tfamily,\t   Marumakhathayam   family    and
\nAliyasanthana  family,\t the  latter   two   being
\nmatriarchal. In the matriarchal family the husband
\nand wife  are not  members of  the same family but
\nbelong to  different  families.\t The  joint  Hindu
\nfamily does  not merely\t consist of  the  husband,
\nwife and  unmarried minor children; it consists at
\nleast of  the husband  wife and\t all the  children
\nwhether married\t or unmarried and whether minor or
\nadult. The definition of “family” therefore in the
\nAct is an artificial one which does not conform to
\nany of\tthe three  kinds of  families prevalent in
\nthe State.\n<\/p>\n
     Turning now  to s.\t 58, the  ceiling has been
\nfixed in  two ways. The first is by reference to a
\nfamily as defined in the Act of not more than five
\nmembers which  is allowed  15 acres of double crop
\nnilam or  its equivalent  with an  addition of one
\nacre of\t double crop  nilam or\tits equivalent for
\neach
\n863<\/span>
\nmember in  excess of  five, so\thowever\t that  the
\ntotal extent of the land shall not exceed 25 acres
\nof double crop nilam or its equivalent. The second
\nis by  reference to  an adult unmarried person who
\nis allowed  7.50 acres of double crop nilam or its
\nequivalent. It\thas been  urged on  behalf of  the
\nState that  the provisions  as they  stand do  not
\nmake any  discrimination whatsoever  for there\tis
\nthe same provision for all adult unmarried persons
\nand the\t same for  all families\t as defined in the
\nAct. This in our opinion is an over-simplification
\nof the\tprovision relating to ceiling under s. 58.
\nOn an  argument of  this kind  no provision  would
\never be\t discriminatory for  it is unlikely that a
\nprovision  would   on  the   face  of  it  make\t a
\ndiscrimination. The  discriminatory nature  of the
\nprovision has  to be  judged from the results that
\nfollow from  it and  we have  no  doubt\t that  the
\nresults which follow from this double provision as
\nto ceiling  are bound to be discriminatory. If the
\nceiling\t had   been  fixed  with  respect  to  one
\nstandard whether  it be of an individual person or
\nof a  natural family  by which\twe mean\t a  family
\nrecognised in  personal law,  the results  may not
\nhave been discriminatory. But where the ceiling is
\nfixed as  in the present case by a double standard
\nand over  and above that the family has been given
\nan artificial definition which does not correspond
\nwith a\tnatural family\tas known  to personal law,
\nthere is bound to be discrimination resulting from
\nsuch  a\t provision.  A\tsimple\tillustration  will
\nexplain how the results of the manner in which the
\nceiling has been fixed by s. 58 will lead to clear
\ndiscrimination between person and person. Take the
\ncase of\t an adult unmarried person and a minor who
\nis an  orphan with  no father,\tmother brother\tor
\nsister. Assume\tfurther that each owns 25 acres of
\nland under personal cultivation. The former who is
\nan adult  unmarried person will retain 7 acres and
\nwill have to surrender 17.50 acres as excess land.
\nThe latter  will be an artificial family under the
\ndefinition of that word
\n864<\/span>
\nin s.  2(12). This  follows from  the fact  that a
\nfamily\tconsists   of  husband,\t  wife\tand  their
\nunmarried minor children or such of them as exist.
\nThis is\t also made  clear by  s. 61(2) which shows
\nthat even  a minor  who has  no\t parents,  and\tno
\nbrothers or sisters will constitute a family under
\ns. 2(12).  This minor  therefore as constituting a
\nfamily will  be entitled  to 15\t acres of land and
\nwill have  to surrender\t only 10  acres as  excess
\nland. No  justification has  been shown\t to us\ton
\nbehalf\tof   the  State\t for  this  discriminatory
\ntreatment of  two individual  persons; nor  are we
\nable to\t understand why\t such discrimination which
\nclearly\t results   from\t the  application  of  the
\nprovisions of  s. 58(1)is not violative of Art. 14
\nof the\tConstitution. Examples\tcan be\tmultiplied
\nwith reference to joint Hindu families also, which
\nwould show  that in many cases discrimination will
\nresult on  the application  of these provisions to
\njoint Hindu families. Similar would in our opinion
\nbe the case with Marumakhathayam and Aliyasanthana
\nfamilies where\tas we have already pointed out the
\nhusband and  wife do not belong to the same family
\nas known to personal law. Discrimination therefore
\nis writ large on the consequences that follow from
\nthe provisions\tof s.  58(1). We  are therefore of
\nopinion\t that\ts.  58(1)   is\tviolative  of  the
\nfundamental right  enshrined in\t Art. 14;  as that
\nsection is the basis of entire Chap. III the whole
\nChapter must  fall  with  it.  This  would  be\tan
\nadditional reason  why Chap.  III should be struck
\ndown as\t violative of Art 14 in its application to
\nryotwari landas\t which have  come to  the State of
\nKerala from the State of Madras.\n<\/p>\n
Re. (6)
\n     It is  contended that the manner in which the
\ncompensation is\t cut down  progressively in ss. 52
\nand 64\tof the\tAct is\tviolative of  Art. 14. The
\nCompensation payable  under s. 52 is determined in
\nthis manner.  First the\t purchase price is arrived
\nat under  s. 45.  Thereafter s.\t 52(2)(b) provides
\nthat the  landowner or the intermediary, except in
\nthe
\n865<\/span>
\ncase  of  religious,  charitable  and  educational
\ninstitution of\ta public nature, would be entitled
\nto compensation. The compensation would consist of
\n(1) the value of structures, wells and embankments
\nof a  permanent nature\tsituated in  the land  and
\nbelonging to the landowner or the intermediary, as
\nthe case  may be,  and (2)  the percentage  of the
\nvalue  of   interest  of   the\tlandowner  or  the
\nintermediary  in  respect  of  the  land  and  the
\nimprovements other  than those\tfalling under sub-
\ncl. (i)\t according to the scales specified in Sch.
\nII. Schedule  II then  provides that the first Rs.
\n15,000\/-. of  the compensation\twill  be  paid\tin
\nfull. Thereafter  there will  be a  reduction of 5
\nper cent.  in each  slab of  Rs. 10,000\/-  till we
\nreach compensation above Rs. 1,45,000\/- Thereafter
\nthe compensation  arrived at under s. 52 read with
\ns. 45  is reduced  by 70  per  cent  so\t that  the
\nlandowner or  the intermediary\tgets only  30  per
\ncent of\t what has  been arrived at under s. 52 (2)\n<\/p>\n
(b) read with s. 45.\n<\/p>\n
     Similarly in  s. 64  the compensation payable
\nfor excess  land surrendered is (i) the full value
\nof any\tstructures, wells  and\tembankments  of\t a
\npermanent nature situate in the land and belonging
\nto the\tperson who  surrenders such land, and (ii)
\nthe percentage of the market value of the land and
\nimprovements other  than  those\t specified  above.
\nHere again  on the first Rs. 15,000\/- compensation
\nat 60  per cent\t is to\tbe  paid.  Thereafter  the
\ncompensation is\t reduced by  5 per  cent for  each
\nslab of\t Rs.  15,000\/-\ttill  we  reach\t over  Rs.
\n1,75,000\/- when\t the compensation is reduced by 75
\nper cent.\n<\/p>\n
     The contention  on behalf\tof the petitioners
\nis that\t there is  no intelligible  differentia on
\nwhich the purchase price determined under s. 45 or
\nthe market  value is  to be  reduced by\t different
\npercentages depending  on the total purchase price
\nor the\ttotal market  value of\tthe interest to be
\nacquired. The reply on behalf of the State is that
\nthere is really no discrimination inasmuch
\n866<\/span>
\nas  the\t same  percentage  is  reduced\twhere  the
\ncompensation payable  to different  persons is the
\nsame. That  is undoubtedly  so. But  that alone is
\nnot in\tour opinion  the end  of the  matter.  The
\nquestion which\tis posed  for our consideration is
\nwhy a  person in  whose case the purchase price or
\nthe market  value Rs. 15,000\/- should get the full
\npurchase price or suffer a reduction in the market
\nvalue at  a certain  rate while\t another person in
\nwhose case  compensation is more than Rs. 15,000\/-
\nshould suffer reductions at a different rate which
\nreductions  become  progressively  higher  as  the
\npurchase price\tor the\tmarket value increases. We
\ncould understand  once the  purchase price  or the
\nmarket value  had been\tdetermined a  uniform  cut
\ntherefrom   for\t   all\t persons    entitled\tto
\ncompensation. That  would then\traise the question
\nof adequacy of compensation and unless the cut was
\nso large  as to make the compensation illusory the
\ncut may\t be protected  by Art.31(2).  But  in  the
\npresent case  there is\tnot a  uniform cut  on the
\npurchase  price\t  or  the  market  value  for  all
\npersons, the  cut is  higher as the purchase price
\nor the\tmarket value  gets bigger and bigger after
\nthe first slab of Rs. 15,000\/-. This difference in
\ncut in\tbeing justified\t on behalf of the State on
\nthe same principle on which (for example) the slab
\nsystem exists  for purposes  of income-tax. We are
\nhowever of  opinion that  there is  no\tcomparison
\nbetween the  slab system  of income-tax\t rates and
\nthe present  cuts. Taxation  is a  compulsory levy
\nfrom  each  individual\tfor  the  purpose  of  the
\nmaintenance  of\t  the  State.\tWe  may\t therefore
\nreasonably expect  that a rich man may be required
\nto make\t a contribution\t which may  be higher than
\nwhat may  be proportionately  due from\this income
\nfor that  purpose as  compared to a poor man. This
\nprinciple cannot  be applied  in a  case  where\t a
\nperson is deprived of his property under the power
\nof eminent  domain for\twhich he  is  entitled\tto
\ncompensation. There  is no  reason  why\t when  two
\npersons are  deprived of their property one richer
\nthan the other, they should be paid at
\n867<\/span>
\ndifferent rates\t when the  property of\twhich they
\nare deprived  is of the same kind and differs only
\nin extent.  No such  principle can  be applied\tin
\ncase where  compensation is  being  granted  to\t a
\nperson for  deprivation of his property. Where one
\nperson owns  property valued at Rs. 15,000\/- while
\nanother owns property valued at Rs. 30,000\/-, both
\nare  equally   deprived\t of   the  property.  When
\ntherefore it  comes to\ta question  of payment\tof
\ncompensation we\t can see  no reason  why a  person
\nwhose compensation  amounts to Rs. 15,000\/- should
\nget the\t whole of  it or  a large part of it while
\nanother person whose compensation amounts to (say)
\nRs. 30,000\/-  should get  something less  than the
\nfirst person.  It is  not  as  if  there  is  some
\ndifference in  the nature  of the  property  which
\nmight justify  different payments of compensation.
\nWhat the  Act provides is to work out the purchase
\nprice or the market value first for the purpose of
\ndetermining compensation  and then  make different
\ncuts from  the purchase\t price or the market value
\naccording to  whether in  one  case  the  purchase
\nprice or  the market  value is Rs. 15,000\/- and in
\nanother case  it is  more than\tRs.  15,000\/-.\tNo
\njustification,\t is    pointed\t out\tfor   this
\ndiscrimination except  the principle  on which the
\nslab system  for  the  purpose\tof  income-tax\tis
\njustified. That principles as we have just pointed
\nout does not apply to a case of compensation.\n<\/p>\n
     Nor  are\twe  able   to  see   any  rational
\nclassification which  would justify different cuts
\nbased simply  on the amount of compensation worked
\nout on\tthe basis  of  purchase\t price\tor  market
\nvalue. The only thing we can see is that because a
\nperson is possibly richer he must be paid less for
\nthe same type of land while a person who is poorer
\nmust be\t paid more. This kind of discrimination in
\nthe payment  of compensation cannot in our opinion
\nbe possibly  justified on the objects and purposes
\nof the\tAct. The object and purpose of the Act, as
\nwe have\t already  said,\t is  to\t grant\trights\tto
\ncultivating tenants so that they may
\n868<\/span>
\nimprove their lands resulting in larger production
\nto the\tbenefit of the national economy. Secondly,
\nthe object  of the  Act is to provide land for the
\nlandless and  to those who may have little land by
\ntaking excess  land  from  those  who  have  large
\ntracts of lands so that peasant proprietorship may
\nincrease with  consequent increase  in\tproduction
\ndue to\tgreater interest  of the cultivator in the
\nsoil. But  these objects have no rational relation
\nwhich would  justify the  making of different cuts
\nfrom the  purchase price  or the  market value for
\nthe purpose  of giving compensation to those whose
\ninterests are being acquired under the Act. We can
\ntherefore  see\t no   justification   for   giving
\ndifferent compensation\tbased  on  different  cuts
\nfrom the  purchase price  or the  market value\tas
\nprovided in ss. 52 and 64 of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
     We may  in this connection refer to Kameshwar
\nSingh v.  The State of Bihar (1), in which similar
\nquestion with  respect to compensation provided in
\nthe Bihar  Land Reforms\t Act, 1950,  came  up  for
\nconsideration. There the Act provided compensation
\nat different  rates depending upon the net income.
\nThe landowner having the smallest net income below
\nRs. 500\/-  was to  get twenty times the net income
\nas compensation\t while the  landowner  having  the
\nlargest net income, i. e., above 1,00,000\/- was to
\nget  only   three  times   of  the   net   income.
\nIntermediate slabs  provided  different\t multiples
\nfor  different\t amounts  of   net  income.   That
\nprovision was  struck down by the Special Bench of
\nthe Patna  High Court  as violative of Art. 14. It
\nmay be\tmentioned that\t decision was given before
\nthe Constitution (First Amendment) Act adding Art.
\n31A and the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution was
\npassed. Three learned Judges composing the Special
\nBench who heard that case were unanimously of the
\n869<\/span>
\nopinion\t that\tsuch  difference  in  payment  was
\nviolative  of\tArt.  14   and\tthe  principle\tof
\nprogressive taxation did not apply to compensation
\nfor land acquired. We are of opinion that the view
\ntaken in that case is correct and the same applies
\nto the\tpresent case.  We may point out that  case
\ncame in\t appeal to  this Court\t(see, The State of
\nBihar v.  Maharajadhiraja Sir  Kameshwar Singh<\/a> (1)
\n). The appeal however was heard after Art. 31A and
\nthe Ninth  Schedule had\t been  introduced  in  the
\nConstitution  and  therefore  this  Court  had\tno
\noccasion to  consider whether  such difference\tin
\npayment of compensation would be violative of Art.\n<\/p>\n
14. We\tare therefore  clearly of opinion that the
\nmanner in which progressive cuts have been imposed
\non the\tpurchase price\tunder s. 52 and the market
\nvalue under  s.\t 64  in\t order\tto  determine  the
\ncompensation   payable\t  to   land    owners\tor
\nintermediaries in  one case  and to  persons  from
\nwhom excess  land is  taken in\tanother results in
\ndiscrimination and  cannot  be\tjustified  on  any
\nintelligible differentia which has any relation to
\nthe objects  and  purposes  of\tthe  Act.  As  the
\nprovision as  to compensation  is all  pervasives,
\nthe entire Act must be struck down as violative of
\nArt. 14 in its application to ryotwari lands which
\nhave come to the State of Kerala from the State of
\nMadras.\n<\/p>\n
     In view  of what  we have\tsaid above  on the
\nmain  points   urged  in   the\tpetitions,  it\tis
\nunnecessary to\tconsider other\tsubsidiary  points
\nattacking particular  sections of  the Act  on the
\nground that they were unreasonable restrictions on
\nthe right to acquire, hold and dispose of property
\nunder  Art.   19(1)(f).\t We  therefore\tallow  the
\npetitions and  strike down  the Act in relation to
\nits application\t to ryotwari lands which have come
\nto the\tState of  Kerala from the State of Madras.
\nThe petitioners\t will get  their  costs\t from  the
\nState of Kerala, one set of hearing costs.\n<\/p>\n
870<\/span><\/p>\n
     SARKAR, J.-I  wish to  say a few words on two
\nof the questions that arise in these cases.\n<\/p>\n
     The Act, the validity of which is challenged,
\nprovides for  acquisition of  lands for\t equitable
\ndistribution among  the people\twho require it for
\ncultivation by themselves. It provides for payment
\nof  compensation  to  those  whose  interests  are
\nacquired. It also provides for a mode of valuation
\nof these interests. Then it provides by ss. 52 and
\n64 for\tpayment of compensation at a progressively
\nsmaller rate for larger valuations. For the higher
\nslabs in  the valuation\t made as  provided by  the
\nAct, less and less is paid by way of compensation.
\nIt is said that these provisions for progressively
\ndiminishing compensation  are  discriminatory  and
\nunconstitutional. This\tis the\tfirst  point  with
\nwhich I propose to deal.\n<\/p>\n
     The  question   is\t whether  the  payment\tof
\ncompensation at\t a progressively  smaller rate\tas
\nthe valuation  is higher  offends Art.\t14 of  the
\nConstitution.  Now   it\t is   not  disputed   that
\nprogressively higher  rate of  taxation by  an Act
\ntaxing income  is not  unconstitutional.  I  think
\nsuch taxation  is too  well recognised\tnow to\tbe
\nchallenged. If\tthat is\t so-and that was the basis
\non which  arguments proceeded  in this\tcase-I\tam
\nunable\tto   see  that\ta  statute  providing  for
\nacquisition  of\t  property  and\t  for  payment\tof
\ncompensation at a progressively lower rate for the
\nhigher slabs of valuation can be unconstitutional.\n<\/p>\n
     “The reason  for progressive  taxation in the
\ncase of\t inheritance taxes and income taxes is the
\nability of  those receiving  or\t giving\t to  pay”:
\nWillis’s Constitutional Law (1936 ed.) p. 597. The
\ncases in  America that\tI have\tlooked up also put
\nthe matter  on the  same basis. The classification
\nby  progressively  higher  taxation  in\t a  taxing
\nstatute is  therefore good  if based  on  the  tax
\npayers’ ability to pay.\n<\/p>\n
     It is  however said  that what applies in the
\ncase of a taxing statute cannot apply to a statute
\n871<\/span>
\npermitting acquisition\tof property  on payment of
\ncompensation. I\t do not\t see why  ? I am not aware
\nthat the  test for  determining whether\t there has
\nbeen unequal treatment is different with different
\nvarieties of  statutes, that the test for a taxing
\nstatute is  not the  same as  that for\ta  statute
\nproviding   for\t   acquisition\t on   payment\tof
\ncompensation. I think the test is the same for all
\nstatutes,  and\t it  is\t that  there  must  be\tan
\nintelligible   differentia   having   a\t  rational
\nrelation to the object of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
     Now the  object of\t a taxing  statute  is\tto
\ncollect revenue for the governance of the country.
\nAbility\t to   pay  is\tacknowledged  to   be\tan
\nintelligible differentia having a relation to such
\nan object. The object of the statute with which we
\nare concerned  is to  acquire land  on payment\tof
\ncompensation so\t that the  land may  be\t equitably
\ndistributed among  the people.\tIf under a statute
\nwhose object  is to  collect revenue  more can\tbe
\nlegitimately demanded  from a  person having more,
\nit seems  to me\t that under a statute whose object
\nis to acquire land by paying compensation less can
\nequally legitimately  be paid  to a person who has
\nmore. Ability  to pay,\tor which is the same thing
\nas ability  to bear  the loss arising from smaller
\npayment received,  would  in  either  case  be\tan
\nintelligible   differentia   having   a\t  rational
\nrelation to  the object of the Act. In one case it
\nserves the  object by  collecting more revenue for
\nadding to  the resources for governing the country
\nand in\tthe other  case it  serves the\tobject\tby
\nmaking it  possible for\t the State  by payment\tof
\nless money  out of  its resources to acquire lands
\nfor better  distribution. In  both cases the State
\nresources are  benefited, in  one by  augmentation
\nand  in\t  the  other   by  prevention\tof  larger
\ndepletion. Therefore,  I would\taccept the learned
\nAttorney-General’s argument  that ss. 52 and 64 of
\nthe Act\t cannot be  held to  be discriminatory and
\nvoid for the same reason on which
\n872<\/span>
\nprogressive rates  of taxation\tare held not to be
\nso in the case of an Income-tax Act.\n<\/p>\n
     The next  question on  which I  wish to say a
\nfew words  concerns those  provisions of  the  Act
\nwhich exempt plantations of tea, coffee, rubber or
\ncardamom or  such other\t kinds of special crops as
\nthe   Government   may\t specify,   from   certain
\nprovisions  of\tthe  Act.  Plantations\thave  been
\ndefined in  s. 2(39)  of the Act as land used by a
\nperson principally  for the  cultivation  of  tea,
\ncoffee,\t rubber\t or  cardamom  or  other  notified
\ncrops. No other crop appears to have been notified
\nyet. Section  58 of  the Act  provides the ceiling
\narea of\t land which  may be held by any individual
\nproprietor. Land  above\t the  ceiling  has  to\tbe
\nsurrendered to\tthe Government.\t Section 57 of the
\nAct provides  that this\t provision would not apply
\nto plantations\tas defined in s. 2(39). Again, Ch.
\n2 of  the Act which gives the tenants the right to
\npurchase land  from the landlords and vests in the
\nGovernment  the\t  lands\t of   the  landlords   not
\nthemselves  cultivating\t them  above  the  ceiling
\nfixed, is  by s.  3 (viii)  not made applicable to
\nplantations exceeding  thirty acres in extent. The
\nquestion is  whether the  benefit so  given to the
\nplantations   as    defined   in    the\t  Act\tis
\ndiscriminatory. The  petitioners own  large  scale
\ncultivation of areca and pepper. They contend that
\nno legitimate  differentiation is possible between
\nlands on  which areca  and pepper  are\tgrown  and
\nlands on  which tea,  coffee, rubber  and cardamom
\nare grown.\n<\/p>\n
     No doubt the presumption is that a statute is
\nconstitutional\tbut   such  presumption\t  is   not
\nconclusive. It\tis  also  true\tthat  a\t court\tis
\nentitled to  assume the\t existence of all rational
\nbasis on  which the  classification made by an Act
\nmay be\tjustified. Even\t so, it\t seems to me, that
\nthe present  classification is,\t on the\t materials
\nnow before  us\tnot  justified.\t It  may  be  that
\nplantations of tea, coffee
\n873<\/span>
\nrubber and  cardamom, especially  the first three,
\nare  usually   large  in   size\t and  require  big
\ninvestments. It may be that they are carried on as
\nindustries which give employment to a large labour
\nforce.\tThese  characteristics\tmay  however  only
\njustify the  putting of large plantations of these
\ncrops in  a class.  The Act  however  exempts  all
\nlands on  which tea, coffee, rubber or cardamom is
\ngrown irrespective  of the  size of  the  business
\ncarried on  or of  labour employed  on them,  as a
\nclass. Materials  have been  placed before  us\tto
\nshow that there are a very large number of smaller
\nplantations growing  tea, coffee and rubber. There
\nare  also   many  areca\t  and  pepper  plantations
\nexceeding thirty acres in area. There is no reason
\nto  put\t  tea,\t coffee,   rubber   and\t  cardamom
\nplantations  in\t a  class  as  distinguished  from
\nsimilar sizes  of plantations of areca and pepper.
\nNone at\t least has  been shown\tby  the\t State\tof
\nKerala to  exist. The  only ground  shown  in  the
\naffidavit  of  the  State  of  Kerala  seeking\tto
\njustify the  classification of tea, coffee, rubber
\nand cardamom  plantations in  one  class  is  that
\n“plantation crop  is generally understood to refer
\nonly to tea, coffee, rubber and cardamom” and that
\n“areca and  pepper are\tnot generally  grown on\t a
\nplantation scale”. I am unable to think that these
\nafford\tsufficient   justification  for\t making\t a
\ndiscrimination in  favour of  tea, coffee,  rubber
\nand cardamom plantations. It would appear from the
\nPlanning Commission’s  Report that  other kinds of
\ncrops might  profitably\t be  grown  as\tplantation
\ncrops. In  any case,  a general understanding even
\nif there  was one,  is not  sufficient\tbasis  for
\ndiscrimination.\t  With\t regard\t  to   the   other
\nstatements of  the State, it is enough to say that
\nthe Act\t does not make a discrimination because of
\nthe size  of the  plantations. Therefore, there is
\nno point  in saying  that areca and pepper are not
\ngrown on a plantation scale.\n<\/p>\n
     For these\treasons I  think the provisions in
\nthe Act making a discrimination in favour of tea,
\n874<\/span>
\ncoffee, rubber\tand cardamom plantations cannot be
\nupheld.\t For   the  same   reason,  I\tthink  the
\ndiscriminatory treatment  made in favour of cashew
\nplantation  also  cannot  be  sustained.  Sections
\n3(viii),  57(1)(d)   and  59(2)\t of  the  Act  are
\ntherefore, in my opinion, invalid. I think however
\nthat these  provisions are  severable  from  other
\nparts of  the Act. I think it cannot be reasonably
\nsaid that  the legislature  would not  put the Act
\ninto operation\tif these  provisions are taken out
\nof it.\tThe deletion  of the  provisions does  not
\nfurther make it impossible for the rest of the Act
\nto operate.  I am, therefore, unable, to hold that
\nbecause the  sections mentioned above are bad, the
\nwhole Act should be declared to be bad.\n<\/p>\n
     That is  all I  wish to say in this judgment.
\nWith regard  to the  other matters arising in this
\ncase, I\t agree\twith  the  judgment  delivered\tby
\nWanchoo J.\n<\/p>\n
     AYYANGAR, J.-I  entirely agree with the order
\nthat the  petitions  should  be\t allowed  and  the
\nimpugned  Act  struck  down  in\t relation  to  its
\napplication to\tryotwari lands which came into the
\nState of  Kerala from  the  State  of  Madras-this
\nbeing the  only relief\twhich the petitioners seek
\nfrom this  Court. My only reason for this separate
\njudgment is  because I\tdo  not\t agree\twith  that
\nportion of  the reasoning in the judgment just now
\npronounced in  these petitions where it deals with
\nthe interpretation  of Art. 31A(2). In my judgment
\nin the\tcompanion case-Writ  Petition No.  105\tof
\n1961-I have endeavored to point out what according
\nto me  is the  proper construction of this Article
\nand I adhere to that view.\n<\/p>\n
     I consider\t that on  Art. 31A(2) as it stands
\neven after  the fourth\tAmendment, properties held
\non ryotwari  tenures and  the interest of the royt
\nin such\t lands would  not  be  “estates”  for  the
\npurposes of  that Article. No doubt as pointed out
\nby me in the
\n875<\/span>
\nother judgment, if there was a law existing on the
\ndate of\t the Constitution  in  relation\t to  land-
\ntenures\t under\twhich  “estate”\t were  defined\tas
\nincluding not  merely lands held by intermediaries
\nand of\tothers holding\tunder favourable tenurers,
\nbut also  of ryotwari  proprietors  having  direct
\nrelationship with  the Government  and paying full
\nassessment,  such  latter  category  of\t interests
\nmight  also   be  comprehended\t within\t the  term
\n“estate” by  reason of\tthe words  “have the  same
\nmeaning\t as   that  expression…….has   in  the
\nexisting law  relating to land tenures in force in
\nthat area”  in Art.31A(2)(a).  That  is\t the  real
\nbasis and  the ratio  underlying the  decisions of
\nthis Court  in Ram  Ram Narain\tMedhi v.  State of
\nBombay<\/a>(1), and\tAtma Ram v. State of Punjab(2). In
\nall other  cases (apart\t from the  two\tcategories
\nspecially added\t by the Fourth Amendment) no lands
\nother than those held by intermediaries or held on
\na  favourable\ttenure\twould\tfall  within   the
\ndefinition of  “an estate” this being according to
\nme the\tcentral concept\t or the\t thread which runs
\nthrough the entire definition.\n<\/p>\n
     The    choice     between\t  the\t different
\ninterpretations of  the Article\t does not  however
\npresent itself\tfor the\t disposal of this petition
\nwhich  has   to\t be  answered  in  favour  of  the
\npetitioner even\t on the\t view of the scope of Art.
\n31A which  has commended  itself to my colleagues.
\nWhere an “existing law in relation to land-tenures
\nin force  in an\t area” contains a definition of an
\n“estate” and that definition excludes the interest
\nof  a  roytwari\t proprietor,  the  very\t words\tof
\nArt.31A(2)(a) which I have extracted earlier would
\nnegative the  applicability of\tits provisions\tto
\nthat tenure.\n<\/p>\n
     Art. 31A  being out  of the  way I agree that
\nthe provision in (1) s. 2 (39) of the Act which by
\ndefinition excludes  pepper and\t areca plantations
\nfrom the  category of  the plantations\twhich  are
\nnamed in  it which are exempted from the operative
\nprovisions of the impugned Act, (2)s. 58 for the
\n876<\/span>
\ndetermination  of   the\t ceiling   in  respect\tof
\ndifferent individuals  who are\tbrought within the
\nscope of  the enactment,  and (3) ss.52 and 64 for
\ndetermining  the   compensation\t payable   to  the
\nseveral\t classes   of  persons\t whose\tlands  are
\nacquired under\tAct, all  these are  violative the
\nguarantee of  the equal\t protection of\tlaws under
\nArt. 14 of the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
     I therefore  agree in the order proposed that
\nthe petitions be allowed, and with costs.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\tPetitions allowed.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Karimbil Kunhikoman vs State Of Kerala on 5 December, 1961 Equivalent citations: 1962 AIR 723, 1962 SCR Supl. (1) 829 Author: K Wanchoo Bench: Gajendragadkar, P.B., Sarkar, A.K., Wanchoo, K.N., Gupta, K.C. Das, Ayyangar, N. Rajagopala PETITIONER: KARIMBIL KUNHIKOMAN Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF KERALA DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05\/12\/1961 BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-9508","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nKarimbil Kunhikoman vs State Of Kerala on 5 December, 1961 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/karimbil-kunhikoman-vs-state-of-kerala-on-5-december-1961\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Karimbil Kunhikoman vs State Of Kerala on 5 December, 1961 - 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