{"id":96065,"date":"1975-09-01T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1975-08-31T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kerala-state-electricity-board-vs-indian-aluminium-co-on-1-september-1975-2"},"modified":"2018-12-18T01:12:53","modified_gmt":"2018-12-17T19:42:53","slug":"kerala-state-electricity-board-vs-indian-aluminium-co-on-1-september-1975-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kerala-state-electricity-board-vs-indian-aluminium-co-on-1-september-1975-2","title":{"rendered":"Kerala State Electricity Board vs Indian Aluminium Co on 1 September, 1975"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Kerala State Electricity Board vs Indian Aluminium Co on 1 September, 1975<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1976 AIR 1031, \t\t 1976 SCR (1) 552<\/div>\n
Author: A Alagiriswami<\/div>\n
Bench: Alagiriswami, A., Bhagwati, P.N., Goswami, P.K., Sarkaria, Ranjit Singh, Gupta, A.C.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nKERALA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nINDIAN ALUMINIUM CO.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT01\/09\/1975\n\nBENCH:\nALAGIRISWAMI, A.\nBENCH:\nALAGIRISWAMI, A.\nBHAGWATI, P.N.\nGOSWAMI, P.K.\nSARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH\nGUPTA, A.C.\n\nCITATION:\n 1976 AIR 1031\t\t  1976 SCR  (1) 552\n 1976 SCC  (1) 466\n CITATOR INFO :\n RF\t    1976 SC1999\t (8)\n R\t    1978 SC 215\t (30)\n RF\t    1980 SC1955\t (12)\n F\t    1983 SC 937\t (33)\n R\t    1984 SC 981\t (8)\n MV\t    1985 SC 421\t (61)\n R\t    1986 SC  63\t (7)\n F\t    1987 SC1837\t (54)\n RF\t    1987 SC2034\t (15)\n F\t    1990 SC 781\t (71)\n R\t    1990 SC1637\t (44)\n E\t    1990 SC1851\t (36)\n RF\t    1990 SC2072\t (10,44)\n\n\nACT:\n     Kerala Essential  Articles Control\t (Temporary  powers)\nAct, 1961,  S.2(a) and\tS.3-Kerala State  Electricity Supply\n(Kerala\t State\t Electricity  Board   and  Licensees  Areas)\nSurcharge Order made under s. 3-Constitutional validity of -\nconstitution of\t India, 1950-Art.  246-Notwithstanding\"\t and\n\"Subject to\"  in Art.  246(1) and  (3) meaning of-Entries 43\nand 44\tof List I and Entry 38 of  List III-Doctrine of pith\nand substance.\n     Presidential assent-If  could be given to cure possible\nrepuganancy-If could be given to notifications-Assent to the\nwhole  Act  not\t merely\t to  one  amendment  when  referred-\nSubordinate Legislation-Principle regarding validity of.\n     Section 2(a)  of the Kerala Esseential Articles Control\n(Temporary Powers)  Act, 1961 defines \"essential article\" as\nmeaning any  article (not  being  an  essential\t article  as\ndefined in  Essential Commodities  Act. 1955)  which may  be\ndeclared by  the Government  by\t a  notification  to  be  an\nessential article.  Section 3  enables the State Government,\nif of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do\nfor maintaining\t or increasing the supplies of any essential\narticle etc.  to make  certain notified\t orders. The Act was\noriginally intended  to be  in force  for five years but its\nlife was extended by successive amendments.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n     In exercise of powers conferred by s.2(a) of the Kerala\nAct, the  State\t  Government declared  'electricity'  as  an\nessential article  in 1965.  In 1968,  the State  Government\npassed an  Order called\t the Kerala State Electricity Supply\n(Kerala\t State\t Electricity  Board   and  Licensees  Areas)\nSurcharge Order,  1968, under  s.3 of  the  Kerala  Act,  by\nwhich, the  State Electricity  Board was required to collect\nsurcharge from\tnon-licensee consumers\tof electricity\teven\nthough the  Board may  have entered into long term contracts\nwith them  with\t regard to the rate at which electricity was\nto be supplied to them.\n     The   respondents,\t  who\twere   bulk   consumers\t  of\nelectricity, questioned\t before the  High Court the validity\nof the\torder. The order having been struck down by the High\nCourt, in  appeal to  this Court,  the respondents supported\nthe judgment  of the  High Court  on the  grounds:  (i)\t The\nKerala Act is repugnant to the Electricity Act, 1910 and the\nElectricity (Supply)  Act, 1948\t (both of  which are Central\nActs) and,  in particular  the latter,\twhich  falls  within\nEntries 43 and 44 of List I; and that the State Act trenches\nupon the  field occupied  by the 1948-Act which falls partly\nunder Entry  43 of  List I and partly under Entry 38 of List\nIII. On\t behalf of  the appellants it was contended that the\nKerala Act  falls under Entries 26 and 27 of List II, and in\nany event,  the Presidential  assent to\t the Kerala  Act has\ncured the repugnancy.\n     Allowing\tthe   appeal   (per   majority-Alagiriswami,\nBhagwati, Goswami and Sarkaria, JJ.):\n^\n     HELD: The\tKerala Act, the declaration of 'electricity'\nas an  essential article  under s.  2(a), and  the Surcharge\nOrder made under s. 3, are valid. [581 G]\n     1. The  question of repugnance arises only in case both\nthe legislations  fall within  the same\t List, namely,\tList\nIII. If any legislation is enacted by a State Legislature in\nrespect of a matter falling within List I that will be void.\nThere can,  therefore, be  no question of repugnance between\nthe Electricity\t Act, 1910 and the Electricity (Supply) Act.\n1948 on the one hand, and the Kerala Act on the other if the\nfirst two  Acts fall in List I or List III and the State Act\nin List II. [562 D]\n     Indu Bhushan  v.  Sundari\tDevi  [1970]  1\t S.C.R.\t 443\nreferred to.\n553\n     2. (a)  The words\t\"notwithstanding\" in  clause (1) and\n\"subject to\"  in clause\t (3) of Art. 246 of the Constitution\nmean that  where an entry is in general terms in List II and\npart of\t that entry is in specific terms in List I the entry\nin List I takes effect notwithstanding the entry in List II.\nThis is\t also on  the principle\t that the 'special\" excludes\nthe \"general\" and the general entry in List II is subject to\nthe special entry in List I. [563 C]\n     (b) The word \"notwithstanding\" also means that if it is\nnot possible  to reconcile the two entries the entry in List\nI will\tprevail. But  before that  happens attempt should be\nmade to decide in which List a particular legislation falls.\nFor deciding  under which  entry  a  particular\t legislation\nfalls, the  theory of  \"pith and substance\" has been evolved\nby Courts.  If in  pith and  substance a  legislation  falls\nwithin one  list or  the other,\t but  some  portion  of\t the\nsubject matter\tof that\t legislation  incidentally  trenches\nupon and might come to fall under another List, the Act as a\nwhole  would   be  valid   notwithstanding  such  incidental\ntrenching. [563 D-E]\n     (c) Both  the 1910\t Act as\t well as  the  1948-Act\t are\nexisting  law\tas  contemplated   under  Art.\t372  of\t the\nConstitution. An  existing law\tcontinues to  be valid\teven\nthough the  legislative power  with respect  to the  subject\nmatter of  the existing\t law might  be in  a different\tList\nunder the  Constitution from  the List\tunder which it would\nhave fallen  under the\tGovernment of  India Act, 1935. But,\nafter the Constitution came into force an existing law could\nbe amended  or repealed\t only by the Legislature which would\nbe competent  to enact\tthat law  if' it  were to  be  newly\nenacted. [566 G]\n     3(a) The  Statement of  Objects and  Reasons though not\nrelevant for  the purpose of interpreting the sections of an\nAct, will  throw light\tupon the  object of  the Legislature\nfrom the historical point of view [569 A]\n     (b) The  1948-Act was  enacted for\t the purpose  of co-\nordinated development  of electricity in India on a regional\nbasis. The  Statement of  objects and  Reasons\tstates\tthat\nthere was  necessity for the constitution of semi-autonomous\nbodies like  Electricity Boards to administer grid system on\nquasi-commercial lines. The Act deals with the incorporation\nand regulation\tof Electricity\tBoards. It created a central\nauthority (which  is not  an incorporated  body) as  well as\nvarious\t  provincial\tElectricity   Boards\t(which\t are\nincorporated bodies). A Provincial Electricity Board located\nin one\tProvince and  operating in  a neighbouring  Province\ncould carry  on its  operations by  agreement with the other\nProvince or  Provinces. The  jurisdiction of  an Electricity\nBoard, however,\t was confined  mainly to the jurisdiction of\nan Province  under the Act the executive power vested in the\nProvinces. The Statement of objects and Reasons further says\nthat the  semi-autonomous  Electricity\tBoards\tcontemplated\nunder the  Act could not be set up by provincial Governments\nunder the  then existing constitutional Act as they would be\nin the\tnature of  trading corporation within the meaning of\nentry 33  of the  Federal Legislative List of the Government\nof India Act, 1935. [568A-H]\n     4. The  argument that  the 1948_Act falls under entries\n43 and 44 of List I has no substance. [568 A]\n     (a) A  reading of\tthe Statement of Objects and Reasons\nshows that  the 1948-Act was a legislation under an entry in\nthe Concurrent\tList. Although the Statement of objectcs and\nReasons mentions  entry 33  of the  Federal  List    of\t the\nGovernment of  India Act,  1935 (corresponding to entries 43\nand  44\t  of  List   I\tof   the  Seventh  Schedule  to\t the\nConstitution) it does not show that the 1948-Act falls under\nentry 44.  Nor is  the fact  that entry\t 33 of List I of the\nGovernment of India Act, 1935 was mentioned in the Statement\nof objects and Reasons a conclusive test. [568 E]\n     (b) From  an examination of the provisions of the 1948-\nAct it\twould be obvious that one part of the Act deals with\nthe constitution of the Board,the incorporation of the Board\nand the\t regulation of\tits activities. But the main purpose\nof the\tAct is\tfor, rationalising the production and supply\nof electricity.\t The regulation\t contemplated in  entries 43\nand 44\tof List\t I is  not regulation  of  the\tbusiness  of\nproduction, distribution and supply of electri-\n554\ncity  of   the\tCorporation.  The  provision  regarding\t the\nincorporation and    regulation of Electricity Boards should\nbe taken  to be\t only incidental to the provisions regarding\nproduction,  supply   and   distribution   of\telectricity.\nTherefore, the\tprovisions of  the 1948\t Act  regarding\t the\nBoard's functions  do not make it one falling under entry 43\nof List I. [570 H; 571A]\n     R. C.  Cooper v.  Union<\/a> [1970] 3 S.C.R. 520 and Ramtanu\nHousing society v. Maharashtra [1971] 1 S.C.R. 719 followed.\n     (c) The  1948-Act in  pith\t and  substance,  should  be\ndeemed to  be one falling under entry 38 of List III. In the\nPresent case  the incorporation\t of  the  Stage\t Electricity\nBoards is  merely for  the rationalisation of the production\nand supply  of electricity, for taking measures conducive to\nelectrical  development\t  and  for  all\t matters  incidental\nthereto. Furthermore,  Electricity Boards  are\tnot  trading\ncorporations; they  are established  to promote co-ordinated\ndevelopment of\tthe generation,\t supply and  distribution of\nelectricity on\ta no-profit-no-loss  basis. In the discharge\nof  their  functions,  they  are  guided  by  directions  on\nquestions of  policy given  by the  State Governments. There\nare no shareholders and there is no distribution of profits.\nThis is\t another reason\t why the  1948-Act cannot be said to\nfall under entry 43 of List I. [573 B-D]\n     (d) Even  assuming that  part  of\tthe  1948-Act  is  a\nlegislation with  respect to incorporation and regulation of\na trading  corporation, falling\t under entry 48 of List I of\nSchedule Seven,\t the rest  of it will fall under entry 38 of\nList III.  The\tKerala\tAct  has  nothing  to  do  with\t the\nincorporation and  regulation of the Electricity Boards and,\ntherefore, it  can only\t relate to entry 38, List III, if at\nall. [573 F-G]\n     (e) The  1910 and\t1948-Acts together  form a  complete\ncode with  respect to  entry 38 in List III and the Board is\nonly an\t instrument fashioned  for carrying out this object.\n[571 A]\n     (f) Therefore  both the  1910-Act and 1948-Act could be\namended or  repealed by the Parliament and also by the State\nLegislature if\tit obtains  Presidential assent\t to  an\t Act\namending or repealing the 1910-Act or 1948-Act. [566 H]\n     A. K.  Krishna v. State of Madras<\/a> [1957] SCR 399; P. N.\nKaul v.\t The State of J & K. [1959] Supp.2 SCR 270 and J & K\nState v. M. S. Farooqi<\/a> [1972] (3) SCR 881, referred to.\n     (g) The  assent of\t the President\tshould be deemed not\nmerely to  the substitution  of the  words five years by the\nwords seven  years in  the Kerala  Act but  to the  Act as a\nwhole and  any repugnance  between the Kerala Act on the one\nhand and  the 1910-Act\tand 1948-Act  on the other should be\ndoemed to  have been cured by such assent. The Kerala Act in\nso far\tas it  deals with  electrieity can  be deemed  to be\nlegislation under entry 38 of List III Though the Act itself\nhas not\t declared any  article as an essential article, when\nthe declaration was made under s.2(a) in 1965 it became part\nof the Act. When the President assented to the Amendment Act\nof 1967\t the declaration  of electricity  as  and  essential\narticle had  been made and should be deemed to have become a\npart of the Act. [575 F; C]\n     (5) But  the Kerala  Act  is  a  matter  falling  under\nentries 26 and 27 of List II. [575 A]\n\t  (a)  \"Essential  article\"  is\t a  term  which\t has\n     acquired a\t defining connotation  in Indian legislative\n     practice  and  is\tnot  a\tvague  or  a  general  term.\n     \"Essential\t commodity\"   defined\tin   the   Essential\n     Commodities Act, 1955 includes practically every matter\n     regarding industry within the legislative competence of\n     Parliament.  The\tterm  \"essential  commodity\"  is  an\n     expression corresponding  to a  commodity essential  to\n     the life  of the  community. It  is  not  open  to\t the\n     authority exercising  powers under s.2(a) of the Kerala\n     Act to  declare and any every commodity as an essential\n     commodity. That  Act deals\t with esential\tarticles not\n     being essential  article dealth with the by Central Act\n     of 1955.  It is  not  a  legislation  with\t respect  to\n     electricity and,  therefore, does\tnot fall under entry\n     38 of  List III.  Electricity, being  beyond  doubt  an\n     essential article\tmay be\tdeclared to  be an essential\n     article under the Act. In that case the power\n555\nexercised is  not in relation to electricity qua electricity\nbut electricity\t as an essential article. The Act, therefore\nin pith\t and substance is with respect to trade and commerce\nand production,\t supply and  distribution of electricity. It\nis not\ta permanent  legislation with respect to electricity\nbut a temporary one dealing with a temporary situation. [574\nA; F-H]\n     (b) The  Surcharge order was necessary for the survival\nand existence  of the  Board without  which there  can be no\nproduction  or\t supply\t of  electricity.  It  is  no  valid\ncriticism of  this view\t to say that the powers of the Board\nunder the  1948-Act are\t over-ridden by\t the Surcharge order\nand the\t order is, therefore, repugnant to the 1948-Act. The\nBoard was  anxious to  make no\tSurcharge order.  This is  a\nsimple case  of a  contract being over-ridden in exercise of\nstatutory powers. [575 B]\n     6(a) It  is not  correct to  say that  in so far as the\nconsequence of\ta declaration under s.2(a) of the Kerala Act\nwas that  the State  Government was  enabled to\t make orders\nregarding   production,\t   supply   and\t   distribution\t  of\nelectricity, there  was a  possibility of  such orders being\nrepugnant to the provisions of the 1910-Act and the 1948-Act\nand, therefore,\t any such repugnancy was cured by the assent\ngiven by  the President.  It is\t only the  actual repugnancy\nthat can  be  cured  by\t Presidential  assent  and  not\t the\npossibility of repugnancy. [575 G]\n     (b)  No   Presidential  assent   was  possible  to\t the\nnotification Art.  254(2) does\tnot contemplate Presidential\nassent to  notifications issued\t under the  Act. The Article\ncontemplates Presidential  assent only\tto laws\t made by the\nLegislature of a State. [567 G]\n     7(a)  Notwithstanding   the   fact\t  that\t subordinate\nlegislation is\tlaid on\t the table of House of Parliament or\nState Legislature  and being subject to such   modification,\nannulment or  amendment as  they may  make  the\t subordinate\nlegislation cannot  be said  to be valid unless it is within\nthe scope  of the rule making power provided in the statute.\nWhere  an  executive  authority\t is  given  power  to  frame\nsubordinate legislation\t within stated limits, rules made by\nsuch authority,\t if outside  the scope\tof  the\t rule-making\npower should  not be  deemed to be valid merely because such\nrules have  been  placed  before  the  Legislature  and\t are\nsubject to  such modification, annulment or amendment as the\nLegislature may\t think fit.  The process  of such amendment,\nmodification or\t annulment is not the same as the process of\nlegislation and\t in particular it lacks the assent either of\nthe President or the Governor of the State. [576 E-G]\n     Minister of  Health v.  The King,\t[1931] A.C.  494 and\nInstitute of  Patent Agents  v. Lockwood,  [1894]  A.C.\t 347\nreferred to.\n     (b) If  a declaration  made under\ts. 2(a)\t or an order\nmade under  s.3(a) is  not within  the scope  of the Act, it\nshould be held to be not valid. [576 H]\n     (c) A  declaration can  still be attack if the power to\nmake such  a declaration  was beyond  the scope of the power\ndelegated. even if subsequent to the declaration the Act was\namended and  the President  had given  his assent  to the to\nAmending Act.[577 A]\n     (d) But the power conferred by the Kerala Act is a case\nof conditional legislation. The various types of powers that\ncan be\texercised under\t that Act are enumerated in it. Only\nan article  with reference  to which  those powers are to be\nexercised is  left to  be determined  by the Executive. That\nwill vary  from time to time. It is the Exceutive that would\nbe in  a position to judge when and under what circumstances\nan article  becomes an\tessential article and, therefore, it\nis  necessary.\t to  control   the  production,\t supply\t and\ndistribution of trade. and commerce in that article.[578 H]\n     The Queen\tv. Burah (5 L.R.178@ 194) State of Punjab v.\nKhan Chand  A.I.R.<\/a> 1974\t SC. 543  and Gwalior Rayon Mills v.\nAsst. Commr. S.T. A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1660 followed.\n556\n     The  Kerala   Essential  Articles\t Control  (Temporary\nPowers) Act,  1961 is an invalid piece of legislation on the\nground of  excessive  delegation  and  the  declaration\t and\nSurcharge order\t made respectively  under s.2(a)  and s.3 of\nthat Act are of no consequence.[582 G]\n     1(a) The  definition of  essential article leaves it to\nthe State  Government to  decide what should be an essential\narticle for  the purpose  of the Act. The legislature is, of\ncourse presumed\t to know  the limits  of its  competence and\nassuming it is permissible to attribute similar knowledge to\nthe Government\tas to  the bounds  of  its  authority  under\ns.2(a) an  essential article  may be  any article covered by\nany of the entries in List II or List III except the classes\nof commodities\tmentioned as  an essential  commodity in the\nEssential Commodities  Act. Until, therefore, the Government\nissued a  notification\tunder  s.2(a)  declaring  electrical\nenergy to  be an  essential article  almost four years after\nthe Act\t came into  force, it was not possible even to guess\nwhat the  Act was  about. Thus\tthe Act\t as  passed  had  no\npositive  content,   it\t was   and  empty   husk   and\t its\ninsubstantiality, if  by itself\t not an invalidating factor,\nexposes the  want of  a declared  legislative policy  in the\nAct. The  Act does  not provide any guidance or lay down any\ntest to\t ascertain what\t makes an  article essential for the\npurpose\t of   the  Act.\t  The  reference  to  the  Essential\nCommodities Act\t in s.2(a) which defines \"essential article\"\nis merely  to  exclude\tfrom  its  purview  the\t commodities\ncovered by  the Essential Commodities Act and only serves to\nemphasise its  indefiniteness and makes it more difficult to\nfind any  clue to the nature of the articles the Legislature\nhad in\tmind in\t enacting the  Kerala Act. Almost the entire\nlegislative field  was left open to the Government to choose\nfrom and decide according to their own lights what should be\nan essential article. [583 C-G]\n     (b)  The  Legislature  cannot  delegate  the  essential\nlegislative function,  which means that the Legislature must\ndeclare the policy of the law and provide a standard for the\nguidance of the subordinate law making authority. The Kerala\nAct authorises\tthe Government\tto declare  any\t article  as\nessential  except   those   mentioned\tin   the   Essential\nCommodities Act without laying down any definite criteria or\nstandards. This\t is surrendering  unguided  and\t uncanalised\npower to the executive. The Act cannot be called an instance\nof conditional\tlegislation. The  powers  conferred  on\t the\nGovernment  by\t the  Kerala   Act  exceed   the  limits  of\npermissible delegation. [583 H]\n     (c) The Kerala Act of 1961 was to remain in force for a\nperiod of five years from January 1962. The Principal Act as\nwell as\t the Amending  Acts of 1967, 1969, and 1970 received\nthe assent  of the  President. But the Act as passed in 1961\ndid not\t appear to contain any provision which was repugnant\nto any\tCentral Act  or existing  law; that  being  so,\t the\nassent given  to it  seems redundant  and of no consequence.\nArticle 254(2)\tcontemplates an\t existing repugnancy and not\npossible future inconsistencies.\n     [Obiter: Assuming that assent given by the President to\nthe amending  Acts would  have\tthe  effect  of\t curing\t the\nrepugnancy between  the declaration  under  s.2(a)  and\t the\nSurcharge Order\t under s.3  of the  principal Act on the one\nhand and  the Central Acts of 1910 and 1948 on the other, If\nthe declaration\t and the  Surcharge Order  were outside\t the\nAct,could not  cure the\t repugnancy arising  from these\t two\norders.[584 H]\n     The orders\t made by  the-State Government\tunder s.2(a)\nand s.3(1)  of the  impugned Act could not be called part of\nthe Act.  The Act  did not even say that such orders were to\nbe treated  as if enacted in the Act. The President's assent\ncould not  be said  to have  cured the repugnancy created by\nthe Surcharge order. [585 G]\n     Arguments for the appellant:\n     The impugned Kerala Act is a legislation under Entry 26\nof List\t II (Trade  and Commerce).  It may  also fall  under\nEntry 27,  List II  (Production, Distribution  and Supply of\nGoods). Assuming that the Electricity Supply Act falls under\nEntries 43  and\/or 44  of List\tI, the\tState Legislature is\ncompetent\n557\nto pass\t legislation relating  to the trading and commercial\nactivities of  the Corporation\tset up under the Central Act\npassed under Entry 43 and\/or 44 of List I.\n     Assuming that  the Kerala\tAct encroaches on the powers\nof the\tElectricity Board  under s.49,\tsuch encroachment is\nincidental and\tis justified  under the doctrine of pith and\nsubstance.\n     Assuming that  the Central\t legislation as\t well as the\nState legislation falls under Entry 38 of List III, there is\nno repugnancy  or conflict  between the\t powers of the Board\nunder s.49  and the impugned Act and the orders because they\nare made  within the  provisions of  the Act  and to aid and\nsupport the powers of the Board.\n     If\t the   surcharge  had\tnot  been   introduced\t the\nElectricity Board  would not  have been able to carry on the\nbusiness and  would have  been compelled  to close  down its\nbusiness.\n     Arguments on behalf of Electricity Board:\n     The Act  applies  to  essential  commodities  i.e.\t all\nessential  commodities\t as  understood\t  at  the   time  of\nlegislation  in\t  1962.\t In   view  of\t the  programme\t  of\nindustrialisation, and\tthe limited  scope  of\tthe  Central\nEssential  Commodities\t Act,  1955,  the  present  Act\t was\nconceived. The\tbackground of the Act strongly indicates the\ncontent of the expression 'essential commodities' as meaning\nthe same  thing as \"essential to the life of the community\".\nUnder the  impugned Act\t by s.2(a)  the power  to select the\narticles for  control is  delegated to the State Government.\nThe power  to take  orders for\tcontrol is delegated both to\nthe State  Government and  authorised officers. The articles\nfalling within\tthe Central  Essential Commodities Act, 1955\nare excluded from the purview of the Act not because control\nof those  articles is  not desired  but\t because  the  State\nGovernment have\t the necessary\tpowers under the Central Act\nitself. The  definition in  s.2(a) should  be understood  to\nmean \"essential\t articles\" notified  by the State Government\nand essential  articles should\tbe understood as those which\nare essential  to  the\tlife  of  the  community.  The\tword\n'control' in the preamble is indicative of the limited scope\nof the\tAct. This interpretation saves the Act from the vice\nof abdication  of  essential  legislative  function  by\t the\nLegistature.\n     The  preamble   to\t the   Act  is\ta  key-note  to\t the\nunderstanding of  an Act as well as the Statement of Objects\nand Reasons  clearly indicates\tthe scope and purpose of the\nAct.  \"Trade   and  Commerce\"\tas  well   as  \"supply\t and\ndistribution\" must be in respect of articles or goods but on\nthat account  it will  not be permissible to dissect the Act\nand make  it relatable\tto each commodity over which control\nis imposed.  The pith  and substance  of the  Act makes them\nfall within List II, Entries 26 and 27. The law is not a law\nrelating  to   electricity  as\tsuch  nor  relating  to\t the\nincorporation or  power of the Electricity Board established\nunder the Electricity Supply Act, 1948.\n     The Supply\t Act, 1948,  as\t clearly  expressed  in\t the\npreamble and  worked out in the Act through several agencies\nincluding the Board shows that the pith and substance of the\nAct is development of electricity and falls within List III,\nEntry  31   of\tthe  Government\t of  India  Act.  1935.\t The\nincorporation of  State Electricity  Board for each State is\nonly one  of the means of achieving the objective. Moreover,\nthe Board  is not  a trading  Corporation since\t it  is\t not\ncreated to  earn profits  but to  carry out  development and\nsupply energy  at the  most economical\trate. Each  Board is\nestablished  by\t  a  State.  The  whole\t law  falls  in\t the\nConcurrent List\t and in any event not under List I, Entry 43\nbecause the  Board is  not a trading corporation nor does it\nfall under  Entry 44  because the Board is a State Board for\nthe State. The Supply Act was passed under the Government of\nIndia Act,  1935 and  was  an  \"existing  law\"\tand  not  an\nimpediment to the State passing a law within its competence.\nThere is  no conflict  between the impugned notification and\nthe exercise of powers of the Board under s.40 of the supply\nAct. Assuming  that both  the legislations  fall under\tList\nIII,  the   President's\t assent\t to  the  impugned  Act\t was\noperative, the conflict was immaterial.\n558\n     Arguments for the respondent:\n     The Electricity  Supply Act of 1948 is relatable partly\nto List\t I entry  43 and  44 (Government of India Act List I\nEntry 33)  and partly  to List\tIII Entry  38 (Government of\nIndia Act  List III  Entry 31). Part of the Act is concerned\nwith the  constitution and  powers of  the Electricity Board\nwhich is  something like  the memorandum  and Article  of  a\nLimited Company\t and another  part of the Act may be said to\nbe concerned with electricity.\n     The Kerala\t Act is\t a vague  piece of  legislation. The\nArticles to  which this\t Act may apply are not mentioned. It\nis only\t after the  power under the Act is exercised that it\nis possible  to say whether it would conflict with any other\nlegislation.\n     The  impugned   Act  may\tbe  applicable\tto  Articles\nrelatable to  as many as 20 legislative entires from List I,\nII and III at the discretion of the Government.\n     Regulation and  Control with  regard  to  many  of\t the\nmatters\t are  covered  by  existing  Central  Acts  such  as\nIndustries Regulation  and Development\tAct, Factories\tAct,\nCentral Excise\tand Salt  Act, Defence\tof India Act, Indian\nElectricity Act, 1910, Electricity Supply Act, 1948.\n     Every aspect  of electricity  in respect of generation,\ncontrol price fixation must be relatable to entry 38 of List\nI and not Entry 26 or 27 of List II. The Central Legislature\nhas already  legislated on  all these  aspects in the Indian\nElectricity Act\t of 1910  and Supply Act 1948. If these were\nthe subject  matter of\tEntries 26  and 27  of List  II, the\nCentral Legislature could not have legislated.\n     Any argument  on the  basis that the Electricity Supply\nAct 1948  is existing  law, is not relevant because the 1948\nAct has\t been extensively amended in 1956 and 1966 and these\namendments relate  to the  field of control under the Kerala\nAct, if the same is applied in respect of electricity.\n     The Presidential  assent given  to the Kerala Act could\nbe said\t to be\tan assent  within the meaning of Article 254\nsince at  the time when the assent was given the Act did not\ndisclose any  inconsistency with  any Central  Act since the\nitems to  which the Kerala Act was applicable did not appear\nin the\tstatute. The  conflict arose  only when an order was\nmade  by   the\tState\tGovernment  applying   the  Act\t  to\nelectricity. No\t steps were even taken to incorporate in the\nAct the commodities to which the Act could apply and to take\nPresident's assent thereon.\n     The  Kerala   Act\tsuffers\t from  excessive  delegation\nbecause at the will of the State Government the Act could be\nmade applicable\t to any article, except those covered by the\nEssential Commodities  Act. The State Government could apply\nthe Act\t even to  items falling\t in List I since there is no\nguideline.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
     CIVIL  APPELLATE\tJURISDICTION:  Civil   Appeals\tNos.
\n2557\/69, 20\/70, 1423-1434, 1733, 2474, 2575-2578\/72, 95-105,
\n1318, 1371-74,\t2040\/73, 2100-2102\/74  and 120, 121 & 536 of
\n1975.\n<\/p>\n
     From the Judgment and Order dated 24-9-69, 16-8-71, 25-
\n1-72, 16-2-72,\t11-2-72, 10-2-72, 22-11-72, 21-7-72, 8-2-72,
\n25-7-72, 31-5-72 and 4-3-75 of the Kerala High Court in W.A.
\nNos.809\/69, 846-47,  855, 867,\t894 and\t 940 of 1969, 261\/71
\nand 957-58,983,988  and 1021\/69,942\/69,\t 427\/71,  458,\t415,
\n407, 408  & 68\tof 1971 and 211, 241\/70, 3 and 7\/71, 342\/72,
\n36, 42 and 43 of 1971 and
\n559<\/span>
\n     Civil Appeal No. 2117 of 1972.\n<\/p>\n
     Appeal by\tSpecial Leave  from the\t Judgment and  Order
\ndated 17-8-71  of the  Kerala High Court in W.A. No. 1021 of
\n1969.\n<\/p>\n
     Lal Narain\t Sinha, Solicitor  General of  India, A.  G.
\nPuddissery for the Appellant in C.A. No. 2557\/69.\n<\/p>\n
     V. A.  Seyid  Mohammed  and  K.  M.  K.  Nair  for\t the
\nAppellant in C.A. No. 20\/70.\n<\/p>\n
     A. K.  Sen (In  C.A. Nos.\t1423\/72), M. P. Jha (In C.A.
\n1423\/72), A.  G. Puddissery  (In all  the petitions) for the
\nappellants in C.As. Nos. 1423, 1434, 1735, 2474, 2575, 2576-
\n78\/72, 1318,  1371, 1374,  2040\/73,  2100-2102\/74,  120-121,
\n536\/75.\n<\/p>\n
     P. C.  Chandi, K.\tM. K. Nair and K. R. Nambiar for the
\nAppellants in CAs. Nos. 2117\/72 and 95-105\/73).\n<\/p>\n
     S. V.  Gupte, Ajay\t Ray and P. Mathai, O. C. Mathur, K.
\nJ. John\t and J.\t B. Dadachanji for the Appellants in CA. No.
\n1457\/71.\n<\/p>\n
     G. Rathi,\tAdvocate General for the State of Orissa and
\nB. Parathasarthy for the Appellant in C.A. Nos. 1652\/74.\n<\/p>\n
     Vinoo Bhagat  for the  Appellants (In  C.As. Nos. 1653-
\n54774).\n<\/p>\n
     S. V.  Gupte (In CA. No. 2557\/69), P. Mathai, Ajay Ray,
\nO. C.  Mathur K. John, J. B. Dadachanji and Mrs. S. Bhandare
\n(In C.A.  No. 20\/70  for  Respondent  Nos.  1  (In  CA.\t No.
\n2557\/69) & (In CAs. Nos.20\/70, 1423-24\/72).\n<\/p>\n
     G. B.  Pai, K.  J. John, O. C. Mathur, J. B. Dadachanji
\nand P. K. Kurian (In CAs. Nos. 1733\/72) for Respondent No. 1
\n(In CAs.Nos.  1426-1429, 1431-1434, 1733\/72, 2577-78, 95-96,
\n99-100 and 102 -105\/73).\n<\/p>\n
     N.\t Sudharkaran,\tP.  Mathai  and\t P.  K.\t Pillai\t for
\nRespondent Nos.\t 1  (In\t CA.  No.  2575\/72)  and  (C.A.\t No.
\n1425\/72).\n<\/p>\n
     K. R. Nambiar for Respondent No. 2 (In CA. No. 2575\/72,
\n2576-78\/72 and 2040\/73).\n<\/p>\n
     Miss Lily\tThomas for  Respondent No.  1  (In  CA.\t No.
\n2576\/72).\n<\/p>\n
     A.\t S.  Nambiar  for  Respondent  No.  1  (In  CA.\t No.
\n2578\/72).\n<\/p>\n
     N. Sudharkaran for Respondent No. 1 (In CA. No. 97773).
\n     G. B.  Pai (In CA Nos. 2100-2102\/74, 121\/75), P. Mathai
\n(In CA.\t Nos. 1318\/75) Ranjit Mahanty, Ajay Ray (In CAs. No.
\n1652\/74) and  O. C.  Mathur, K. J. John and J. B. Dadachanji
\n(In all\t matters) for  Respondent No.1 (In C.A. No. 1318\/73,
\n2100-2102\/74, 121\/75)  for the\tRespondents (In\t C.As.\tNos.
\n1652\/74).\n<\/p>\n
     Lal Narain\t Sinha, Solicitor  General of India (In C.A.
\nNo. 1457\/71) A. G. Puddissery for the Respondent (In CA. No.
\n1457 and 1641\/71).\n<\/p>\n
560<\/span><\/p>\n
     T. S.  Krishnamoorthy Iyer,  P. Mathai,  N. Sudharkaran
\nand P.\tK. Pillai  for Respondent No. 1 (In CA. No. 1371 and
\n1374\/73) and (In C.A. No. 1373\/73)
\n     K. M. K. Nair for Respondent No. 2 (In C.As. Nos. 1371-
\n1374\/73).\n<\/p>\n
     G. L.  Sanghi, P.\tMathai, K. J. John, O. C. Mathur and
\nJ. B. Dadachanji for Respondent No. 1 (In CA. No. 1372\/73).\n<\/p>\n
     G.Rathi, Advocate\tGeneral for  the State of Orissa and
\nB. Parthasarthy for Respondents (In CAs. Nos. 1653-1654774).\n<\/p>\n
     P. K. Pillai for the Intervener (In CA. No. 20\/70).
\n     G. L.Sanghi,  P. V.  Kapur, U.  K. Khaitan\t (for  Ferro
\nAlloys Corpn.)\tK. R.  Choudhry K.  Raj Choudhry  (for\tA.P.
\nElectricity Board) for the Intervener (In C.A. No. 1652\/74).\n<\/p>\n
     S. Balakrishnan  for  Respondent  No.  1  (in  CA.\t No.
\n2040\/73).\n<\/p>\n
     Note: Mrs.\t Sunanda Bhandare, Advocate appeared for the
\napplicant intervener  in CA.  Nos. 1457\t and 1642\/71 and CA.
\nNos. 1652-1654\/74  and Mr. B. Sen, Senior Advocate, appeared
\nfor Respondent\tNo. 1 (In CA. 20\/70 and applicant intervener
\nin CA. No. 1652\/74).\n<\/p>\n
     The  Judgment   of\t  the\tCourt\twas   delivered\t  by
\nAlagiriswami, J. A. C. Gupta, J. gave a dissenting Opinion.\n<\/p>\n
     ALAGIRISWAMI, J.  The  validity  of  the  Kerala  State
\nElectricity  Supply  (Kerala  State  Electricity  Board\t and
\nLicensees Areas)  Surcharge Order  1968 is  in\tquestion  in
\nthese appeals.\tThat Order  was passed\tin exercise  of\t the
\npowers conferred  by  section  3  of  the  Kerala  Essential
\nArticles Control  (Temporary Powers)  Act, 1961.  It obliges
\nthe Board  to collect surcharges from non-licensee consumers
\nof electricity\teven though  the Board may have entered into
\nlong-term contracts  with them\twith regard  to the  rate at
\nwhich electricity  is to be supplied to them. The Act is one
\nto provide,  in the  interest of  the general public for the
\ncontrol of  the production,  supply and distribution of, and
\ntrade and commerce in, certain articles. Section 2(a) of the
\nAct defines “essential articles” as meaning any article (not
\nbeing an  essential commodity  as defined  in the  Essential
\nCommidities  Act,   1955)  which  may  be  declared  by\t the
\nGovernment by  notified order  to be  an essential  article.
\nSection 3  enables the\tGovernment, if of opinion that it is
\nnecessary  or\texpedient  so\tto  do\tfor  maintaining  or
\nincreasing the\tsupplies of  any essential  article  or\t for
\nsecuring their\tequitable distribution\tand availability  at
\nfair prices, to make notified orders providing for:\n<\/p>\n
\t  (a) regulating  by licences,\tpermits or otherwise
\n     the production or manufacture of any esential article:<\/p>\n
\t  (b) controlling  the price  at which any essential
\n     article may be bought or sold;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
561<\/span><\/p>\n
\t  (c) regulating  by licences, permits, or otherwise
\n     the   storage,   distribution,   transport,   disposal,
\n     acquisition,  use\t or  consumption  of  any  essential
\n     article;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (d) prohibiting  the withholding  from sale of any
\n     essential article ordinarily kept for sale;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (e) requiring\t any person  holding  in  stock\t any
\n     essential article to sell the whole or a specified part
\n     of the  stock to  the Government  or to  an officer  or
\n     agent of  the Government  or to  such other  person  or
\n     class of  persons and  in such  circumstances as may be
\n     specified in the order;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (f)  regulating   or\tprohibiting   any  class  of
\n     commercial or  financial transactions  relating to\t any
\n     essential\tarticle,   which,  in  the  opinion  of\t the
\n     authority making  the order, are, or if unregulated are
\n     likely to be detrimental to the public interest;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (g) collecting  any information or statistics with
\n     a\tview   to  regulating  or  prohibiting\tany  of\t the
\n     aforesaid matters;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (h) requiring\t persons engaged  in the production,
\n     supply or\tdistribution of, or trade or commerce in any
\n     essential\tarticle\t  to  maintain\t and   produce\t for
\n     inspection such books, accounts and records relating to
\n     their business and to furnish such information relating
\n     thereto as may be specified in the order;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (i) regulating  the processing  of  any  essential
\n     article;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (j) exercising  over the  whole or  any part of an
\n     existing undertaking,  such functions  of\tcontrol\t and
\n     subject to\t such conditions, as may be specified in the
\n     order;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (k)  any   incidental\t and  supplementary  matters
\n     including in  particular the  entering  and  search  of
\n     premises vehicles, vessels and aircraft, the seizure by
\n     a person  authorised to make such search of any article
\n     in respect\t of which  such person has reason to believe
\n     that a contravention of the order has been, is being or
\n     is about  to  be  committed,  the\tgrant  or  issue  of
\n     licences, permits\tor other documents, and the charging
\n     of fees therefor.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
In exercise of the powers under section 2(a) electricity was
\ndeclared as an essential article in 1965. Electricity is the
\nonly article  declared as an essential article under the Act
\nso far and in spite of the wide powers with regard to making
\nof notified  orders under  section 3  the impugned Surcharge
\nOrder is the only order so far made. It provides, as already
\nstated,\t for   levying\tof   a\tsurcharge   on\tsupplies  of
\nelectricity  made  to  bulk  consumers,\t many  of  whom\t are
\nrespondents in these appeals.\n<\/p>\n
     The  validity  of\tthe  Act  itself  is  not  seriously
\nquestioned except  in one  respect which  we shall deal with
\nlater; but  it is  contended  that  by\tthe  declaration  of
\nelectricity as an essential article under the Act, the
\n562<\/span>
\nAct impinges  upon various  matters either in List I or List
\nIII of\tthe Seventh  Schedule to the Constitution. According
\nto Mr.\tGupte, who  appeared for  the  respondent  in  Civil
\nAppeal No. 2557 of 1969, the legislation is repugnant to the
\nElectricity Act,  1910 and  the\t Electricity  (Supply)\tAct,
\n1948, in  particular the  latter, which falls within Entries
\n43 and\t44 of  List I. According to Mr. B. Sen, who appeared
\nfor the\t respondents in Civil Appeal No. 20 of 1970, the Act
\ntrenches upon the field occupied by the Electricity (Supply)
\nAct, 1948  which falls\tpartly under  Entry 43 of List I and
\npartly under  Entry 38\tof List\t III. According to Mr. G. B.
\nPai, who  appeared for\tthe 1st respondent in Civil No. 1733
\nof 1972 the 1948 Act falls within Entry 44 of List I and the
\nKerala Act  impinges upon  that field.\tOn the contrary, the
\nSolicitor General  appearing on\t behalf of  the Kerala State
\nElectricity Board  contends that  the Kerala Act falls under
\nEntries 26  and 27 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the
\nConstitution.\n<\/p>\n
     There  is,\t  in  the   arguments  on   behalf  of\t the
\nrespondents, a\tcertain amount of confusion. The question of
\nrepugnance arises  only in  case both  the legislations fall
\nwithin the  same List  III.  There  can,  therefore,  be  no
\nquestion of  repugnance between\t the Electricity Act and the
\nElectricity (Supply)  Act on the one hand and the Kerala Act
\non the\tother, if  the former fall in List I or List III and
\nthe latter  in List  II. If  any legislation is enacted by a
\nState Legislature in respect of a matter falling within List
\nI that will be without jurisdiction and therefore void.\n<\/p>\n
     The scope\tof the\tlegislative powers of the Parliament
\nand the\t State Legislatures  is now  well settled.  They are
\nfound in Article 246 of the Constitution, which reads :\n<\/p>\n
\t  246. (1)  Notwithstanding anything  in clauses (2)
\n     and (3),  Parliament has  exclusive power\tto make laws
\n     with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I
\n     in the  Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred
\n     to as the “Union List”).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (2)  Notwithstanding\t anything  in\tclause\t(3),
\n     Parliament and,  subject to clause (1), the Legislature
\n     of any State also, have power to make laws with respect
\n     to any  of the  matters enumerated\t in List  III in the
\n     Seventh Schedule  (in this\t Constitution referred to as
\n     the “Concurrent List”).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (3)  Subject\t to  clauses   (1)  and\t  (2),\t the
\n     Legislature of a State has exclusive power to make laws
\n     for such  State or any part thereof with respect to any
\n     of the  matters enumerated\t in List  II in\t the Seventh
\n     Schedule (in the Constitution referred to as the “State
\n     List”).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect
\n     to any  matter for\t any part  of the territory of India
\n     not included  in  a  State\t notwithstanding  that\tsuch
\n     matter is a matter enumerated in the State List.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
563<\/span><\/p>\n
     In view  of the provisions of Article 254, the power of
\nParliament to  legislate in  regard to\tmatters in List III,
\nwhich  are   dealt  with  by  clause  (2)  is  supreme.\t The
\nParliament has\texclusive power to legislate with respect to
\nmatters in List I. The State Legislature has exclusive power
\nto legislate with respect to matters in List II. But this is
\nsubject to the provisions of clause (1) (leaving out for the
\nmoment the  reference to  clause 2). The power of Parliament
\nto legislate  with respect  to matters included in List I is
\nsupreme notwithstanding\t any thing  contained in  clause (3)
\n(again leaving out of consideration the provisions of clause\n<\/p>\n
2). Now\t what is  the meaning of the words “notwithstanding”
\nin clause  (1) and  “subject to”  in clause  (3) ? They mean
\nthat where  an entry is in general terms in List II and part
\nof that\t entry is  in specific terms in List I, the entry in
\nList I\ttakes effect  notwithstanding the  entry in List II.
\nThis is\t also on  the principle\t that the `special’ excludes
\nthe `general’ and the general entry in List II is subject to
\nthe special  entry in  List I.\tFor instance,  though  house
\naccommodation and  rent control might fall within either the
\nState List  or the  Concurrent List,  Entry 3  in List\tI of
\nSeventh Schedule  carves out the subject of rent control and
\nhouse accommodation  in cantonments from the general subject
\nof house  accommodation and rent control (see Indu Bhusan v.
\nSundari Devi<\/a>(1).  Furthermore, the word `notwithstanding’ in
\nclause (1)  also  means\t that  if  it  is  not\tpossible  to
\nreconcile the  two entries the entry in List I will prevail.
\nBut before  that happens attempt should be made to decide in
\nwhich list  a particular  legislation  falls.  For  deciding
\nunder which  entry a particular legislation falls the theory
\nof “pith  and substance”  has been evolved by the Courts. If
\nin pith and substance a legislation falls within one List or
\nthe other  but some  portion of\t the subject  matter of that
\nlegislation incidentally  trenches upon\t and might  come  to
\nfall under  another List,  the Act as a whole would be valid
\nnotwithstanding such  incidental trenching. These principles
\nhave been laid down in a number of decisions.\n<\/p>\n
     In re  The Central\t Provinces and\tBerar Act No. XIV of
\n1938(2) Sir  Maurice Gwyer  observed, with  reference to the
\ncorresponding provisions  of the Government of India Act, as
\nfollows :\n<\/p>\n
\t  “It will  be observed that by s.100(1) the Federal
\n     Legislature is given exclusive powers enumerated in the
\n     Federal Legislative  List, “notwithstanding anything in
\n     the two  next succeeding sub-sections” of that section.
\n     Sub-section (2)  is not  relevant to  the present case,
\n     but s.s.(3)  is, as  I have stated; the enactment which
\n     gives to  the  Provincial\tLegislatures  the  exclusive
\n     powers enumerated\tin the\tProvincial Legislative List.
\n     Similarly Provincial Legislatures are given by s.100(3)
\n     the exclusive  powers in the Provincil Legislative List
\n     “subject to  the two  preceding sub-sections”,  that is
\n     s.ss. (1) and (2). Accordingly, the Government of India
\n     further contend  that, even  if the  impugned Act\twere
\n     otherwise\twithin\tthe  competence\t of  the  Provincial
\n     Legislature, it  is nevertheless  invalid, because\t the
\n     effect of the
\n564<\/span>
\n     non-obstante clause in s.100(1), and a fortiori of that
\n     clause read  with the  opening words of s.100(3), is to
\n     make  the\t federal  power\t  prevail  if\tfederal\t and
\n     provincial legislative powers overlap.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
He observed further :\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Only in  the\t Indian\t Constitution  Act  can\t the
\n     particular\t  problem   arise   which   is\t now   under
\n     consideration; and\t an endeavour  must be made to solve
\n     it, as  the Judicial  Committee have  said,  by  having
\n     recourse to  the context  and scheme  of the Act, and a
\n     reconciliation   attempted\t  between   two\t  apparently
\n     conflicting jurisdictions\tby reading  the two  entries
\n     together and  by interpreting,  and,  where  necessary,
\n     modifying, the  language of  the one  by  that  of\t the
\n     other. If\tindeed such  a reconciliation  should  prove
\n     impossible, then,\tand only then, will the non-obstante
\n     clause operate  and the  federal power prevail; for the
\n     clause ought  to be  regarded as  a  last\tresource,  a
\n     witness to\t the imperfections  of human  expression and
\n     the fallibility of legal draftsmanship.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     In Subrahmanyan  Chettiar v.  Mutuswami Goundan(1)\t the
\nsame learned C.J. observed :\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Section 100(3)  of the  Constitution Act provides
\n     that a  Provincial Legislature  has the exclusive power
\n     of legislating  with respect  to the matters enumerated
\n     in List  II, the  Provincial Legislative List. But this
\n     power  is\t expressly  stated  to\tbe  subject  to\t the
\n     provisions of  s.100(1), which  give an exclusive power
\n     to the Federal Legislature to legislate with respect to
\n     the  matters   enumerated\tin   List  I,\tthe  Federal
\n     Legislative List. Hence, though Parliament has no doubt
\n     done its  best to enact two lists of mutually exclusive
\n     powers, it\t has also  provided, ex-majori cautela, that
\n     if the  two sets  of legislative powers should be found
\n     to overlap, then the federal legislation is to prevail.
\n     And the reason for this is clear. However carefully and
\n     precisely lists of legislative subjects are defined, it
\n     is practically  impossible to  ensure that\t they  never
\n     overlap; and  an absurd  situation would  result if two
\n     inconsistent laws,\t each of equal validity, could exist
\n     side by side within the same territory.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
In the same case Sulaiman, J. observed :\n<\/p>\n
\t  “On a\t very strict  interpretation  of  s.100,  it
\n     would necessarily\tfollow that from all matters in List
\n     II\t which\t are  exclusively  assigned  to\t Provinicial
\n     Legislatures, all portions which fall in List I or List
\n     III, must\tbe excluded.  Similarly,  from\tall  matters
\n     falling in\t List III, all portions which fall in List I
\n     must be  excluded. The section would then mean that the
\n     Federal Legislature  has full  and exclusive  power  to
\n     legislate with respect to matters in List I, and has
\n565<\/span>
\n     also power to legislate with respect to matters in List
\n     III. A  Provincial Legislature  has exclusive  power to
\n     legislate\twith  respect  to  List\t II,  minus  matters
\n     falling in\t List I or List III, has concurrent power to
\n     legislate with  respect to\t matters in  List III, minus
\n     matters falling in List I. In its fullest scope, s. 100
\n     would then\t mean that  if it  happens that there is any
\n     subject in\t List II  which also falls in List I or List
\n     III, it  must be taken as cut out from List II. On this
\n     strict interpretation there would be no question of any
\n     real overlapping at all. If a subject falls exclusively
\n     in List  II and  no other\tList, then  the power of the
\n     Provincial Legislatures is supreme. But if it does also
\n     fall within  List I, then it must be deemed as if it is
\n     not included  in List  II at all. Similarly, if it also
\n     falls in  List III,  it must  be deemed  to  have\tbeen
\n     excluded from  List II.  The dominant  position of\t the
\n     Central Legislature  with regard  to matters  in List I
\n     and List III is thus established. But the rigour of the
\n     literal interpretation  is relaxed\t by the\t use of\t the
\n     words “with  respect to”  which as\t already pointed out
\n     only signify  “pith and substance”, and do not forbid a
\n     mere incidental encroachment.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     In Governor General in Council v. Province of Madras(1)
\nthe Judicial Committee of the Privy Council observed :\n<\/p>\n
\t  “For in  a Federal Constitution, in which there is
\n     a division\t of legislative\t powers between\t Central and
\n     Provincial legislatures,  it appears  to be  inevitable
\n     that controversy  should arise  whether  one  or  other
\n     legislature is  not exceeding  its own, and encroaching
\n     on the other’s constitutional legislative power, and in
\n     such a  controversy it  is\t a  principle,\twhich  their
\n     Lordships do not hesitate to apply in the present case,
\n     that it is not the name of the tax but its real nature,
\n     its “pith and substance” as it has sometimes been said,
\n     which must determine into what category it falls.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     In Prafulla  Kumar Mukherjee  and\tOthers\tv.  Bank  of
\nCommerce, Limited,  Khulna(2) the  Judicial Committee of the
\nPrivy Council  quoted with  approval the observations of Sir
\nMaurice Gwyer  C.J. in\tSubrahmanyan Chettiar’s case (supra)
\nto the effect :\n<\/p>\n
\t  “It must  inevitably happen from time to time that
\n     legislation, though  purporting to\t deal with a subject
\n     in one list, touches also on a subject in another list,
\n     and the different provisions of the enactment may be so
\n     closely intertwined that blind observance to a strictly
\n     verbal interpretation would result in a large number of
\n     statutes being declared invalid because the legislature
\n     enacting them  may\t appear\t to  have  legislated  in  a
\n     forbidden sphere. Hence the rule which has been evolved
\n     by the Judicial Committee, whereby the impugned statute
\n     is examined to ascertain its `pith and substance,’ or
\n566<\/span>
\n     its `true\tnature and  character,’ for  the purpose  of
\n     determining whether  it is\t legislation with respect to
\n     matters in this list or in that.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
They also held :\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Thirdly,  the  extent  of  the  invasion  by\t the
\n     Provinces into  subjects enumerated in the Federal List
\n     has to  be considered.  No doubt,\tit is  an  important
\n     matter, not,  as their  Lordships\tthink,\tbecause\t the
\n     validity of  an Act can be determined by discriminating
\n     between degrees  of invasion,  but for  the purpose  of
\n     determining what  is the  pith  and  substance  of\t the
\n     impugned Act.  Its provisions  may advance\t so far into
\n     Federal territory\tas to  show that  its true nature is
\n     not concerned with Provincial matters, but the question
\n     is not,  has it  trespassed more  or less,\t but is\t the
\n     trespass, whatever it be, such as to show that the pith
\n     and substance  of the impugned Act is not money lending
\n     but promissory notes or banking ? Once that question is
\n     determined the  Act falls\ton one\tor the other side of
\n     the line  and can be seen as valid or invalid according
\n     to its  true content.  This view  places the precedence
\n     accorded to the three lists in its proper perspective.”
\n     The matter\t has been  elaborately discussed in Union v.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
H. S.  Dhillon(1). All\tthe relevant  earlier decisions have
\nbeen considered\t there and for the purpose of these cases it
\nis not\tnecessary to  enter into  any further  discussion on
\nthis aspect.\n<\/p>\n
     Having discussed  the question of the legislative field
\nit might  be necessary\tto discuss  the question  as to what
\nhappens\t if   it  should  be  held  that  the  matter  under
\nconsideration in  these cases  falls within  the  Concurrent
\nList, that  is, Entry  38 in  List III\tas contended  in the
\nalternative by some of the respondents. As already mentioned
\nthe question  will arise  only if it should be held that the
\nKerala State Act falls under Entry 38 as contended by Mr. B.
\nSen. If\t the impugned  legislation falls under List III then
\nthe question  of repugnancy  of that  legislation  with\t the
\nexisting law  or the law made by Parliament, as the case may
\nbe, will have to be considered. Both the 1910 Act as well as
\nthe 1948  Act are existing law as contemplated under Article
\n372 of\tthe Constitution.  An existing\tlaw continues  to be
\nvalid even  though the legislative power with respect to the
\nsubject matter\tof the\texisting law might be in a different
\nlist under  the Constitution  from the\tlist under  which it
\nwould have  fallen under  the Government of India Act, 1935.
\nBut after  the Constitution  came into force an existing law
\ncould be  amended or  repealed only by the legislature which
\nwould be  competent to enact that law if it were to be newly
\nenacted. In  that sense\t both the  1910 Act and the 1948 Act
\ncould be  amended or  repealed by the Parliament and also by
\nthe State  Legislature if it obtains the Presitential assent
\nto an  Act amending  or repealing  the 1910  Act or 1948 Act
\n(leaving aside for the moment the question whether they
\n567<\/span>
\nfall wholly  or partly\tunder Entries 43 and 44 of List I of
\nthe Seventh Schedule to the Constitution). That the question
\nof repugnancy can arise only with reference to a legislation
\nfalling under the Concurrent List is now well settled. In A.
\nS. Krishna  v. State of Madras<\/a>(1) after referring to section
\n107 of\tthe Government of India Act, 1935, which is in terms
\nsimilar to clause (1) of Article 254, this Court observed:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “For this section to apply, two conditions must be
\n     fulfilled :  (1) The  provisions of  the Provincial law
\n     and those\tof the\tCentral legislation  must both be in
\n     respect  of   a  matter  which  is\t enumerated  in\t the
\n     Concurrent List, and (2) they must be repugnant to each
\n     other. It\tis only\t when both  these  requirements\t are
\n     satisfied that  the provincial  law will, to the extent
\n     of the repugnancy, become void.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
To the\tsimilar effect\tis the decision in P. N. Kaul v. The
\nState  of  J&K(2).  The\t whole\tquestion  of  repugnancy  is
\nelaborately discussed in J & K State v. M. S. Farooqi<\/a>(3).\n<\/p>\n
     Let us  now, therefore,  consider what  in its pith and
\nsubstance is  the subject matter of the Kerala Act. Is it an
\nAct dealing with incorporation, regulation and winding up of
\ntrading corporations,  including banking,  insurance and any
\nfinancial  corporations\t  but  not   including\t cooperative
\nsocieties  (Entry  43);\t or  incorporation,  regulation\t and
\nwinding up  of corporations,  whether trading  or not,\twith
\nobjects\t not  confined\tto  one\t State,\t but  not  including
\nuniversities (Entry  44)? Clearly  the Act  itself does\t not
\ndeal with  any of  these  subjects.  It\t is  true  that\t the
\nnotification issued under section 2(a) declaring electricity
\nas an  essential article  enable orders\t to  be\t made  under
\nsection 3 of the Act. But the only question we are concerned
\nwith in this case is the validity of the surcharge order. No
\nnotified order\thas  been  made\t under\tany  of\t the  powers
\nconferred on  the State\t by section  3 except  the  impugned
\nSurcharge Order.  If the  Act had  stood as it is or even if
\nthe notification  had stood  as it  is nobody would have any
\ncause for  complaint.  It  is  only  by\t the  issue  of\t the
\nSurcharge Order\t that the respondents have been affected. It
\nis for\tthe purpose of deciding the question of the validity
\nof the\tSurcharge Order\t that we have to decide the validity
\nof the\tdeclaration under  section 2(a) of electricity as an
\nessential  article.   Does   the   notification\t  make\t the
\nlegislation one\t relating to  electricity under\t Entry 38 of
\nList III  ? Was\t it necessary  to get the President’s assent
\nfor this  notification as  contended of\t the  respondents  ?
\nQuite clearly  no Presidential\tassent to  the notification.
\nArticle 254(2)\tdoes not contemplate assent to notifications
\nissued under  the Act. The Article contemplates Presidential
\nassent only  to laws  made by the Legislature of a State. We
\nshall later deal with the question whether the assent of the
\nPresident to  the Act  after the 1965 notification declaring
\nelectricity  as\t  an  essential\t  article   validates\tthat
\nnotification.\n<\/p>\n
     The Electricity  Act 1910\tand the Electricity (Supply)
\nAct, 1948  can be  said to cover the whole field relating to
\nelectricity under Entry
\n568<\/span>
\n38 of  List III\t of the\t Seventh Schedule. We are clearly of
\nthe opinion  that the  argument of Mr. Pai that the 1948 Act
\nfalls under Entry 44 of List I has no substance. It does not
\ndeal with  the incorporation, regulation and winding up of a
\ncorporation with  objects not  confined to  one\t State.\t The
\nCentral Electricity  Authority created by that Act is not an
\nincorporated body,  whereas the\t various  State\t Electricity
\nBoards\tare   incorporated.   The   Act\t  deals\t  with\t the
\nincorporation  and   regulation\t of  the  State\t Electricity
\nBoards. Where a State Electricity Board is to operate beyond
\nthe limits  of the  State for which it is constituted, it is
\ndone only  by means  of an agreement with the other State in
\nwhich it is to operate. The Statement of Objects and Reasons
\nof that\t Act does  not help  his contention. The coordinated
\ndevelopment of electricity in India on a regional basis, for
\nwhich  the   Government\t felt\tit  necessary  to  bring  in
\nlegislation which  resulted in the Electricity (Supply) Act,
\n1948 cannot  show that\tit deals  with the incorporation and
\nregulation of  an  inter-State\tcorporation.  The  statement
\nitself proceeds\t on the\t basis that the executive power will
\nvest in\t the Provinces,\t which means  that  the\t legislation
\nfalls in  the Concurrent  List. The Statement of Objects and
\nReasons also  mentions the necessity for the constitution of
\nsemi-autonomous bodies like Electricity Boards to administer
\nthe  grid   systems.  The  Electricity\tBoards,\t as  already
\nmentioned, are\tconfined to  the jurisdiction of States. The
\nStatement of  Objects and Reasons itself shows that what was
\ncontemplated was  a  legislation  under\t the  Entry  in\t the
\nConcurrent List.  The  Statement  of  Objects  and  Reasons,
\nhowever, mentions  Entry 33  of\t the  Federal  List  of\t the
\nGovernment of  India Act,  1935 as the Entry under which the
\nlegislation  was   undertaken.\tThat  Entry  corresponds  to
\nEntries 43  and 44  of List  I of  Seventh Schedule  to\t the
\nConstitution.  Therefore,   the\t Statement  of\tObjects\t and
\nReasons does  not show\tthat the  Electricity  (Supply)\t Act
\nfalls under  Entry 44. The question then is whether it falls
\nwithin Entry  43. The fact that the Statement of Objects and
\nReasons mentions  Entry 33  of List  I (of the Government of
\nIndia  Act)   as  the\tlegislative  head  under  which\t the
\nlegislation was being undertaken is not conclusive. We have,
\ntherefore to  consider whether the Electricity (Supply) Act,
\n1948 falls  under Entry\t 43 as\tcontended  by  some  of\t the
\nrespondents.\n<\/p>\n
     There is  no doubt\t that the  Act does  deal  with\t the
\nincorporation and  regulation of the Electricity Boards, but
\nthe question  is whether  in pith  and\tsubstance  it  is  a
\nlegislation regarding the constitution and regulation of the
\nElectricity Boards  falling under  Entry 43  of List I or on
\nelectricity falling  under Entry  38 of List III. The object
\nof the Electricity (Supply) Act as seen from the preamble is
\nto rationalise\tthe production and supply of electricity and
\nto take measures conducive to electrical development. In the
\nStatement of Objects and Reasons it is stated that “there is
\nnecessity for  the constitution\t of  semi-autonomous  bodies
\nlike Electricity  Boards to  administer the  grid system  on
\nquasi-commercial  lines,   and\tthat   such  Boards  cannot,
\nhowever, be  set up  by\t Provincial  Governments  under\t the
\nexisting Constitutional\t Act as\t they would be in the nature
\nof trading  corporations within\t the meaning  of Entry 33 of
\nthe Federal Legislative List.” The Statement of Objects and
\n569<\/span>
\nReasons though\tnot relevant for the purpose of interpreting
\nthe sections of the Act, will throw light upon the object of
\nthe legislature from the historical viewpoint.\n<\/p>\n
     Let us  now look  at the Act itself. Section 3 provides
\nfor the\t constitution of a Central Electricity Authority. It
\nsays that  the Central\tGovernment shall  constitute a\tbody
\ncalled the  Central Electricity\t Authority to  exerise\tsuch
\nfunctions and  perform such duties and in such manner as the
\nCentral\t Government  may  prescribe  or\t direct.  Section  5
\nprovides for  the  constitution\t and  composition  of  State
\nElectricity Boards.  Section 6\tsays that  the Government of
\nany State  may in lieu of constituting a Board under section
\n5  enter   into\t an  agreement\twith  the  Government  of  a
\ncontiguous State  to provide  that the Board constituted for
\nthe latter  State shall\t exercise the  functions of  a Board
\nunder the  Act in the former State. Section 7 deals with the
\neffect of  inter-State agreement  as contemplated in section\n<\/p>\n
6.  Section   8\t provides   for\t terms\t and  conditions  of
\nappointment of\tthe members  of the Board. Section 9 relates
\nto the\tqualifications of  the members of the Board. Section
\n10 deals  with removal\tor suspension  of the members of the
\nBoard. Section\t10A gives  power to  the State Government to
\ndeclare void certain transactions in connection with which a
\nmember has  been removed  under the provisions of section 10
\non 12  provides that  the Board\t shall be  a body corporate.
\nSection 14  provides for  the meetings of the Board. Section
\n15 deals  with the  appointment of  the staff  by the Board.
\nSection 16 states that the State Government shall constitute
\na State\t Electricity Consultative  Council for the State and
\nprovides for  constitution of that body. Section 17 provides
\nfor the\t constitution of a Local Advisory Committee. Section
\n18 describes  the general  duties of  the Board.  Section 19
\nsays that  the Board  may supply electricity to any licensee
\nor person  requring such supply in any area in which a schme
\nsanctioned under  Chapter V is in force. Section 20 provides
\nfor power  of the  Board to  engage in certain undertakings.
\nSection 21  concerns the  power of  the Board in relation to
\nwater-power. By\t section 22 the Board is invested with power
\nto conduct  investigations, experiments\t and trials  for the
\nimprovement of the methods of transmission, distribution and
\nsupply etc.  of electricity. Section 24 deals with the power
\nof  the\t  Board\t to  contribute\t to  contribute\t to  certain
\nassociations engaged  in generation, distribution and supply
\nof electricity.\t Section 25  says that\tthe Board  may, from
\ntime to\t time, appoint\tqualified persons  to be  Consulting
\nEngineers to the Board. Section 26 says that the Board shall
\nhave all  the powers and obligations of a licensee under the
\nIndian\tElectricity  Act,  1910.  Section  28  concerns\t the
\npreparation  of\t scheme\t for  establishement  of  generating
\nstations  etc.\tSection\t 29  provides  for  publication\t and
\nsanctioning of schemes prepared under section 28. Section 30
\ndeals with  the matters to be considered by the authority in
\nrecommending a\tscheme. Sections  31 and  32 also  relate to
\nsechemes. Section 34 deals with controlled stations. Section
\n35 provides  for the supply by the Board to licensees owning
\ngenerating stations  while section  36 gives  power  to\t the
\nBoard to close down generating stations. Section 37 provides
\nfor Purchase  of generating  stations of undertaking or main
\ntransmission lines  by the Board. Section 38 makes provision
\nfor establishing new generating stations by
\n570<\/span>
\nthe Board. Section 39 deals with the arrangements to be made
\nwith the  licensee for\toperation of  the Board’s generating
\nstations.  Section   40\t makes\t provision   regarding\t the
\nconnections with  main transmission  lines purchased  by the
\nBoard. Section\t41 relates  to\tthe  use  by  the  Board  of
\ntransmission lines.  Section 42\t provides for  power of\t the
\nBoard for placing wires, poles etc. Section 43 describes the
\npowers of  the Board to enter into arrangements for purchase
\nor sale of electricity’ under certain conditions. Section 44
\nplaces\tcertain\t  restrictions\ton   establishment  of\t new
\ngenerating stations  or major  additions or  replacement  of
\nplant in  generating statons.  Section 45  says that  if any
\nlicensee  fails\t  to  close  down  his\tgenerating  station,
\npursuant to  a declaration of the Board under section 36, or
\nif any\tperson establishes  or acquires\t a  new.  generating
\nstation, the  Board may\t authorise any\tof its\tofficers  to
\nenter upon  the premisess  of such station and shut down the
\nstation. Section 46 provides for Grid Tariff. It says that a
\ntariff to  be known  as the Grid Tariff shall, in accordance
\nwith any regulations made in this behalf, be fixed from time
\nto time\t by the\t Board in  respect of  each area for which a
\nscheme is in force, and tafiffs fixed under the section may,
\nif the\tBoard thinks  fit, differ  for different  areas, and
\nsubsection (2) of that section provides that the Grid Tariff
\nshall  apply  to  sales\t of  electricity  by  the  Board  to
\nlicensees in  other so\trequired under\tany  of\t the  first,
\nsecond and  third schedules  and shall also be applicable to
\nsales of  electricity by  the Board  to licensees  in  other
\ncases.\tSection\t  47  vests  power  in\tthe  Board  to\tmake
\nalternative arrannements  with licensees.  Section 49  makes
\nprovision for  sale of\telectricity by\tthe Board to persons
\nother than  licensees. Section 50 says that the Board should
\nnot supply  electricity in certain circumstances. Section 55
\nprovides that licensees should comply with the directions of
\nthe Board.  Section 63\tsays that  the State  Government may
\nmake subventions  to the  Board for  the purpose of the Act.
\nSection 64 provides for loans by the State Government to the
\nBoard. Section\t65 gives  power\t to  the  Board\t to  borrow.
\nSection 66  provides for guaranteeing of loans raised by the
\nBoard by  the State  Government.  Section  67  provides\t for
\npriority of  the liabilies  of the  Board. Section  68 makes
\nprovision for depreciation reserve. Secton 69 deals with the
\naccounts of  the Board\tand their audit. Section 76 provides
\nfor arbitration\t of all\t disputes arising  between the State
\nGovernment or  the  Board  and\tlicensee  or  other  person.
\nSection 78  vests power\t in the\t State\tGovernment  to\tmake
\nrules. Section\t78A  says  that\t in  the  discharge  of\t its
\nfunctions, the\tBoard shall  be guided by such directions on
\nquestion of  policy as may be given to it by the Government.
\nSection 79  vests power\t in the\t Board to  make regulations.
\nSection 81  says that  all members, officers and servants of
\nthe Board  shall be  deemed to be public servants within the
\nmeaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code.\n<\/p>\n
     It would  be obvious that one part of the Act does deal
\nwith the constitution of the Board, the incorporation of the
\nBoard and  the regulation  of its  activities. But  the main
\npurpose of  the Act  is for rationalising the production and
\nsupply of electicity. The regulation contemplated in Entries
\n43 and\t44 is  not regulation of the business of production,
\ndistribution and  supply of  electricity of the corporation.
\nAs the\t1910 and  1948 Acts  together form  a complete code,
\nwith res-\n<\/p>\n
571<\/span><\/p>\n
pect to Entry 38 in List III the Board is only an instrument
\nfashioned  or\tcarrying  out  this  object.  The  provision
\nregarding  the\t incorporation\t and   regulation   of\t the
\nElectricity Board  should be  taken to be only incidental to
\nthe provision  regarding production, supply and distribution
\nof electricity.\n<\/p>\n
     It was  observed by  this Court  in  R.  C.  Cooper  v.
\n     union(1)
\n\t  “The argument\t raised by Mr. Setalvad, intervening
\n     on behalf\tof the State of Maharashtra and the State of
\n     Jammu and\tKashmir, that the Parliament is competent to
\n     enact Act 22 of 1969, because the subject-matter of the
\n     Act  is   “with  respect\tto”  regulation\t of  trading
\n     corporations  and\tmatters\t subsidiary  and  incidental
\n     thereto and  on that account is covered in its entirety
\n     by Entries\t 43 and 44 of List I of the Seventh Schedule
\n     cannot be\tupheld. Entry  43 deals\t with incorporation,
\n     regulation\t and  winding  up  of  trading\tcorporations
\n     including\tbanking\t  companies.  Law   regulating\t the
\n     business of  a corporation is not a law with respect to
\n     regulation\t of   a\t corporation.\tIn  List  I  entries
\n     expressly relating to trade and commerce are Entries 41
\n     & 42.  Again  several  entries  in\t List  I  relate  to
\n     activities commercial  in character. Entry 45 “Banking”
\n     Entry 46  “Bills of exchange, cheques, promissory notes
\n     and other like instruments; Entry 47 “Insurance”; Entry
\n     48 “Stock\texchanges  and\tfuture\tmarkets”,  Entry  49
\n     “Patents, inventions  and designs.”  There are  several
\n     entries relating  to activities  commercial as  well as
\n     non-commercial in\tList II-Entry  21 “Fisheries”, Entry
\n     24<\/span>
\n     “Industries …. “; Entry 25 “Gas and Gas works”; Entry
\n     26 “Trade\tand commerce”:\tEntry 30  “Money-lending and
\n     money-lenders”; Entry  31 “Inns and Inn-keeping”; Entry
\n     33 “Theaters and dramatic performances, cinemas etc.”;.
\n     We are  unable to accede to the argument that the State
\n     Legislatures are  competent to  legislate in respect of
\n     the subject  matter of  those  entries  only  when\t the
\n     commercial activities are carried on by individuals and
\n     not when they are carried on by corporations.
\nTherefore the  provisions in  the  1948\t Act  regarding\t the
\nBoard’s functions  do not make it one falling under Entry 43
\nof List I.\n<\/p>\n
     In Ramtanu Housing Society v. Maharashtra(2) this Court
\nhad dealt  with the  Maharashtra Industrial Development Act,
\n1961 and  the question\twhether the  Maharashtra Development
\nCorporation formed  under the Act was a trading corporation.
\nIn holding  that the  legislation fell under Entry 24 of the
\nState List  and not  under Entry  43 of\t the Union List this
\nCourt observed .\n<\/p>\n
     (1)[1970] 3 S.C.R.530.\t      (2)[1971] 1 S.C.R.719.\n<\/p>\n
572<\/span><\/p>\n
\t  “The Act  is one  to make  a special provision for
\n     securing  the orderly establishment in industrial areas
\n     and industrial  estates of\t industries in\tthe State of
\n     Maharashtra,   and\t  to   assist\tgenerally   in\t the
\n     organisation thereof, and for that purpose to establish
\n     an Industrial Development Corporation, and for purposes
\n     connected with the matters aforesaid.\n<\/p>\n
\t  The Corporation  is established for the purpose of
\n     securing  and   assisting\t the   rapid   and   orderly
\n     establishment  and\t  organisation\tof   industries\t  in
\n     industrial areas and industrial estates in the State of
\n     Maharashtra.\n<\/p>\n
\t  Broadly stated  the functions\t and powers  of\t the
\n     Corporation  are\tto  develop   industrial  areas\t and
\n     industrial estates\t by  providing\tamenities  of  road,
\n     supply  of\t  water\t or  electricity,  street  lighting,
\n     drainage ….  Or otherwise  transfer any property held
\n     by the  Corporation on such conditions as may be deemed
\n     proper by the Corporation……\n<\/p>\n
\t  The principal\t functions  of\tthe  Corporation  in
\n     regard to\t‘ the  establishment, growth and development
\n     of industries  in the  State are first to establish and
\n     manage  industrial\t  estates  at  selected\t places\t and
\n     secondly to  develop industrial  areas selected  by the
\n     State Government.\tWhen industrial\t areas are  selected
\n     the necessity  of acquisition of land in those areas is
\n     apparent. The  Act, therefore,  contemplates  that\t the
\n     State Government  may  acquire  land  by  publishing  a
\n     notice specifying the particular purpose for which such
\n     land is  required………\t Where\tthe  land  has\tbeen
\n     acquired for  the Corporation  or any  local authority,
\n     the  State\t  Government  shall,   after  it  has  taken
\n     possession of  the\t land,\ttransfer  the  land  to\t the
\n     Corporation or that local authority
\n\t  It is in the background of the purposes of the Act
\n     and powers\t and functions\tof the\tCorporation-that the
\n     real and  true character  of the  legislation  will  be
\n     determined…………. Industries come within Entry 24
\n     of\t the  State  List.  The\t establishment,\t growth\t and
\n     development of  industries in  the State of Maharashtra
\n     does not  fall within Entry 7 and Entry 52 of the Union
\n     List.  Establishment,   growth   and   development\t  of
\n     industries in  the State  is within  the State  List of
\n     industries..  …Acquisition  or  requisition  of\tland
\n     falls under  Entry 42  of the Concurrent List. In order
\n     to achieve\t growth of  industries it  is necessary\t not
\n     only to acquire land but also to implement the purposes
\n     of the  Act. The  Corporation is  therefore established
\n     for carrying  out the purposes of the Act. The pith and
\n     substance of  the\tAct  is\t establishment,\t growth\t and
\n     organisation of industries, acquisition of land in that
\n     behalf and\t carrying out  the purposes  of the  Act  by
\n     setting up\t the Corporation  as one  of  the  limbs  or
\n     agencies of the Government. The powers and functions of
\n     the Corporation  show in  no uncertain terms that these
\n     are all in
\n573<\/span>
\n     aid  of   the  principal  and  predominant\t purpose  of
\n     establishment, growth  and establishment of industries.
\n     The Corporation  is established  for that purpose.. We,
\n     therefore, hold  that the\tAct  is\t a  valid  piece  of
\n     legislation.”\n<\/p>\n
     In the  present case  the incorporation  of  the  State
\nElectricity Boards  is merely for the rationalisation of the
\nproduction and\tsupply of  electricity. for  taking measures
\nconducive to  Electrical development  and  for\tall  matters
\nincidental thereto.  The incorporation\tof  the\t Electricity
\nBoards\tbeing  incidental  to  the  rationalisation  of\t the
\nproduction and supply of electricity and for being conducive
\nto  electrical\t development,  the  1948  Act  in  pith\t and
\nsubstance should  be deemed to be one falling under Entry 38
\nof List III. Furthermore, Electricity Boards are not trading
\ncorporations. They are public service corporations. They
\n have  to function  without any profit motive. Their duty is
\nto  promote  co-ordinated  development\tof  the\t generation,
\nsupply and distribution of electricity in the most efficient
\nand economical\tmanner with  particular\t reference  to\tsuch
\ndevelopment in\tareas not  for\tthe  time  being  served  or
\nadequately served  by any  licensee (Section  18). The\tonly
\ninjunction is  that as\tfar as\tpracticable they  shall\t not
\ncarry on  their operations  at a loss (Section 59). They get
\nsubventions from  the State Governments (Section 63). In the
\ndischarge of  their functions  they are guided by directions
\non questions  of policy\t given by State Governments (Section
\n78A). There are no shareholders and there is no distribution
\nof profits.  This is  another reason why the 1948 Act cannot
\nbe said to fall under Entry 43 of List I.\n<\/p>\n
     The  question,   therefore,  is  whether  the  impugned
\nlegislation falls  under Entry\t38 of List III or Entries 26
\nand 27 of List II and if the former, whether it is repugnant
\nto the\texisting law  on the  subject. that is, the 1910 and
\n1948 Acts  and if  that were so, whether that repugnancy has
\nbeen cured by Presidential assent ?\n<\/p>\n
     Even assuming  that part of the 1948 Act is legislation
\nwith respect  to incorporation\tand regulation\tof a trading
\ncorporation, falling  under Entry  43 of  List I of Schedule
\nSeven, the  rest of it will fall under Entry 38 of List III.
\nThat part  of the  Act relating\t to the\t regulation  of\t the
\nactivities  regarding\tproduction   and   distribution\t  of
\nelectricity would,  as we  have shown,\tfall under the Entry
\n‘Electricity’. The  Kerala Act\thas nothing  to do  with the
\nincorporation and  regulation of  the Electricity Board and,
\ntherefore, it can only relate to Entry 38 of List III, if at
\nall.\n<\/p>\n
     The argument of the learned Solicitor General appearing
\non behalf  of the Kerala Electricity Board in support of his
\nsubmission that\t the legislation  falls under Entries 26 and
\n27 of List II may be summarised as follows: Those entries do
\nnot enable  the State  Legislatures to legislate with regard
\nto all\tconceivable  goods  like  arms,\t ammunition,  atomic
\nminerals etc.  as was argued by Mr. Sen. A legislature while
\nlegislating with  respect to  matters within  its competence
\nshould be  deemed to  know its\tlimits and  its\t legislative
\nauthority and  should not be deemed to be legislating beyond
\nits jurisdiction. One thing that has always
\n574<\/span>
\ngot to be kept clear in one’s mind is that there may be more
\nthan one  aspect with regard to a particular subject matter.
\n“Essential articles’ is a term which has acquired a definite
\nconnotation in\tIndian legislative  practice and  is  not  a
\nvague or a general term. In the Government of India Act 1935
\nEntries 27  and 29 in List I correspond to Entries 26 and 27
\nof List\t II in\tthe Constitution. There was no entry in that
\nAct  corresponding   to\t Entry\t 33  of\t  List\tIII  of\t the
\nConstitution. Section  102 of  that Act\t enabled the Federal
\nLegislature to\tlegislate  in  the  State  List\t during\t the
\nemergency. During  the World  War the  Defence of  India Act
\n1939 enabled  the Central  Government to  make such rules as
\nappeared  to  it  necessary  or\t expedient  for\t maintaining
\nsupplies  and\tservices  essential   to  the  life  of\t the
\ncommunity. Rule\t 81 of the Defence of India Rules dealt with
\nmaintaining supplies  and services essential for the life of
\nthe community  and electricity\twas specifically referred to
\nas an  article within  the scope  of that  rule Many  orders
\nregarding electricity  were made  during the  course of that
\nwar like  Electricity Control order, 1942 of Bihar. When the
\nproclamation of\t emergency was\trevoked on 1.4.1946 the laws
\nmade by\t the Federal  Legislature with\trespect\t to  matters
\nincluded in  the  Provincial  Legislative  List\t would\thave
\nceased to  have effect\tand therefore the British Parliament
\nenacted India (Central Government and Legislative) Act, 1946
\nenabling the  Federal Legislature  to make laws with respect
\nto trade  and commerce (whether or not within the Province )
\nin, and\t production,  supply  and  distribution\t of  cotton,
\nwoollen textiles, papers, foodstuffs etc. and in exercise of
\nthat  power   the  Central   Legislature  enacted  Essential
\nSupplies (Temporary  Powers) Act,  1946 for  continuance  of
\npowers to  control production,\tsupply and distribution etc.
\nIn respect  of articles\t not covered  by the Central Act the
\nProvinces passed  similar  laws\t regarding  other  essential
\ncommodities, for instance, Madras Essential Articles Control
\nand Requisitioning  Act, 1949  in respect  of  ten  articles
\nincluding electricity.\tAt present  electricity is  the only
\narticle included within the scope of that Act. The Essential
\nCommodities Act\t 1955 was  passed by  Parliament on  1.4.55.
\nEssential commodity  was defined in that Act. It practically
\nincluded  every\t  matter  regarding   industry\twithin\t the
\nlegislative  competence\t  of  Parliament.   Thus  the\tword
\n‘essential commodity’  is an  expression corresponding\tto a
\ncommodity essential to the life of the community. It is not,
\ntherefore, open\t to the\t authority exercising  powers  under
\nsection 2(a)  of the  Kerala Act  to declare  any and  every
\ncommodity as  an essential  commodity. That  Act deals\twith
\nessential articles  not being  essential articles dealt with
\nby the Central Act of 1955. It is not an Act with respect to
\nthe incorporation  or regulation of trading corporations and
\ntherefore does not all under Entry 43 or 44 of List I. It is
\nnot a  legislation with respect to electricity and therefore
\ndoes not  fall under Entry 38 of List III. Electricity being
\nbeyond doubt  an essential  article may be declared to be an
\nessential article  under the  Act. In  that case  the  power
\nexercised is  not in relation to electricity qua electricity
\nbut electricity\t as an\tessential article. The Act therefore
\nin pith\t and substance is with respect to trade and commerce
\nand production,\t supply and distribution. We agree that this
\nis the\tcorrect view. It is not a permanent legislation with
\nrespect to  electricity but  a temporary  one dealing with a
\ntemporary situation. There can be no
\n575<\/span>
\ndoubt about  the argument  on behalf  of the  Board that the
\nSurcharge order\t is necessary for its survival and existence
\nwithout which  there can  be  no  production  or  supply  of
\nelectricity. That  is why  it  is  a  matter  falling  under
\nEntries 26  and 27  of List  II. It is no valid criticism of
\nthis view to say that the powers of the Board under the 1948
\nAct are\t overridden by\tthe Surcharge order and the order is
\ntherefore repugnant  to the  1948 Act.\tIndeed the  Board is
\nmore than willing, it is anxious, for the Surcharge order to
\nbe made.  It is\t not necessary\tto resort  to section 59 for
\nthis purpose.  This is\ta simple  case of  a contract  being
\noverridden  in\t exercise  of\tstatutory  powers.   In\t the
\nalternative it\tis argued as follows: The Kerala Act insofar
\nas it deals with electricity can be deemed to be legislation
\nunder Entry  38 in  List III.  Though the Act itself has not
\ndeclared  any  article\tas  an\tessential  article,  when  a
\ndeclaration was\t made under  section 2(a)  in 1965 declaring
\nelectricity as\tan essential article for the purposes of the
\nAct, it\t became part of the Act. When the President assented
\nto the Kerala Act in 1962 it may be that it cannot be deemed
\nthat he\t had assented to it on the basis that the provisions
\nof that Act were repugnant to some Act made by Parliament or
\nsome existing  law in the concurrent field because there was
\nnothing in the Act itself which made it repugnant to any Act
\npassed by  Parliament or  any  existing\t law.  But  when  he
\nassented in 1967 to the Act extending the life of the Kerala
\nAct by\tanother two  years the declaration of electricity as
\nan essential  article had  been made and should be deemed to
\nhave become part of the Act. So far we are in agreement with
\nthe argument  of the  learned Solicitor General. But when he
\ngoes further  and argues  that insofar as the consequence of
\nsuch declaration  was that  the State Government was enabled
\nto make orders regarding production, supply and distribution
\nof electricity, there was a possibility of such orders being
\nrepugnant to the provisions of the Electricity Act, 1910 and
\nthe Electricity\t (Supply) Act,\t1948 and  therefore any such
\nrepugnance was\tcured by  the assent given by the President,
\nwe cannot  agree. We  agree that the assent should be Deemed
\nnot merely  to the substitution of the words “five years” by
\nthe words “seven years” in the Kerala Act, but to the Act as
\na whole,  that is,  as amended\tby  the\t 1967  Act  and\t any
\nrepugnance between  the Kerala\tAct and the Electricity Act,
\n1910 and the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 should be deemed
\nto have\t been cured  by such  assent. When  assenting to the
\n1967 Act  the President\t should naturally  have looked\tinto
\nthe. whole Act, that is, the 1961 Act as amended by the 1967
\nAct.  But   the\t declaration   itself  did  not\t create\t any
\nrepugnancy with\t the 1948  Act. It  was\t in  1968  that\t the
\nSurcharge order\t was made,  in pursuance  of which the bills
\nwere served  on the various respondents in these appeals and
\ndemands made  for enhancing  charges for electricity. And it
\nwas the\t Surcharge order  that can  be said  to\t create\t the
\nrepugnancy if  at all. It is only actual repugnancy that can
\nbe cured  by Presidential  assent and not the possibility of
\nrepugnancy.\n<\/p>\n
     Mr. Krishnamoorthy\t Iyer appearing\t for the respondents
\nin Civil  Appeals Nos. 1371 and 1373-74 of 1973 is therefore
\nright when  he argues that the declaration of electricity as
\nan essential  article in  1965 did not in any way affect the
\nrights of the respondents but only the
\n576<\/span>
\nSurcharge order\t of 1968  and that as the bills for enhanced
\ncharges\t  for electricity  were served on the respondents in
\n1968 before  the 1969  amendment of  the Act  the  Surcharge
\norder  and   the  demands  made\t were  not  cured  of  their
\nrepugnancy till\t the 1969  Amendment Act  was assented to by
\nthe President  assuming that  there is\tsuch repugnancy.  It
\nthere is  such repugnancy  by virtue  of the Surcharge order
\nthe assent  of the President can cure the repugnancy between
\nthe Kerala  Act and  the 1910  and 1948\t Acts only  if it is
\nsubsequent to the Surcharge order. It is the exercise of the
\npower under  section 3\tof the Kerala Act that is alleged to
\nhave created  the repugnancy.  We do  not pause\t to consider
\nwhether\t there\t is  in\t fact  any  repugnancy\tbetween\t the
\nSurcharge order and the 1948 Act.\n<\/p>\n
     The question  still remains  whether when a declaration
\nis made\t under section\t2(a) of the Act declaring an article
\nas an  essential article or an order is made under section 3
\nsuch a\tdeclaration or\torder becomes  part of\tthe Act ? In
\nEngland\t even\twhere  an   Act\t declares   that  subsidiary
\nlegislation shall  have effect\tas if  enacted in the Act it
\ndoes not  preclude the\tCourt from  calling in\tquestion the
\nsubsidiary legislation\twhere it  is inconsistent  with\t the
\nprovisions of the Act Minister of Health v. The King(1). But
\nit would  appear that  where the  statute provides  for\t the
\nlaying of  the rules  before Parliament\t and the  Parliament
\ncould have  annulled them,  such a  provision would make the
\nsubordinate legislation beyond challenge Institute of Patent
\nAgents v.  Lockwood (2).  In India  many  statutes  both  of
\nParliament and of State Legislatures provide for subordinate
\nlegislation made  under the  provisions of those statutes to
\nbe placed on the table of either the Parliament or the State
\nLegislature  and   to  be   subject  to\t such  modification,
\namendment or  annulment, as  the case may be, as may be made
\nby the Parliament or the State Legislature. r Even so, we do
\nnot think  that where  an executive authority is given power
\nto frame subordinate legislation within stated limits, rules
\nmade by\t such authority\t if outside  the scope\tof the\trule
\nmaking power  should be\t deemed to  be valid  merely because
\nsuch rules  have been  placed before the legislature and are
\nsubject to such modification, amendment or annulment, as the
\ncase may  be, as  the legislature may think fit. The process
\nof such amendment, modification or annulment is not the same
\nas the process of legislation and in particular it lacks the
\nassent either of the President or the Governor of the State,
\nas the\tcase may  be. We  are therefore, of opinion that the
\ncorrect\t view\tis  that   notwithstanding  the\t subordinate
\nlegislation  being  laid  on  the  table  of  the  House  of
\nParliament or  the State  Legislature and  being subject  to
\nsuch modification,  annulment or amendment as they may make,
\nthe subordinate legislation cannot be said to be said unless
\nit is  within the scope of the rule making power provided in
\nthe statute.\n<\/p>\n
     What happens  then to  a declaration made under section
\n2(a) or\t an order made under section 3 If such a declaration
\nor order  is not  within the  scope of\tthe Act it should be
\nheld to\t be not\t valid. Does  the subsequent  assent of\t the
\nPresident to an Amending Act, which as
\n     (1) [1931] A.C.494.\t\t  (2)[1894] A.C.347.\n<\/p>\n
577<\/span><\/p>\n
we have\t shown earlier in effect amounts to an assent to the
\nwhole  Act,   cure  this  defect  ?  We\t consider  that\t the
\ndeclaration itself  can still  be attacked  if the  power to
\nmake such  a declaration  is beyond  the scope\tof the power
\ndelegated. Whether  the power  delegated can  be attacked on
\nthe ground of excessive delegation of the legislative powers
\nor on the ground that in so conferring the legislative power
\non the executive authority the legislature has abdicated its
\nfunction or  the legislature itself could not have me such a
\nlaw is’\t a different  question. There is a slight difference
\nbetween such  a situation  and the one where it is held that
\nthe declaration\t is  beyond  the  scope\t of  the  Act.\tThat
\nelectricity is\tan essential  article and therefore the 1965
\ndeclaration under  section 2(a)\t declaring electricity as an
\nessential article  is valid  cannot be\tdisputed. It  is not
\ndisputed- that\tan article which is not in fact an essential
\narticle cannot be declared to be an essential article.\n<\/p>\n
     The next  question\t to  be\t considered,  therefore,  is
\nwhether the  declaration or  the order can be said to be bad
\non the\tground either that there was excessive delegation or
\nthat the  legislature can  be said  to\thave  abdicated\t its
\npowers ? In The Queen v. Burah(1) it was observed:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Their Lordships  agree that\tthe Governor-General
\n     in Council\t could not  by any form of enactment, create
\n     in India, and arm with general legislative authority, a
\n     new legislative  powers. not  created or  authorized by
\n     the Council’s  Act. Nothing  of that kind has, in their
\n     Lordships’ opinion,  been\tdone  or  attempted  in\t the
\n     present case. What has been done is this. The Governor-
\n     General in\t Council has  determined,  in  the  due\t and
\n     ordinary course  of legislation, to remove a particular
\n     district from  the jurisdiction  of the ordinary Courts
\n     and offices,  and to  place it  under  new\t Courts\t and
\n     offices, to  be appointed\tby and\tresponsible  to\t the
\n     Lieutenant-Governor  of   Bengal;\tleaving\t it  to\t the
\n     Lieutenant-Governor to  say at  what time\tthat  change
\n     shall take\t place; and  also enabling  him, not to make
\n     what laws\the pleases  for that  or any other district,
\n     but to  apply by  public notification  to that district
\n     any law, or part of a law, which either already was, or
\n     from time\tto  time  might\t be,  in  force,  by  proper
\n     legislative  authority,   “in  the\t  other\t territories
\n     subject to\t his government.” The Legislature determined
\n     that, So  far, a  certain change should take place; but
\n     that it  was expedient  to\t leave\tthe  time,  and\t the
\n     manner, of carrying it into effect to the discretion of
\n     the Lieutenant-Governor.  and also, that the laws which
\n     were or  might be\tin force  in the  other\t territories
\n     subject to the same Government were such as it might be
\n     fit and  proper to\t apply to  this district  also;\t but
\n     that, as  it was  not certain  that all those laws, and
\n     every part\t of them, could with equal convenience be so
\n     applied, it  was expedient,  on  that  point  also,  to
\n     entrust a\tdiscretion to  the Lieutenant  Governor This
\n     having been
\n     (1) 5.L.R.178,194.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
578<\/span><\/p>\n
     done as  to the  Garo Hills,  what was  done as  to the
\n     Khasi and\tJaintia Hills ? The Legislature decided that
\n     it was  fit and  proper that  the adjoining district of
\n     the Khasi and Jaintia Hills should also be removed from
\n     the jurisdiction  of the  existing Courts,\t and brought
\n     under the\tsame pro  visions with\tthe Garo  Hills, not
\n     necessarily and  at all  events but  if  and  when\t the
\n     Lieutenant-Governor should think it desirable to do so;
\n     and  that\tit  was\t also  possible\t that  it  might  be
\n     expedient\tthat  not  all,\t but  some  only,  of  those
\n     provisions\t should\t  be  applied\tto  that   adjoining
\n     district. And  accordingly the  Legislature  entrusted,
\n     for these\tpurposes also,\ta discretionary power to the
\n     Lieutenant Governor.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  Their Lordships  think that  it is  a\t fallacy  to
\n     speak of the powers thus conferred upon the Lieutenant-
\n     Governor (large  as they  undoubtedly are)\t as if, when
\n     they were\texercised, the\tefficacy of  the  acts\tdone
\n     under them\t would\tbe  due\t to  any  other\t legislative
\n     authority than that of the Governor General in Council.
\n     Their whole  operation is,\t directly  and\timmediately,
\n     under and\tby virtue of this Act (XXII of 1869) itself.
\n     The proper Legislature has exercised its judgment as to
\n     place, person,  laws, powers;  and the  result of\tthat
\n     judgment has  been to legislate conditionally as to all
\n     these things. The conditions having been fulfilled, the
\n     legislation is  now absolute.  Where plenary  powers of
\n     legislation exist as to particular subjects, whether in
\n     an imperial  or in\t a provincial  Legislature, they may
\n     (in  their\t Lordships’  judgment)\tbe  well  exercised,
\n     either  absolutely\t  or   Conditionally.\tLegislation,
\n     conditional on  the use of particular powers, or on the
\n     exercise of  a limited  discretion,  entrusted  by\t the
\n     Legislature to persons in whom it places confidence, is
\n     no uncommon  thing; and,  in many circumstances, it may
\n     be highly\tconvenient. The British Statute Book abounds
\n     with examples  of it:  and it  cannot be sup posed that
\n     the Imperial  Parliament did not, when constituting the
\n     Indian   Legislature,    contemplate   this   kind\t  of
\n     conditional legislation  as within\t the  scope  of\t the
\n     legislative  powers   which  it   from  time   to\ttime
\n     conferred.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
We are of opinion that the power conferred by the Kerala Act
\nis a  case of conditional legislation as contemplated in the
\nabove decision.\t The various  types of\tpowers that  can  be
\nexercised under\t that Act  are enumerated  in it.  Only\t the
\narticle with  reference to  which those\t powers\t are  to  he
\nexercised is  left to  be determined  by the executive. That
\nwill vary  from time  to time;\tat one\ttime salt  may be an
\nessential article,  at another time rice may be an essential
\narticle and  on a  third occasion  match boxes.\t It  is\t the
\nexecutive that\twould be  in a\tposition to  judge when\t and
\nunder what  circumstances an  article becomes  an  essential
\narticle and therefore it is necessary to
\n579<\/span>
\ncontrol the production, supply and distribution or trade and
\ncommerce in  a particular  article. The corresponding Madras
\nAct,   the    Madras   Essential    Articles   Control\t and
\nRequisitioning (Temporary  Powers) Act,\t 1949 originally had
\nten  articles\tincluded  in   the  schedule  as  “essential
\narticles” with\tpowers to add others to the schedule. It now
\ncontains only  one article  in the schedule, electricity. It
\ncannot\ttherefore  be  said  to\t suffer\t from  the  vice  of
\nexcessive delegation  either. Subsequent  decisions of\tthis
\nCourt only emphasize this point.\n<\/p>\n
     We may  however refer  to two  recent decisions of this
\nCourt. In State of Punjab v. Khan Chand<\/a>(1) dealing with East
\nPunjab Movable\tProperty  (Requisitioning)  Act,  1947\tthis
\nCourt held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “The Act  confers uncontrolled  power on the State
\n     Government\t or   the  officers   authorised  by  it  to
\n     requisition any  movable property.\t No guidelines\thave
\n     been laid\tdown regarding the object or the purpose for
\n     which it  becomes necessary or expedient to requisition
\n     a movable\tproperty. Even\tthe authority requisitioning
\n     movable property is not required to specify the purpose
\n     for which\tit has\tbecome\tnecessary  or  expedient  to
\n     requisition that property. There is no provision in the
\n     Act that  the power  of requisitioning movable property
\n     can be  exercised under  the  Act\tonly  for  a  public
\n     purpose nor  is there  any provision  that powers under
\n     the Act  can be  exercised only  in an  emergency or in
\n     some special  contingency. Hence  the provisions of the
\n     Act violate Articles 14 and 19 of Constitution
\nThe Act\t did not  even. provide\t for suitable  machinery for
\ndetermining the\t compensation payable  to the  owner of\t the
\nmovable property  nor did  it contain any guiding principles
\nfor determining\t the amount of compensation. But in the very
\nsame decision it was observed:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  ‘Considering the  complex nature of problems which
\n     have  to  be  faced  by  a\t modern\t State,\t it  is\t but
\n     inevitable that the matter of details should be left to
\n     the authorities  acting under  an enactment. Discretion
\n     has,  therefore,\tto  be\t given\tto  the\t authorities
\n     concerned for the exercise of the powers vested in them
\n     under an enactment.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n
This decision  considered  the\trelevant  decisions  on\t the
\nsubject and is not against the view which we have taken
\n\t  We must,  however, refer  to the  decision of this
\n     Court in  Gwalior Rayon  Mills v. Asst. Commr. 5. T.(2)
\n     relied upon  by the  respondents. In  that case  it was
\n     found that\t the Parliament\t had laid  down\t legislative
\n     policy and\t had not abdicated its legislative function.
\n     It is necessary to refer to the view taken in that case
\n     by the  majority judgment that it is not correct to say
\n     that if  the legislature  can repeal  an enactment,  it
\n     retains enough  control over  the authority  making the
\n     subor-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (1) A.I.R.1974 S.C.543.\t    (2) A.I.R l974 S.C.1660.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
580<\/span><\/p>\n
dinate legislation and, as such, it is not necessary for the
\nlegislature   to lay  down legislative\tpolicy, standard  or
\nguidelines in  the statute.  That was,\tof course,  not\t the
\nargument on  behalf of\tthe appellants\tin  this  case.\t But
\nhaving regard  to the  fact that  reference was\t made to the
\ndecision in  Cobb & Co. Ltd. v. Kropp(1) which is very often
\nrelied upon for contending that if the legislature conferred
\ncertain powers\ton an executive authority it could be upheld
\nbecause\t the   legislature  could   any\t time\trepeal\t the
\nlegislation and withdraw such authority and discretion as it
\nhad vested  in that  authority, it  is necessary  to look  a
\nlittle more  closely into  that judgment.  The main  dispute
\nthere was  about the State Transport Act, 1960 passed by the
\nlegislature of\tQueensland. It\twas attacked  on the  ground
\nthat it\t unlawfully and\t unconstitutionally delegated to the
\nCommissioner  for   Transport  sovereign   plowers  of\t the
\nlegislature of Queensland to impose and levy taxes and would
\nconstitute an  unlawful\t and  unconstitutional\ttransfer  of
\nsovereign power\t of legislature\t to the\t Commissioner or  an
\nabdication of  such power  in his favour. There were various
\nother contentions  to which it is not necessary to refer. In
\nthe same case the validity of the State Transport Facilities
\nAct, 1946 was also in question. Under the 1946 Act, however,
\na determination\t or a decision of the Commissioner was to be
\nsubmitted to  the Minister  for his  confirmation. Stable J.
\ndescribed  this\t  provision  as\t  one\tunder\twhich\t‘the
\ncommissioner had  a Parliamentary  hand\t on  his  shoulder’.
\nAfter referring\t to the\t various provisions  of the  Acts as
\nwell as\t the powers  of the Queensland Legislature the Privy
\nCouncil rejected  the argument\tthat the  effect of the Acts
\nwas to create a new legislative authority. The Privy Council
\npointed out that it cannot rationally be said that there was
\nany abandonment\t or abdication of power in favour of a newly
\ncreated\t legislative   authority,  and\t referred   to\t the
\nobservations of\t the Privy  Council in\tthe Queen  v.  Burah
\n(supra). The  Privy Council  then went on to point out that’
\nnothing comparable with “a new legislative power” armed with
\n“General authority”  has been  created by the passing by the
\nQueensland  Legislature\t  of  the  various  Transport  Acts.
\nReference was  then made  to the  decisions in\tHodge v. The
\nQueen(2) and  Powel v.\tApollo Candle Company Ltd.(3) and it
\nwas pointed  out that  the Queensland  Legislature preserved
\nits own\t capacity insect  and retained\tperfect control over
\nthe Commissioner  for Transport. It was in that context that
\nthey added  “inasmuch as  it could  at any  time repeal\t the
\nlegislation and withdraw such authority and discretion as it
\nhad vested  in him”. This portion of the observations cannot
\nbe relied upon in every case where the question of excessive
\ndelegation arises to justify it merely on the ground that it
\nis open\t to the\t legislature to\t repeal the  legislation and
\nwithdraw the  authority. This  would be\t apparent  from\t the
\nextract from  the judgment  of Stable  J. which\t immediately
\nfollows thereafter:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “obviously  Parliament   cannot  directly  concern
\n     itself  with   all\t the   multitudinous   matters\t and
\n     considerations which  necessarily arise  for daily\t and
\n     hourly determination within
\n     (1)[1967] 1 A.C.141.\t(2)(1883)9 App.Cas.117 P.C.
\n\t\t(3)(1885)10App.Cas.282 P.C.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
581<\/span><\/p>\n
     the ramifications of a vast transport system in a great
\n     area in the fixing of and collection of licensing fees.
\n     So, as  I see  it\ton  the\t face  of  the\tlegislation,
\n     Parliament has  lengthened its  own arm by appointing a
\n     commissioner to  attend to all these matters, including
\n     the fixing\t and gathering of the taxes which Parliament
\n     itself has seen fit to impose. The commissioner has not
\n     been given\t any power  to act  outside the\t law as laid
\n     down by  Parliament. Parliament  has not abdicated from
\n     any of  its own  power. It has laid down a framework, a
\n     set of  bounds, within  which the\tperson\tholding\t the
\n     office created by Parliament may grant, or refrain from
\n     granting licenses,\t and fix, assess, collect or refrain
\n     from collecting fees which are taxes.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
and the succeeding observations to the following effect:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “The legislature were entitled to use any agent or
\n     any subordinate  agency  or  any  machinery  that\tthey
\n     considered appropriate for carrying out the objects and
\n     purposes  that   they  had\t  in  mind  and\t which\tthey
\n     designated. They  were entitled to use the Commissioner
\n     for Transport  as their  instrument to  fix and recover
\n     the licences  and permit fees. They were not abrogating
\n     their power  to levy  taxes and  were not\ttransferring
\n     that power\t to the\t commissioner. What  they created by
\n     the passing  of the Transport Acts could not reasonably
\n     be described  as a\t new legislative  power or  separate
\n     legislative  body\t armed\twith   general\t legislative
\n     authority (see  R. v. Burah, 3 App. Case. 889). Nor did
\n     the Queensland  legislature “create  and endow with its
\n     capacity a new legislative power not created by the Act
\n     to which  it owes\tits own\t existence” (see  In re\t The
\n     Initiative and  Referendum Act.  1910 A.C.\t 945; 35 TLR
\n     630 P.C.).\t In no\tsense did the Queensland Legislature
\n     assign or transfer or abrogate their powers or renounce
\n     or abdicate  their responsibilities.  They did not give
\n     away or  relinquish their\ttaxing powers.\tAll that was
\n     done was  done under  and by reason of their authority.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     It was  by virtue of their will that licence and permit
\n     fees became payable.’
\nWe agree  with the  view taken by the majority of this Court
\nin Gwalior Rayon Mills’ case. In the result we hold that the
\nKerala Act,  the 1965 declaration under section 2(a) and the
\n1968 Surcharge order under section 3 are all valid
\n     The result is that the appeals will have to be allowed;
\nbut in\tCivil Appeals  Nos. 1425, 2575, 2576 of 1972 and 97,
\n1373 and  1374 of  1973 a  question regarding Article 14 has
\nbeen raised which has not been considered by the High Court.
\nIn these  cases the  High Court will deal with that question
\nalone and dispose of the matter afresh.\n<\/p>\n
     In Civil Appeal No. 1372 of 1973 the respondent is what
\nis called  a sanction  holder under section 28 of the Indian
\nElectricity Act, 191
\n582<\/span>
\nand as\tsuch a\tlicensee within\t the meaning  of that term n
\nclause (6)  of section\t2 of  the Electricity  (SUPPLY) Act,
\n1948. The  respondent has  no objection\t to  collecting\t the
\nsurcharge from\tthose to  whom it  supplies electricity. The
\nrespondent’s contention\t is a  limited one  that it need not
\npay surcharge  on the  electricity  which  it  consumes.  We
\nconsider this contention well founded and it is supported by
\nthe provisions\tof clause (3) and (8) of the Surcharge order
\nwhich read  together leave  no room for doubt on that point.
\nClause (3) reads as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “3.  Notwithstanding\t anything  to  the  contrary
\n     contained\tin  any\t agreement  entered  into  with\t any
\n     consumer or  the conditions  of service  agreed upon by
\n     the Kerala\t State Electricity  Board; the\tKerala State
\n     Electricity Board\tshall levy a surcharge in accordance
\n     with clause 5 on all supplies of electrical energy made
\n     by it either directly or through licensees:<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  Provided that\t no surcharge under this order shall
\nbe levied on-\n<\/p>\n
\t  (a)  Bulk supplies of energy to the licensees;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (b)  Low Tension  supplies of\t energy for domestic
\n\t       residential purposes;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (c)  Low   Tension\tsupplies   of\tenergy\t for
\n\t       agricultural purposes.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The respondent\tis a  licensee and  bulk supplies  have been
\nmade to the licensee. It is not a consumer to whom the Board
\nsupplies electrical  energy directly  or through a licensee.
\nIt cannot  be said  that in consuming electricity itself the
\nrespondent is supplying electricity to itself. The Surcharge
\norder clearly  makes a\tdistinction between  the consumer on
\nthe one\t hand and  the licensee\t on the\t other and  makes no
\nprovision for  surcharge  in  the  case\t of  consumption  of
\nelectricity by\ta licensee.  It would  be therefore declared
\nthat  the  respondent  in  this\t appeal\t need  not  pay\t the
\nsurcharge on  the electricity  consumed by it. There will be
\nno order as to costs.\n<\/p>\n
     GUPTA, J. I regret I am unable to agree that the Kerala
\nEssential Articles  Control (Temporary Powers) Act, 1961 and
\nthe declaration\t and the  surcharge order  made respectively
\nunder ss.  2(a) and  3 of  that Act are valid. In my opinion
\nthe Kerala  act is  an invalid\tpiece of  legislation and as
\nsuch the  declaration and  the surcharge  orders are  of  no
\nconsequence. It\t is not necessary to restate the facts which
\nhave  been   set  out  fully  in  the  Judgment\t of  brother
\nAlagiriswami J.;  I shall  briefly state the reasons for the
\nview I have taken.n
\n     The State\tLagislature has power to make laws only with
\nregard to  matters specified  in List II and List III in the
\nSeventh\t Schedule   of\tthe   Constitution  subject  to\t the
\nprovisions of Art. 254(2). The Kerala Act, as its long title
\nshows, is in Act to provide for the control of the produc
\n583<\/span>
\ntion, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in,
\n“certain articles”. The Preamble of the Act also states that
\nit was\tpassed as it was considered expedient to provide for
\nthe control  of the  production, supply and distribution of,
\nand trade  and commerce in, “certain articles”, Sec. 1(3) of
\nthe Act provides that the Act would remain in force for five
\nyears from the date of its commencement which was in January
\n1962.  Sec.3(1)\t  empowers  the\t State\tGovernment  to\tmake
\nprovisions by a notified order for regulating or prohibiting
\nthe production\tsupply and  distribution of  any  ‘essential
\narticle’ and  trade and\t commerce therein  if the Government
\nthought it  was\t expedient  so\tto  do\tfor  maintaining  or
\nincreasing  the\t supplies  or  for  securing  the  equitable
\ndistribution of\t such essentiai\t articles. Sec. 2(a) defines
\nessential article  as any  article not\tbeing  an  essential
\ncommodity as  defined in the Essential Commodities Act, 1955
\nwhich the  Government by  notified order might declare to be
\nan essential  article. The  definition leaves  it  to  State
\nGovernment to decide what should be an essential article for
\nthe purpose  of\t the  Act.  The\t Legislature  is  of  course
\npresumed to  know the  limits of its competence and assuming
\nit is  permissible to  attribute similar  knowledge  to\t the
\nGovernment as  to the  bounds of  its authority\t under\tsec.
\n2(a), an essential article may be any article covered by any
\nof the\tentries in List 11 or List III except the classes of
\ncommodities  mentioned\t as  essential\t commodity  in\t the
\nEssential Commodities  Act. Until  therefore, the Government
\nissued a  notification on  December 10, 1965 under sec. 2(a)
\ndeclaring electrical  energy  to  be  an  essential  article
\nalmost four  years after the act came into force, it was not
\npossible even  to guess what the Act was about. Thus the Act
\nas passed  had no positive content, it was an empty husk and
\nits insubstantiality, if by itself not, an ill
\n  validating   factor,\texposes\t  the  want  of\t a  declared
\nlegislative policy  in the  Act. The  Act does\tnot give any
\nindication as  to the  nature of  the articles in respect of
\nwhich it  sought  to  control  the  production,\t supply\t and
\ndistribution, and  trade and  commerce.\t It  confer  on\t the
\nGovernment the authority to declare any article an essential
\narticle and  to exercise  the aforesaid powers in respect of
\nthat article.  The Act\tdoes not provide any guidance or lay
\ndown any  test to  ascertain what makes an article essential
\nfor the\t purpose of  the Act. The reference to the Essential
\nCommodities  Act  in  sec.  2(a)  which\t defines  ‘essential
\narticle’  is   merely  to   exclude  from  its\tpurview\t the
\ncommodities covered  by the  Essential Commodities Act., and
\nonly serves  to emphasize  its indefiniteness  and makes  it
\nmore difficult\tto find\t any  clue  to\tthe  nature  of\t the
\narticles the  Legislature had in mind in enacting the Kerala
\nEssential Articles  Control (Temporary\tPowers)\t Act,  1961.
\nAlmost the  entire legislative\tfield was  left open  to the
\nGovernment to  choose from and decide according to their own
\nlights what should be an essential article.\n<\/p>\n
     It hardly\tneeds repetition that the Legislature cannot
\ndelegate the  essential legislative  function,\twhich  means
\nthat the  Legislature must declare the policy of the law and
\nprovide a  standard for the guidance of the subordinate law-
\nmaking authority.  The Kerala  Act authorises the Government
\nto declare  any article as essential, except those mentioned
\nin the\tEssential Commodities  Act, without  laying down any
\ndefine criteria or standards. This, I think, is surrendering
\nunguided and un
\n584<\/span>
\ncanalised power\t to the\t executive. I do not see how the Act
\ncan be\t called\t an instance of conditional legislation-this
\nis not\ta case\twhere the  Legislature having determined the
\npolicy has  left the details to be supplied by the executive
\nauthority. I  cannot think of a case where the Legislature’s
\nself-effacement could  be more\tcomplete. In  my opinion the
\npower conferred\t on the Government by the Kerala Act exceeds
\nthe limits of permissible delegation.\n<\/p>\n
     I may  now refer  to another  aspect of  the  case.  As
\nstated\tearlier,   the\tKerala\tEssential  Articles  Control
\n(Temporary Powers)  Act, 1961 came into operation in January
\n1962 and was to remain in force for five years from the date
\nof its\tcommencement. However,\tthe  life  of  the  Act\t was
\nextended by  successive amending  Acts passed  in 1967, 1969
\nand 1970. Art. 254(2) of the Constitution provides:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Where a  law made  by the  Legislature of a State
\n     with respect  to one  of the  matters enumerated in the
\n     Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the
\n     provisions of  an earlier\tlaw made by Parliament or an
\n     existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law
\n     so made  by the  Legislature of such State shall, if it
\n     has  been\t reserved  for\t the  consideration  of\t the
\n     President and  has received his assent, prevail in that
\n     State:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent
\n     Parliament from  enacting at  any\ttime  any  law\twith
\n     respect to\t the same  matter including a law adding to,
\n     amending, varying\tor repealing  the law so made by the
\n     Legislature of the State.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
It appears  that the  President had  given his assent to the
\nprincipal Act  of 1961\tand also  to the successive amending
\nActs extending\tthe life of the principal Act. The Act as it
\nwas passed  in 1961 does not appear to contain any provision
\nwhich was repugnant to any Central Act or existing law, that
\nbeing so,  the assent  given to it seems redundant and of no
\nconsequence.  (obviously,   Art.  254(2)   contemplates\t  an
\nexisting repugnancy and not possible future inconsistencies.
\nin  December   10,  1965   the\tState  Government  issued  a
\nnotification declaring\telectrical energy to be an essential
\narticle under  sec. 2(a) of the Act, and on June 1, 1968 the
\nState Government  made the  Kerala State  Electricity Supply
\nSurcharge order\t in exercise of the powers conferred by sec.\n<\/p>\n
3.  The\t  surcharge  order   made  in\t1968  following\t the
\ndeclaration of\telectrical energy as an essential article in
\n1965 is\t said to  be in\t conflict with the provisions of the
\nIndian Electricity  Act, 1910  and  the\t Electricity  Supply
\nAct,1948. Both\tthese Acts  are existing laws. It was argued
\nthat assent  of the President received for the amending Acts
\nof 1967,  1969 and  1970 cured\tthe repugnancy introduced by
\nthe surcharge  order. Assuming\tthat  assent  given  to\t the
\namending  Acts\t would\thave   the  effect   of\t curing\t the
\nrepugnancy, if\tany, in\t the  principal\t Act,  the  question
\nremains where  the declaration\tand the surcharge order part
\nof the Act under which they were made ? If they were not, if
\nthe  order  declaring  electrical  energy  as  an  essential
\narticle and  the surcharge  order were outside the Act, then
\nthe assent given to the Act could not cure
\n585<\/span>
\nthe repugnancy\tarising from  these two\t orders. Art. 254(2)
\nrequires the  State  legislation  containing  the  repugnant
\nprovision to  be  reserved  for\t the  consideration  of\t the
\nPresident before he gives his assent to it. Could it be said
\nthat the declaration and the surcharge order were provisions
\nin the\tKerala Essential Articles Control (Temporary Powers)
\nAct 1961  ? this  Court considered a similar question though
\nin a  different context\t in Chief Inspector of Mines v. Lala
\nKaram<\/a>  chand   Thappar.(1)  In\tthat  case  this  Court\t was
\nexamining the effect of the repeal of the Mines Act, 1923 on
\nthe regulations\t framed under  that Act. Mines Act, 1923 was
\nrepealed and  was re-enacted  with certain  modifications as
\nthe Mines  Act, 1952. Sec. 29 of the 1923 Act empowering the
\nCentral Government  to make  regulations consistent with the
\nAct for\t specified purposes was reenacted in the 1952 Act as
\nSec. 57. Regulations were  made in 1926 under sec. 29 of the
\n1923 Act,  but no regulations had been made under sec. 57 of
\nthe 1952  Act at the relevant date in 1955. The question was
\nwhether in  view of  sec. 24  of the General Clauses Act the
\nMines Regulations  of 1926  could be  said to  have been  in
\nforce at the relevant date as there was nothing in the later
\nproviding  otherwise,\tand   the   regulations\t  were\t not
\ninconsistent with the re-enacted provisions. Sub-sec. (4) of
\nsec.  31  of  the  1923\t Act  laid  down,  inter-alia,\tthat
\nregulations and\t rules made  under the\tAct would  have\t the
\neffect\t“as   if  enacted   in\tthis  Act.”  overruling\t the
\ncontention that\t the regulations  became part  of the Act in
\nview of\t sub-sec. (4) of sec. 31 and that with the repeal of
\nthe Act\t the regulations also stood repealed as part of that
\nAct, this Court observed at page 23 of the report:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “The true  position appears  to be  that the rules
\n     and regulations  do not  lose their  character as rules
\n     and regulations  even though they are to be of the same
\n     effect as\tit contained in the Act. They continue to be
\n     rules subordinate\tto the\tAct, and  though for certain
\n     purposes, including  the purpose  of construction, they
\n     are to  be treated\t as if\tcontained in  the Act, their
\n     true nature as subordinate rule is not lost.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
There is  thus at  least one  decision of  this Court  which
\nseems to  support the view that the orders made by the State
\nGovernment under sec. 2(a) and sec. 3(1) of the impugned Act
\ncould not  be called part of the Act; this Act does not even
\nsay that  such orders are to be treated as if enacted in the
\nAct. This  is an  important aspect of the case, and I do not
\nthink it can be assumed or taken for granted without further
\nconsideration that  these orders  formed part of the Act and
\nthe President’s assent
\n     (1)[1962] 1 S.C.R 9
\n7-L925SlupCI\/75
\n586<\/span>
\nto the\tAct cured  the repugnancy  created by  the surcharge
\norder. However, as I have already held the Act to be invalid
\non the\tother ground.  I prefer not to express any concluded
\nopinion on this point.\n<\/p>\n
     In may  judgment the  Kerala Essential Articles Control
\n(Temporary Powers)  Act, 1961  is invalid  on the  ground of
\nexcessive delegation.  I would therefore dismiss the appeals
\nbut without any order  as to costs.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t   ORDER
\n     In view  of the  decision of  the majority. the appeals
\nare allowed  and Civil Appeals Nos. 1425, 2575, 2576 of 1972
\nand 97,\t 1373 and  1374 of  1973 are  remanded to  the\tHigh
\nCourt. There will be no order as to costs.\n<\/p>\n
P. B. R .\n<\/p>\n
587<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Kerala State Electricity Board vs Indian Aluminium Co on 1 September, 1975 Equivalent citations: 1976 AIR 1031, 1976 SCR (1) 552 Author: A Alagiriswami Bench: Alagiriswami, A., Bhagwati, P.N., Goswami, P.K., Sarkaria, Ranjit Singh, Gupta, A.C. PETITIONER: KERALA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD Vs. RESPONDENT: INDIAN ALUMINIUM CO. DATE OF JUDGMENT01\/09\/1975 BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-96065","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nKerala State Electricity Board vs Indian Aluminium Co on 1 September, 1975 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kerala-state-electricity-board-vs-indian-aluminium-co-on-1-september-1975-2\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Kerala State Electricity Board vs Indian Aluminium Co on 1 September, 1975 - 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