While ruling on a very significant legal point pertaining to defamation, the Bombay High Court in the exercise of its criminal appellate jurisdiction in a recent, robust, rational and remarkable judgment titled Harish Kumar Garg V/s. The State of Maharashtra and Anr in Writ Petition No. 1798 of 2019 that was pronounced recently on April 25, 2023 has minced just no words to make it crystal clear that defence of truth must extend to entire libel and not just a part of it. The Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Amit Borkar has refused to quash a lawyer’s defamation complaint against Bombay Presidency Radio Club President Harish Kumar Garg for his remarks about a dispute regarding the election to the club’s management committee held in 2018. The Court concluded that the Magistrate applied judicial mind while issuing process against Garg and hence no case for interference is made out.
At the very outset, this learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Amit Borkar of Bombay High Court sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The petition is directed against the order of issuance of process dated 15th December 2018 passed in Criminal Complaint C.C. No.2379/SW/2018 filed in the Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 38th Court at Ballard Pier, Mumbai, for the offences punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereafter “IPC”, for short).”
As we see, the Bench then points out in para 2 that, “Respondent No.2 filed a complaint under Sections 499 and 500 of IPC, contending that the petitioner got published the following news item in Mumbai Mirror Edition Mumbai dated 29th September 2018. The extract quoted in the complaint reads as under:-
“Harish Kumar Garg president of the Club said that the elections were being held in a free and fair manner. There are absolutely no irregularities at all. We have followed all Rules and Bye law. The allegations are totally baseless. This is an attempt to malign the image of the Club and the Committee,” Garg said.
He explained that “the Courts had not given any relief to Bhasin or Goenka” They first asked us to include them in our panel and when we rejected the they started making these allegations. No Court has given them any interim relief. They wanted to get the elections barred but they failed. All their attempts to defame us and cancel the elections have failed,” Garg said.”
Needless to say, the Bench then states in para 3 that, “It is contended that the reputation of the complainant has been adversely affected by such averments, as allegations and the words are read by peers in the profession as well as by the public at large through such newspaper. It is stated that respondent no.2/ complainant believes that whatever was stated by the petitioner has jeopardized the complainant’s reputation in the profession, and he has been defamed. It is alleged that the petitioner tried to harm the reputation of respondent no.2/complainant by false and incorrect statements without any material or substance with the sole intention of defaming the complainant.”
Frankly speaking, the Bench then mentions in para 4 that, “The learned Magistrate, by a detailed order dated 15th December 2018, issued a process against the petitioner. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has filed a present writ petition.”
To be sure, the Bench then stipulates in para 7 that, “Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the material on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the complaint and the order of issuance of the process should be quashed.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 8 that, “The parameters for inquiry under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 are extremely limited to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding (i) on the material placed by the complainant before the Court ; (ii) for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case for issuance of the process has been made out; and (iii) for deciding question purely from the point of view of the complainant without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have. The inquiry needs to be restricted to the intrinsic quality of statements made before the Court on oath by the complainant to ascertain whether essential ingredients of offence are made out or not.”
Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 10 that, “According to the learned advocate for the petitioner, the statement that no Court has given them any relief in the extracted portion is true and correct. The learned advocate for the respondent submitted that there were various proceedings filed between the parties. Learned advocate for the respondent invited my attention to the order dated 19th September 2018, by which relief was granted to the complainant directing the defendant therein to give an inspection of the register of members.”
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 11 that, “It appears that at some stage of relief proceedings between parties some relief was granted to the complainant, and at subsequent stages, relief was refused. However, whether the statement that no Court has granted them any interim relief is true or false has to be ascertained at the stage of trial after considering material produced by the parties. In the circumstances referred to above, it is necessary that the complainant should be granted the opportunity to prove that the article published by the petitioner has lowered his reputation in his profession as he is a practising advocate and enjoys a good reputation with the Bar. As held in the judgment in the case of Rohini Singh, D/o Late Mr. M.B. Singh & 6 (supra), it would be sufficient to show that the petitioner intended or knew or had reason to believe that the imputation made by him would harm to the complainant.”
Most significantly and most forthrightly, the Bench then minces absolutely no words to indubitably hold in para 12 that, “Publication of truth as sufficient justification is available under exception (1) to section 499, provided it is made for the public good. But when the truth is set up as a defence, it must extend to the entire libel, and it is not sufficient that only a part of the libel is proved to be true. In the facts of the case, prima facie, it appears that part of the statement that no Court has given them any interim relief is partly true.”
It is a no-brainer that the Bench then very rightly points out in para 13 that, “It is well settled that the inquiry while issuing process is extremely limited only to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint based on the material on record. Therefore, the petitioner’s defence need not be gone into at this stage.”
Quite frankly, the Bench then minces just no words to candidly hold in para 14 that, “The judgments relied upon by the petitioner are of no help to the petitioner, as in the case of W. Hay and others (supra), it arose out of the civil suit. The said judgment is of no help for adjudicating the order of issuance of process. The next judgment in the case of MJ Zakharia Sait (supra) arises from an election petition on the grounds of corrupt practice, which is inapplicable to the present case.”
Most remarkably and most sagaciously, the Bench then hastens to add in para 15 holding that, “On reading of the impugned order, it discloses that the Magistrate has passed detailed order recording prima facie satisfaction that the allegations in the newspaper would fall within the expression of “defamation” under Section 499 of IPC. To determine whether imputations are sufficient to attract provisions of Section 499 of IPC, a judicial inquiry has been made prima facie by the Magistrate. On perusal, the impugned order indicates that the Magistrate has applied judicial mind. Therefore, in my opinion, no case for interference is made out.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 16 that, “The writ petition stands dismissed. No costs.”
All said and done, we thus see clearly that the Bombay High Court has been most forthright in holding that defence of truth in defamation cases must extend to entire libel and not just a part of it. We thus see quite discernibly that the Bombay High Court has unequivocally reiterated that truth as a defence must extend to the entire statement and it is not sufficient that only part of the statement is proved to be true. It thus merits no reiteration that all the courts must definitely pay heed to what the Bombay High Court has held in this leading case so very clearly, cogently and convincingly and rule accordingly in similar such cases.
Sanjeev Sirohi
