While coming out fully blazing in support of the convicted person right of leading a dignified life just like any other individual and batting most strongly in favour of it, the Calcutta High Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled Mahuya Chakraborty vs The State of West Bengal & Ors in W.P.A 22366 of 2023 that was pronounced as recently as on January 5, 2024 has minced just no words to hold unequivocally that the right under Article 21 to live a life of dignity cannot be deprived merely because a person is convicted. It must be mentioned here that the petitioner who is the wife of a convict serving a life sentence challenged the decision of the State Sentence Review Board (SSRB) in rejecting her application for the premature release of her husband. The case was disposed of finally without any order as to costs.
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, balanced and bold judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya of the Calcutta High Court sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “Two primary grounds have been taken by the petitioner in challenging the decision of the State Sentence Review Board, West Bengal (SSRB) in rejecting the application of the present petitioner, the wife of a convict who was handed a life sentence. Those are that the SSRB was not properly constituted and that the grounds cited for such rejection by the SSRB are not in consonance with the consistent view taken by the Supreme Court and this Court as well as the other High Courts.”
It is worth noting that while citing the relevant case law, the Bench notes in para 2 that, “Learned counsel places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in Rajo alias Rajwa alias Rajendra Mandal vs. The State of Bihar where the Supreme Court categorically observed that the aim, ultimate goal of imprisonment, even in the most serious crime, is reformative after the offender undergoes a sufficiently long spell of punishment through imprisonment.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench then very rightly propounds in para 3 that, “Apart from other considerations on the nature of the crime, whether it affected society at large, the chance of its recurrence, etc. it was held that the appropriate Government should, while considering the potential of the convict to commit crimes in the future, whether there remains any fruitful purpose of continued incarceration, and the socio-economic conditions, review the convict’s age, state of health, familial relationships and possibility of reintegration, extent of earned remission, and the post-conviction conduct including, but not limited to, whether the convict has attained any educational qualification whilst in custody, volunteer services offered, job/work done, jail conduct, whether they were engaged in any socially aimed or productive activity, and the overall development as a human being.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 4 that, “The Board, it was held, should not entirely rely either on the presiding judge or the report prepared by the police.”
To be sure, the Bench reiterates in para 5 that, “The same view was reiterated in certain judgments of this court as well, in the matters of Gopal Sarkar vs. State of West Bengal reported at AIR Online 2022 CAL 2520 as well as two unreported judgments in Narayan Mahato alias Naran Mahato vs. State of West Bengal and Biresh Poddar and another vs. State of West Bengal and others etc.”
Do also note, the Bench then notes in para 6 that, “Learned counsel for the State submits that although a gist of the reasons for refusal has been annexed to the writ petition, learned counsel is handicapped, since detailed reasons, if furnished, are not with counsel.”
It merits mentioning that the Bench observes in para 7 that, “However, it transpires upon hearing counsel that the grounds of rejection annexed to the writ petition appear to be comprehensive, having been given by way of reply to an application filed by the petitioner under the Right to Information Act 2005 on the issue of why the application for premature release of the petitioner’s husband was rejected.”
Quite glaringly, the Bench notes in para 8 that, “The petitioner’s husband is already in custody for more than two decades.”
Needless to say, the Bench states in para 9 that, “It is well-settled that the aim of punishment in modern criminal jurisprudence is reformative and not retributive.”
In addition, the Bench observes in para 10 that, “That apart, as indicated above, the Supreme Court has, time and again, laid down several aspects of the matter which are to be considered apart from the nature of crime and propensity of the petitioner to commit the crime again if set free.”
For clarity, the Bench clarifies in para 11 that, “It transpires that none of the said considerations finds place in the grounds of rejection in the present case.”
As for instance, the Bench then points out most clearly in para 12 that, “For example, nothing in the grounds of rejection indicate that any report was taken from the Probation cum After Care Officer and/or the Superintendent of the concerned correctional home where the petitioner has been incarcerated, in order to show the conduct of the petitioner during his period of incarceration throughout the entire period and the petitioner’s current behaviour.”
Furthermore, the Bench clarifies and discloses in para 13 that, “That apart, we do not find from the records anything to indicate whether the petitioner participated in any socially productive work in the meantime and/or has undergone any further education or qualification while in custody.”
What’s more, the Bench points out in para 14 that, “Even the police report as cited in the grounds of rejection is cryptic, since the heinous nature of the crime committed by the petitioner long back appears to be the primary consideration.”
It cannot be glossed over that the Bench then clarifies in para 15 stating that, “Possibility of retaliation upon the witnesses as cited in the said report is palpably based on conjecture and does not find support from any concrete material.”
Still more, the Bench then observes in para 16 that, “That apart, it has been stated that the socioeconomic condition of the family is not good. The victim’s son and relatives apparently oppose the premature release of the petitioner.”
Truth be told, the Bench then lays bare in para 17 observing briefly that, “However, even if such opposition is there, there needs to be solid reasons to support such opposition. Moreover, the application for premature release has been filed by none other than the wife of the convict, belying the story of opposition from his family.”
Most significantly, the Bench then aptly underscores in para 18 holding that, “The right of the petitioner under Article 21 to live a life of dignity cannot be deprived merely because the petitioner was convicted.”
Most sagaciously and most remarkably, the Bench then further expounds in para 19 holding succinctly that, “The life behind bars has already been undergone by the petitioner for a considerable period. There cannot be any double punishment on the petitioner by refusing the petitioner an opportunity to reintegrate in mainstream society even if the petitioner is otherwise eligible.”
It cannot be lost on us that the Bench then further points out in para 20 stating that, “That apart, since the SSRB was not properly constituted, it is all the more necessary that the request of the petitioner for premature release is reconsidered by a properly constituted Board.”
Most forthrightly, the Bench in the fitness of things then further hastens to add in para 21 mandating precisely that, “Accordingly, WPA 22366 of 2023 is disposed of by directing the respondent authorities to ensure that a properly constituted SSRB reconsiders the petitioner’s request for premature release of her husband, who is a life convict, by taking into consideration the yardsticks as indicated above.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by directing in para 22 of this noteworthy judgment that, “It is expected that such reconsideration shall be carried out at the earliest, positively within one month from this date. There will be no order as to costs. Urgent photostat copies of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of all requisite formalities.”
All said and done, we thus see clearly that the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya of the Calcutta High Court has made it indubitably clear that the fundamental right of a convict of leading a dignified life under Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be deprived merely because of conviction. Of course, there can be thus no gainsaying that all the Courts and all the Judges in India must in similar such cases abide fully, firmly and finally with what the Calcutta High Court has held so very elegantly, eloquently and effectively in this leading case. There can be just no denying or disputing it!
Sanjeev Sirohi
