It would certainly be quite crucial to note that in a major development with far reaching implications, the Chhattisgarh High Court at Bilaspur in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Union of India (Through NIA) vs Dinesh Tati in CRA No. 551 of 2025 and also cited in Neutral Citation. No. : 2025:CGHC:29710-DB that was pronounced just recently on July 2, 2025 has minced absolutely just no words to rule in no uncertain terms that Trial Courts have the authority to grant pardon to an accomplice in order to secure truthful testimony, even if the person is not in custody, under Section 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) (now Section 344 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). We thus see that the High Court set aside an order of the NIA Special Court, Jagdalpur which had rejected the National Investigation Agency’s application seeking to tender pardon to a surrendered Naxalite in a case that pertained to terror-related offences. It must be also noted that the Division Bench of Chhattisgarh High Court comprising of Hon’ble Shri Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Hon’ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru had delivered this most commendable judgment on an appeal that had been filed by the Union of India through the NIA (CRA No. 551 of 2025), challenging the NIA Court’s order dated February 7, 2025.
At the very outset, this refreshing, remarkable, rational and recent judgment authored by Hon’ble Shri Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha for a Division Bench of the Chhattisgarh High Court at Bilaspur comprising of himself and Hon’ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 2 that, “As per the office report dated 21.04.2025, it transpires that the notice has been served to the respondent on 29.03.2025 and the matter has been taken up today, but on behalf of the respondent, no counsel is present to contest the present appeal filed by the Union of India, hence Court proceeds to hear the matter.”
As we see, the Division Bench while laying bare the purpose of the appeal spells out in para 3 stating that, “The appeal is preferred by the appellant against the order dated 07.02.2025, passed by the learned NIA Special Court, Jagdalpur refusing the application filed under Section 306(1) of Cr.P.C. (343 of the BNSS) for grant of permissions to tender pardon to one of the accused persons-cum-surrendered naxal.”
To put things in perspective, the Division Bench while elaborating briefly on the facts of the case envisages in para 4 observing succinctly that, “Brief facts of the case are that a crime was registered on 16/06/2023 by the Kotwali Police Station, District Bijapur having Crime No. 68/2023 under Section 8(1)(3) (5) of Chhattisgarh Special Public Security Act 2005.The allegations inscribed therein in the report in brief are that the Kotwali Police had arrested one person, Dinesh Tati, Son of Masa Tati, resident of Palnar, PS-Gangalur, District-Bijapur, Chhattisgarh. During a personal search, a black colour bag containing Rs. Ten Lakh (Rs. 2000×500) notes was found to be kept in yellow polythene cover, one pass book, 80 naxal pamphlets, and some medicines which were seized. Upon examination of the said accused Dinesh Tati, he revealed that he had received the said amount of Rs. Ten Lakhs from a Surrendered Naxal (named ‘A’ as mentioned by the Hon’ble Court of Special Judge, Jagdalpur), Shanti Hemla (Area Committee Member), Pandru Pottam (Area Commander in Chief), all belonging to proscribed terrorist organization CPI (Maoist). Further the above accused persons told Dinesh Tati to purchase a tractor out of this money from John Deer Tractor at showroom Majiguda, Bijapur, Chhattisgarh and while returning he was directed to go to Kandulanar and hand over the 80 Naxal pamphlets to Venkat @ Vishwanath, Bhopalpatnam Local Organization Squad Commander of Madded Area Committee. Subsequent to that later on, during the course of investigation by the state police Sec 10, 13 (1)(2), 39,40 of UA(P) Act 1967 were also invoked.
The Central Government had received information regarding registration of F.I.R. No.68/2023 dated 16/06/2023 at Kotwali Police Station, District Bijapur. Subsequent to the above turn of events, the Central Government was of the view that Scheduled Offence under the NIA Act, 2008 has been committed and giving full regard to the gravity of the offences and security ramifications, it was found to be necessary that the offence need to be investigated by the National Investigation Agency in accordance with the provisions of NIA Act 2008. In pursuance of the opinion formed thus by Central Government, an order was issued exercising power under Section 6(4)(5) read with Section 8 of NIA Act 2008 on 27/03/2024 to take over the matter.
In furtherance to the above order of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, (CTCR Division), New Delhi Order no 11011/35/2024/NIA dated 04/03/2024 and 27/03/2024, the NIA has reregistered the said F.I.R. as RC No.- 17/2024/NIA/RPR on 04/04/2024.
The appellant is a Central Government Agency established by the Indian Government at the National level to investigate and prosecute offences affecting the sovereignty, security, integrity as well as economic security of the country. It has been established after the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks as need for a Central Agency to combat terrorism was found essential in the interest of National security and integrity of the country.
Thereafter, Appellant-NIA started the investigation pertaining to the serious offence committed by the accused persons and during the course of investigation, an application was filed by the Agency before the learned trial Court under section 343 BNSS (306 Cr.P.C.) for tendering pardon to a person who had close acquaintance with the facts and circumstances of the present case.
Upon hearing the application filed by the Appellant, the learned trial Court rejected the application stating that the provision provided under Section 306 (4)(b) CrPC (New law 343 of BNSS) has the applicability in the present case and the condition provided therein under the said provisions of law has not been complied with and on this basis the application filed by the appellant was rejected. Hence this appeal.”
It is worth noting that Division Bench notes in para 14 that, “From perusal of the order dated 07.02.2025 passed by the NIA Special Court, it transpires that the application of the appellant has been rejected relying upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 329/1992 Suresh Chandra Bahari vs. State of Bihar and Others, Criminal Appeal No. 159/2022 and Criminal Appeal 159/1992 and other Criminal Appeal 160/1992 and holding that in the context of the opinion mentioned in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court above and sub-clause (b) of sub-section 4 of Section 306 Cr.P.C., for pardon of the co-accused, it is also a necessary condition that unless that person is already on bail, he will be kept in custody till the conclusion of the trial. Whereas in this case, the accused surrendered Naxalite “A” mentioned in the application in respect of whom pardon is sought is neither already on bail nor has he been arrested nor is he in custody. Therefore, in the context of sub-clause ‘b’ of sub-section 4 of section 306 Cr.P.C. and the opinion of the trial Court in the above mentioned judicial precedent, the necessary condition of sub-clause ‘b’ of subsection 4 of section 306 Cr.P.C. is not fulfilled in respect of the person mentioned in the application submitted by the prosecution.”
It would be instructive to note that the Division Bench points out in para 15 that, “The surmise, which guided, the learned NIA Court to reject the application, is that application in respect of whom pardon is sought is neither already on bail nor has he been arrested nor is he in custody, is contrary to the statutory scheme of Section 306 of the Cr.P.C. The power to tender pardon upon fulfillment of certain conditions has its own consequences to flow. Merely because, grant of pardon would result in certain legal consequences to flow, as has been provided under Section 306 of the Cr.P.C., the application for grant of pardon could not have been rejected.”
Be it noted, the Division Bench while citing the relevant case law specifies in para 16 stating that, “In the case of Chandran vs. State of Kerala (2011) 5 SCC 161, the Supreme Court had an occasion to appreciate the evidence of a person, who had not been put on trial, but could have been tried jointly with the accused and found his evidence reliable in view of the law laid down by that Court in Laxmipat Choraria vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 938.
Considering the legal position as discussed in the case of Chandran and Laxmipat Choraria (supra), the Supreme Court in the case of Prithipal Singh (supra) summarized the law, on the point, as below:-
“43. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that the deposition of an accomplice in a crime who has not been made an accused/put to trial, can be relied upon, however, the evidence is required to be considered with care and caution. An accomplice who has not been put on trial is a competent witness as he deposes in the court after taking oath and there is no prohibition in any law not to act upon his deposition without corroboration.”
Most significantly and as a corollary, the Division Bench encapsulates in para 17 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “The aforesaid discussion, leads to irresistible conclusion that without scrutinizing the statements and materials placed before it and without considering the fact that it has power vested under Section 344 of the BNSS (Section 307 of the Cr.P.C.) to consider the application of the appellant for pardon, the learned NIA Court, mechanically rejected the application of the appellant, which is perse illegal. Hence, the impugned order is set aside.”
Equally significant is what is then pointed out in para 18 holding that, “The matter is remanded back to the NIA Special Court for reconsideration of the appellant’s application afresh, in the light of the provisions under Section 344 of the BNSS (Section 307 of the Cr.P.C.) and the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of State (Through National Investigation Agency) vs. Hidma and Others passed in CRA No. 754/2020.”
Finally and resultantly, the Division Bench then concludes by directing and holding in para 19 that, “In the result, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.”
All told, the sum and substance of this notable judgment by the Chhattisgarh High Court is that the court can grant pardon to accomplice for truthful testimony under Section 307 CrPC/344 BNSS. We thus see that while allowing the appeal filed by the appellant, the Chhattisgarh High Court explicitly held that the rejection of the application by the NIA Court was “per se illegal” and was passed without proper scrutiny of material facts and legal provisions. We thus see that the impugned order was accordingly thus set aside by the Chhattisgarh High Court. No denying or disputing it!
Sanjeev Sirohi
