It is entirely in order and so also in the fitness of things that while striking the right chord, the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled State of UP & Anr vs Mohd Arshad Khan & Anr in Criminal Appeal No. 5610 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 17272 of 2025) With Ors in Neutral Citation No.: 2025 INSC 1480 that was pronounced most recently on December 19, 2025 in the exercise of its criminal appellate jurisdiction has minced absolutely just no words to hold in no uncertain terms that courts must refrain from ordering time-bound investigations in criminal cases unless the material on record demonstrates undue delay or stagnation. It must be noted that a Bench of Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjay Karol and Hon’ble Mr Justice NK Singh underscored that the courts have consistently recognized that directing a time-bound investigation must remain the exception rather than the norm. Thus, it called for allowing investigating agencies a reasonable degree of latitude. Very rightly so!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjay Karol for a Bench of the Apex Court comprising of himself and Hon’ble Mr Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 2 that, “The State of Uttar Pradesh is in appeal against the judgments and orders passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in petitions for quashing preferred by accused persons in connection with common FIR dated 24th May 2025 in Case Crime No. 33 of 2025 registered at Police Station, Nai Ki Mandi, District Agra under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Hereinafter, referred to as ‘IPC’) and Sections 3/25/30 of the Arms Act 1959. Before us in Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No.17272 of 2025, is Mohd. Arshad Khan (Impugned Judgment in Criminal Misc Writ Petition No. 12162 of 2025) , in Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 17579 of 2025 is Sanjay @Sanjay Kapoor (Impugned Judgment in Criminal Misc Writ Petition No. 12526 of 2025) and in Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No.18150 of 2025 is Muhammad Zaid Khan (Impugned Judgment in Criminal Misc Writ Petition No. 12173 of 2025). They shall be collectively referred to as the accused-respondents.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench while elaborating on the facts of the case envisages in para 3 that, “The case arises from an investigation directed by the Senior Superintendent of Police, STF Headquarters, Lucknow, pursuant to an anonymous petition which, during inquiry, culminated in a statutory complaint dated 31st July 2024. The complaint alleged that certain persons had procured and used arms licenses by submitting forged documents and false affidavits. Acting on these directions, the STF conducted an inquiry on the basis of documentary records, reports submitted by the Additional District Magistrate (City), Arms Section, Agra, statements of complainants and accused persons, and scrutiny of licence files and related documents. The investigation found serious irregularities and in terms of report dated 31st January 2025, it was recommended that a criminal case be registered and further investigation be conducted hereinto. The FIR subject matter of these cases, thus came to be registered. Below is an encapsulation of the content of the FIR regarding the three accused-respondents before us.
With respect to Zaid Khan, son of Sher Khan, it was found during the investigation that arms licence number 1227/03 had been obtained by submitting forged documents and false affidavits. In the licence records, his date of birth was shown as 25th November 1975, whereas his actual date of birth was found to be 25th November 1972. This discrepancy was detected on the basis of documentary evidence examined during the inquiry, and it is alleged that the arms licence was issued on the strength of these false particulars.
In relation to Arshad Khan, son of Ahmed Ali, the investigation revealed that he procured five arms licences bearing numbers 6365, 6491, 6415, 6316 and 6248 – all Tajganj, by using forged PAN card, Aadhaar card and driving licence. In these documents, his date of birth was shown as 15th January 1985, whereas official records indicate his year of birth as 1988. Prior to the issuance of the licences in the year 2006, his date of birth in the records was 15th January 1988. It is alleged that the alteration in the date of birth was made deliberately to show a lower age, with the object of presenting himself as a skilled marksman, obtaining undue benefits, and enabling the import of arms and ammunition from abroad on the basis of multiple arms licences. During the investigation, despite repeated notices, he did not furnish purchase invoices, import documents or passport details and did not cooperate fully with the inquiry. It is further alleged that the arms licences were obtained by knowingly using forged documents.
As regards Sanjay Kapoor, who was serving at the relevant time as Arms Clerk in the office of the Additional District Magistrate, Agra, and who has since retired under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, the investigation prima facie found that he, along with the concerned arms licence holders, was involved in acts relating to forgery, concealment of material facts and submission of false affidavits in connection with the processing and issuance of arms licences.”
Most rationally, the Bench points out in para 9 that, “In exercise of these wide-ranging powers – was it justified to direct time bound completion of investigation? The investigation of an offence is a long, winding road. It is full of ups and downs and is not, possibly, even for a moment, predictable in the true sense. There can be delays in the investigation, witnesses who at one point in time appeared confident, may begin to hesitate or completely resile from their statement, documentary evidence on which much hope was pinned, may turn out to be unusable or so many other such possibilities may occur. Legal proceedings frequently intersect with the investigation and affect its pace and direction. Applications for anticipatory bail, regular bail, or the like can result in temporary pauses or changes in strategy. Courts may call for further investigation, ask for clarification on specific aspects or even direct a change of the investigating officer. Each such intervention requires the investigating agency to revisit its work and sometimes take a fresh path altogether. So, it can be seen that the investigative process is at times straight, at other times one of lots of twists, turn and recalibrations and in yet others, frustratingly round-about like, before it can come to a somewhat definitive conclusion to present the case for trial before the concerned, and sometimes, even at that time the definitive conclusion, at least from an investigator’s standpoint, remains elusive.
While all this may undoubtedly be true, it is also unquestionably so that it cannot be an excuse for avoidable delay. Speedy trial, which necessarily includes timely and diligent investigation, has been recognized as an integral part of Article 21 of the Constitution and is essential to the fairness and credibility of the criminal justice system. Undue delay prejudices not only the accused, whose liberty and reputation remain under a cloud, but also the victim and society at large, for whom justice loses meaning when it is endlessly deferred. The challenge, therefore, lies in balancing the practical realities of investigation with the constitutional mandate that criminal proceedings, from investigation through trial, be conducted with reasonable promptitude and care. It is this balancing role that the judiciary plays. It is for those reasons that while on the one hand there is a statutorily laid down process in place which is generally followed, powers such as that of Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Hereinafter, referred to as ‘CrPC’) have been kept open in their widest sense possible- to secure the ends of justice.”
Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 10 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “Courts have consistently recognized that directing a time-bound investigation must remain the exception rather than the norm. Investigation is, as can be seen from the above discussion, a product of many factors and happenings apart from the crime itself, that lend to it a sense of uncertainty and the law therefore accords investigating agencies a reasonable degree of latitude. At the same time, the Constitution does not permit investigations to remain open-ended. The Supreme Court has long held that the right to a speedy trial, which necessarily includes a timely and diligent investigation, forms an essential part of Article 21, as first recognized by a Constitution Bench in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81, and later elaborated by another Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225. It is in this constitutional setting that courts have, in appropriate cases, intervened where delay itself begins to cause prejudice. Where there is evident stagnation, unexplained inaction, or a pattern of delay that cannot be justified by the nature or complexity of the case, judicial directions fixing timelines have been considered warranted. In Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226, the Court emphasized the need for prompt and effective investigation, particularly where delay risks allowing serious matters to drift without resolution. More recently, in Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State of Bihar 2025 INSC 1339, the Court reaffirmed that investigations cannot be allowed to continue endlessly, and that prolonged and unexplained delay between the registration of an FIR and the filing of a chargesheet may itself infringe Article 21, especially where such delay keeps an individual under a continuing cloud of suspicion without meaningful progress. Courts have also been mindful of the impact of prolonged investigation on personal liberty, particularly where coercive measures or extended custody are involved. In such cases, fixing timelines is viewed not as an intrusion into the investigative domain, but as a safeguard against inertia and arbitrariness. At the same time, the Supreme Court has cautioned against routine or mechanical directions for time-bound investigation, reiterating in Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja (2003) 6 SCC 195, that the manner and pace of investigation ordinarily lie within the investigator’s domain. What emerges, therefore, is a balanced approach: courts respect the practical realities of investigation, yet intervene where delay itself threatens fairness, liberty, or the integrity of the criminal justice process.”
Equally significant is what is then propounded in para 11 holding clearly that, “The necessary conclusion to be drawn from the above discussion is that timelines are not drawn by the Court to be followed by the investigators/the executive right from the beginning, for that would clearly amount to stepping on the toes of the latter. Timelines are therefore imposed at a point where not doing so would have adverse consequences i.e., there is material on record demonstrating undue delays, stagnation, or the like. In sum, timelines are imposed reactively and not prophylactically. As such, the timelines imposed by the High Court need to be interfered with and set aside. Ordered accordingly.”
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 12 that, “The next aspect is the protection from arrest till the taking of cognizance by the concerned Court. On this count too, we are of the considered view that the High Court fell into error. The reason why the Court may have been justified in doing so in the factual context of Shobhit Nehra (supra) is that inter alia the criminal action therein, had the pretext of a long-standing civil dispute along with familial animosity. The dispute in that case has already made its way up to this Court way back in 1998, and even today proceedings of one nature or another are on the docket of at least two courts. Given that background, arrest on the basis of FIR simpliciter, arguendo, may have had an impact on Article 21 rights of the accused therein. How the directions issued therein apply to the instant facts is unclear, for the impugned orders do not discuss the same.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding and directing aptly in para 17 that, “The State’s Appeals are allowed. Interim protection in favour of the respondents herein shall continue to operate for the next two weeks, after which, all actions as permissible in law will follow. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.”
Sanjeev Sirohi