It is entirely in the fitness of things and so also absolutely pragmatic that the Delhi High Court while striking the right chord in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Prof Madhu Kishwar vs State of NCT of Delhi & Ors in CRL.M.C. 2250/2008 & CRL.M.A. 8357/2008, CRL.M.A. 9096/2019, CRL.M.A. 13632/2023, CRL.M.A. 14139/2024 that was pronounced just recently on 16.10.2025 has quashed a 17-year-old attempt to murder case against academician Madhu Kishwar that was lodged after FIR was registered in 2008 on a complaint filed by members of the Basoya family. It must be mentioned that the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Amit Mahajan noted that the FIR was a maliciously motivated counter blast to the case that was lodged by her for rioting and criminal intimidation. It is worth paying attention that the FIR against Madhu Kishwar was over a purported altercation with the Basoya family while she was clicking photographs of alleged unauthorized constructions in the city for her human rights organization named Manushi.
It must be noted that the Delhi High Court passed the order while allowing a petition by Kishwar seeking quashing of an FIR that was lodged against her in June 2008 for the alleged offences of attempt to murder, voluntarily causing hurt and criminal intimidation under the erstwhile IPC. The FIR pertains to an altercation that took place between Basoya family and Kishwar on December 31, 2007. The complainant Basoya family had accused Kishwar of instructing her driver to run over her and her family members with a car during dispute over the alleged allotment of shops in Sewa Nagar Market in Kotla Mubarakpur area. But Delhi High Court after perusing the facts of the case and the material on record found just no force in the serious allegations that were made against Madhu Kishwar and so the attempt to murder case was thus quashed against her. Very rightly so!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Amit Mahajan of Delhi High Court sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The present petition is filed inter alia seeking quashing of FIR No. 162/2008 (‘FIR’) dated 28.06.2008, registered at Police Station KM Pur, for offences under Sections 307/323/506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), including all consequential proceedings arising therefrom.”
As we see, the Bench then discloses in para 2 stating that, “The petitioner has also challenged the order dated 30.05.2008, passed in complaint case 127/1 of 2008, whereby the learned Magistrate directed the concerned SHO to register the subject FIR.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 3 while shedding light on the facts of the case and elaborating briefly lays bare mentioning herein that, “Briefly stated, it is alleged that Respondent No.4/complainant and her sons were cheated by the petitioner on the pretext of allotment of shops in Seqa Nagar Modal Market. Allegedly, on 31.12.2007, at about 12:30 PM, the complainant met with the petitioner and her associates near her son’s shop to request for return of the money that had been taken by the petitioner for allotment of shops. It is alleged that on demand of money, the petitioner became annoyed and instructed her driver to start the car and run over the complainant, due to which, the petitioner’s driver hit the complainant by the car. When the son and grandson of the complainant came to the assistance of their mother, the accused persons gave beatings to the complainant and her son as well as grandson. Allegedly, serious injuries were sustained by the victims.”
Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 4 that, “It is the case of the petitioner that the subject FIR was nothing but a counterblast to FIR No. 666/2007 dated 31.12.2007, that was registered at police station KM Pur on the instance of the petitioner for the offences under Sections 147/149/341/323/509/506 of the IPC. It is submitted that the petitioner was authorised to monitor civil discipline in the concerned area and to report about the unauthorised construction. It is further submitted that certain area had been taken over illegally by a gang which was headed by the son of Respondent No.4, due to which she had a vested interest against the petitioner.”
It is also worth noting that the Bench notes in para 5 that, “Perusal of FIR No. 666/2007 indicates that the same was registered pursuant to the same incident which took place on 31.12.2007. It is alleged in the said FIR that on 31.12.2007, when the petitioner along with some volunteers had reached the market and started clicking some photographs, Respondent No.4 came in front of the camera again and again to start a fight. When the petitioner moved towards her car, Respondent No.4 kicked her from behind, pulled her hair and kicked the petitioner into the drain in front of the park. In the meanwhile, the son of Respondent No.4 along with other accused persons also started beating the petitioner. When the petitioner’s driver–Sheeshpal came to her rescue, he was also beaten with a stick near the car. One of the accused persons therein also strangled Sheeshpal. The accused persons also threatened the petitioner.”
It cannot be glossed over that the Bench points out in para 6 that, “While the proceedings in the subject FIR were stayed way back in the year 2008 itself, the proceedings in the cross-FIR continued. Undisputedly, by judgment dated 26.08.2019 passed in the case arising out of FIR No. 666/2007, the learned Trial Court has already convicted the complainant in the present case along with other accused persons therein for the offences under Sections 147/149/323/341/506/509/34 of the IPC. It is pointed out that the said judgment has since attained finality.”
Briefly stated, the Bench states in para 7 that, “In the said judgment on conviction, the learned Trial Court duly appreciated the material in regard to the incident that happened on 31.12.2007 and held that there is evidence to show that each of the accused persons, including Respondent No.4, actively participated in the use of criminal force against the petitioner, with an object to prevent the petitioner from clicking photographs and from obstructing the accused persons illegal encroachment. Tangible proof was found of unlawful activities by Respondent No.4 and other accused persons therein. It was held that the prosecution has been able to proof beyond reasonable doubt that Respondent No.4 along with other accused persons had formulated unlawful assembly and committed the offence. The learned Trial Court took note of the injuries suffered by the petitioner as well as Sheeshpal and found that the medical evidence was consistent with the version of the victims.”
It would be worthwhile to note that the Bench notes in para 8 that, “While FIR should ordinarily not be quashed at the inception when there are disputed questions of fact, however, it is settled law that this Court is empowered to quash the FIR when the record suggests that the same has been registered to wreak vengeance. In the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal : 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Hon’ble Apex Court had illustrated the category of cases where the Court may exercise its extraordinary power under Article 226 of Constitution of India or inherent jurisdiction to quash the proceedings, wherein one of the illustrated categories was that of criminal proceedings that have been instituted due to personal grudge. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced hereunder:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
(emphasis supplied).”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 9 that, “Where the accused seeks quashing of FIR essentially on the ground that the proceedings are vexatious, the Court is required to look more closely into the FIR and to appreciate the attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case as well with due care and circumspection [Ref. Mahmood Ali & Ors. v. State of U.P & Ors. : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950].”
Most significantly, the Bench points out in para 10 that, “From the facts of the present case, it is apparent that the subject FIR was registered after the registration of FIR on a complaint given by the petitioner. The judgment passed by the learned Trial Court in the case arising out of FIR No. 666/2007 clearly indicates that Respondent No.4 along with other accused persons therein had formed an unlawful assembly with the purpose of stopping the petitioner from clicking photographs and given beatings to the petitioner as well as Sheeshpal, for which the complainant was ultimately convicted. The subject FIR appears to be in the nature of defence and a maliciously motivated counter blast to FIR No. 666/2007 for wreaking vengeance upon the petitioner. Both the FIRs pertain to the incident that took place on 31.12.2007, and the conviction of Respondent No.4 in relation to her conduct on the said date appears to have attained finality. Although the allegations levelled are serious in nature, considering the findings of the learned Trial Court in relation to Respondent No.4 having been a part of an unlawful assembly on the date of the incident and beaten both the petitioner and Sheeshpal, the allegations made in the subject FIR in relation to Respondent No.2 having been hit by a car by Sheeshpal at the instance of the petitioner appear to have been for the reason of counterblast. The jurisdiction court as noted above has already convicted the complainant for forming an unlawful assembly an causing injuries to the Petitioner.”
As a corollary and equally significant is that the Bench while continuing in the same vein hastens to add in para 11 holding that, “In such factual background, setting the criminal law machinery in motion only for the reason that the complaint discloses commission of cognizable offence would be an abuse of the process of the court.”
It would be instructive to note that the Bench postulates in para 12 holding that, “Even if the allegations of the complainant are taken at the highest, considering the complainants conviction in a case arising out of same incident, the same can at best be considered as a self-defence or an altercation at the stage when the complainant has formed an unlawful assemble and caused injuries to the petitioner and another person when they were carrying out certain functions assigned to them.”
Resultantly, the Bench then directs and holds in para 13 that, “In view of the above, the present petition is allowed. Accordingly, FIR 162/2008 and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by directing and holding in para 14 that, “The present petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.”
Sanjeev Sirohi