It is most deeply worrying to note that while expressing its grave concerns on the gross misuse of technology to commit cyberbullying against children who are most vulnerable and fall an easy prey to such crimes , none other than the Delhi High Court itself in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Rajesh Gambhir vs State GNCT of Delhi and Anr. in CRL.A. 141/2025, CRL.M.(BAIL) 243/2025 & CRL.M.(BAIL) 965/2025 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025:DHC:6131 that was pronounced as recently as on 28.7.2025 has minced absolutely just no words to hold in no uncertain terms that cyberbullying, though faceless and silent, can be as mentally traumatic and scarring as physical violence, especially when directed at children. It must be noted that the Delhi High Court held so while most commendably upholding the conviction of a man who had dared to sent morphed nude images and threatening messages to a minor girl who was studying in Class 9. There definitely must be zero tolerance for such heinous crimes! What also must be noticed is that the Delhi High Court thus rejected his appeal against a five-year sentence, describing the case as a “textbook example of cyberbullying”.
It merits just no reiteration that the Delhi High Court also very rightly underscored the dire need to protect children in digital spaces from cyberbullying. No denying it! The Delhi High Court also most commendably observed that the plea for leniency on behalf of the appellant stands on a fragile footing and the law must send a clear message that crimes committed in cyberspace against children are taken with utmost seriousness and will attract consequences that reflect the gravity of the impact on the victim. We thus see that the Delhi High Court thus dismissed the appeal of the appellant and also upheld his conviction! Very rightly so!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Dr Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma of the Delhi High Court whose each and every stellar judgment deserves to be read in its entirety sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The appellant has preferred the present appeal to assail the judgment dated 26.03.2024 and the order on sentence dated 02.12.2024 [hereafter ‘impugned judgment and order’], passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-01, POCSO, North-West, Rohini Courts, Delhi [hereafter ‘Trial Court‘] in SC No. 53654/16. The said case arose out of FIR No. 456/2016, registered on 23.09.2016 at Police Station Ashok Vihar, Delhi, for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 354A, 354D, 509 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [hereafter ‘IPC’] and Sections 67 and 67A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 [hereafter ‘IT Act’].”
As we see, the Bench then lays bare in para 2 disclosing that, “By way of the impugned judgment, the appellant was convicted for offences under Sections 354A(iii), 354D, 509, and 506 of the IPC; Sections 67 and 67B of the IT Act; and Sections 11(v)/12 and 13/14 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 [hereafter ‘POCSO Act’]. Vide the impugned order on sentence, he was awarded sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a period of 03 years for the offence punishable under Section 12 of POCSO; rigorous imprisonment for a period of 01 year for the offence punishable under Section 506 of IPC; rigorous imprisonment for a period of 05 years for the offence punishable under Section 14 of POCSO Act; and rigorous imprisonment for a period of 05 years for the offence punishable under Section 67B of the IT Act. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages while elaborating on the factual backdrop of the case states in para 3 that, “The prosecution was set in motion pursuant to a complaint dated 22.09.2016 lodged by the mother of the minor victim ‘VG’, a Class IX student. It was alleged that the victim VG had received vulgar and obscene images on her mobile phone, which bore the number 96XXXXX55, through WhatsApp messages sent from mobile number 7834891235. The images were disturbing in nature, i.e. her face had been morphed onto the nude body of another person. Accompanying these images was a threatening message warning that if she did not comply with the sender’s demands, the obscene content would be uploaded on Facebook and circulated over the Internet. Based on this complaint, FIR No. 456/2016 was registered, and investigation commenced.”
As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 4 that, “During investigation, the Investigating Officer (I.O.) procured the call detail records (CDRs) of mobile number 7834891235. The CDRs revealed that the said number had been used across multiple IMEIs, and was registered in the name of one Ramesh. However, no verifiable address for Ramesh could be located. Further technical analysis showed that the number had been predominantly used with three IMEIs: (1) 356436035501640, (2) 358425073433590, and (3) 355965042266750. Upon cross-checking the CDRs linked to these IMEIs, one common mobile number i.e. 9910902401 surfaced repeatedly. This number was found registered in the name of the present accused, Rajesh. The police thus reached the address associated with the said number, which turned out to be a mobile shop named ‘Gambhir Communication’. Upon spotting the police, the accused attempted to flee but was apprehended. A search of his premises led to the recovery of a Samsung J7 (golden colour) mobile phone. Examination of the phone revealed several obscene and sexually explicit images, including the same morphed picture that had been sent to the victim.”
As things stands, the Bench reveals in para 7 that, “Upon completion of investigation, a chargesheet was filed before the learned Trial Court. Charges were framed for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 354A, 354D, 506, and 509 of the IPC; Sections 11(v)/12 and 13/14 of the POCSO Act; and Sections 67 and 67B of the Information Technology Act.”
Simply put, the Bench observes in para 19 that, “This case brings forth certain pertinent issues surrounding the misuse of cyberspace, particularly its potential to inflict psychological harm and create situations of coercion through anonymous and faceless acts. It also highlights the manner in which technology can be misused to invade privacy, morph images, and issue threats, especially to young individuals.”
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 54 that, “In the present case, the testimony of the victim, her mother and the FSL report as well as the testimony of the concerned official from FSL proves that the present appellant had morphed the photograph of the victim by using body of some other girl and thereafter indecent obscene representation of the victim girl was made and sent on her Whatsapp. This amounts to sexually explicit representation of a child and constitutes use of a child for pornographic purposes as defined under Sections 11 and 13, punishable under Sections 12 and 14 of the POCSO Act, respectively.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 56 that, “In this regard, it has been contended on behalf of the appellant that no offence under these provisions could be made out as even if presumed that such material was sent to the victim, it cannot be called lascivious or appealing to the prurient interest of the victim child or depicting the victim in obscene manner. This Court however does not agree with this contention since a perusal of the messages and the images reveals that the accused had sent morphed indecent and vulgar pictures of the victim to her which depicted the victim in obscene, in decent and sexually explicit manner and therefore, his acts are clearly covered under Section 67 and 67B of the IT Act.”
Do also note, the Bench then notes in para 57 that, “Thus, this Court finds that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the case beyond reasonable doubt through the consistent and corroborated testimonies of the victim and her mother, supported by expert evidence and the FSL report. The defence taken by the appellant, that he was falsely implicated, has not been substantiated by any credible evidence. Therefore, no infirmity is found in the judgment of conviction passed by the learned Trial Court, which is accordingly upheld.”
Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 58 that, “As regards the sentence awarded, this Court notes that the learned Trial Court has rightly sentenced the appellant under Sections 12 and 14 of the POCSO Act, Section 506 IPC, and Section 67B of the IT Act, after properly considering the applicability of Section 42 and 42A of the POCSO Act and Section 71 of the IPC. It has also rightly observed that the offences under Sections 354A(iii), 354D, and 509 IPC are subsumed under the broader provisions of the POCSO Act, and that the offence under Section 67 of the IT Act overlaps with Section 67B.”
Further, the Bench directs in para 59 holding that, “As far as the quantum of sentence is concerned, the learned Trial Court has awarded the maximum punishment prescribed for the offences under Section 67B of the IT Act and Section 12 of the POCSO Act, and awarded half of the maximum sentence for the offence under Section 506 of IPC. The sentence under Section 14 of the POCSO Act has also been appropriately awarded in accordance with law.”
It cannot be lost sight of that the Bench points out in para 60 that, “This Court cannot lose sight of the manner in which the present crime was executed, i.e. through deliberate and calculated misuse of modern technology. The appellant herein chose to operate from behind the veil of a mobile device and internet connectivity, believing he could escape the reach of law enforcement agencies by frequently changing handsets and SIM cards. This is not just an act of technological manipulation but one which was clearly aimed at outsmarting the investigative machinery. However, it is a matter of reassurance that while the accused misused technology for nefarious purposes, the same tools – through forensic and technical expertise – were used by the agencies to trace the crime back to its origin and establish a clear chain of electronic evidence linking the accused to the commission of offence in question.”
Most alarmingly and most worryingly, the Bench candidly lays bare in para 61 observing that, “However, what is deeply concerning is the use of technology to commit cyberbullying – an act that, while faceless and silent, can be as mentally traumatic and scarring as physical violence, especially when directed towards children. The present case reflects a textbook example of cyberbullying, where an adolescent girl, who was pursuing her studies, became a victim of a targeted assault upon her privacy and dignity. The act of morphing her face onto an obscene image and coupling it with threatening messages not only sought to shame her but was intended to coerce her into submission through fear. Such conduct, in the virtual world, has very real and devastating consequences in the real world.”
Most forthrightly, the Bench underscores in para 62 propounding that, “The psychological impact on a minor who receives a morphed nude photograph of herself, combined with a threat that the same will be published online if she does not comply with the accused’s demands, is difficult to quantify in words in a judgment. The victim in this case, a student of class IX, was at a vulnerable stage of life, one where academic performance, self-esteem, peer relationships, and family interactions are all deeply affected by emotional stability. An act like this would shatter a child‘s sense of safety, personal security, and dignity, possibly for years to come.”
Most remarkably, the Bench expounds in para 63 holding that, “Thus, this Court is also of the view that creating a safe environment for children cannot be restricted to physical spaces alone. The modern world demands that equal protection be extended to digital spaces, where children are now spending considerable time, often for educational purposes. Tablets, mobile phones, and internet access have become essential tools for learning, especially in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the case at hand demonstrates the dark side of such access, i.e. where a child electronic device was misused as a medium of abuse.”
It would be instructive to note that the Bench notes in para 64 that, “It must be therefore emphasized that threats extended in cyberspace can never be taken lightly. The harm caused is not mitigated by the fact that there was no physical contact. The trauma from virtual abuse lingers as strongly, if not more so, because of its repetitive and invasive nature. A morphed image, once created and circulated, can cause long-term damage to a child‘s mental health, dignity and her reputation. The fear of such circulation alone, even if the image is never actually published, is enough to terrorize a young mind.”
Most significantly and so also most sagaciously, the Bench encapsulates in para 65 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “In the aforesaid context, the plea for leniency on behalf of the appellant stands on a fragile footing. The law must send a clear message that crimes committed in cyberspace against children are taken with utmost seriousness and will attract consequences that reflect the gravity of the impact on the victim. Therefore, while this Court remains cognizant of the complexity of crimes committed through digital means, it also acknowledges the equally compelling responsibility of the justice system to evolve with time. It is important to not only detect and punish such crimes effectively but also to affirmatively uphold a child’s right to safety, dignity, and mental well-being in such cases.”
Notably and as a corollary, the Bench then directs in para 66 holding that, “Therefore, this Court finds no reason to interfere either with the conviction of the appellant, or with the sentence awarded to the appellant herein. The impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court suffer from no infirmity or error. The same are accordingly upheld.”
Resultantly, the Bench then directs in para 67 mandating clearly that, “In view of the above, the present appeal alongwith pending application, stands dismissed.”
Finally, we see that the Bench then concludes aptly by directing and holding in para 68 that, “The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.”
In a nutshell, we thus see that the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Dr Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma of the Delhi High Court has made it indubitably clear that cyberbullying though faceless and silent can be mentally traumatic and scarring as physical assault especially against children who are innocent and have little knowledge of such crimes. It was also very rightly, robustly, rationally and remarkably held by the Bench that, “An act like this would shatter a child’s sense of safety, personal security and dignity, possibly for years to come.” So it thus merits no reiteration that there has to be zero tolerance for such heinous acts of crime. The Delhi High Court thus was absolutely right to upheld the conviction of the Trial Court and so also in resolutely dismissing the appellant’s plea! No denying or disputing!
Sanjeev Sirohi
