{"id":95402,"date":"2010-10-29T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2010-10-28T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-authorised-officer-vs-nandini-on-29-october-2010"},"modified":"2019-04-04T19:52:54","modified_gmt":"2019-04-04T14:22:54","slug":"the-authorised-officer-vs-nandini-on-29-october-2010","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-authorised-officer-vs-nandini-on-29-october-2010","title":{"rendered":"The Authorised Officer vs Nandini on 29 October, 2010"},"content":{"rendered":"
Madras High Court<\/div>\n
The Authorised Officer vs Nandini on 29 October, 2010<\/div>\n
       \n\n  \n\n  \n\n \n \n IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS\n\nDATED:29.10.2010\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\nC O R A M\n\nTHE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE. K. MOHAN RAM  \n\nC.R.P.PD.No.3777 OF 2009\nand\nM.P.Nos.1 and 2of 2009 and 1 of 2010\n\n\nThe Authorised Officer\nIndian Overseas Bank \nSpecialised Assets Recovery\nManagement Branch, Coimbatore. \t\t                    .....Petitioner\t\t\t\t\t\nVs\n\n1. Nandini\n2.Naren\n3.Karpagam\n4.Venkatapathy\t\t\t\t\t\t\t    ..Respondents\n\n  \t\n\tPetition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India  against the order, dated 20.11.2009 passed in I.A.No.546 of 2009 in O.S.No.106 of 2009 on the file of the Sub Court, Udumalpet. \n\n  \n\t\t\tFor Petitioner : Mr.V.T. Gopalan, Senior Counsel \n\t\t\t\t\t       for Mr.F.B. Benjamin George\n\t\t\tFor Respondent No.1 : Mr.G. Ethirajulu \n\t\t\tFor Respondent No.2 & 3: Mr.Govi Ganesan \n\t\t\t\n\n\t\t\t\t\tO R D E R\t\n<\/pre>\n
\t\tThe  fourth respondent  in I.A.No.546  of 2009   in O.S.No.106 of 2009    on the  file of the  Sub Court, Udumalpet, who is also the  fourth defendant    in the  suit is the petitioner  in the above C.R.P. \n\t\t2. The brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of the above  C.R.P.  are set out below:-\n<\/pre>\n
\t\ta. The  petitioner is a  nationalised bank, which is having  one of its branches at  Karamadai, Coimbatore District.   M\/s. V.N.K. Textiles  and  Papers  Mills P. Ltd.,  availed cash credit   and term loans   for the purchase  of  machinery, construction of  building etc.   The total limit sanctioned   was Rs.10.71 Crores, out of which   they  availed  loans  to the extent  of  Rs.6.50 Crores.\n<\/p>\n
\t\tb. According to the petitioner, after availing the loan, the said company did not adhere  to the terms  and conditions   of sanction  with regard to payment   and consequently   the accounts  became  NPAs.   As on 18.12.2006   a total sum of Rs.6,17,61,308\/-  was due.  Therefore,   the petitioner  issued  a demand notice   dated  18.12.2006  under Section  13(2) of the SARFAESI Act  calling  upon the  borrower  company  and the parties   concerned  to repay the dues with interest.    The demand notice was not complied with.   Hence, the petitioner  took  physical possession  of the secured  assets  on 19.3.2008.\n<\/p>\n
\t\tc. The petitioner  herein  brought the secured assets  for sale by issuing a sale notice  on 5.5.2009 fixing the date of auction  on 6.6.2009.   The  first respondent herein filed  a suit in O.S.No.1243 of 2009   on the file of the Principal District Munsif  at Coimbatore for permanent injunction contending  that the secured assets   were purchased by the sale of joint family properties and hence,  she is entitled   to  a  share   in the said properties.\n<\/p>\n
\t\td. The first respondent also filed  an interim application for  injunction  restraining the   petitioner  from alienating or encumbering the suit properties  which are  the secured assets.   The  Principal District Munsif  granted an order of interim injunction  on  5.6.2009.  The petitioner filed  C.R.P.No.2739 of  2009 before this Court against the said order  of  interim injunction  and the C.R.P. was disposed  of  with a direction to the   Court  below to dispose of the I.A.No.1106 of 2009  on or before 9.10.2009. Thereafter,  the District Munsif  dismissed  the said application on 12.10.2009.\n<\/p>\n
\t\te. Thereafter, the petitioner herein  again brought  the secured assets   for sale by issuing  sale notice  on 19.10.2009  and fixing the auction date on  21.11.2009. While so,   the first respondent filed another civil suit   in O.S.No.106 of 2009  on the file of the Sub Court, Udumalpet.  In that suit,  the petitioner herein has been arrayed as  fourth defendant.\n<\/p>\n
\t\tf. In the suit the case  of the  first respondent is  that   the first defendant   is  her brother,  the second defendant  is her mother and the third defendant  is her father’s brother.    Item  No.I described in the schedule of property  stands in the name of the  first defendant.   Item Nos.2 to 6 described in the schedule of property   stands in the name of  M\/s.VNK  Textile Mill and M\/s VNK  Paper Mill, which are the partnership firms.   In the said VNK Textile Mill and Paper Mills, the partners  are   Mr. Ramadoss, who is the father of  the plaintiff, who had expired, the first defendant  and the third defendant.   The property  described  as Item No.7 belongs  to the  father of the plaintiff, namely, Ramadoss  by virtue of a settlement deed dated  24.2.1959.\n<\/p>\n
\t\tg. The family of the plaintiff  and the family of the  third defendant   are all undivided  families and all the properties of the families  remain   as Hindu Undivided Family Properties till date.  There is no separate partition of  all the properties till date.  The two families originally had  several ancestral properties jointly  and commonly.  Thereafter, certain ancestral properties   were sold by both  the parties   and the joint family decided to  do business and to develop  the welfare of  the joint family.   Hence, after selling certain ancestral properties  Item No.1 of the schedule property was  purchased   out of the ancestral  nuclei in the name of the first  defendant and Item Nos.2 to 6 of the schedule property    was purchased in the name of  the  partnership firms.\n<\/p>\n
\t\th. It is the further case of the plaintiff that the first defendant has executed a settlement deed   in favour  of the second defendant  in order to defeat the rights of the 1st respondent  regarding  Item No.1 of the schedule property.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t i. It is the further  case of the plaintiff  that  father of the  plaintiff Mr. Ramadoss, the first defendant   and the third defendant  by suppressing the fact that the suit properties  are purchased out of  ancestral  nuclei and that the suit property   is ancestral in nature,  had mortgaged  the properties  to the fourth defendant bank  and availed certain loan facilities.   But after having availed  the loan,  the father of the plaintiff  died leaving behind  the plaintiff and the defendants 1 and 2   as his legal heirs.\n<\/p>\n
\t\tj. The plaintiff came to  know about the mortgage only on  1.6.2006.   Thereafter, the plaintiff  immediately   informed the fourth defendant  bank that the suit properties are  ancestral  in nature   and that she is entitled for a share in the property.   It is the case of the plaintiff  that  she has got  < th share in the suit properties and her request   for partition  and  handing over of her share   was not conceded by the defendants  1 to 3.  The defendants 1 to 3 have colluded  with the fourth defendant  to bring the properties  for sale  and the fourth defendant bank  had published  auction notice dated 19.10.2009 and hence, the plaintiff was constrained  to  file  the suit for  partition   for her < share  and for consequential injunction restraining the  defendants  1 to 4 from in any manner  of  auctioning, alienating  and encumbering the suit properties.\n<\/p>\n
\t\tk. Along with the suit,  the first respondent filed  I.A.No.546 of 2009 seeking  interim  injunction pending the suit.   By an order, dated  20.11.2009,  the learned Subordinate Judge,  passed the following order:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“Perused  the Affidavit.  Heard the petitioner side.   Perused the documents. The suit is filed  claiming partition  in the suit property.  L.R. Certificate shows  that  the prima facie  relationship  of the property  if as alleged  any alienation is made by the 4th respondent    then the petitioner right will be prejudiced.   Hence, to maintain the  status quo as on date,  it is necessary to grant injunction.  Hence,  Ad.  Interim   injunction is  granted   till 27.11.2009.  Notice   to Respondent   by then O 39 R 3 CPC   to be complied  with failing which   the petition   stand dismissed.  Call on 27.11.2009.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t3. Being aggrieved by that the petitioner  has filed the above C.R.P.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t4. In the grounds of revision,  it is contended that  Section 34 of the  SARFEASI Act,  ousts the jurisdiction of the civil court   and  hence, the Court below   ought  not to have   entertained the suit  and rejected the same.  It is further contended that  Section  34 of the SARFEASI Act  restrains the  courts and authorities  from granting any  sort  of injunction order against the  action or proposed action of the secured creditors  under the Act and therefore,  the order, dated 20.11.2009 granting  interim  injunction is liable to be vacated.\t\t5. It  is further  contended that  while granting  ex parte order  of injunction,  the mandatory provisions  stipulated under Order 39 Rule  3 C.P.C.  have not been complied with.   It is  also contended that   in O.S.No.106 of 2009 the pendency of the earlier suit  in  O.S.No.1243 of 2009   on the file of the Principal  District Munsif, Coimbatore  and the dismissal of the injunction application therein  has been suppressed.   It is further contended that the process of the Court  has been abused  by the first respondent.  The C.R.P. had been admitted  and  notice was ordered on 26.11.2009 and on the same  day  interim stay for four weeks   has also been granted.   Thereafter, the first  respondent  had filed M.P.No.2 of 2009  to vacate  the interim stay granted  in M.P.No.1 of 2009.    In M.P.No. 2  of 2009 in M.P.No.1 of 2009 in C.R.P.No.3777 of 2009,  the following order came to be passed   by Mr. Justice P.P.S. Janarthana Raja,  on  17.12.2009.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“Learned counsel  stated that  the auction was completed. The sale certificate  was issued  on  12.12.2009 .  Taking into consideration of the same, the sale is subject to the Court confirmation and also the learned counsel  appearing for the respondent undertakes to  deposit two crores (Rupess two crores only) on or before  4.1.2010.  Call on 4.1.2010.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t6. Thereafter,  M\/s. Sree Anandhakumar Mills Ltd.,  represented by its Managing Director   Mr.M.R.Rathindran,  the auction purchaser   has filed M.P.No.1 of 2010  to implead  the auction purchaser  as  5th respondent in the C.R.P.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t7. In the affidavit filed in support of  the petition in M.P.No.1 of  2010, it is stated that the petitioner  is the  successful  bidder   in the tender cum auction originally  slated to be held by the  first respondent  on 21.11.2009.   The tender was submitted   on 20.11.2009 along with 10% EMD.   The petitioner received a communication   on 21.11.2009   stating that  the tender will not  be opened on that date   as the first respondent  was  awaiting  some  administrativ clearance   for opening the tender and the date of opening  of the tender   will be informed  later.  Ultimately, the tender was opened on  1.12.2009.  In the tender,  as  the petitioner  was the highest bidder,  his bid was accepted but the bid of the other tenderer was rejected  as he was interested only in purchasing a portion of  the plant and machineries.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t8. The revision petitioner by letter dated 1.12.2009 directed the petitioner  to deposit  25%  of the bid amount  and accordingly 25%  of the bid amount was  paid for plant and machineries  and land and building  on 1.12.2009.  The bid was confirmed  by the first respondent  by a communication dated 2.12.2009. The petitioner  paid  the balance amount  of 75%  on 8.12.2009  fro plant and machineries in  all  a sum of Rs.1,44,60,000\/-  and a sale certificate   under Rule 7(2)  of the Securtisation Act  was issued by the first respondent for the sale of plant  and machineries.   The petitioner also paid the balance 75%  representing the bid amount   for  land  and building  on 11.12.2009   and the  sale certificate was issued  to the petitioner  on 12.12.2009 and the petitioner  took possession  of the entire  premises   on 12.12.2009.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t9. It is the further case of  the petitioner  that  the petitioner  was not aware of  any of the pending proceedings   regarding the properties purchased by him.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t10. By letter dated 17.12.2009,  the revision petitioner informed the petitioner that   the first respondent  in the C.R.P.  has field the above said suit    and that the auction sale   by the revision petitioner  will be  subject to the outcome of the revision petition  and directed the petitioner   to maintain the status quo of the property.  According to the petitioner,   the petitioner is the proper and necessary party to the C.R.P.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t11. The second respondent  in M.P.No.1 of 2010, who is the first respondent  in the C.R.P.  has filed  a counter affidavit   in M.P.No.1 of 2010, inter alia contending as  follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t12. The petitioner is not a bona fide purchaser   for valid  consideration  and the purchase   made by him  is hit  by  the principles of  lis pendens. The petitioner has no locus standi  to implead   in a proceedings  connected with  partition suit  between the co-sharers.  It is  for the petitioner  to file  a separate suit   to establish  its title  if any in the properties which are the  subject matter of the partition suit.  The alleged  tender-cum-auction  is not valid  and   no notice was issued   to the third respondent herein and therefore,   the auction conducted by the bank  is   non-est in law.   The order  of injunction dated 20.11.2009 was granted  by the court below in favour of this respondent  by the trial court  restraining  the  first respondent herein  from conducting  the tender and therefore, no tender or auction was conducted.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t13. It  is further contended that   the bank has filed the C.R.P.  and obtained an  order of stay  on 26.11.2009  by stating that already the date of tender was cancelled.   This respondent filed a vacate stay petition on 8.12.2009  after serving the copy  of the  same on the counsel  for the bank.   However, the bank has hurriedly  after receipt  of vacate stay petition opened the tender cover.    The vacate stay petition was listed for hearing  on 10.12.2009 but  the   respondent bank   took an adjournment of the vacate  stay petition  on 15.12.2009  and proceeded  with the tender knowing  the consequences.   Therefore,  the entire proceedings  on the part of the bank and the petitioners are illegal and not binding on this respondent.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t14. The  market value of the properties will be around  Rs.15 crores  but the same was purchased only for a sum of Rs.4,56,60,000\/-, which  speaks volume about the  collusion between the parties.   It is further contended that   the petitioner has no locus standi    to question the averments  and the merits of the partition suit  filed by this respondent  against  the co-sharers.   The suit  in O.S.No.1243 of 2009  on the file of the District Munsif, Coimbatore was filed  only for permanent  injunction, whereas  O.S.No.106 of 2009     on the file of the Sub Court, Udumalpet for partition and therefore,   the cause of action for both the suits are  different  and there is no question of  of abuse of process of court   as alleged by the petitioner.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t15. It is further contended by the second respondent  that the first respondent herein  agreed to receive   a sum of Rs.5.00 Crores   before this Court  and  pursuant to the same, this Court   directed this respondent to deposit to deposit  a sum of Rs.2.00 Crores  on or before   4.1.2010 and this respondent had already  deposited   the amount and  she is ready  and willing to deposit  a further sum of Rs.3 Crores  within the date   to be fixed  by this Court.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t16. On the aforesaid contentions,  the  implead petition is  sought to be dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t17. Heard.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t18. Mr. Yasoth Vardan,  the  learned  Senior Counsel  for the petitioner in M.P.NO.1 of 2010 submitted that  the petitioner being a bona fide purchaser in the auction conducted  by the bank   is  a proper and necessary party   to the above  C.R.P., since any  adverse order that may be passed will affect the interest  of the petitioner.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t19. In support of the aforesaid contentions, the learned Senior Counsel   based  reliance  on the decision of this Court reported in AIR 2008 MADRAS 108 (K. Chidambara Manickam  vs. Shakeena and others<\/a>)  and  JT 2008 (6) SC 653 (Janatha  Textiles and others  vs.  Tax Recovery  Officer and<\/a> another).\n<\/p>\n
\t\t20. Mr.V.T. Gopalan, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the revision petitioner  supported the contention of the learned Senior Counsel, whereas, Mr.G. Ethirajulu, learned counsel  for the second respondent   in this petition opposed the impleading of  the petitioner.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t21. I have considered the  submissions made on either side and perused the materials available on record.\n<\/p>\n
 \t\t22. In the decision reported  in AIR 2008 MADRAS 108,  cited supra,  the Division Bench  of this Court, in paragraph 8, has formulated the points  that arose for consideration, which reads as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“8.  The core and primal points  that arise  and require  to be answered in these appeals   are that:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t(i)  Whether  the sale of  the secured asset in public auction  as per Section 13(4) of  SARFAESI Act, which ended in issuance of  a sale certificate  as per Rule 9(7)  of the Security Interest  (Enforcement) Rules, 2002  (in short “the Rules”)  is a complete  and absolute  sale for the purpose  of SARFAESI Act or whether  the sale  would  become final only on the registration  of the sale certificate ?\n<\/p>\n
\t\t(ii) Whether the action of the second respondent  in not accepting  the amounts paid  by the borrowers  and not cancelling the sale certificate  before the registration  of the sale  is in derogation  of Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, in view of  the Section 37  of SARFAESI Act ? And\n<\/p>\n
\t\t(iii) Whether  Section 35  of the SARFAESI Act  has the effect  of  overriding  Section 37  of  the SARFAESI Act ?.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t23. The passage  extracted above makes it clear that in the said decision, the question as to whether  the  auction purchaser  is a proper  or necessary  party  to the proceedings in the revisional court  was not  an issue that  arose  for consideration  in the writ petition and therefore, the said decision  is not of any use  to decide the issue that arose  for consideration  in this  revision.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t24. In JT 2008  (6) SC 653 , cited supra,  the issue  that  has been formulated  by the Supreme Court  is as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“The short question which arises for consideration  in this appeal is whether the Income Tax Department  is justified in  auctioning the attached property  for  recovery of debt.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t25. In this decision also, the question as to whether  the auction purchaser  is a proper and necessary party to the proceedings in the revisional court was not  at issue   and therefore, the said decision  is not of any  assistance to decide the  issue  that arose for consideration  in this revision.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t26. In this case, the trial Court granted the order of ex parte injunction   on 20.11.2009  and the same has been communicated   to the revision petitioner    on the same day and therefore, as is admitted by the revision petitioner  itself , the tenders  were not opened   and the participants    in the tender-cum-auction   were informed about the same and thereafter,   the revision petitioner\/bank  has filed the C.R.P.  and only after obtaining  the stay  from this Court on 26.11.2009  the tender  has been opened  and the auction purchaser  had deposited  25% of the bid amount  on 1.12.2009. Thus, it is clear  that  the auction purchaser   had  known about the suit filed  by the second respondent   in this petition.  Therefore,  the auction purchaser  having knowledge of the pendency of the litigation in the civil court   has taken the risk of purchasing the property in the tender-cum-auction.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t27. The sale of the suit properties   as rightly contended  by the learned counsel  for the second respondent   is hit by the Section 52  of  the Transfer of Property Act.   In a decree that may be passed in the suit will be binding  on the petitioner  in this petition.  In this context  it will be useful to refer to a decision reported  in (2001)  1 M.L.J.  101 (Bakthavatsalam vs. Anjapuli and others<\/a>).  In the said decision,  His Lordship Mr. Justice P. Sathasivam,  (as His Lordship then was) while considering the scope of Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C.,  after referring to various decisions of the Apex Court  and this Court has laid down, in paragraph 10 of the said decision,  as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“10.  It  is clear  that   a person  is not  to be added as  a defendant  merely  because he or she  would be incidentally  affected by the judgment.   The main consideration  is  whether or not the presence of  such a person  is necessary  to enable the court  to  effectually  and completely   adjudicative  upon and settle  and questions  involved   in the suit.  If the question at issue  between the parties can be worked out  without anyone else  being brought in,  the stranger should  be  added as a party.  In the light of the language used in O.1, Rule 10(2)  of C.P.C.,  as well as various decisions and in the light of factual position  in our case that  preliminary  decree has already been passed   and application for passing  of final decree  is pending before the  court below,  I am of the view that purchasers of properties   during the pendency  of the suit are neither necessary  nor proper parties  inasmuch as  they would be  bound  by the decree in the suit in view of   the principle  enunciated   in Sec.52  of the Transfer of Property Act.  I hold that the parties  sought to be impleaded   as defendants in the  suit  and respondents  in the final decree application  are neither necessary   nor proper parties.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t28. In this case on hand, the tender has been submitted after the grant of   injunction by the trial court and the tender has been  opened after the injunction was  stayed by this Court in the C.R.P.  Therefore,  the sale  is hit by Section  52 of the Transfer of Property Act.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t29. In such circumstances, the auction purchaser cannot be  considered to be  either  necessary or property party to the C.R.P.   At this juncture,  the decision reported  in (1996) 3 SCC 539 (Sarvinder Singh vs. Dalip Singh)<\/a>    is relevant  to be referred to:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“In that case, the appellant  therein filed a suit before  the Sub Court,  Ferozepur for declaration  that he is  the owner of the property   on the basis  of a registered Will,  dated 26.5.1952, executed  by his and that a declaration  to that effect was  already given  by the civil court  in another decree, dated 29.3.1974.  In the application that  he filed under  O.39, Rule 1 C.P.C.,   an ad interim  injunction was granted on 14.6.1991, which subsequently  came to be vacated   on 2.12.1991.  Thereafter,  the defendants  alienated   the self same lands by  registered sale deeds, dated 2.12.1991  and 12.12.1991 in favour of the respondents before the Supreme Court.  On that basis, they sought to  come on record   as defendants   under O.1, Rule 10 C.P.C.   The Trial Court   dismissed the application holding that they were neither necessary  nor  property parties to the suit.   On revision, the High Court in the order  impugned  therein passed in C.R.No.323 of 1993, dated 13.5.1993, directed impleadment  of  the respondents  as  party defendants  to the suit.   Hence,  the appeal before the Supreme Court  by special leave.   After considering   the above factual position  as well as   Sec.52 of the Transfer of Property Act, their Lordships have said:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“It would  therefore  be clear that the defendants  in the suit were prohibited   by operation of Sec.52  to deal with the property and  could not transfer  or otherwise   deal with it  in any way affecting  the rights of teh appellant even with the order or authority of the Court. Admittedly,  the authority or order of the  court had not  been obtained  for alienation  of those properties. Therefore, the  alienation  obviously  would be hit by  the doctrine  of lis pendens by operation  of Sec.52.  Under these circumstances,  the respondents  cannot be  considered to be either necessary  or proper parties  to the suit.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t30. The aforesaid decision of the Apex Court  squarely applies to the facts of the case. Therefore, this court is of the considered view that the petitioner  in M.P.No.1 of 2010\/auction purchaser has no locus standi to get  impleaded in the C.R.P.  as he is neither a necessary nor a property party  to the proceedings.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t31. It has to be further pointed out that the mere fact that fresh litigation  can be  avoided as no ground  to invoke  the power under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t32. For the aforesaid reasons, M.P.NO.1 of 2010   is dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t33. Heard.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t34. Mr.V.T.Gopalan,  learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Mr.    F.B. Benjamin George  for the revision petitioner made the following  submissions.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t35. The  borrowers from the bank are not  before this Court.  The first respondent claiming  to be the daughter of  the deceased  partner  of the guarntor firm has filed the  suit for partition  and consequential  injunction.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t36. The learned Senior Counsel   submitted that in view of the provisions contained  in  Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, the suit filed by  the first respondent   in O.S.No.106 of  2009 before  the Sub Court, Udumalpet  is not maintainable and in view of the bar  contained  in  Section 34  of the SARFAESI Act, the Sub Court has no jurisdiction  to grant interim injunction and  therefore,  the ex parte  injunction granted by the  Court below  has to be set aside.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t37. The learned  Senior Counsel  submitted that the order, dated 20.11.2009  granting ex parte injunction  does not  contain  valid reasons as contemplated   under Order 39 Rule 3 C.P.C.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t38. It was  further contended  that the first respondent   had already filed O.S.NO.1243 of 2009  before the Principal District Munsif, Coimbatore seeking a decree  for permanent injunction and also filed an interim application   seeking interim injunction and interim injunction was granted   at the initial stage  and the same was vacated  and the interim application was dismissed  and suppressing the same the present O.S.No.106 of 2009  has been filed  in a different Court.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t39. The first respondent   has not approached the Court with clean hands and abused the process of the Court and therefore,   the interim injunction is liable to be vacated.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t40. The learned Senior Counsel further contended that there are other properties available for partition but the same  have not been included  in the suit  and therefore,  the suit  is  bad for seeking partial  partition.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t41. In support of the said contention, the learned Senior Counsel  based reliance   on the following  decisions.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t42. Basing reliance on the decisions reported in  (2009) 9 SCC 52 (R. Mahalakshmi  vs. A.V. Anantharaman and others<\/a>) and (1994) 4 SCC 294 (Kenchegowda (since deceased) by legal representatives vs. Siddegowda alias Moetgowda), the learned Senior Counsel submitted that   the suit for partial partition  when all the family properties  are not made the subject matter of the  suit is not maintainable.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t43.  In support of the contention that the civil court’s  jurisdiction is barred  under Section 34 of  the SARFAESI Act and  the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to grant injunction, the decision reported  in  CDJ 2007 (MHC) 4500 (Dadha Estates Pvt. Ltd.,  represented  by its Managing  Director, Chennai  vs. C. Ravindran)<\/a> has been relied upon.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t44. In the said decision, the learned Single Judge of this Court, has laid down as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“8.  ….. Regarding   the rights of the secured  creditor  and the remedy available  for the borrower  or anybody else,  who is an aggrieved person,  Section 34  of the SARFAESI Act, 2002  clearly puts   a bar  on the civil court   to entertain any suit or proceedings  in respect of any  matter which   the Debts Recovery  Tribunal  or the appellate Tribunal is empowered   under the said Act to determine.  The grant of  injunction to stall the action taken by the secured creditors under the provisions  of  the SURFAEST Act, 2002  has also been  completely  barred under  section 34 of the said Act.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“14.  The present suit  has been filed   completely ignoring  the bar under section 34 of the SURFAEST Act, 2002. The applicant  has to approach  the Debts  Recovery  Tribunal  under section 17 of the Act to establish  his charge over the property. This court has no  jurisdiction to deal with such a lis.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t45. The learned Senior Counsel  also based reliance   on the decision of the learned Single Judge  reported in  CDJ 2007  MHC 3767  (The Authorised Officer, Corporation Bank v. Koottu Road, Sheep Farm Post, Attur Taluk, Salem District) wherein,  in  para 16,  it has been laid down as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“16. A comparative  reading of all the decisions cited above  would make it clear  that  as per Section 34 of the SARFAEST Act,  the Civil Court has no jurisdiction  to entertain  any suit challenging  the proceedings  initiated  in pursuance  of the powers conferred under the said Act  and the plaint filed  in such suits are  liable  to be rejected  straight away.   However,  such bar  under Section 34  of the  SARFAESI  shall not come  in the way of adjudication of the civil rights, like declaration  of  title  of the suit properties,  partition rights in the ancestral properties etc., which are mortgaged, because  such claims\/rights made are  outside  the jurisdiction  and adjudication  of the Debt Recovery Tribunal  or Appellate Tribunal  under the said Debt Recovery Acts.  However, in such suits  the civil courts have no jurisdiction  to grant either  interim stay  or interim injunction  restraining  the secured creditor\/bank   which is at liberty  to proceed with  the mortgaged  properties  for realisation of the amounts   in view of the express bar contained   under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, constitutional validity  of such provision  has been upheld   by the Hon’ble Apex Court.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t46. In AIR  2006  Karnataka 21 (Krishna vs. Kedarnath and others),  in para 7 and 8,   it has been laid down as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“7.  Whether  all the suits  schedule properties  are joint family properties   and  all the  properties  are  mortgaged   to the Bank and plaintiffs are entitled to  partition  etc. after  the first charge  upon the same is cleared, are all the  aspects required   to be decided  by the Civil Court  as the plaintiffs  rights  are traceable  to the provisions  of S.9 of C.P.C.,  S. 34 of the Act   is a bar for the Civil Court  to entertain  the suits in respect  of   the matters which are empowered    to be determined  by   the Debts Recovery Tribunal  or Appellate Tribunal.  But adjudication   or determination of  rights or claims   of the parties for partition of the properties   which  are in the nature of civil rights, cannot be stopped.   Partition suits that would be instituted by  a party claiming civil rights   in respect of  either ancestral joint family properties or co-ownership properties   will have to  be exclusively dealt with  by the Civil Court.   That is the view taken  by the Madras High Court  in the decision referred to above.   Of course the  said decision is rendered  prior to Marida Chemical’s Ltd., case.  The Supreme Court   has upheld   the constitutional validity    of the provisions of the Act. , at paragraph 51 in the above referred case.    It is held that jurisdiction of the Civil Court  also can be invoked   for limited purposes.  While the Bank can enforce  its security interest   for realisation of its amount, right  of the plaintiffs to claim partition  in the suit schedule properties if  they prove  they are ancestral joint  family  properties cannot  be  deprived off  as contended  by the Bank, which contention was erroneously accepted  by the trial Court.   For adjudication  of such claim, the Bar under S.34 of the Act  shall not come in the way.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“8.  For the reasons stated above,  these appeals  are allowed.  The orders\/judgments  and decrees  under appeals  are set aside.  The status quo order passed  in the suits shall  stand dissolved   as there is express bar  under S.34 of the Act. The  Bank is at  liberty  to proceed  for the  recovery of  its amount  by  taking necessary  steps in respect of the  mortgaged  properties   by the debtors  under the provisions of the Act, as the same are  mortgaged  for collateral  security  of the loan amount  borrowed  by them.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t47. In CDJ  2007 (DHC)  916 (Allahabad Bank vs. Sh. Randhir Singh and Others),  the<\/a> learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, in Para 14, has laid down as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t  “14. Ex facie,  there is  a complete  bar on the jurisdiction of civil court to entertain suits  or proceedings  in respect whereof  the Debt Recovery Tribunal  is empowered  to determine  issues raised  and no injunction can be granted  by a civil court.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t48. In (2003)  6 SCC 675 (Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and others<\/a>) in paragraph  38 the Apex Court  has laid down the guidelines for exercise of  the jurisdiction  under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, which reads as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“37. Such like matters frequently arise before the High Courts. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder:-\n<\/p>\n
(1) Amendment by Act No. 46 of 1999 with effect from 01.07.2002 in Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure cannot and doest no affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by the CPC Amendment Act No. 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.\n<\/p>\n
(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction, i.e., when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction – by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction – by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules or procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice.\n<\/p>\n
(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.\n<\/p>\n
(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (iii( a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.\n<\/p>\n
(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident, i.e., which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view the error cannot be called gross or patent.\n<\/p>\n
(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and\/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis.\n<\/p>\n
(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character.\n<\/p>\n
(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annual or set aside the at, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t49. The learned Senior Counsel further contended that   since the auction sale   has been confirmed   and sale certificate  was issued only  after  the interim injunction granted   by the lower court  was stayed by this Court, the auction cannot be challenged.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t50. Countering  the aforesaid submissions,  Mr.G.Ethirajulu, the learned counsel for the first respondent submitted that  while O.S.NO.1243  of 2009  on the file of the Principal District Munsif has been filed by the first respondent  for permanent injunction, O.S.No.106 of 2009 on the file  of  the Sub Court, Udumalpet  has been filed  seeking partition  of the joint family properties  and consequential injunction.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t51. The learned counsel  submitted that  the cause of action for filing the suit  in O.S.No.1243 of 2009 and the cause of action for filing the suit in O.S.No.106 of 2009 are totally different.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t52. The  learned counsel submitted that since the relief of partition sought  for in the suit  cannot be granted   by  DRT,  the civil court’s  jurisdiction   is not barred  and since the relief of  injunction is sought for   only as a consequential  prayer  in the suit for  partition,   the  same is not barred   under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t53. The learned counsel submitted that    unless the interim injunction is granted  by the trial court  pending the partition suit,  the subject matter of the  suit, which is also the subject matter of the proceedings before the  DRT,  which will be brought for auction,  and in the event of  the plaintiff succeeding the suit,  she will be deprived of her  share  of the property which is the subject matter of the suit and therefore,  the trial  court is right in granting   injunction.    The learned counsel submitted that  the Court below  has recorded  its prima facie  satisfaction for granting   interim injunction.   It  has also considered the balance of convenience   and therefore,  the order satisfies the requirements  under Order 39 Rule 3 C.P.C., and therefore, the above C.R.P.  is  not maintainable.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t54. The learned counsel submitted that  without approaching the trial court  to vacate the  ex parte order of  injunction, the petitioner is not entitled to approach this Court straight  away  under Article 227 of  the Constitution of India.   In support of the said contention,   the learned counsel relied  on the decision reported in 2000 (IV) CTC 358 (A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu  vs.  S. Challappan and others<\/a>)\n<\/p>\n
\t\t55. The learned counsel submitted that  the trial court granted interim injunction  on  20.11.2009 and the same was communicated  by the revision petitioner immediately and the date  of auction was  only on 21.11.2009.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t56. The learned counsel  submitted that   in the affidavit filed in support of  M.P.NO.1 of 2009, which is sworn to by  AL. Ramanathan, it is stated as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“I  state that   pursuant to the sale notice, dated 19.10.2009, the petitioner  has  received three sealed tenders.   The last  date for receiving sealed tenders  is  20.11.2009  till 5 p.m.  However  at about   on 20.11.2009 the petitioner  herein received   a fax message   conveying  the injunction order granted  by the Court  below.  Therefore, the petitioner  herein   deferred the opening    of the sealed  tenders   cum auction  which was scheduled    on 21.11.2009 at  11.30 a.m. and put  a public notice.   The participants   in the tender were  informed   that the next  day of  auction will be notified  later.  However, the participants   in the auction  may not be  willing to keep  the money blocked  for a long time.  It is,  therefore,  necessary to stay the order, dt. 20.11.2009.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t57. In the additional affidavit  filed in M.P.No.1 of 2009, which was sworn to by one A.K. Udayashankar,   it is stated as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“However before opening   the said tenders,  the 1st respondent  herein filed  the Civil Suit bearing  No.106 of 2009  and obtained   an order of interim  injunction  on 20.11.2009  itself  in  I.A.No.546 of  2009. Therefore, the opening  of the sealed tenders  was deferred.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t58. In the very same  affidavit,  it  is further  stated that  after the interim stay was granted by this Court on 26.11.2009,  the petitioner rescheduled the opening of the tender to  1.12.2009  and   on opening   it was found only two tenders are valid  and  other tenders are invalid as the offer for the same  was for select machineries.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t59. In the additional affidavit, which was sworn on 11.12.2009 in paragraph 4 and 5,  it is stated as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“4. I state that  M\/s Sree Ananda Kumar Mills Ltd.,  having their office at  Saravanapatty,  Coimbatore –  35  has furnished  both the said tenders for the purchase  of machinery  and Land & Building.  Its offer  of Rs.3,12,00,000\/-  against the upset price of Rs.3,11,00,000\/-   for the land and building, and Rs.1,44,60,000\/-  as against the upset price of  Rs.1,44,55,000\/-   was accepted  and the said purchaser  was  declared  as  successful bidder.   The said purchaser  has paid  the 25% of the amount   on the same day and the sale  was confirmed  in its favour   on 2.12.2009.  The balance  75% sale  consideration  for the sale of the machineries  was paid on 8.12.2009 and the sale certificate for the sale of the machineries  was issued  on 8.12.2009  itself.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“5. The purchaser  has paid the entire  balance sale consideration  for the sale  of the immovable property  on 11.12.2009. The respondent  is in the process of   issuing   sale certificate  to the purchaser   in respect of the immovable property. ”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t60. The learned counsel submitted that  the first respondent filed M.P.No.2 of 2009 to vacate  the interim  stay granted by this Court on 8.12.2009   after serving the same  on the counsel  for the bank and the matter was listed before the court  on 10.12.2009. But at the request of the revision petitioner, time was granted till 15.12.2009  to file counter affidavit.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t61. According to the learned counsel,  on 10.12.2009,   nothing was stated about the  issue of  sale certificate  by the bank.  Counter affidavit of the bank  sworn on 11.12.2009  was served on the counsel for the first respondent  on 14.12.2009.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t62. As per the  order of the learned  Judge, dated 17.12.2009  the first respondent   had deposited  a sum of Rs.2 crores  on 2.1.2010 itself.    The learned counsel submitted  that  in the affidavit sworn to by  AL. Ramanathan    dated 12.4.2010 filed in the C.R.P.  In paragraph  5,  it is stated as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“5. I state  that  later when  the above CRP  was  listed before this Hon’ble Cuort  for hearing, in view of the oral undertaking of the 1st respondent  herein to deposit  Rs.5 Crores, this Hon’ble  Court  was pleased  to  observe  that the sale held in favour of the auction purchaser is subject to the result  of the above Civil Revision Petition.  However though the 1st respondent  deposited Rs.2 Crores   she had failed to deposit the remaining  Rs.3 Crores.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t63. The aforesaid submissions,  according to the learned counsel makes it clear that the sale in favour of the  auction purchaser   is  subject  to the result   of the  above C.R.P.  But in spite of the same,   and  in spite of the order, dated 17.12.2009 the bank in collusion with the auction purchaser  has hurriedly  issued the sale certificate  and put the auction purchaser in possession of the same.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t64. The learned counsel  in support of  his contention that  the civil court jurisdiction  is not completely  ousted   relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in  2008 (1) CTC 471 (S.V.Subramanian  vs. Cypress Semiconductor Technology India Private Limited,  Bangalore and others<\/a>).\n<\/p>\n
\t\t65. In the said decision while considering  Sections 17 and 18  of  the Recovery  of Debts  due to Banks  and Financial Institutions  Act, 1993 (51 of 1993),  the  Division Bench of this Court  has held as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“From the aforesaid  provisions,  it would be evident that there  is no total  ouster   of jurisdiction  of the civil Court.  The ouster  is by virtue  of Section 18   of the 1993 Act, which  sets  out  that no Court or  other authority  can try matters   of recovery   of debts.   Insofar as  the reliefs  which do not   pertain  to debts, on a plain reading of Section 17 of the  1993 Act, are concerned,  there  can be no doubt  that the Civil Court  will still retain  the  jurisdiction  Centurion  Bank Ltd., v.  Indian  Lead Ltd., 2000 (100) Comp. Cas.537.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“(f) Section 17 of the 1993 Act,  again fell consideration before the Supreme Court  in the decision Indian Bank v. ABS  Marine  Products (P) Ltd.,<\/a>  2006 (5) SCC 72, wherein, the Supreme Court made the following  observation:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“15. It is evident from Sections 17 and 18 of the Debts Recovery Act  that Civil Court’s jurisdiction  is barred only in regard to applications   by a bank or a financial institution  for recovery  of its debts.  The  jurisdiction of Civil Court   is  not barred in regard to any suit filed by a borrower  or any other person against a bank for any relief……..”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“(g)  while dealing with the question  of grant of injunction  restraining  the  enforcement   of the orders passed  by the Tribunal,  in the case of  Industrial Investment  Bank of India Ltd., vs.  Marshal’s  Power & Telecom  (I) Ltd.,<\/a> 2007 (1) SCC 106, the Supreme Court  observed as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“8.  ……… That apart,  to grant  an injunction  restraining  the enforcement  of  orders passed by the Tribunal  having jurisdiction  to pass such orders  cannot  normally be  granted  unless it is a case  of fraud  or the existence  of some  such  vitiating  factors   is established  or prima  facie made out.   Even then,  the  order of injunction  as now granted   could be granted only  in exceptional  cases.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“(h)   In the present case,  as the plaintiff   is neither  the Bank\/financial   institution   nor the borrower, the provisions   of Section 17 of  of the 1993 Act are  not attracted.  It is  not the case  of the Bank that they filed an Application  for recovery  of  its  debt from the plaintiff.  The plaintiff   who is not a party   before the DRT,  has only alleged   fraud  played  by the parties   to obtain order from the DRT and therefore,  in view of  the decisions   of the Supreme Court,  as referred  to above,  we hold that  the present suit is  not barred  by the provisions  of Section 18 of the 1993 Act.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t66. The learned counsel also based reliance   on the decision of the learned  Single Judge  reported in 2004 (4) CTC 261 (Arasa Kumar and another vs.  Nallammal and others).\n<\/p>\n
\t\t67. In the said decision,  the learned Single Judge of this Court  after referring to several other decisions   as laid down in paragraphs 30 and 31  as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“30. Section 9, C.P.C., and bar of  jurisdiction created  under relevant  Sections in respect of   the Co-operative Societies Act,  Arbitration  and Conciliation Act, 1996  and also Section  29 of the  Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and  under Rule 40 of the Income Tax ( Certificate  Proceedings)  Rules, 1962   an also the bar  under the Tamil Nadu  Hindu Religious  and Charitable  Endowments Act, 1959  were all considered  by this Court  and the Apex Court   as referred supra and now,  it is  manifestly  clear  that the power under Section 34 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial  Assets  and Enforcement  of Security Interest Act  is not absolute  and the same is subject to certain  restrictions,  they are;\n<\/p>\n
\t\t(1)  that the parties,  who filed the suit  must  be  a party   to the liabilities  created  in favour of the secured creditor,
\n\t\t(2) the disputes  between the parties  could be resolved   under the provisions of the Act itself,
\n\t\t(3) that if the claim made by the parties  is outside  the jurisdiction of the Debts Recovery  Tribunal  or the appellate  tribunal  or any action taken  or to be taken   under this Act  and also under the Recovery of  Debt   due to Banks  and  Financial Institutions   Act, 1993  and the dispute raised   by the parties cannot  be adjudicated   by any of the tribunal  or authority, created  under the act   or under any other act,  the right of the parties to approach  the Civil Court  for  appropriate   relief cannot be  deprived and taken away.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“31.  Admittedly,  in our case,  the petitioners have filed the suit for  partition  including the item,  in respect of which,  the 3rd respondent  taken out   proceedings to bring the same for sale   without  the intervention of the Court and till the rights of the parties are determined   by the Civil Court,  and the Civil Court  alone could decide  and determine  the rights of the parties  in respect of their  respective claims  in the suit for partition,  the 3rd defendant,  though a secured creditor, cannot bring the property for sale  by invoking   the bar under Section  34 of the Securitisation  and Reconstruction and Financial Assets and Enforcement of  Security Interest Act or the  bar under Section 13 of the Act.  The Court below   has taken  into consideration   of these aspects  and as a matter  of fact,  these salient features  were not brought  to the notice of teh  Court below, which resulted  in passing of erroneous order, which is liable to be set aside.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t68. The learned counsel also submitted that  the above decision squarely applies to the facts of  the case.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t69. In  AIR  2010  Madras 68 (M\/s. Consolidated Construction Consortium Ltd.,  v. M\/s. Indian Bank)  another learned Single Judge of this Court on a consideration of  Section 34  of the SARFAESI Act,  in paragraph 30,  has  held as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“30.  Regarding  the maintainability  of  the suit  is concerned,  I would like to point out   that since the  plaintiff  pleads that  fraud was  practised on the authority  and there are  precedents   to the effect that  if the suit is instituted  challenging  certain  proceedings  on the ground of fraud, then such a suit cannot  simply  be thrown  away by invoking  Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t70. In the very same  decision,  in paragraph 43, the learned Single Judge of this Court   has observed as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“43. The tour d’horizon   of the learned  counsel for  the plaintiff  would be to the  effect that  the bank  being in an advantageous   position, as per the The Recovery  of Debts  Due to Banks  and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 as well as  SARFAESI Act cannot be allowed to erode  the right of innocent  person, by resorting  to the draconian  provisions  of the Act  and necessarily the Bank  should be injuncted  and a fair  opportunity  should be accorded  to the plaintiff to put  forth his case during trial.”\n<\/p>\n
 \t\t71. In that case, accepting the contention of the plaintiff, the learned Judge  has granted   injunction  in the suit  as  seen from paragraph 43 of the judgment.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t72. In  2009 (4) CTC 663 (G.V. Films Limited   vs.  Indian Bank, Assets Recovery Management Branch-II,<\/a> 55, Wellington Estate, Ethiraj Salai, Chennai-8),  K. Chandru, J.,  in paragraph 15  has laid down as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“15.  If it is seen  in the light of the above precedents, it can still  be held that  there is some scope for  moving the Civil Court  notwithstanding the fact that  the financial  institutions have invoked the provisions of  SARFAESI Act.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t73. In the very same decision,  the learned Judge has taken a view that injunction can also be granted in  appropriate cases.  But in that case, taking into consideration the facts of that case refused to grant  injunction.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t74. In support  of the  contention that   the action of the revision petitioner   in  issuing the sale certificate  and handing over  possession pending the civil revision petition and after taking time to file  counter in the vacate stay petition amounts to overstepping to frustrate the court proceedings, the learned counsel  based reliance on the decision reported in 2009 (2) CTC 68 (Sivagangai Municipality  vs.  C. Meenakshisundaram  and another).\n<\/p>\n
\t\t75. In paragraph 13 of the said judgment,  it  is stated as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“13.  It is also on record that  without filing counter affidavits before the learned District Munsif, Sivagangai, and after  seeking time to file counter affidavit, the Municipality  passed resolution  to cancel the licences on 10.11.2008, which  is to be treated  as overstepping  to frustrate the Court proceedings  and to non-suit   the respondents, who are plaintiffs  in the original suits.   The Chairman of  the Sivagangai  Municipality  has filed an  affidavit  stating that  the Municipality  sought for legal opinion   and no prohibitory order  of injunction    having been passed, the Municipality proceeded  with the proposed Municipal Council Meeting   and cancelled the licences  granted to the petitioners.  The said affidavit   also discloses  the fact that during  pendency of the Injunction Applications, resolution was passed cancelling the grant of licences.  The said action  of  the Municipality  cannot be condoned   and if such kind of over-reaching    the Court proceedings  are  allowed,  the litigants  may tend  to  ignore  the Court proceedings   and act  according to  their whims  and fancies. Such kind of action of the petitioners cannot be condoned  as rightly held by the learned District Munsif.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t76. In response to the submissions made by the learned  counsel  for the first respondent,  Mr.V.T. Gopalan, learned Senior Counsel   referred to the decision of the Apex Court reported in (1996) 7 SCC 205 (N. Rathinasabapathy  and others  vs. K.S. Palaniappa  Kandar and others), wherein, in paragraph 3, it has been laid down as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“3. With respect to the High Court  we find it difficult  to comprehend  how the blame could be laid  at the doors  of the appellants.   There is no doubt  that the operation of the injunction  was limited  to three weeks.  It is nobody’s case  that it  was extended thereafter.  The appellants  showed respect   to the order of the Court by stopping the construction  as soon as  the injunction order was received.  After  the expiry  of  three weeks  when they did not receive any order continuing  the injunction, they proceeded with the construction.   As such it is difficult to  understand how it can be  said that the appellants  had shown disrespect  tot he order passed by the Court.  On the contrary,  they  showed respect   by not proceeding with the construction  as soon as the injunction order was received  and they continued  with the construction  only after its period expired.   Therefore, the High Court  was  wrong in stating that the appellants committed gross violation of the spirit and intention of the order  “as if  it had been  effective  only for a period of  three weeks  from the date of pronouncement  of the order”.  There  is no question  of the order being  in existence after the expiry of  three weeks.  The expression ‘as if’  used in the abstracted part of the order   is totally unwarranted  because indisputably, it was effective only for a period  of three weeks.  There was, therefore,  absolutely  no violation of the Court’s order.  We, therefore,  fail to understand how the appellants can be hauled  up for contempt under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. We are clearly of the opinion  that  there was no disrespect  intended  or shown   and there was no  contempt  whatsoever.  The impugned order of the High Court cannot, therefore,  be allowed to stand. ”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t77. Basing reliance  on the same, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that  it cannot  be said that  the revision petitioner  has overstepped  to frustrate the Court proceedings.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t78. I have considered the  aforesaid submissions made on either side and perused the materials  available on record.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t79. As far as the contention  of Mr.V.T. Gopalan,  the learned Senior Counsel that  the suit is bad for seeking  partial partition is concerned, it is the question to be decided  by the trial court on the basis of the  pleadings and evidence to be let in  before it and  the  same cannot  be decided in the C.R.P.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t80. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel is that the civil court’s jurisdiction  is barred under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act  and the  civil court has no jurisdiction  to grant injunction and the said submissions is  supported by the decision reported in  CDJ  2007  MHC  3767  Mr. Justice. S. Ashok Kumar  has laid down that  the bar under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act shall not come  in the way of adjudication of the civil rights, like declaration  of  title  of the suit properties, partition rights in the ancestral properties etc., which are mortgaged, because  such claims\/rights made are  outside  the jurisdiction  and adjudication  of the Debt Recovery Tribunal  or Appellate Tribunal  under the said Debt Recovery Acts. However, the learned Judge has held that in such suits  the civil court has no jurisdiction to grant either interim stay  or interim injunction  restraining  the  secured creditors\/bank which is at liberty to proceed with  the mortgaged properties for realisation of the amounts. But  the learned Judge has  not discussed at length or given  reasons  as to why  injunction cannot be granted  pending such suits.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t81. A similar  view has been taken  by the  Karnataka High Court   in the decision reported in  AIR  2006  Karnataka   21.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t82. The  Delhi High Court   in  CDJ  2007  (DHC)  916  has held that  there is a complete bar  on the jurisdiction of the civil court  to entertain suits or proceedings in respect whereof  the Debt Recovery Tribunal is empowered  to  determine issues raised  and no injunction can be granted  by a civil court .  But the Delhi High Court has not considered  as to whether  the suits like  declaration of title or partition  in respect of  secured  assets are maintainable or not.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t83. On the other hand, Mr. G.Ethirajalu  the learned counsel for the first respondent  based reliance  on the following decisions:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t84. In 2008 (1) CTC 471, the Division Bench of this Court, while considering the similar  provision contained in Sections 17 and 18 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993),  has laid down that  there is no  total  ouster of the jurisdiction   of the civil court. The ouster  is by virtue   of Section 18 of the 1993 Act, which sets out that no Court or other authority  can try matters of  recovery of debts.  Insofar as the  reliefs  which do not pertain to debts,  on a plain reading of Section 17 of the 1993 Act, there can be no doubt  that the Civil Court  will still retain  the jurisdiction.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t85. In  2006 (5) SCC 72 (Indian Bank vs. ABS  Marine Products (P) Ltd.)<\/a> , the Apex Court   has made the following  observation:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“15. It is evident from Sections 17 and 18 of the Debts Recovery Act  that Civil Court’s jurisdiction  is barred only in regard to applications   by a bank or a financial institution  for recovery  of its debts.  The  jurisdiction of Civil Court   is  not barred in regard to any suit filed by a borrower  or any other person against a bank for any relief……..”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t86. In  2007 (1)  SCC  106 (Industrial Investment Bank of India Ltd., vs. Marshal’s Power & Telecom (I) Ltd.),  the Apex Court<\/a>  while considering the  scope of Section 34 of  the SARFAESI Act  has held that  the order  of injunction  could be  granted  in exceptional cases.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t87. In 2004  (4)  CTC 261,  the learned Single Judge of this Court   has elaborately considered the similar question that arose for consideration  and has held as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“It is  manifestly  clear  that the power under Section 34 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial  Assets  and Enforcement  of Security Interest Act  is not absolute  and the same is subject to certain  restrictions,  they are;\n<\/p>\n
\t\t(1)  that the parties,  who filed the suit  must  be  a party   to the liabilities  created  in favour of the secured creditor,
\n\t\t(2) the disputes  between the parties  could be resolved   under the provisions of the Act itself,
\n\t\t(3) that if the claim made by the parties  is outside  the jurisdiction of the Debts Recovery  Tribunal  or the appellate  tribunal  or any action taken  or to be taken   under this Act  and also under the Recovery of  Debt   due to Banks  and  Financial Institutions   Act, 1993  and the dispute raised   by the parties cannot  be adjudicated   by any of the tribunal  or authority, created  under the act   or under any other act,  the right of the parties to approach  the Civil Court  for  appropriate   relief cannot be  deprived and taken away.”\n<\/p>\n
and in that  decision, the learned Judge has further held that  in such suits, injunction can be granted.  Similar view has been taken  in AIR  2010   Madras 68  by  Mr. Justice G. Rajasuria\n<\/p>\n
\t\t88. In the decision reported  in  2009 (4) CTC 663 ,  Mr. Justice   K.Chandru,  has held that the civil court  has got jurisdiction  to entertain  the suits  claiming common law  rights,   partition suits,  declaration of title   etc. In the very same decision,  the learned Judge  has held that  the injunction can also be granted   in all appropriate cases.  Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that  the contention of Mr.V.T.Gopalan,  the learned Senior Counsel   cannot be countenanced.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t89. In the light of the aforesaid decisions,  the civil Court’s jurisdiction  is not totally  ousted  by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act  and the power to grant   interim  injunction  in such suits which are maintainable is also  not taken away by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t90. From the aforesaid decisions,  it is clear that  the civil court jurisdiction  is barred  only in regard to the applications filed by a bank\/financial institutions  for recovery of debts.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t91. In the present case,  as the plaintiff is neither  the borrower  nor   the guarantor  Section 34 of the  SARFAESI Act  is not  attracted.  When  majority of the decisions  have  held that  the partition suit  filed  by a  person who is not a borrower  or guarantor  is maintainable   in a civil court.   That should be taken into consideration while  interpreting  Section 34  of the SARFAESI Act as a  whole.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t92. Section 34  reads as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction  to entertain  any suit or proceeding   in respect of any matter which  a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal  is empowered   by or under this Act to determine  and no injunction  shall be granted   by  any court or other  authority in respect  of  any action taken or  to be taken in pursuance  of any power conferred  by or  under this act  or under the Recovery  of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993).”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t 93. A reading of Section 34  of the SARFAESI Act  makes it clear that   no civil court  shall have jurisdiction  to entertain any suit  or proceedings  in respect of  which  a DRT or Appellate Tribunal is  empowered  by  or under this Act  to determine and no  injunction shall be granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken  or to be taken  under the said Act or under Act 51 of 1993.  But in a suit otherwise maintainable which does not relate  to  recovery  of debts, like  the suit for partition, unless  interim injunction sought for by the plaintiff restraining the bank  from alienating  the property  is granted   and  if ultimately   if a decree is passed  in favour of the plaintiff   the subject matter of the suit will not be available for partition and therefore, to preserve the subject matter of the partition suit, the civil court will definitely  have jurisdiction   to grant interim orders  or interim injunction, as the case may be, pending the suit.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t94. At the risk of repetition, it has  to be pointed out that only in respect of the suits of the nature referred to   in the first limb of Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act,   the civil court’s jurisdiction to grant injunction   is barred but there is no bar  in respect of  other suits  which are maintainable  before the civil court,  and therefore,  the aforesaid submission made  by Mr.V.T.Gopalan,  the learned Senior Counsel  cannot be countenanced.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t95. As far as the contention of the learned Senior Counsel   that  the trial court  has not recorded   reasons   as contemplated under  Order 39 Rule 3 C.P.C. , this Court is unable to countenance  the said submissions   for the following reasons:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t96. A reading of  the  order, dated 20.11.2009  passed by the Court below  shows that   it has perused the affidavit  and the documents  filed along  with the  petition and has taken note of the fact that the suit  for partition.   On the basis of the  L.R. Certificate  filed by the plaintiff, the lower court   prima facie  satisfied that the plaintiff  has got a right   in the suit properties.    The Court below  has also observed  that  if  any alleged alienation is made by the bank  (4th respondent in the I.A) then the  petitioner’s  right will be prejudiced and therefore,  it is clear that   the Court below   has come to the conclusion that  prima facie case  has been made out   and the balance  of convenience   lies in favour of the first respondent.    Having  come to such a conclusion   to maintain the status  quo  as on date, the Court  below has thought it fit to grant   injunction and the Court below   has  limited it  till 27.11.2009. Thus   it is clear that the Court below  has applied its mind  to the facts of the case  and has recorded reasons for  granting ex parte  order of  injunction and therefore,  there is  no violation   of Order 39 Rule 3 C.P.C.   as sought to be contended by the learned Senior Counsel.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t97. Now  it has  to be seen  as to whether  in the light of the  rejection  of the aforesaid two contentions made  by the learned Senior Counsel  the C.R.P. is  maintainable.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t98. A catena of the decisions of the Apex Court  as well as this Court  have  held  that  only if  Order  39 Rule 3 C.P.C. has not been complied with and if the Court   has exercised  the jurisdiction which is not vested in it   then this Court   can invoke the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and  that is the principle  that has been  laid down in Sururya Dev Rai’s  Case,  which is relied  upon by Mr.V.T.Gopalan, the learned Senior Counsel.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t99. In the decision  reported  in   2000 (IV) CTC 358  the Apex Court  in paragraph  18,  it has been laid down as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“18. Now  what  remains   is the question whether  the High Court should  have entertained    the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution  when  the party had  two other  alternative  remedies.   Though  no hurdle  can be put  against    the exercise  of the Constitutional powers of the High Court  it is a well  recognized principle  which gained  judicial recognition  that the High Court  should direct the party to avail  himself  of such remedies   one or the other before he resorts   to a constitutional remedy.  Learned single judge   need not have entertained the revision petition at all the  party affected   by the  interim ex pate  order should have been directed  to resort to one of the other  remedies.   Be that   as if may,  now it is idle to  embark  on the aspect  as the High Court  had chosen to entertain   the revision petition.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t100. It is open to the revision petitioner   to  approach the Court below   to vacate  the  ex parte order of injunction  by filing  a counter affidavit    in the injunction application.  Without approaching the lower court, the revision petitioner  has straight  away approached this Court   under Article  227 of the Constitution of India.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t101. For the aforesaid reasons,  this Court is not inclined to  entertain the above C.R.P.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t102. In the affidavit  filed  in support of the M.P.No.1 of 2009  which is sworn to by one A.L. Ramanathan  it is stated that  the last date for  receiving  the sealed tenders   is 20.11.2009  till 5.00 p.m.   However,  on 20.11.2009   the petitioner  herein   had received  a fax message  conveying the injunction order  granted  by the Court below.  Therefore, the petitioner  deferred the opening  of the sealed tenders-cum-auction  at  11.30 a.m.   and put a public notice.  The participants  were informed  that the next date  will be  notified  later.\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t103. Conveniently, the time of  receipt of  the  fax message  has been omitted to be mentioned  in the affidavit. However, the fact remains that   on 20.11.2009  itself before 5.00 p.m.  the fax message   conveying the granting  of injunction  by the trial court has been  received  by the  revision petitioner.  Thereafter, the revision petitioner has filed the above C.R.P.  and  obtained interim stay  on 26.11.2009.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t104. According  to the petitioner , the reschedule of the opening of the tender to 1.12.2009.  In the additional affidavit,  which was sworn   on 11.12.2009, filed in support of the said petition,  it is stated that M\/s. Sree Ananda Kumar Mills Ltd.,  has been declared as  successful bidder   and they paid  25% of the amount  on the same day  and the sale was  confirmed    in their  favour  i.e. on  2.12.2009. The balance 75%  of sale consideration for the sale  of machineries   is said to have been  paid on 8.12.2009   and the sale certificate  for the sale of machineries   was issued on 8.12.2009 itself.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t105. According to the petitioner, the purchaser  has paid  the entire balance sale consideration  for the sale of  immovable property  on 11.12.2009.  In the said affidavit it is further stated that  the respondent  is in the process of  issuing sale certificate   to the purchaser in respect of  immovable property.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t106. Admittedly, the first respondent filed M.P.No.2 of  2009  on 8.12.2009  to vacate   the interim stay  granted  by this Court.  After serving  papers  on the learned counsel for the bank and the matter had been listed before the  court on 11.12.2009. But having  taken time  for filing counter  till 15.12.2009  the bank has chosen to  receive the entire  balance consideration  for the immovable property on 11.12.2009 and issued the sale certificate on 12.12.2009  and  handed over the possession on 12.12.2009.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t107. Thus  the aforesaid action of the  revision petitioner, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the first respondent  clearly amounts  to  overstepping  to frustrate  the court proceedings as has been laid down in 2009 (2) CTC  68.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t108. Since the  decision reported in  (1996) 7 SCC 205  relied upon by Mr.V.T.Gopalan,  the learned Senior Counsel  relates to   a contempt proceedings and the facts  are different,  the same is not applicable to the facts of this case.    In a contempt proceedings the violation  of the order passed by the court should  be intentional  and wilful.  A   similar  yardstick  cannot be applied  to the facts of the case. Therefore, the said decision  is not applicable  to the facts of  the case.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t109. As this Court has held that the C.R.P. is not maintainable, the same is dismissed.  Interim  stay  granted on 26.11.2009  also stands vacated.   Once the interim  stay granted is vacated, the status quo ante is restored and the injunction granted  by the Court below shall automatically come into force  and therefore,  any auction or confirmation of auction  in violation of the  injunction granted by the Court below will be nullified.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t110. It has to be further pointed out that  in the affidavit sworn to by  one  AL. Ramanathan   on  12.4.2010  it is stated as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“5. I state  that  later when  the above CRP  was  listed before this Hon’ble Court  for hearing, in view of the oral undertaking of the 1st respondent  herein to deposit  Rs.5 Crores, this Hon’ble  Court  was pleased  to  observe  that the sale held in favour of the auction purchaser is subject to the result  of the above Civil Revision Petition.  However though the 1st respondent  deposited Rs.2 Crores   she had failed to deposit the remaining  Rs.3 Crores.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t  111. Further,  Mr. Justice P.P.S. Janarthana Raja,  in the order dated  17.12.2009 has observed that in the light of the submission made  by the  learned counsel for the revision petitioner  that the auction was completed  and the sale certificate   was issued on 12.12.2009  observed as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t“Taking into consideration of the same,  the sale is subject to the court confirmation  and also  the learned counsel appearing for the respondent   undertakes  to deposit Rs.2.00 crores  (Rupees Two crores only) on or before  4.1.2010. Call on 4.1.2010.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t112. Admittedly,  pursuant to the said order,  the first respondent   has deposited  a sum of Rs.2 crores  on 2.1.2010.   In the light  of the aforesaid facts of the case and the reasons stated above and in view of the C.R.P. being dismissed,  the sale in favour of M\/s. Sree Anandkumar Mills will automatically go.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t113. Since,  pending the C.R.P.,  the first respondent has deposited  a sum of Rs.2.00 crores,  she  is at liberty to withdraw the same.  It is open to the revision petitioner to approach the trial  court and seek vacation of  the interim  injunction granted by it.\n<\/p>\n
\t\tWith the above directions, the C.R.P. is dismissed.  No costs.  Connected M.Ps. are also dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
rnb\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t29.10.2010\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\n\n\n  \nIndex: Yes\/No\n\nInternet : Yes\/No\t\t\t\n\nTo\nThe Sub Court, Udumalpet.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\t \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tK. MOHAN RAM,  J.  \n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\n\n\nRNB\n\n\n\n\n\n\t    \n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\nC.R.P.PD.No.3777 OF 2009\nand\nM.P.Nos.1 and 2of 2009 and 1 of 2010\n\n\t\t\n\n\n\n\n\n\t\t\t\t\n\n\n\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tDATED:29.10.2010\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\t\t\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\t\tPre Delivery Order in C.R.P.No.3777 of 2009\nTHE HON'BLE MR. \nJUSTICE  K. MOHAN RAM\nMOST RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED \nN. BASKAR, PA. \n\n<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Madras High Court The Authorised Officer vs Nandini on 29 October, 2010 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:29.10.2010 C O R A M THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE. K. MOHAN RAM C.R.P.PD.No.3777 OF 2009 and M.P.Nos.1 and 2of 2009 and 1 of 2010 The Authorised Officer Indian Overseas Bank Specialised Assets Recovery Management […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,13],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-95402","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-high-court","category-madras-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nThe Authorised Officer vs Nandini on 29 October, 2010 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-authorised-officer-vs-nandini-on-29-october-2010\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Authorised Officer vs Nandini on 29 October, 2010 - 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