It is quite interesting to note that while ruling on a very significant legal point on the question of invoking of High Court’s inherent power, the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Abhimanue v. State of Kerala in Criminal Appeal Nos.4197-4199 of 2025 [Arising out of SLP (Criminal) Nos.5814-5816 of 2025] and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025 INSC 1136 and so also in 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 929 that was pronounced as recently as on September 22, 2025 in the exercise of its criminal appellate jurisdiction has minced absolutely just no words to hold in no uncertain terms that a plea for cancellation of bail can be moved before the High Court by invoking its powers under Section 439(2) read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, even if the Sessions Court has already declined a cancellation application under Section 439(2). It must be noted that the top court rejected the contention that once a Sessions Court declines an application under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) for cancellation of bail, a second application under the same provision cannot be filed directly before the High Court. It must be laid bare that the Apex Court Bench that comprised of Hon’ble Mr Justice Dipankar Datta and Hon’ble Mr Justice AG Masih was considering an appeal against a judgment of the Kerala High Court cancelling the bail of the accused. The top court thus very rightly set aside the Kerala High Court’s order and upheld the plea of the appellants.
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Dipankar Datta for a Bench of the Apex Court comprising of himself and Hon’ble Mr Justice Augustine George Masih sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 2 that, “Assailed in the present set of appeals is the judgment and order dated 11th December, 2024 (impugned order) of the Kerala High Court, passed on a batch of petitions (Crl. M Nos. 4707, 4713, 4716, 4739, 4749, 4752, 4762, 4767 & 4798 of 2024) filed by the State of Kerala praying for setting aside of grant of bail (through separate orders) to a total of 10 (ten) accused. Vide the impugned order, the High Court set aside the orders granting bail to 5 (five) of the 10 (ten) accused, who are the appellants before us.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 3 disclosing that, “A First Information Report (FIR No. 621/2021, PS Mannanchery, District Alappuzha, Kerala) under Sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 324 and 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), was registered on 19th December, 2021, against unknown persons. It was alleged therein that such unknown persons committed the said offences under the leadership of one political activist of a particular political organization (not a party to these proceedings). Soon thereafter, the appellants were arrested. As per the narrative in the police report (charge-sheet) filed under Section 173(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) dated 15th March, 2022, the accused are activists of a particular political organization who, allegedly, due to political enmity murdered the victim on 18th December, 2021. Accused 2-6 formed an unlawful assembly, followed the victim in a vehicle and collided with his scooter at 5:50 pm. The victim fell down whereupon he was brutally attacked; ultimately, he succumbed to his injuries at 11:30 pm. The accused were consequently charged with having committed offences under Sections 120-B, 109, 115, 143, 147, 148, 149, 324 and 302, IPC and Section 27(1) of the Arms Act, 1959. We note that the appellants Abhimanue, Athul, Sanand, Vishnu and Dhaneesh figure as A-3, A-5, A-4, A-2 and A-6, respectively, in the chargesheet.”
To recapitulate, the Bench recalls in para 4 that, “In December 2022, vide separate orders of various dates, after being in custody for nearly a year, the appellants and the co-accused were granted bail by the trial court. The State applied for cancellation of bail before the Additional Sessions Judge, who rejected the application on 5th April, 2024.”
Further, the Bench observes in para 5 that, “Next, the State approached the High Court in May 2024 praying for setting aside of the orders granting bail to the accused persons.”
Furthermore, the Bench specifies in para 6 stating that, “The High Court divided the accused into two categories – (i) conspirators and (ii) persons against whom the specific overt act of murder was alleged. The appellants belong to the second category. The High Court noted that bail was granted to the appellants by the Sessions Court in a mechanical manner, without referring to any “circumstance that should have been borne in mind while granting bail in a heinous crime as murder”. The High Court further noted that the Sessions Court granted bail, based on two factors. First, the accused had been in custody for more than a year, and secondly, there was no opposition from the Public Prosecutor. The possibility of influencing the witnesses or tampering with evidence was not borne in mind by the Sessions Court, whereas only a few weeks prior, their bail applications were rejected finding that they may influence the witnesses and tamper with evidence. The High Court found that there was no change of circumstances, and hence bail should not have been granted. The High Court also rejected the argument that bail should not be cancelled, as the applications praying for cancellation were filed more than a year and a half after the grant of bail. Accordingly, the bail granted in favour of the appellants stood set aside by the High Court.”
Needless to say, the Bench states in para 7 that, “Aggrieved by the impugned order revoking grant of bail, the appellants have now carried it to this Court in appeal.”
Quite significantly, the Bench points out in para 21 that, “Apart from the fact that it has not been shown to our satisfaction that the appellants violated any of the conditions of bail except in one case, which we propose to consider a little later, we are of the considered opinion that notwithstanding the gravity of the offences alleged against the appellants, the conflicting interests of individual liberty on the one hand and the victim’s rights as well as concerns for community safety on the other could have been better balanced bearing in mind that the appellants had suffered incarceration for nearly a year and thereafter had been on bail for almost 2 (two) years before the orders granting bail were revoked vide the impugned order. The likelihood of the accused influencing the witnesses or tampering with the evidence and ensuring smooth progress of the trial could have been taken care of by imposing stringent conditions over and above those which were imposed while granting bail.”
Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 22 that, “Reverting to the sole instance of violation of bail condition, we note that after the grant of interim bail by this Court, Vishnu and A-1 had allegedly assaulted and threatened Abhiram with a knife, which led to Abhiram lodging an FIR under Sections 115 (2), 118(1), 351(2) and 25 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Seeking quashing of the said FIR, Vishnu approached the High Court. The records indicate that Abhiram filed an affidavit before the High Court denying Vishnu’s involvement in the crime stating that “(T)he police may have for reasons best known to them implicated him in the offence. After preparing the statement, I merely affixed my signature at the paper as shown by them without reading the statement. I was never aware that the Petitioner’s name was included … .”. Abhiram also denied having settled the dispute and clarified that “upon conciliation talks only the misunderstanding was mitigated”. Suffice it to record on perusal of the above statement that there is much more than what meets the eyes. We are not prepared to accept the contention that the FIR lodged by Abhiram affords ground for cancellation of bail granted to Vishnu.”
While citing a recent and relevant case law, the Bench propounds in para 23 holding that, “Our attention was also invited to the status report filed by the State, to indicate the various criminal antecedents of the appellants. Suffice it to say, however, that such antecedents by themselves cannot constitute a ground for denial of bail. In this context, a useful reference may be made to the decision of a coordinate Bench of this Court in Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3763 of which one of us (Augustine George Masih, J.) was a member. The relevant paragraph therefrom is extracted below:
10. The presence of the antecedents of the accused is only one of the several considerations for deciding the prayer for bail made by him. In a given case, if the accused makes out a strong prima facie case, depending upon the fact situation and period of incarceration, the presence of antecedents may not be a ground to deny bail. There may be a case where a Court can grant bail only on the grounds of long incarceration. The presence of antecedents may not be relevant in such a case. In a given case, the Court may grant default bail. Again, the antecedents of the accused are irrelevant in such a case. Thus, depending upon the peculiar facts, the Court can grant bail notwithstanding the existence of the antecedents. ……… .”
Most significantly, the Bench then encapsulates in para 24 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “Cancellation/revocation of bail, no doubt, seeks to uphold trial integrity. The dominant purpose thereof is to ensure a fair trial and protect societal interests by preventing persons accused of a heinous or grave crime and having tendencies to influence or intimidate witnesses or to tamper evidence from being released. Indeed, if such accused are likely to interfere with witness testimony, the courts could be justified in ordering the accused to be taken back into custody. However, at the same time, the golden rule of bail jurisprudence propounded by Hon’ble V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. of ‘bail being the rule and jail an exception’ cannot be ignored. Taking back the appellants in custody for no better reason than that the Sessions Court should not have been swayed by omission of the Public Prosecutor to raise any objection to grant of bail should not operate to the appellants’ prejudice, more so when two years have passed in the interregnum.”
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 25 that, “Upon perusing the status report filed by the State, we find that the case was posted for “schedule trial” on 30th May, 2025 and thereafter the case has been listed on various dates. As per the chargesheet, a total of 141 (one hundred forty-one) witnesses are to be examined. Of them, there are at least five witnesses who allegedly witnessed the crime. The trial will obviously take time to conclude. Bearing in mind that the appellants since grant of bail have not been involved in any similar or other offence, we prefer to lean in favour of liberty rather than its curtailment. Accordingly, while setting aside the impugned order, the appellants’ liberty is not curtailed subject to imposition of certain stringent conditions.”
It would be instructive to note that the Bench then hastens to add in para 26 stipulating that, “To obviate any possibility of tampering with evidence and intimidation and/or influencing of the witnesses by the appellants, we impose the following conditions for grant of bail to the appellants:
a. The appellants shall not enter the limits of district Alappuzha, save when their presence is required for the purposes of trial.
b. The appellants shall inform the trial court of their respective address where they propose to stay during such time condition (a) remains in force.
c. On every alternative day, the appellants shall mark their presence at the police station having jurisdiction in respect of their proposed places of stay. Such attendance need not be marked, if on any particular day, they are required to remain present before the trial court.
d. The appellants shall not procrastinate the trial and fully cooperate with the trial court to take the trial to its logical conclusion without any delay.
e. The appellants shall not tamper with prosecution evidence and influence/intimidate the witnesses.
f. The appellants shall not pray for deferment of cross-examination of any eye-witness.
g. After the evidence of all the alleged eye-witnesses is recorded, the appellants shall be at liberty to seek modification of condition (a) supra before the trial court.
h. The appellants shall be required to furnish bail bonds to the satisfaction of the trial court.”
In addition, the Bench directs and holds in para 27 that, “The trial court, in addition to the aforesaid conditions, may impose any other conditions as it may deem fit and proper.”
Still more, the Bench then holds in para 28 that, “The police administration of the State may appoint the investigating officer of the case or any other police officer to ensure that not only do the appellants not influence/intimidate the witnesses but also that protection to the witnesses, as and when the occasion so demands, is provided.”
Going ahead, the Bench then also directs in para 29 holding that, “We direct the State too to cooperate with the trial court by ensuring the presence of all the private and official witnesses on the dates fixed by the trial court for recording evidence.”
Moving on, the Bench then further holds in para 30 that, “The trial court is encouraged to expedite the trial by scheduling dates in such a manner that witness testimony is recorded without undue delay.”
While adding a caveat, the Bench then stipulates in para 31 holding succinctly that, “The appellants shall continue to remain on bail, pending trial, subject to adherence to the terms and conditions for such grant as imposed by the trial court, in addition to the conditions imposed by us. Should there be any breach of the terms and conditions and the same is brought to the notice of the trial court, appropriate orders may be passed including cancellation of the bail granted by this Court.”
More to the point, the Bench then directs and holds in para 32 that, “The impugned judgment and order revoking the orders granting bail stands set aside. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by aptly holding in para 33 that, “Pending application (s), if any, shall stand disposed of.”
In conclusion, we thus see that the Apex Court has made it indubitably clear that High Court’s inherent power can be invoked to cancel bail after Sessions Court’s dismissal of S.439(2) CrPC plea. It was also made absolutely clear by the top court that even after a Sessions Court declines an application under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) for cancellation of bail, a second application under the same provision can be filed directly before the High Court. The Apex Court thus set aside the Kerala High Court’s order and the appellant’s plea for granting bail was allowed. Very rightly so!
Sanjeev Sirohi