{"id":9736,"date":"2006-04-12T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-04-11T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/rama-narang-vs-ramesh-narang-anr-on-12-april-2006"},"modified":"2015-08-02T02:28:00","modified_gmt":"2015-08-01T20:58:00","slug":"rama-narang-vs-ramesh-narang-anr-on-12-april-2006","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/rama-narang-vs-ramesh-narang-anr-on-12-april-2006","title":{"rendered":"Rama Narang vs Ramesh Narang & Anr on 12 April, 2006"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Rama Narang vs Ramesh Narang & Anr on 12 April, 2006<\/div>\n
Author: R Pal<\/div>\n
Bench: Ruma Pal, B.N. Srikrishna, Dalveer Bhandari<\/div>\n
           CASE NO.:\nContempt Petition (civil)  148 of 2003\n\nPETITIONER:\nRama Narang\n\nRESPONDENT:\nRamesh Narang & Anr\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT: 12\/04\/2006\n\nBENCH:\nRuma Pal, B.N. Srikrishna & Dalveer Bhandari\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
J U D G E M E N T<\/p>\n
CONTEMPT PETITION NO.148 OF 2003
\nIN
\nCP NOS. 265-267 OF 1999 IN CP NO.209 OF 1998
\nIN
\nCIVIL APPEAL NO. 366 OF 1998<\/p>\n
RUMA PAL, J.\n<\/p>\n
In this contempt petition the petitioner alleged that the
\nrespondents 1 and 2 have violated this Court’s orders dated
\n12th December, 2001 and 8th January, 2002 disposing of
\nContempt Petition (Civil) Nos. 265-267\/1999 in Contempt
\nPetition (Civil) No.209 of 1998 in Civil Appeal Nos. 366\/1998,
\n603\/1998 and 605\/1998.  The petitioner and the respondents
\nrepresent two groups of members of one family. The petitioner,
\nRama Narang is the father of Ramesh and Rajesh the two
\nrespondents herein. They are the children of his first wife,
\nwhom he divorced in 1963. The petitioner also has children by
\nthe second wife.  Disputes have been raging between the
\nparties for over a decade.  Several suits and counter suits have
\nbeen filed.  In contempt proceedings filed by the respondent
\nNo.1 against the petitioner an order was passed by this Court
\non 12th December, 2001 to the following effect:-
\n“The following cases are pending between
\nthe parties who are parties in the present
\nproceedings before us one way or the
\nother.  We are told that all the parties
\nhave settled their disputes in respect of
\nall the litigations specified below.\n<\/p>\n
1.\tO.S. No.3535 of 1994 before the
\nBombay High Court.\n<\/p>\n
2.\tO.S. No.3578 of 1994 before the
\nBombay High Court<\/p>\n
3.\tO.S. No.1105 of 1998 before the
\nBombay High Court<\/p>\n
4.\tO.S. No.3469 of 1996 before the
\nBombay High Court<\/p>\n
5.\tO.S. No.1792 of 1998 before the
\nBombay High Court<\/p>\n
6.\tO.S. No.320 of 1991 before the
\nBombay High Court<\/p>\n
7.\tCompany Petition No.28 1992 before
\nthe Bombay High Court<\/p>\n
Before the Principal Bench, Company
\nLaw Board, New Delhi.\n<\/p>\n
8.\tArbitration Suit No.5110 of 1994
\nbefore the Bombay High Court.\n<\/p>\n
Today they filed a document styled it as
\n“MINUTES OF CONSENT ORDER” signed
\nby all the parties.  Learned counsel
\nappearing on both sides submitted that
\nall the parties have signed this document.
\nToday except Mona Narang and Ramona
\nNarang (two ladies), all the rest of the
\nparties are present before us when these
\nproceedings are dictated.  As for Mona
\nNarang and Ramona Narang learned
\ncounsel submitted that Mona Narang had
\naffixed the signatures and the power of
\nattorney holder of Ramona Narang has
\nsigned the above document in his
\npresence.  This is recorded.\n<\/p>\n
   Both sides agreed that all the suits can
\nbe disposed of in terms of the settlement
\nevidenced by “MINUTES OF CONSENT
\nORDER” produced before us.  For
\ndisposal of those cases and\/or for
\npassing decrees in them we have to
\npronounce the final formal order in terms
\nof the settlement now produced before us.\n<\/p>\n
  We, therefore, withdraw all the aforesaid
\nsuits to this  Court  under Article 139-A
\nof the Constitution of India.\n<\/p>\n
    Prothonotory and Senior Master of the
\nBombay High Court is directed to
\ntransmit the records in the above
\nmentioned suits by special messenger to
\nthis Court so as to reach the Registry
\nhere within ten days from today.  The
\nBench Officer of the Principal Bench of
\nthe Company Law Board, New Delhi is
\ndirected  to  forward the records relating
\nto company petition No.28 of 1992 to the
\nRegistry of this Court so as to reach the
\nRegistry within ten days from today.\n<\/p>\n
   All the parties have undertaken before
\nus that they will implement the terms of
\nthe “MINUTES OF CONSENT ORDER” on
\nor before 1.1.2002 and that no further
\ntime will be sought for in the matter.\n<\/p>\n
    Clause (f) of the compromise relates to
\nthe operation of the bank accounts. That
\nclause will come into force from today
\nonwards.\n<\/p>\n
    All the afore-mentioned suits and the
\ncompany petition will be posted for final
\nformal orders on 8.1.2002 at 10.30 a.m.
\nalong with these contempt proceedings.”\n<\/p>\n
The Minutes of the Consent Order referred to in the order
\ndated 12th December, 2001 was as an agreement between the
\nparties, which was duly executed by them.
\n The bone of contention between the parties is primarily
\nthe control of a company known as NIHL.  The consent
\nminutes provided inter alia:-\n<\/p>\n
(a)\tWith effect from 4th May, 1999 Rama,
\nRamesh and Rajesh are the only
\nDirectors of NIHL (and its
\nsubsidiaries).  Any increase in the
\nBoard of Directors shall be with the
\nmutual consent of Rama and
\nRamesh\/Rajesh.\n<\/p>\n
(b)\tNone of the Directors (Rama,
\nRamesh and Rajesh) can be removed
\nfrom directorship.\n<\/p>\n
(c)\tRama and Ramesh shall continue to
\nbe in joint management and control
\nof NIHL and Rajesh shall continue
\nto be the Permanent Whole Time
\nDirector thereof in charge of day to
\nday operations\/management.\n<\/p>\n
(d)\tNo decision shall be adopted
\nconcerning or affecting the said
\nCompany (and its subsidiaries)
\nwithout the consent of Rama and
\nRamesh (or Rajesh) in writing.  It is
\nfurther clarified and agreed that
\nsave and except as provided herein
\nno prevailing decisions including
\nappointment of Directors\/
\nExecutives or any other persons
\nshall continue unless Rama and
\nRamesh (or Rajesh) consent to the
\nsame in writing.\n<\/p>\n
(e)\tAll the collections coming in cash
\nshall continue to be remitted in the
\nbank accounts of the Company and
\nall transactions will only be made in
\nthe form of cheques and\/or as may
\nhereafter be agreed  to between
\nRama and Ramesh (or Rajesh).\n<\/p>\n
(f)\tAll bank accounts of the Company
\nshall continue to be operated jointly
\nby any two out of the three Directors
\nnamely Rama, Ramesh and Rajesh
\nand\/or as may hereafter be agreed
\nto between Rama and Ramesh(or
\nRajesh). If the amount of any
\ntransaction exceeds Rs. 10 (ten) lacs
\nthe same shall be undertaken
\nthrough a cheque signed jointly by
\nRama and Ramesh\/Rajesh.”\n<\/p>\n
The consent terms also provide for the performance of
\nvarious actions by the parties which are not necessary to be
\nrecorded.  It is sufficient  to note that  all the agreed actions
\nwere to be performed by the petitioners group before 1.1.2002.
\nWhen the matter appeared in the list on 8.1.2002 the
\nCourt recorded that all the eight suits and proceedings
\nwithdrawn from other courts had been transmitted. The
\nappellant’s suits were disposed of in terms of the minutes of
\nthe consent order incorporated  in the proceedings passed by
\nthe Court on 12.12.2001.  The order dated 8th January, 2001
\nfurther provided:-\n<\/p>\n
“All the above are now being disposed of
\nin terms of the Minutes of Consent Order
\nincorporated in the proceedings passed
\nby us on 12.12.2001.\n<\/p>\n
The decree will be drawn up in terms of
\nthe Minutes of the Consent Order.”\n<\/p>\n
On the allegation that the two respondents had violated
\nthe terms of the orders specially the clauses 3(c), (d) and (f) of
\nthe consent minutes, this contempt petition has been filed.  It
\nis also the case of the petitioner that the violations of the
\norders had been admitted by the respondents.  According to
\nthe petitioner the violations amounted to a willful disobedience
\nof the orders dated 12.12.2001 and 8.1.2002 and were
\npunishable under this Court’s power of contempt.
\nInitially a notice was issued by this Court on the
\npetitioners’ application on 9th May, 2003 to the respondents
\nfor ascertaining the facts and to enable them to respond to the
\naverments in the petition.  After the filing of the responses, on
\n15th September, 2003, a notice in contempt proceedings was
\nissued to the respondents.\n<\/p>\n
In an attempt to bring the disputes between the parties
\nto amicable end, the Court appointed a retired Chief Justice of
\nOrissa High Court as a mediator.  The mediation was however,
\nunsuccessful.  Since the settlement of disputes was not
\npossible, the proceedings before the mediator were terminated
\nand the contempt petition was directed to be listed for hearing.
\nBefore taking up the question whether the respondents
\nare guilty of contempt as alleged by the petitioner, the
\npreliminary objection raised by the respondents as to the
\nmaintainability of the contempt petition are addressed.
\nAccording to the respondents, the consent order did not
\ncontain an undertaking or an injunction of the Court and
\ncould not be the basis of any proceedings for contempt.
\nReliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in Babu
\nRam Gupta Vs. Sudhir Bhasin And Anr. 1980(3) SCC 47;
\nBank of Baroda Vs. Sadruddin Hasan Daya And Anr. 2004
\n(1) SCC 360; R.N. Dey And Ors. Vs. Bhagyabati Pramanik &
\nOrs. 2000(4) SCC 400; Rita Markandey Vs. Surjit Singh
\nArora 1996 (6) SCC (14); Nisha Kanto Roy Chowdhury Vs.
\nSmt. Saroj Bashini Goho AIR 1948 (Cal.) 294; Bajranglal
\nGangadhar Khemka & Anr. Vs. Kapurchand Ltd.AIR 1950
\n(Bombay), 336.  According to the respondents in the absence
\nof an undertaking given to the Court and an allegation that
\nsuch undertaking had been violated, this Court could not
\nexercise jurisdiction over a mere violation of the terms of
\nconsent order which may have been incorporated in the
\nconsent order.  It was also argued that the order dated
\n12.12.2001 has in fact been carried out and implemented
\nwithin the time specified.  According to the respondents the
\norder dated 12.12.2001 had merged in the final order dated
\n8.1.2002.  Reference has been made to the language of the
\norder dated 8.1.2002 which the respondents submitted, was
\nthe only operative order and which did not in fact contain any
\nundertaking of the respondents at all.  The respondent’s case
\nis that the mere imprimatur of the Court to a consent
\narrangement was not sufficient to attract the contempt
\njurisdiction.  Only such consent orders which are coupled with
\nundertakings or injunctions by the Court  could be the subject
\nmatter of contempt proceedings.  The respondents have
\nargued that in the facts of this case the final order does not
\nreflect any undertaking except the petitioner’s undertaking to
\nRakesh, who was the brother of the respondents 1 and 2. They
\nhave also submitted that the contempt power must be strictly
\nconstrued.  Finally, it was submitted that if this Court holds
\nthat the earlier decisions relied upon by the respondents had
\nbeen wrongly decided, the same should not serve to proceed
\nagainst the respondents, because when the actions
\ncomplained were done the law did not treat those actions as
\ncontumacious.\n<\/p>\n
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners
\nhas submitted that a decree for injunction whether directory
\nor prohibitory can only be enforced by way of contempt
\nproceedings.  It was argued that there was nothing in principle
\nto draw a rational distinction between the orders passed on
\nmerits and  orders passed by consent.  Our attention was also
\ndrawn to the language of the order dated 12.12.2001 which
\ndirected clause (f) of the minutes to be enforced from that date
\nonwards. In fact the various suits referred to in the order
\ndated 8th January, 2002 had been decreed in terms of the
\nmutual consent order.   It has also been submitted that all the
\nrelevant clauses in the consent minutes could be read both as
\nprohibitory and directory.  The petitioner has submitted that
\nin a civil contempt, the issue is not so much the punishment
\nof the alleged contemnor, but the execution of the decree.
\nAccording to the petitioner,  all the decisions cited by the
\nrespondents were distinguishable. Reliance has been placed
\non the definition of civil contempt in the Contempt of Courts
\nAct, 1971 as well as on the decisions in Rosnan Sam Boyce
\nVs. B.R. Cotton Mills Ltd. & Ors. 1990 (2) SCC 636; C.H.
\nGiles V. Morris & Ors. 1972 (1) All ER 1960; and Salkia
\nBusinessmen’s Association & Ors. Vs. Howrah Municipal
\nCorporation & Ors. 2001 (6) SCC 688.\n<\/p>\n
Prior to the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act,
\n1971 (referred to hereafter as the Act), the field was governed
\nby the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952  which did not contain
\nmany of the provisions which have  been introduced for the
\nfirst time by the 1971 Act. Till the 1971 Act, the policy of the
\nlegislature was to leave the formulation of the law of contempt
\nto the Courts.  The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act
\n1952 were, therefore, broadly framed.  Consequently, there
\nwas  often a conflict between the practice in a Court and the
\njudicial decisions and sometimes conflict between the views of
\nthe different High Courts on the law applicable.
\n  An instance of such conflict is the case of Nisha Kanto
\nRoy Chowdhury V. Smt. Saroj Bashini Goho AIR 1948 Cal\n<\/p>\n
294. In that case, a suit had been filed for ejectment by the
\nrespondent of the appellant.  The suit was not contested.
\nTerms of compromise were drafted and a decree passed in
\nterms of the compromise.  One of the clauses of the
\ncompromise contained an undertaking of the appellant to
\nremove the image of the deity which had been installed by the
\nappellant together with the structures around the deity  on
\ndemand by the respondent-landlord.  However,  when the
\nrespondent called upon the appellant to remove the image, the
\nappellant refused.  The respondent then filed an application
\nbefore the High Court to commit the appellant for contempt of
\nCourt on the ground that he had broken an undertaking
\nwhich had been given to the  Court that he would remove the
\nimage when called upon to do so by the respondent. The
\nSingle Judge allowed the application and committed the
\nappellant holding that he had violated the order of the Court.
\nOn  appeal, however, the Division Bench differed with the
\nviews expressed by the learned Single Judge.  It was held that
\nthe clause which recorded the appellant’s undertaking to
\nremove the image did not state that the defendant undertook
\n“to the Court” to remove the image.  The word “undertakes”
\nwas construed to mean “formal promise or pledge”.  It was
\nheld that the appellant had thus merely promised or pledged
\nthe respondent to remove the image.  The Court was no party
\nto that promise at that stage.  It was also said that:
\n“It must be remembered that a
\ncompromise decree is nothing more
\nthan an agreement of the parties
\nwith the sanction of the Court
\nsuper-added.  It has really no
\ngreater sanctity than the agreement
\nitself.  It certainly cannot mean
\nanything more than the agreement
\nitself.”\n<\/p>\n
When it was pointed out that the practice on the original
\nside of the High Court was to record  an undertaking to the
\nCourt in that manner and that this practice had been
\nendorsed in several earlier decisions, the Division Bench
\nopined that if that was so then “sooner the practice is
\nstopped is better”.  It was affirmed that if it was the intention
\nof the parties that an undertaking should be given to the
\nCourt then the compromise should have made it clear that
\nsuch was the case.\n<\/p>\n
A different view was taken by the Division Bench of the
\nBombay High Court in Bajranglal Gangadhar Khemka and
\nAnr. V. Kapurchand Ltd. AIR 1950 (Bom.) 336.  In that
\ncase, a suit for specific performance by execution of a lease
\nwas compromised and consent terms were filed in Court and
\nan order passed thereon. One of the terms in the compromise
\nrecorded an undertaking by the defendants to have a third
\nparty joined as a confirming party to the lease which the
\ndefendant had agreed to execute in favour of the plaintiff.
\nThe defendant failed to execute the lease.  The plaintiff took
\nout proceedings for execution and the lease was executed by
\nan officer of Court.  The defendant then refused to get the
\nthird party to confirm the lease in terms of his undertaking.
\nThe plaintiff took out an application for contempt of Court.
\nThe Single Judge allowed the application holding that the
\ndefendant was guilty of willful default and asked the
\ndefendant to carry out the undertaking within one month
\nfailing which a warrant of arrest would issue.  In the appeal
\npreferred by the defendant, it was contended by him that no
\nundertaking was given by the defendant to Court.  Reliance
\nwas placed on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in
\nNisha Kanto’s case.  The Division Bench rejected the
\nsubmission and dismissed the appeal saying:
\n“We are not prepared to accept a
\nposition which seems to us contrary
\nto the long practice that has been
\nestablished in this Court.”\n<\/p>\n
The Court opined that:\n<\/p>\n
” the expression
\n“undertake” has come to acquire
\nthrough long practice, a technical
\nmeaning.  In all orders and decrees
\nof the Court, whenever the
\nexpression “a party undertakes”\n<\/p>\n
has been used, it has always borne
\nthe meaning that the undertaking
\nhas been to the Court.\n<\/p>\n
What is more, it has been held by
\nBhagwati J.— an opinion with
\nwhich I entirely agreethat it has
\nbeen the long standing practice on
\nthe original side that, whenever
\ncounsel wishes to give an
\nundertaking to the Court, he never
\nexpressly uses the words ” to the
\nCourt” but merely states that he
\nundertakes on behalf of his
\nclient.”\n<\/p>\n
Accordingly it was concluded:\n<\/p>\n
“..we can only construe the
\nundertaking given by the defendants
\nas an undertaking given to the
\nCourt and not given to the other
\nside
\nThe very fact that the Court
\npassed a decree after an
\nundertaking was embodied in the
\nconsent terms clearly shows that
\nthe Court did sanction a particular
\ncourse; and that course was the
\nputting of its imprimatur  upon the
\nconsent terms.  The Court was led
\nto  pass an order upon the
\ndefendants to execute a lease in
\nview of the fact that an undertaking
\nwas given by the defendants to get
\nthe Paradise Cinema, Limited, to
\njoin the lease.”\n<\/p>\n
The view expressed by the Bombay High Court has, in
\nour opinion, been approved by this Court in Bank of Baroda
\nV. Sadruddin Hasan Daya<\/a> 2004 (1) SCC 360.   The Calcutta
\nHigh Court’s judgment to the contrary in Nisha Kanto Roy
\nChowdhury (supra) does not therefore correctly reflect the
\nlaw.\n<\/p>\n
In the face of such apparent divergence, the Sanyal
\nCommittee was set up and asked to examine the law of
\ncontempt with a view to its clarification and reforming it
\nwherever necessary.  The present statute is the outcome of
\nthose suggestions.\n<\/p>\n
The Sanyal Committee Report which preceded the
\nframing the enactment of the Act had opined:
\n“The 1952 Act is sound as far as it
\ngoes.  While its provisions may  be
\nretained, its scope requires to be
\nwidened considerably.”\n<\/p>\n
The Act has been duly widened.  It provides inter-alia for
\ndefinitions of the terms and lays down firmer bases for
\nexercise of the Court’s jurisdiction in contempt.  Section 2(b) of
\nthe Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines civil contempt  as
\nmeaning “willful disobedience to any judgment decree,
\ndirection, order, writ or other process of a Court or willful
\nbreach of an undertaking given to Court”.   Analysed, the
\ndefinition provides for two categories of cases, namely, (1)
\nwillful disobedience to a process of Court and (2) willful breach
\nof an undertaking given to Court.  As far as the first category
\nis concerned, the word “any” further indicates the wide nature
\nof the power.  No distinction is statutorily drawn between an
\norder passed after an adjudication and an order passed by
\nconsent.  This first category is separate from the second and
\ncannot be treated as forming part of or taking colour from the
\nsecond category.  The legislative intention clearly was to
\ndistinguish between the two and create distinct classes of
\ncontumacious behaviour.  Interestingly, the Courts in England
\nhave held that the breach of a consent decree of specific
\nperformance by refusal to execute the agreement is punishable
\nby way of proceedings in contempt (see C.H. Giles and
\nCompany Ltd. Vs. Morris and Ors. 1972 (1) All ER 960).
\nThe two decisions of the Calcutta and Bombay High
\nCourt are limited to the second category of cases mentioned
\nagainst Section 2(b) of the 1971 Act.  Incidentally, nether of
\nthe decisions held that a violation of breach of any other
\nterms of a consent order would not amount to contempt if it
\nwere willful.\n<\/p>\n
We proceed on the basis that no undertaking was given
\nto Court by the respondents in the consent minutes and that
\ntherefore there was no question of their violating such
\nundertaking.  The only question is, whether the respondents
\ncould be called upon to answer proceedings in contempt for
\nwillful disobedience to this Court’s orders dated 12th
\nDecember 2001 and 8th January 2002.\n<\/p>\n
\tAfter the Act came into force, in 1980 this Court was
\ncalled upon to dispose of an appeal filed under Section 19 of
\nthe Act against a decision of the Division Bench of the Delhi
\nHigh Court convicting the appellant under Section 2(b) of the
\n1971 Act and sentencing him to prison.    The case Babu
\nRam Gupta V. Sudhir Bhasin<\/a> 1980 (3) SCC 47, arose out of
\na dispute between the partners.  The partnership deed
\ncontained an arbitration clause.  An application was filed by
\none of the parties under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act.
\nPending the application, a receiver was appointed.  An appeal
\nwas preferred from this order.  A consent order was passed
\nappointing ‘X’ as the receiver.  The appellant was then in
\npossession of the property.  He did not hand over possession
\nof the property to the receiver.   An application was filed
\nalleging that the appellant had committed a serious breach of
\nthe undertaking given to the Court to hand over possession
\nto the receiver.  The High Court had so found. This Court
\nconstrued the consent order and came to the conclusion that
\nit did not contain any express direction to the appellant to
\nhand over possession of the property to the receiver  It was
\nheld that no undertaking had been given by the appellant at
\nall.  The High Court had proceeded, according to this Court,
\nerroneously by implying an undertaking from the consent
\norder itself.  In that context, this Court said:\n<\/p>\n
“There is a clear-cut distinction
\nbetween a compromise arrived at
\nbetween the parties or a consent
\norder passed by the Court at the
\ninstance of the parties and a clear
\nand categorical undertaking given
\nby any of the parties.  In the former,
\nif there is violation of the
\ncompromise or the order no
\nquestion  of contempt of court
\narises, but the party  has a right to
\nenforce the order or the compromise
\nby either executing the order or
\ngetting an injunction from the
\ncourt.”\n<\/p>\n
The Court then considered various consent orders
\nwhich could not base proceedings for contempt if the consent
\norder were violated.  Thus for example, a decree for payment
\nof money if not complied with could not found an action for
\ncontempt.  Similarly the allocation of certain property to a
\nparty by consent would not give rise to proceedings of
\ncontempt if possession of property was not given to that
\nparty.   The Court was of the view that:\n<\/p>\n
“In the absence of any express
\nundertaking given by the appellant
\nor any undertaking incorporated in
\nthe order impugned, it will be
\ndifficult to hold that the appellant
\nwillfully disobeyed or committed
\nbreach of such an
\nundertaking
\n. If we were to hold that
\nnon-compliance of a compromise
\ndecree or consent order amounts to
\ncontempt of court, the provisions of
\nthe Code of Civil Procedure relating
\nto execution of decrees may not be
\nresorted to at all.  In fact , the
\nreason why a breach of clear
\nundertaking given to the court
\namounts to contempt of court is
\nthat the contemner by making a
\nfalse representation to the court
\nobtains a benefit for himself and if
\nhe fails to honour the undertaking,
\nhe plays a serious fraud on the
\ncourt itself and thereby obstructs
\nthe course of justice and brings into
\ndisrepute the judicial institution.
\nThe same cannot, however, be said
\nof consent order or a compromise
\ndecree where the fraud, if any, is
\npracticed by the person concerned
\nnot on the court but on one of the
\nparties.  Thus, the offence
\ncommitted by the person concerned
\nis qua the party not qua the court,
\nand therefore, the very foundation
\nfor proceeding for contempt of court
\nis completely absent in such case.”\n<\/p>\n
The appeal was accordingly allowed and the order passed
\nunder Section 2(b) Act set aside.\n<\/p>\n
The question which was before the Court in Babu Ram
\nGupta’s case was limited to the issue whether the appellant
\nhad given any undertaking to the Court, either expressly or
\nimpliedly, which he had violated. In other words it was limited
\nto the second category of cases mentioned under Section 2(b)
\nof the Act.  The Court was not called upon to decide whether
\nthere was any contumacious  conduct as envisaged by the first
\ncategory of cases under that Section.  The observations made
\nin that regard, are strictly speaking, obiter.  The Court was not
\ncalled upon to consider nor did it construe the language of
\nSection 2(b) of the Act.  If we were to accept the observations of
\nthe Court as an enunciation of the law, it would run contrary
\nto the express language of the statute. As we have earlier
\nnoted, the section itself provides that willful violation of any
\norder or decree etc. would   tantamount to  contempt.  A
\ncompromise decree is as much a decree as a decree passed on
\nadjudication.  It is not as has been wrongly held by the
\nCalcutta High Court in Nisha Kanto Roy Chowdhury (supra)
\nmerely an agreement between the parties.  In passing the
\ndecree by consent, the Court adds its mandate to the consent.
\nA consent decree is composed of both a command and a
\ncontract.  The Bombay High Court’s view in Bajranglal
\nGangadhar Khemka (supra) correctly represents the law that
\na consent decree is a contract with the imprimatur of the
\nCourt.  ‘Imprimatur’ means ‘authorized’ or ‘approved’.  In other
\nwords by passing a decree in terms of a consent order the
\nCourt authorizes and approves the course of action consented
\nto.   Moreover, the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of
\nCivil Procedure requires the Court to pass a decree in
\naccordance with the consent terms only when it is proved to
\nthe satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted
\nwholly or in part by any lawful agreement
\n\tAll decrees and orders are executable under the Code of
\nCivil Procedure. Consent decrees or orders are of course also
\nexecutable. But merely because an order or decree is
\nexecutable,  would not take away the Courts jurisdiction to
\ndeal with a matter under the Act provided the Court is
\nsatisfied that the violation of the order or decree is such, that
\nif proved, it would warrant punishment under Section 13 of
\nthe Act on the ground that the contempt substantially
\ninterferes or tends substantially to interfere with the due
\ncourse of justice.  The decisions relied upon by the
\nrespondents themselves hold so as we shall subsequently see.
\n\t  In such circumstances it would neither be in consonance
\nwith the statute, judicial authority, principle or logic to draw
\nany distinction between the willful violation of the terms of a
\nconsent decree and willful violation of a decree which is
\npassed on adjudication.  The decision in Baburam Gupta’s
\ncase must, therefore, be limited to its own peculiar facts.
\nRita Markandeya Vs. Surjit Singh Arora (1996) 6 SCC
\n14, which was also been relied upon by the respondents to
\nurge that the present application for contempt was not
\nmaintainable, related to proceedings for eviction.  The
\nrespondent, who was the tenant had been directed to vacate
\nthe tenanted premises.  His appeal before this Court was
\ndismissed. While dismissing  the appeal the Court recorded:-
\n“However, as agreed to by both the
\nlearned counsel, time to hand over
\nvacant possession to Smt. Rita
\nMarkandey is granted  till
\n31.3.1995. This shall be subject to
\nthe usual undertaking to be filed by
\nthe appellant-tenant within four
\nweeks from today.”\n<\/p>\n
The respondent did not file the undertaking. He also did
\nnot vacate the tenanted premises by the agreed date.  The
\nlandlord-appellant then filed a petition alleging that the
\nrespondent had committed contempt of court by gaining time
\nfrom the Court to vacate the premises only to file an
\nundertaking and thereafter refusing to file the undertaking.
\nThe Court found, on an interpretation of  its order, that the
\ncourt had not itself passed any order fixing the time.  In terms
\nof the agreement between the parties the time had been fixed
\nand the Court had only “embodied the terms of the agreement
\nso arrived at.” Therefore, it was held that the respondent could
\nnot be held liable for contempt of that order.
\n  The respondents herein have however, relied upon the
\nfollowing passage in the judgment claiming that the same
\nsupported their contention:-\n<\/p>\n
“Law is well settled that if any party
\ngives an undertaking to the court to
\nvacate the premises from which he is
\nliable to be evicted under the orders
\nof the court and there is a clear and
\ndeliberate breach thereof it amounts
\nto civil contempt but since, in the
\npresent case, the respondent did not
\nfile any undertaking as envisaged in
\nthe order of this Court the question of
\nhis  being punished for breach
\nthereof does not arise.  However, in
\nour considered view even in case
\nwhere no such undertaking is given,
\na party to a litigation may be held
\nliable for such contempt if the court
\nis induced to sanction a particular
\ncourse of action or inaction on the
\nbasis of the representation of such a
\nparty and the court ultimately finds
\nthat the party never intended to act
\non such representation or such
\nrepresentation was false.”\n<\/p>\n
This passage is an exposition of the law relating to the
\nsecond category of cases covered by Section 2(b) of the Act.  It
\ndoes not seek to be an exposition of the law relating to the first
\ncategory of cases at all.\n<\/p>\n
The next decision relied upon by the respondents is the
\ndecision of this Court in Bank of Baroda Vs. Sadruddin
\nHasan Daya  & Anr. 2004(1) SCC 360. The petitioner in that
\ncase had filed a suit against the respondents for recovery of
\nmoney.  The suit was disposed of by consent and a decree was
\npassed incorporating the consent terms.  The consent  terms
\ninter alia, provided for payment of the decretal amount in
\ninstalments. Pending the clearance of the decretal amount the
\nrespondents undertook not to sell, mortgage, alienate,
\nencumber or charge some of its properties. Another creditor
\nalso filed the suit against the respondent for recovery of a
\ncertain amount.  This second suit was also disposed of by
\nconsent and a decree passed in terms of the consent order.
\nLike the first decree  the decreed amount was to be satisfied in
\ninstalments and pending satisfaction of the decree, the
\nrespondents undertook to the Court  not to alienate,
\nencumber, or create third  party rights or part with possession
\nof the same properties which had already formed part of the
\nundertaking in the first decree.  The respondents defaulted in
\nmaking payment of the instalments under the first decree.
\nThe petitioner put the decree into execution.  It also filed a
\ncontempt petition alleging that the second consent decree
\nviolated the undertaking given in the first decree.  The Court
\nfound that by placing the same property under attachment in
\nthe second decree the respondent had intentionally and
\ndeliberately acted in breach of the undertaking given to the
\nCourt in the first consent decree.  The Court approved the
\nstatement of the law by the Bombay High Court in Bajranglal
\nGangadhar Khemka & Anr. Vs. Kapurchand Ltd.(supra).
\nSignificantly, the Court also said:
\n“The violation or breach of the
\nundertaking which become part of
\nthe decree of the court certainly
\namounts to contempt of court,
\nirrespective of the fact that it is open
\nto the decree-holder to execute the
\ndecree.”\t\t(Emphasis added)<\/p>\n
This decision reinforces our view of the law.  It does not
\nin any way run contrary to our opinion as expressed earlier on
\nthe interpretation to be put on Section 2(b) of the Act.  On the
\nother hand the  Court repelled the submission of the
\nrespondents that the petitioners remedy lay in executing the
\ndecree  in the following words:-\n<\/p>\n
” The fact that  the petitioner can
\nexecute the decree can have no
\nbearing on the contempt committed
\nby the respondents.”\n<\/p>\n
The decision in R.N. Dey and Anr Vs. Bhagyabati
\nPramanik & Ors 2000(4) SCC 400,  also relied upon by the
\nrespondents, disposed of an appeal filed from an order
\ndirecting the appellants to deposit certain amounts of money
\ntowards compensation money payable in respect of land
\nacquisition proceedings.  The directions were given while
\ndisposing of contempt proceedings initiated by the respondent
\nafter the Court had accepted the unqualified apology tendered
\nby the appellants.  The appellants urged that instead of filing a
\ncontempt application, the respondent should have proceeded
\nwith the execution of the decree or award made in the land
\nacquisition proceedings.  The Court said that:-
\n” the weapon of contempt is not to
\nbe used in abundance or misused.\n<\/p>\n
Normally, it cannot be used for
\nexecution of the decree or
\nimplementation of an order for
\nwhich alternative remedy in law is
\nprovided for.  Discretion given to the
\ncourt is to be exercised for
\nmaintenance of the court’s dignity
\nand majesty of law.”\n<\/p>\n
Furthermore, it has also said that:-
\n” the decree-holder, who does not
\ntake  steps to execute the decree in
\naccordance with the procedure
\nprescribed by law, should not be
\nencouraged to invoke contempt
\njurisdiction of the court for non-\n<\/p>\n
satisfaction of the money decree.”\n<\/p>\n
Having regard to the facts of the case the Court felt that
\nthe contempt proceedings should not have been resorted to
\nand that in any case since the unconditional apology has been
\ntendered  and accepted by the appellant further proceedings
\nshould have been dropped.\n<\/p>\n
As we read the decision, its ratio runs counter to the
\nsubmission of the respondents, namely, that the contempt
\nwould not lie if the decree or order is executable.  Ultimately,
\nthe matter is one of the Court’s discretion having regard to the
\nfacts of the case.  As we have said the fact that a decree is
\nexecutable does not take away the Court’s jurisdiction in
\ncontempt.\n<\/p>\n
In the present case, the consent terms arrived at between
\nthe parties was incorporated in the orders passed by the Court
\non 12th December 2001 and 8th January 2002.  The decree as
\ndrawn up shows that order dated 8th January, 2002 was to be
\n“punctually observed and carried into execution by all
\nconcerned”.   A violation of the terms of the consent order
\nwould amount to a violation of the Court’s orders dated 12th
\nDecember 2001 and 8th January 2002 and, therefore be
\npunishable under the first limb of Section 2(b) of the Contempt
\nof Courts Act, 1971. The question whether the respondents
\nshould not be held guilty of contempt because of any earlier
\nconfusion in the law reflected in the case of Babu Ram Gupta
\n(supra), is a question which must be left for decision while
\ndisposing  of the contempt petition on merits.  It may be
\nargued as an extenuating or mitigating factor once the
\nrespondents are held guilty  of contempt.  The submission
\ndoes not pertain to the maintainability of the petition for
\ncontempt.  The preliminary objection raised by the
\nrespondents regarding the non-maintainability of the petition
\nfor contempt is, for the reasons stated, dismissed.
\nThe issue as to whether the respondents have in fact
\nacted in violation of the terms of the consent order will now
\nhave to be decided on merits.  Let the matter be listed for this
\npurpose.  Costs of this petition will be costs in the  contempt
\npetition.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Rama Narang vs Ramesh Narang & Anr on 12 April, 2006 Author: R Pal Bench: Ruma Pal, B.N. Srikrishna, Dalveer Bhandari CASE NO.: Contempt Petition (civil) 148 of 2003 PETITIONER: Rama Narang RESPONDENT: Ramesh Narang & Anr DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12\/04\/2006 BENCH: Ruma Pal, B.N. Srikrishna & Dalveer Bhandari JUDGMENT: J […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-9736","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nRama Narang vs Ramesh Narang & Anr on 12 April, 2006 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/rama-narang-vs-ramesh-narang-anr-on-12-april-2006\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Rama Narang vs Ramesh Narang & Anr on 12 April, 2006 - 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