It is a matter of utmost significance to note that in a path breaking judgment with far reaching consequences, the Single Judge Bench of the Gwalior Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Ashish Shroti in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled X vs Y in M.P.No.3395/2023 that was pronounced as recently as on June 16, 2025 has minced absolutely just no words to hold in no uncertain terms that a wife’s private Whatsapp chat can be allowed to be presented as evidence under Section 14 of the Family Court Act, 1984 even if they are obtained without her permission. For the uninitiated, it must be laid bare here that Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 allows Family Courts to receive and consider evidence that may help them resolve disputes like divorce, even if that evidence won’t be otherwise admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. We see thus very clearly that in this leading case in an appeal against Family Court’s judgment permitting the husband to mark WhatsApp chats procured without wife’s consent through an application installed on her phone as exhibits in the matrimonial proceedings instituted by him under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Bench upheld strongly the Family Court’s order to admit the WhatsApp chats as evidence and underscored that in matrimonial disputes, the relevance of evidence prevails over the means of its procurement…. Very rightly so!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench of the Gwalior Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Ashish Shroti sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The petitioner/defendant/wife has filed this misc. petition challenging the order dated 13/4/2023 passed by Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Gwalior in Case No. 122-A/2018 (HMA), whereby learned Family Court has permitted the respondent/plaintiff/husband to mark the exhibits on the WhatsApp chats produced by him in his evidence.”
As we see, the Bench then specifies in para 2 stating that, “For the sake of convenience, petitioner and respondent hereinafter shall be referred to as wife and husband respectively.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench in para 3 while elaborating on the facts of the case envisages that, “The facts necessary for decision of this case are that the marriage between the parties took place on 1/12/2016 at Gwalior as per Hindu Rites & Rituals. Out of this wedlock, a baby girl was born on 11/10/2017. The husband has filed a suit for dissolution of marriage under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, on the ground of cruelty. He has also pleaded adultery on the part of wife. In order to prove adultery, in paragraphs 8 & 9 of the plaint, specific pleadings have been made with regard to WhatsApp chat of the wife with a third person. The husband has pleaded that by way of a special application installed in the wife’s phone, the WhatsApp chatting of her phone are automatically forwarded to his phone, which shows that the wife is having extramarital affair with a third person.”
As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 4 mentioning that, “The wife has filed her written statement and denied the allegations made in the plaint. It is also borne out from the records that she has also filed an application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act seeking restitution of conjugal rights.”
Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 18 that, “By reading the dictum of Apex Court in the case of Sharda & Puttaswami (supra), it is evident that right to privacy is recognized as a fundamental right under Article 21 of Constitution, but the same is not an absolute right. In case of necessity, a law can be framed permitting invasion to life and personal liberty. Section 14 of Family Courts Act and Section 122 of Indian Evidence Act are some such statutory provisions which permits invasion to right to privacy. It is worth mentioning here that vires of either of the aforesaid provisions are not under challenge and, therefore, the same have to be deemed as valid, fair and reasonable.”
Most remarkably, the Bench underscores in para 19 propounding that, “Since no fundamental right under our Constitution is absolute, in the event of conflict between two fundamental rights, as in this case, a contest between the right to privacy and the right to fair trial, both of which arise under Article 21 of our Constitution, the right to privacy may have to yield to the right to fair trial. Reference in this regard can be made to the observations of a 5-Judge Constitution Bench decision of Apex Court in Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited Vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India reported in (2012) 10 SCC 603 where the court observed in para 25 thus:
“….. It must not be forgotten that no single value, no matter exalted, can bear the full burden of upholding a democratic system of government. Underlying our constitutional system are a number of important values, all of which help to guarantee our liberties, but in ways which sometimes conflict. Under our Constitution, probably, no values are absolute. All important values, therefore, must be qualified and balanced against other important, and often competing values. This process of definition, qualification and balancing is as much required with respect to the value of freedom of expression as it is for other values. Consequently, free speech, in appropriate cases, has got to correlate with fair trial. It also follows that in an appropriate case one right (say freedom of expression) may have to yield to the other right like right to a fair trial. Further, even Articles 14 and 21 are subject to the test of reasonableness after the judgment of this Court in Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India.”
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 35 that, “In view of the discussion made above, this court is of the opinion that the Legislature, being fully aware of the principles of admissibility of evidence, has enacted Section 14 in order to expand that principle in so far as disputes relating to marriage and family affairs are concerned. The Family Court is thereby freed of restrictions of the strict law of evidence. The only test under Section 14 for a Family Court to receive the evidence, whether collected legitimately or otherwise, is based upon its subjective satisfaction that the evidence would assist it to deal effectively with the dispute.”
Notably, the Bench points out in para 36 holding that, “Further, after having received such evidence on record, the Family Court is free to either accept or discard or give weightage or discard a particular piece of evidence while finally adjudicating the dispute. In other words, merely because evidence has been taken on record by virtue of Section 14, there is no compulsion on Family Court to rely upon such piece of evidence and it can discard such evidence if it is not found trustworthy while appreciating the evidence at the adjudication stage. It is also open to the opposite party to dispute, cross-examine and disprove the evidence so cited and to contest any claim being made on the basis of such evidence. The limited relaxation given by Section 14 is that even if under conventional rules of evidence, a report, statement, document, information or other matter is not admissible, the Family Court may yet receive such evidence on record if in its opinion, the evidence would assist it to deal effectively with the dispute. What value or weightage is to be given to such evidence is the discretion of the judge, when finally adjudicating the dispute.”
Objectively speaking, the Bench deems it fit to point out in para 37 expounding and stipulating that, “Wide power inherit more responsibility. In view of the unusual and wide power conferred on Family Court under Section 14, certain safeguards are required to be adopted by the Family Court while exercising its power under that provision. Some of such safeguards may be:
i. even though a given piece of evidence has been admitted on record, the Court must be extremely careful in relying upon such evidence while deciding lis. The authenticity & genuineness of such evidence must be strictly and meticulously examined.
ii. if in its opinion, the nature of the evidence sought to be adduced is inappropriate, embarrassing or otherwise sensitive in nature for any of the parties, may be litigating or not, the Family Court may restrict the parties who are present in court at the time of considering such evidence. It may conduct in-camera proceedings so as not to cause embarrassment to any person or party.
iii. all proceedings must be conducted strictly within the bounds of decency & propriety, and no opportunity should be given to any party to create a spectacle in the guise of producing evidence.
iv. any party aggrieved by the production of such evidence would be at liberty to initiate appropriate proceedings, whether in civil or criminal law, against party for procuring evidence illegally, although the initiation or pendency of such proceeding shall not make the evidence so produced inadmissible before the Family Court.”
Most significantly, most forthrightly and resultantly, the Bench then encapsulates in para 38 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating that, “In view of the discussion made above, it is held that:
(a) the evidence is admissible so long as it is relevant, irrespective of the fact how it is collected. The possible misuse of this rule of evidence, particularly in the context of the right to privacy, can be addressed by prudent exercise of judicial discretion by the Family Court, not at the time of receiving evidence but at the time of using evidence at the stage of adjudication;
(b) merely admitting evidence on record is not proof of a fact-in-issue or a relevant fact. Admitting evidence is not even reliance by the court on such evidence. Admitting evidence is mere inclusion of evidence in record, to be assessed on a comprehensive set of factors, parameters and aspects, in the discretion of the court;
(c) the test of ‘relevance’ ensures that the right of a party to bring evidence to court, and thereby to a fair trial, is not defeated. What weight is to be given to evidence so brought-in, and whether or not the court ultimately relies upon such evidence for proof of a fact-in-issue or a relevant fact, is always in the discretion of the court.
(d) merely because a court allows evidence to be admitted, does not mean that the person who has illegally collected such evidence is absolved of liability that may arise, whether in civil or criminal law or both;
(e) such evidence must be received and treated with caution and circumspection and to rule-out the possibility of any kind of tampering, the standard of proof applied by a court for the authenticity and accuracy of a such evidence should be more stringent as compared to other evidence.”
Finally and as a corollary, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 39 that, “In view of the aforesaid, the impugned order, dated 13/4/2023, passed by learned Family Court in Case no.122-A/2018(HMA), is upheld. The petition is dismissed.”
In a nutshell, we thus see that the Single Judge Bench of the Gwalior Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Ashish Shroti has made it indubitably clear that family courts can admit whatsapp chats procured without consent as evidence in matrimonial disputes. The Bench cited the landmark judgment titled KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 to clarify that this right is not absolute and must be balanced against other competing rights, particularly the right to a fair trial, which is also rooted in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Bench also while relying on RM Malkani vs State of Maharashtra, (1973) 1 SCC 471, observed that, “A document which was procured by improper or even by illegal means could not bar its admissibility provided its relevance and genuineness were proved.” The Gwalior Bench thus dismissed the wife’s petition and rightly upheld the Family Court’s order to admit whatsapp chats which husband had procured and presented as evidence! No denying or disputing it!
Sanjeev Sirohi