In a very significant development, we need to note that the Delhi High Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Ajit Kumar Gola Vs State (GNCTD) And Anr in CRL.M.C. 1913/2024 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2026:DHC:2829 that was reserved on 13.03.2026 and then finally pronounced and uploaded on 04.04.2026 has minced absolutely just no words to hold in no uncertain terms that an advocate or a self-represented litigant cannot justify an inordinate delay in filing an appeal by claiming a failure to understand a court order. It must be certainly laid bare for the exclusive indulgence of my esteemed readers that the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Dr Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma who authored this enlightening judgment was dealing with a plea that had been moved by a petitioner-in-person who is also a practicing advocate challenging a Sessions Court order after a delay of one year. It must be noted that the petitioner had argued that he faced a difficulty in understanding the Sessions Court order and therefore took a detailed legal research to comprehend its implications before approaching the High Court. But the Delhi High Court found this explanation “not satisfactory” for condoning the delay, considering that the petitioner himself was a lawyer. We thus see that the Delhi High Court dismissed the advocate’s application seeking condonation of delay in filing the petition. Consequently, the Delhi High Court also rejected the plea that had challenged the Sessions Court order. Very rightly so!
CRL.M.A. 17529/2024 (condonation of delay)
At the very outset, this remarkable, robust, rational and recent judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Dr Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The above-captioned petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [hereafter ‘Cr.P.C.’] has been filed by the petitioner seeking setting aside of the order dated 19.01.2023 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, North, Rohini Courts, Delhi [hereafter ‘Sessions Court’] in Cr. Rev. No.137/2019 titled ‘Retd. SI Rampal Singh & Ors. vs. State & Ors.’. By way of the said order, the learned Sessions Court had discharged the accused no. 1 in the case, and quashed the summoning order dated 23.04.2019 passed qua him.”
As we see, the Bench then discloses in para 2 that, “However, the present application has been filed seeking condonation of delay of 412 days in filing the present petition.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 3 while elaborating on the factual background stating succinctly that, “On the issue of condonation of delay, the petitioner, who appeared and argued in person before this Court, contended that the delay in filing the present petition is neither intentional nor deliberate. It was argued that though the impugned order is dated 19.01.2023, the delay in the present case is in fact not 412 days, as stated in the application, but approximately 316 days. He further submitted that the impugned order had been passed in a revision petition and, as per his understanding, there is no prescribed period of limitation for filing a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. against an order passed by the learned Sessions Court. It was thus contended that technically there is no delay in filing the present petition and that the application seeking condonation of delay has been filed only by way of abundant caution so as to avoid any technical objection regarding limitation. It was further submitted that even if the limitation applicable to a revision petition is taken to be 60 days, the delay would be about 346 days, and if it is taken to be 90 days, the delay would be about 316 days. The petitioner further submitted that, being a practising advocate, he initially faced difficulty in properly understanding the impugned order and therefore had to undertake detailed legal research in order to comprehend the implications of the order passed by the learned Sessions Court before approaching this Court. It was contended that the time taken in understanding the impugned order and researching the relevant legal position resulted in the delay in filing the present petition. It was also argued that it is a settled principle of law that matters should ordinarily be decided on merits rather than on technical grounds such as limitation, particularly when the petition raises substantial issues regarding the legality and correctness of the impugned order. It is therefore prayed that the delay, if any, be condoned in the interest of justice and the petition be heard on merits.”
As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 6 that, “The issue which arises for consideration is whether the delay in filing the present petition deserves to be condoned so as to permit the petitioner to assail the impugned order dated 19.01.2023 on merits.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 11 that, “It is a settled principle of law that while considering an application for condonation of delay, the party seeking such indulgence is required to place before the Court a cogent and satisfactory explanation covering the entire period of delay, preferably explaining the delay day-to-day or at least stage-wise. In the present case, the petitioner has failed to provide any such explanation.”
Do also note, the Bench then notes in para 12 that, “The present application filed by the petitioner is conspicuously silent with respect to the steps taken by the petitioner during the long intervening period of more than one year after the passing of the impugned order. There is no disclosure of any specific dates, events, or circumstances explaining the cause of delay and as to why the petitioner could not approach this Court within a reasonable time.”
Frankly speaking, the Bench then observes in para 14 that, “Even otherwise, legal research or consultation with other lawyers, even by a practising lawyer is a routine exercise undertaken by a self represented litigant and advocates alike, in case, one is not able to understand the order passed by a trial Court which is to be challenged in a higher Court. Not being able to understand a judicial order by a self represented litigant, who wants to challenge the order before a higher Court or by a counsel who may receive a brief on behalf of a client cannot be treated as a ground to justify an inordinate delay in availing the remedy.”
Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 16 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “Moreover, the plea that the petitioner believed that there was no limitation period for filing a petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. also cannot come to his aid. While it is true that there is no specific prescribed period of limitation for filing a petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. challenging an order, it is well settled that such a petition must nevertheless be filed within a reasonable period of time and must not suffer from undue delay and laches and must disclose sufficient cause for the delay caused.”
Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 20 that, “In the present case, this Court is unable to accept the explanation put forth by the petitioner to pass the test of ‘constituting sufficient cause’ for passing of an order to condone the delay of more than a year in filing the present petition.”
Most forthrightly, the Bench then propounds in para 21 holding that, “To reiterate, the contention of the petitioner that he is a practising advocate and that he required considerable time to understand the impugned order and undertake legal research cannot, by itself, justify a delay of more than one year in approaching this Court. If such a ground were to be accepted as a sufficient explanation, it would render the law of limitation and the principles of delay and laches, largely otiose, and would make it extremely difficult for any Court to reject an application for condonation of delay under the law of limitation or cases where no limitation is prescribed.”
As a corollary, the Bench then directs and holds in para 22 that, “In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner has failed to show any sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the present petition. The explanation offered does not satisfactorily account for the prolonged delay in filing the petition.”
It is worth noting that the Bench then directs and holds in para 23 that, “Accordingly, the present application seeking condonation of delay is dismissed.”
Adding more to it, the Bench then further directs and holds in para 24 that, “Consequently, the captioned petition filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., i.e. CRL.M.C. 1913/2024, being barred by delay and laches, is also dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by directing and holding in para 25 that, “The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.”
In summation, there can be just no gainsaying that the Delhi High Court has made it indubitably clear in this brilliant judgment that lawyer cannot justify delay in filing appeal saying he could not understand lower court order. We thus see that the plea of the lawyer for according delay in filing the appeal on ground of not being able to comprehend lower court order was rejected outrightly by the Delhi High Court. No denying!
Sanjeev Sirohi