It is definitely a matter of extreme grave concern that yet again we see that the Delhi High Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Shashi Arora & Anr vs State through Commissioner of Police & Ors in W.P.(Crl) 2711/2022 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025:DHC:9642 that was pronounced as recently as on 3.11.2025 minced absolutely just no words to hold in no uncertain terms most unequivocally that there has been a growing tendency to rope in distant relatives of the husband in dowry cases even if there is no evidence against them. It must be mentioned here that the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Amit Mahajan who authored this notable judgment laid bare that Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which criminalises cruelty to wife by husband or his relatives, was introduced to curb the scourge and manifestations of crime related to the demand of dowry and to protect married women from cruelty in their matrimonial house. In the same vein, the Bench also underlined adding that, “But sweeping and mechanical implications of even distant relatives in Section 498A offence dilute the intent with which the provision was incorporated.”
We see that the Bench was dealing with a plea that had been filed by two women who sought quashing of the dowry harassment case against them. The petitioners who were aunt (mother’s sister) and cousin of the husband contended that they were distant relatives who did not live with the complainant and were being falsely implicated in a matrimonial dispute. After considering the case and perusing the evidence and material on record, the Delhi High Court quashed the FIR and the consequential proceedings.
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Amit Mahajan of Delhi High Court sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth the purpose of the petition stating herein that, “The present petition is filed seeking quashing of FIR No. 536/2022 dated 13.05.2022 registered at Police Station Adarsh Nagar for offences under Sections 498A/406/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) qua the petitioners.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 2 while dwelling on the FIR that, “Briefly stated, the FIR was registered on a complaint given by Respondent No. 3. It is alleged that Puneet Arora (husband) and his family members including Krishnan Arora (father-in-law), Rama Arora (mother-in-law), Sakshi Arora (sister-in-law), Petitioner No. 1 (massi) and Petitioner No. 2 (daughter of Petitioner No. 1) had tortured, and assaulted Respondent No. 3 in relation to demand of dowry.”
As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 3 that, “The marriage of Respondent No. 3 and Puneet Arora was solemnized on 09.11.2019. It is alleged that prior to her marriage, her in-laws had strictly instructed Respondent No. 3’s parents that the marriage ought to be conducted in a lavish manner, and consequently Respondent No. 3’s parents spent approximately ₹30 lakhs in the marriage. It is alleged that prior to the marriage, the sagan ceremony was performed on 20.10.2019 and Respondent No. 3’s in-laws on the same day demanded a car from the parents of Respondent No. 3.”
While shedding more light, the Bench lays bare in para 7 disclosing that, “Respondent No. 3 alleged that Petitioner No. 1, who used to live in Suraj Mal, which was situated at a distance of 10 minutes from the house of her in-laws interfered in every matter in her house. It is alleged that Petitioner No. 2 also interfered in Respondent No. 3’s life. It is alleged that Respondent No. 3’s in-laws shared each and everything that was related to Respondent No. 3 to the petitioners which included how Respondent No. 3 used to dress her child, what food she gave to her child etcetera.”
Delving deeper, the Bench further reveals in para 8 stating that, “It is alleged that Petitioner No. 1 also used to teach Respondent No. 3 not to disrespect her in-laws and also tried to influence her husband to create misunderstandings between them. It is alleged that whenever Petitioner No. 1 visited Respondent No. 3’s in-laws, she used to say to Respondent No. 3 not to throw tantrums else she would get Petitioner No.2 married with Respondent No. 3’s husband. It is also alleged that Petitioner No. 1 also complained to Respondent No. 3’s father that she did not know how to interact with her in-laws. It is alleged that while the petitioners did not live in the house of Respondent No. 3’s in-laws, they continued to interfere in her life. It is alleged that the petitioners used to call Respondent No. 3’s in-laws every single day to learn about the day-to-day routine of Respondent No. 3 and also forced her to interact with the petitioners by sending messages on WhatsApp.”
While continuing in the same vein, the Bench reveals in para 9 observing that, “It is alleged that on 14.08.2021, when Respondent No. 3’s in-laws were humiliating her and hurting her son and herself and the neighbors were protecting them, the petitioners came to the neighbors house and started shouting on Respondent No. 3’s parents stating that Respondent No. 3 did not have any family value. It is alleged that the petitioners used to support Respondent No. 3’s in-laws and insulted her parents and herself.”
As we see, the Bench specifies in para 10 stating that, “In her statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Respondent No. 3 stated that her stridhan, gifts as well as jewellery received during her marriage and at the time of the birth of her son are in the possession of her husband, in-laws and the petitioners.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 11 that, “Chargesheet has been filed in the present case and against the petitioners for the offences under Sections 498A/406/34 of the IPC.”
While striking a note of caution, the Bench observes in para 16 that, “It is relevant to note that the petitioners have invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court seeking quashing of the present FIR. As noted above, the chargesheet has already been filed in the present case. While this Court is empowered to quash criminal proceedings even after filing of chargesheet to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of law, it is well settled that ordinarily, this Court should be cautious to exercise inherent jurisdiction and interfere with the proceedings after chargesheet has been filed after thorough investigation [Ref. State of Odisha v. Pratima Mohanty and Others: (2022) 16 SCC 703].”
While citing the relevant case laws, the Bench points out in para 18 that, “It is true that in case it is found that the proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or are instituted with the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance, this Court ought to look into the FIR with care and little more closely. The Court can look into the attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case and can read between the lines. If the allegations are far-fetched and it appears that the provisions of Section 498A of the IPC are misused, the Court can interfere while exercising powers under Section 482 of the CrPC [Ref. Mahmood Ali & Ors. v. State of U.P & Ors. : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950; Abhishek v. State of Madhya Pradesh : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083 and Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. : (2022) 6 SCC 599].”
It is worth paying attention that the Bench points out in para 19 that, “In the present case, it is the case of the prosecution that Respondent No. 3 was subjected to harassment and cruelty by her husband and her in-laws including the petitioners. The present petition, however, has been preferred by only two of the accused persons who are the massi of the husband of Respondent No. 3 (Petitioner No. 1) and her daughter (Petitioner No. 2). This Court is thus limiting the consideration of the factual matrix of the present case to that pertaining to the petitioners.”
It would be instructive to note that the Bench hastens to add in para 27 noting that, “It needs no reiteration that Section 498A of the IPC was inserted in the year 1983 with a view to curb the scourge and manifestations of crimes related to demand of dowry. For this reason, Section 498A of the IPC was incorporated with the object to protect women from cruelty at the hands of her husband or his relatives. However, as observed by Courts in a plethora of judgments, there has been a growing tendency to rope in even distant relatives of husbands being uncles, aunts, extended family members – who do not even reside at the matrimonial house of the woman and even in the dearth of evidence to highlight their active involvement in the alleged acts of cruelty solely for the reason that such relatives may have been privy to the matrimonial acrimony of the parties. Such omnibus, sweeping and mechanical implication, however, bereft of concrete evidence, dilutes the very intent and sanctity with which the provision was incorporated.”
Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 28 what constitutes the cornerstone of this robust judgment postulating precisely that, “This Court has minutely traversed through the record and examined the facts of the present case. The petitioners, as is evident from the record, did not reside with Respondent No. 3 in her matrimonial home. The allegations against the petitioners, as reproduced supra, even when taken at the highest, pertain to certain comments made by the petitioners or interference in the married life of Respondent No. 3. However, mere taunts, casual references, vague assertions or general family friction that occur in the ordinary wear and tear of marital life is not sufficient to fall within the definition of “cruelty” as embodied under Section 498A of the IPC. The allegations, even when construed liberally and accepted at face value only reveal that the petitioners were privy to the matrimonial life of Respondent No. 3 and also interfered in her married life, the same however, does not constitute cruelty as per Section 498A of the IPC which as noted above is defined as any wilful conduct that is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or grave injury or danger to life or limb (whether mental or physical) or harassment on account of dowry demand. The allegations that fall short of the statutory threshold cannot attract liability under Section 498A of the IPC.”
Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 29 that, “Insofar as the allegations under Section 406 of the IPC are concerned, it is pertinent to note that a only a vague allegation that “Mera saara stridhan va uphaar, gehne jo shaadi ke samay va bachcha hone ke samay mile the vah sab mere pati-Puneet, saas Rama Arora, sasur Krishn Arora, nanad sakshi, maasi sashi arora va uski ladki aishley arora ke kabze mein hai” has been made. While such general allegations may suffice for the purpose of investigation being commenced, the same is not sufficient for the continuance of consequent proceedings qua the petitioners. As is evident from the record, nothing substantial has been found in the investigation or evidenced in the chargesheet so as to allow the continuance of the proceedings arising out of the FIR against the petitioners.”
Do also note, the Bench notes in para 31 that, “It is pertinent to note that the present petition seeking quashing of FIR was filed way back in the year 2022 and has been pending consideration since then. It was argued that the matter is now pending before the learned Trial Court for consideration on charges.”
Most rationally, the Bench deems it apposite to hold in para 32 that, “On such a conspectus of facts and upon a consideration of the material on record, in the opinion of this Court, no grave suspicion arises against the petitioners for the purpose of framing of charges under Sections 498A/406 of the IPC. However, as noted above, since charges are yet to be framed in the present case, and considering the fact that the present petition for quashing of FIR has been pending consideration since the year 2022, this Court deems it apposite to quash the consequential proceedings arising out of the present FIR against the petitioners.”
It is worth noting that the Bench while adding a caveat notes in para 33 that, “However, if at some stage, the Trial Court finds evidence to proceed against the petitioners, it is open to the learned Trial Court to take appropriate steps in accordance with CrPC.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by directing and holding in para 34 that, “The present petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.”
In essence, the Delhi High Court has thus very rightly quashed the FIR against the petitioners who were implicated in a matrimonial dispute. It was also very rightly underscored by the Court that sweeping and mechanical implications of even distant relatives in Section 498A IPC offence dilutes the intent with which the provision was incorporated as we see in this leading case also. There can be just no denying or disputing it!
Sanjeev Sirohi