While taking a most pragmatic step in the right direction firmly abiding by what is enshrined in law of evidence, the Delhi High Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled McDonalds India Ltd vs State of NCT of Delhi in W.P.(CRL) 2294/2017, CRL.M.A. 12975/2017, CRL.M.A. 13878/2017 that was reserved on 02.12.2025 and then finally pronounced on 12.01.2026 has minced absolutely just no words to hold unambiguously that the courts cannot compel advocates representing a party to disclose the source of documents filed on behalf of their client. It must be mentioned here that the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Ms Justice Neena Bansal Krishna who has authored this robust judgment minced absolutely just no words to hold in no uncertain terms that passing such a direction would violate Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) which establishes the attorney-client privilege. It was also made absolutely clear by the Bench that the primary responsibility for documents filed in courts lies with the party and when a client hands over a document to their lawyer for legal defence, the act of handing over and the information about the origin of the document is part of the professional confidentiality.
No doubt, the Bench conceded that while the Court can ask for the truth but it was also made plainly clear that it cannot compel a lawyer to disclose what the law so expressly protects. But in the same vein, we must also note that the Bench also hastened to add that for Section 126 Indian Evidence Act proviso to kick in, there must be prima facie material to suggest that the communication itself was for an illegal purpose. No denying it.
It must be laid bare that the Bench held so as it set aside a Sessions Court order that had directed lawyers representing fast-food giant McDonald’s to disclose how certain documents came into their possession. The Sessions Court had asked the lawyers to file affidavits stating the date, time and source of applications from 2011 that were relied upon during revision proceedings. The directions followed allegations by the complainant that the documents were illegally obtained or surreptitiously placed on record. After perusing the case and the material on record, the Delhi High Court deemed it fit to quash the order.
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Ms Justice Neena Bansal Krishna sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The present Petition has been preferred under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C), by the Petitioner Company, McDonalds India Pvt. Ltd. to quash and set aside the Impugned Order dated 20.05.2017 directing the Advocate for Petitioner to disclose the source of documents filed in the proceedings before the Ld. Additional Sessions Judge, as well as all proceedings consequential thereto, including the Order dated 22.07.2017 issuing Notice to the Advocates in the proceedings.”
As we see, the Bench then stipulates in para 2 observing that, “The central issue arising for consideration in this Petition is whether a Revisional Court, while exercising jurisdiction, can compel the Advocates representing a party, to file personal affidavits disclosing the “source” of documents placed on the judicial record.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 3 stating that, “The brief facts of the case are that a Criminal Complaint, C.C. No.473636/2016 titled Deepak Khosla v. Connaught Plaza Restaurants (P) Ltd., was filed by Respondent No. 2/Complainant against the Petitioner Company and others for offences under Ss. 409, 420, 423, 463, 465, 467, 468, 471, 474, 477-A/34 /120-B IPC, read with Ss. 191, 192,196, 201,202 Indian Penal Code. Application was filed by the Complainant under Sections 91 and 94 of the Cr.P.C, directing search and seizure at the premises of the Petitioner and others, which was allowed by Ld. ACMM vide Order dated 20.02.2017.”
As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 4 that, “The Petitioner Company challenged this Order by filing a Criminal Revision Petition No. 83/2017 before the Court of the Ld. Additional Sessions Judge (ASJ). During these proceedings, the Petitioner filed copy of two Applications originally filed by the Complainant in 2011 in a different forum/proceeding, to demonstrate the lack of urgency or basis for the search warrants. On 04.03.2017, the Ld. ASJ granted an ex-parte stay on the operation of the search and seizure directions.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 5 that, “Respondent No. 2/Complainant filed an Application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. before the Ld. ASJ, alleging that the said 2011 Applications were not part of the Trial Court record at the time of the hearing on 04.03.2017. Respondent No. 2 alleged that these documents were surreptitiously placed on record or obtained through illegal means, potentially leaked from police or Court records, amounting to fraud and perjury.”
Do also note, the Bench then notes in para 6 that, “The Ld. ASJ, while considering the Applications under Section 340 Cr.P.C and Section 121 Indian Evidence Act, Vide the Impugned Order dated 20.05.2017 directed the Advocates for the Petitioner Company to file their respective personal Affidavits disclosing the date and time when the typed copies of the Applications were filed/placed on record and the “source” of the contents of the said Applications. Aggrieved by this direction, the Petitioner Company has filed the present Court.”
While citing the relevant case law, the Bench mentions in para 19 that, “The rationale, as observed by the House of Lords in Three Rivers DC v. Bank of England and accepted by Indian Courts, is that a man must be able to consult his lawyer in confidence, and this confidence must be inviolable to ensure the proper administration of justice.”
While citing yet another relevant case law, the Bench states in para 20 that, “In Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Satyen Bhowmick (1981) 2 SCC 109, the Supreme Court held that where contents of a document are privileged, no action can be taken against counsel for refusing to disclose the same.”
Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 21 that, “However, this privilege is not absolute. The Proviso to Section 126 carves an exception to the communications made in furtherance of any illegal purpose in respect of any fact showing that any crime or fraud has been committed since the commencement of employment.”
Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 22 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “When a client hands over a document to their Advocate for the purpose of legal defense, the act of handing over and the information regarding the origin of that document, is part of the professional confidentiality. The primary responsibility for the documents filed in Court lies with the Party i.e. the Client. To compel an advocate to disclose that “Client X gave me this document”, is to compel the disclosure of the “source” of the documents is protected by Section 126 IEA. Such documents filed by the Counsel are at the behest of the client and for and on his behalf. By directing disclosure by the Advocate of the Petitioner to file the Affidavit regarding the proceedings in the Court, the Ld. ASJ has compelled the advocates to breach their professional duty, which falls squarely within the ambit of “communication made to him in the course and for the purpose of his employment” and is protected by the Client-Advocate privilege under S.126 IEA.”
Equally significant is what the Bench points out in para 23 that, “The Respondent No. 2’s contention that there is “no privilege against the Court” is a misapplication of the principle. While the Court can ask for the truth, it cannot compel a lawyer to disclose what the law expressly protects, absent a clear finding that the lawyer is conspiring in a fraud committed during the employment.”
No less significant is what the Bench then specifies in para 24 observing that, “Respondent No. 2 relies heavily on the Proviso, alleging that the possession of the documents serves an illegal purpose or is evidence of a crime like theft of court records. However, for the Proviso to apply, there must be prima facie material to suggest that the communication itself was for an illegal purpose, which is not so. These documents were filed to demonstrate that there was no urgency to stay the impugned Order of Search and Seizure.”
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 25 that, “While a Court has the power to inquire into offences affecting the administration of justice, such an inquiry must be conducted within judicial contours. In the present case, the Petitioner has explained that the copies of 2011 Applications were served upon them in 2013, during proceedings before the Company Law Board in CP No. 110/2013, thereby demolishing the allegation of theft or illegal procurement, made by the Respondent No. 2.”
As a corollary and most rationally, the Bench propounds in para 26 holding that, “In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is held that the Impugned Order dated 20.05.2017 fails to appreciate that the information sought is covered by the privilege between the client and the advocate. The exception of fraud was not prima facie established to warrant piercing this privilege, especially when a plausible explanation of service in CLB proceedings was available on record.”
Resultantly, the Bench then directs and holds in para 27 that, “The Impugned Order dated 20.05.2017, insofar as it directs the Advocates for the Petitioner to file personal affidavits disclosing the source of the documents, and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom including the Order dated 22.07.2017 issuing notice for contempt/non-compliance against the counsels, is quashed.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by directing and holding in para 28 that, “The Petition is allowed accordingly and the pending Applications, if any, are disposed of.”
Sanjeev Sirohi