ORDER
Syed Saadatulla Hussatni, J
1. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was enacted by Parliament to make provisions for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. The legislation is enacted to ensure social justice to both employers and employees and advance the progress of industry by bringing about the existence of harmony and cordial relationship between the two parties of industry.
2. The Supreme Court in the case of Gammon India Ltd. v. Union of ‘India, , has pointed out the object and scope of the Industrial Disputes Act as follows :
“The Act was passed to prevent the exploitation of contract labour and also to introduce better conditions of work. The Act provides for regulation and abolition of contract labour. The underlying policy of the Act is to abolish contract labour, wherever possible and practicable, and where it cannot be abolished altogether, the policy of the Act is that the working conditions of the contract labour should be so regulated as to ensure payment of wages and provision of essential amenities. That is why the Act provides for regulated conditions of work and contemplates progressive abolition to the extent contemplated by Section 10 of the Act.”
3. In these appeals, the factual matrix depicts that there was large number of subordinate staff which constitute temporary employees/daily wage casual workers/ empanelled workers as messengers, sweepers, water boys, watchman etc. under the appellants-Bank (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Bank’). The workmen-employees of the Bank were being appointed sometimes on casual basis on daily payment and sometimes on wage basis, but intermittently without continuity in service. It is stated that the respondent-petitioners having not been absorbed in suitable posts by the Bank inspite of their services rendered for a long time with unsecured tenure, they and similarly placed employees took up the matter with the Bank through All India State Bank of India Staff Federation to absorb them or regularise them in such posts. This resulted in entering into settlements with the Bank under Sections 2(p) and 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act read with Rule 58 of the Industrial Dispute Central Rules (for short, the Act and the rules). There are five such settlements between the Bank and the Federation dated 17-11-1987, 16-7-1988,
27-10-1988, 9-1-1988 and 30-7-1996. Under these settlements the vacancies arising upto December, 1994 will be filled from 1989 panel on the basis of seniority and thereafter the panel automatically gets lapsed, and therefore, the remaining candidates in the panel had no claim vyhatsoever for being considered for permanent appointments from the panel. The Bank and the Federation entered into Memo of Understanding (MOU), dated 22-7-1997, which finds place in the paper book at pages 216 to 217, and the rights of the existing temporary employees were crystallised in the settlements and there is no question therefore of any legitimate expectation or estoppel, for neither of these can be superior to or improve upon contractual rights specially those arising out Of an industrial settlement. Therefore, it is contended that after the expiry of 31st March, 1997, the Bank having implemented the settlements by virtue of its terms, the panels have lapsed and the petitioners have no claim to be absorbed by appointment in the regular vacancies. It is contended that since the settlements between the parties have come into existence as per the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, they are binding on them and therefore, the petitioners cannot seek any right or relief against the terms and stipulations of the settlements and the reliefs claimed by them is opposed to the same, as such the writ petitions are not maintainable.
4. After the cut off date i.e. 31-3-1997 and as per the last settlement dated 30-7-1996, still large number of workmen-employees remained to be absorbed in the permanent vacancies. The respondents-petitioners are such employees who have preferred writ petitions, contending that the last settlement did not provide for lapsing of the empanelled candidates, which is not sustainable for that is not the intendment of the settlement, but the Bank is obliged to implement the empanelled candidates/workmen employees till all of them have been permanently absorbed in the Bank services or regularisation of their services by the Bank.
5. Mr. Harish N. Salve, Senior Advocate appearing for the Bank contends that Industrial Disputes Act is enacted which has made provisions for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes between the management and the workmen where the complete machinery is available under the ID Act and for interpretation of settlements. The remedy of the respondents-petitioners is available under Section 36-A of the ID Act. The settlements or contracts between the Bank and the Federation, invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court is not proper remedy for enforcing the contract and interpretation of terms of settlement, as the whole approach of the respondents-petitioners proceed^ on misconceived assumption, that the impugned letters dated 25-3-1997,27-3-1997 and 31-3-1997 issued by the Bank are the orders of oral termination of the respondents-petitioners services. But, these impugned letters are mere directives to ensure with the pernicious practice of engaging temporary employees to be discontinued. This was infect a term of the settlements itself and was based on Government of India’s guidelines in their letter dated 16-8-1990, which is placed, at paper book at page 69 and the approach paper on pages 70 to 74 of the paper book on the issue of temporary employees.
6. Mr. Salve submits that the following issues require consideration, namely :
(i) rights of the workers under the
settlements;
(ii) compliance by the Bank with the settlements;
(iii) effect of the alleged oral termination;
(iv) effect of the directive of the Government; and
(v) maintainability of writ petition.
7. The learned Counsel relies on-the judgment of the Supreme Court in R.K. Panda v. Steel Authority of India, , wherein their Lordships in paragraphs 5 and 7 of the judgment have observed as under :
Paragraph 5 : “Of late a trend amongst the contract labourers is discernible that after having worked for some years, they make a claim that they should be absorbed by the principal employer and be treated as the employees of the principal employer especially when the principal employer is the Central Government or the State Government or an authority which can be held to be State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, although no right flows from the provisions of the Act for the contract labourers to be absorbed or to become the employees of the principal employer. This Court in the case of Gammon India Ltd v. Union of India, (supra), pointed out the object and scope of the Act.”
Paragraph 7 : “It is true that with the passage of time and purely with a view to safeguard the interests of workers, many principal employers while renewing the contracts have been insisting that the contractor or the new contractor retains the old employees. In fact such a condition is incorporated in the contract itself. However, such a clause in the contract which is benevolently inserted in the contract to protect the continuance of the source of livelihood of the contract labour cannot by itself give rise to a right to regularisation in the employment of the principal employer. Whether the contract labourers have become the employees of the principal employer in course of time and whether the engagement and employment of labourers through a contractor is a mere camouflage and a smoke screen, as has been urged in this case, is a question of fact and has to be established by the contract labourers on the basis of the requisite material. It is not possible for the High Court or this Court, while exercising writ jurisdiction or jurisdiction under Article 136 to decide such questions, only on the basis of the affidavits. It need not be pointed out that in all such cases, the labourers are initially employed and engaged by the contractors.
As such at what point of time a direct link is established between the contract labourers and the principal employer, eliminating the contractor from the scene, is a matter which has to be established on material produced before the Court. Normally, the Labour Court and the Industrial Tribunal, under the Industrial Disputes Act are the competent fora to adjudicate such disputes on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence produced before them.”
8. He also relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kulchhinder Singh v. Hardayal Singh, , wherein their Lordships in paragraphs 10 and 11 have observed as under :
“Paragraph 10: “The reason why we are not inclined to add to the enormous erudition on the point already accumulated in case law is that a close perusal of the writ petition will disclose that essentially the appellant is seeking merely to enforce an agreement entered into between the employees and the Co-operative Bank.
Paragraph II : “There is no doubt that some of the legal problems argued by Sri Ramamurthy deserve in an appropriate case jurisprudential study in depth, although much of it is covered by authority. But assuming, for arguments sake, that what he urges has validity, the present case meets with its instant funeral from one fatal circumstance. The writ petition, stripped of embroidery and legalistics, stands naked as a simple contract between the staff and the Society, agreeing upon a certain percentage of promotions to various posts or an omnibus, all-embracing promise to give a quota to the existing employees. At its best, the writ petition seeks enforcement of a binding contract but the neat and necessary repellant is that the remedy of Article 226 is unavailable to enforce a contract qua contract. We fail to see how a supplier of chalk to a Government School or cheese to a Government Hospital can ask for a constitutional remedy under
Article 226 in the event of a breach of a contract, by-passing the normal channels of civil litigation. We are not convinced that a mere contract agreeing to a quota of promotions can be exalted into a service rule or statutory duty. What is immediately relevant is not whether the respondent is State or public authority but whether what is enforced is a statutory duty or sovereign obligation or public function of a public authority. Private law may involve a State, a statutory body, or a public body in contractual or tortious actions. But they cannot be siphoned off into the writ jurisdiction.”
9. He further contends that the entire case of the respondents-petitioners proceeds on a misconceived assumption, that the panel was in perpetuity i.e. as long as the employees are absorbed, it has its life irrespective of the cut off date i.e. 31-3-1997 under last settlement between the parties dated 30-7-1996, as the settlement itself provides that the panel will lapse or that is to say come to an end on the expiry of 31-3-1997.
10. He relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra, , wherein their Lordships in paragraph 10 of the judgment have observed as under :
“Notwithstanding the aforesaid Statutory Rule and without applying the mind to the aforesaid rule the High Court relying upon some earlier decisions of the Court came to hold that the list does not expire after a period of one year which on the face of it is erroneous. Further question that arises in this context is whether the High Court was justified in issuing the mandamus to the appellant to make recruitment of the writ petitioners. Under the Constitution a mandamus can be issued by the Court when the applicant establishes that he has a legal right to the performance of legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought and the said right was subsisting on the date of the petition. The duty that may be enjoined by mandamus may be one
imposed by the Constitution or a Statute or by Rules or Orders having the force of law. But no mandamus can be issued to direct the Government to refrain from enforcing the provisions of law or to do something which is contrary to law. This being the position and in view of the Statutory Rules contained in Rule 26 of the recruitment Rules we really fail to understand how the High Court could issue the impugned direction to recruit the respondents who were included in the select list prepared on 4-4-1987 and the list no longer survived after one year and the rights, if any, of persons included in the list did not subsist. In the course of hearing the learned Counsel for the respondents, no doubt have pointed out some materials which indicate that the Administrative Authorities have made the appointments from a list beyond the period of one year from its preparation. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that in some cases pursuant to the direction of the Court some appointments have been made but in some other cases it might have been done by the appointing authority. Even though we are persuaded to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondents that on some occasions appointments have been made by the appointing authority from a select list even after the expiry of one year from the date of selection but such an illegal action of the appointing authority does not confer a right on an applicant to be enforced by a Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that such appointments by the appointing authority have been made contrary to the provisions of the Statutory Rules for some unknown reason and we deprecate the practice adopted by the appointing authority in making such appointments contrary to the Statutory Rules. But at the same time it is difficult for us to sustain the direction given by the High Court since, admittedly, the life of the select list prepared on 4-4-1987 had
expired long since and the respondents who claim their rights to be appointed on the basis of such list did not have a subsisting right on the date they approached the High Court. We may not be understood to imply that the High Court must issue such direction, if the writ petition was filled before the expiry of the period of one year and the same was disposed of after the expiry of the statutory period. In view of the aforesaid conclusion of ours it is not necessary to deal with the question whether the stand of the State Government that there existed one vacancy in the “year 1987 is correct or not.”
11. Relying on the above three judgments, Mr. Salve submits that the writ is not the proper remedy for the respondents-petitioners, but they have to invoke the provisions of industrial Disputes Act for seeking their reliefs.
12. Mr. Salve relies on another judgment of the Supreme Court in Gammon India Ltd. v. Union of India, (supra), which is extracted at pages 1 and 2 of this judgment, wherein their Lordships have pointed out the object and scope of the ID Act.
13. Mr. S, Ramachandra Rao, Senior Advocate appearing for the respondents-petitioners seeks to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court basing his submissions on the principles of fairplay, equity, good conscientious and justice to exercise the power of judicial review to further the equity in favour of the respondents-petitioners though it is not denied that there is alternative remedy under the ID Act, but as the disengagement of the writ petitioners in the Bank affects their fundamental right to life, and rights under Articles 14, 16 and 21 can neither be waived nor taken away by any settlements, as the same would be unconstitutional, as there could be no waiver or abdication of fundamental rights and other proceedings or enactments are subordinate to the same. Hence, the Constitutional Court has a duty to render justice and enforce the fundamental rights.
14. He contends that by the impugned proceedings dated 25-3-1997, 27-3-1997 and 31-3-1997 by virtue of which the respondents-petitioners services were orally terminated; gives independent cause of action, apart from settlements, and that can be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution.
15. A perusal of the impugned proceedings referred to at pages 24, 25 and 26 of the paper book, is in the nature of a directive to the officers of the Bank that, on the advise of the Deputy General Manager, Zonal Office, Hyderabad that, as both the panels of temporary employees of 1989 and daily wagers/casual labour of 1992 will lapse by 31-3-1997, it has been decided by Central Office not to make any temporary appointments in messengerial category from 1-4-1997. He contends that these impugned proceedings are oral terminations of respondents-petitioners as a result of which about two thousand workmen-employees are jobless and they were on job for a longer period i.e. from few days to 18 years, and they cannot be deprovided of their livelihood, they and their family lives will be shattered.
16. Next, he contends that assurance was given by the Bank and there was legitimate expectation that the Bank would regularise the services of all the empanelled candidates until the panel list was exhausted, as such, by virtue of Doctrine of Legitimate Expectational and Promissory Estoppel arises in favour of the respondents-petitioners.
17. He ‘relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jacob M. Puthuparambil v. Kerala Water Authority, wherein their Lordships in paragraphs 8, 9 and 15 have held as under :
Paragraph 8 : “After we attained independence the pace of industrial growth accelerated. Our Constitution makers were aware of the hardships and insecurity faced by the working classes. The Preamble of our Constitution obligates the State to secure to all its citizens social and economic
justice, besides political justice. By the 42nd Amendment, the Preamble of the Constitution was amended to say that ours will be a socialistic democracy. In furtherance of these promises certain fundamental rights were engrafted in Part III of the Constitution. The Constitution guarantees ‘equality’, abhors discrimination, prohibits and penalises forced labour in any form whatsoever and extends protection against exploitation of labour including child labour. After extending these guarantees, amongst others, the Constitution makers proceeded to chart out the course for the governance of the country in Part IV of the Constitution entitled ‘Directive Principles of State Policy’. These principles reflect the hopes and aspirations of the people. Although the provisions of this part are not enforceable by any Court, the principles laid down therein are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and the State is under an obligation to apply them in making laws. The principles laid down therein, therefore, define the objectives and goals which the State must endeavour to achieve over a period of time. Therefore, whenever the State is required to make laws it must do so consistently with these principles with a view to securing social and economic freedom so essential for the establishment of an egalitarian society. This part, therefore mandates that the State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by minimising the inequalities in income and eliminating inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities; by directing its policy towards securing, amongst others, the distribution of the material resources of the community to subserve the common good; by so operating the economic system as not to result in concentration of wealth; and by making effective provision for securing the right to work as also to public assistance in cases of unemployment, albeit within the limits of its economic capacities. There are certain other provisions which
enjoin on the State certain duties, e.g. securing to all workers work, a living wage, just and humane conditions of work, a decent standard of life, participation in management, etc., which are aimed at improving the lot of the working classes. Thus the Preamble promises socio-economic justice, the fundamental rights confer certain justiciable socio-economic rights and the Directive Principles fix the socio-economic goals which the State must strive to attain. These three together constitute the core and conscience of the Constitution.
Paragraph 9 : India is a developing country. It has a vast surplus labour market. Large-scale unemployment offers a matching opportunity to the employer to exploit the needy. Under such market conditions the employer can dictate his terms of employment taking advantage of the absence of the bargaining power in the other. The unorganised job seeker is left with no option but to accept employment on take-it-or-lcave-it terms offered by the employer. Such terms of employment offer no job security and the employee is left to the mercy of the employer. Employers have betrayed an increasing tendency to employ temporary hands even on regular and permanent jobs with a view to circumventing the protection offered to the working classes under the benevolent legislations enacted from time to time. One such device adopted is to get the work done through contract labour. It is in this backdrop that we must consider the request for regularisation in service.
Paragraph 15 : “Now to the text of Rule 9(a)(i) of the Rules. It empowers the appointing authority to appoint a person temporarily otherwise than in accordance wit the rule if (i) it is necessary in public interest, and (ii) where an emergency has arisen to fill any particular post which has fallen vacant, immediately. In the present case it is difficult to say that all appointments made after 1st April, 1984
were required to be filled immediately because of an emergency of the type contemplated by the said rule. On the contrary it seems appointments were routinely made in purported exercise of power conferred by this rule. The proviso on which reliance is placed, which we have extracted earlier, merely states that ordinarily such appointments will be of those persons who possess the requisite qualifications for the post. If any person who does not possess the requisite qualifications is appointed under the said clause, he will be liable to be replaced by a qualified person. Clause (iii) of Rule 9 states that a person appointed under clause (i) shall, as soon as possible, be replaced by a member of the service or an approved candidate qualified to hold the post. Clause (e) of Rule 9, however, provided for regularisation of service of any person appointed under clause (i) of sub-rule (a) if he had completed continuous service of two years on December 22, 1973, notwithstanding anything contained in the rules. This is a clear indication mat in the past the Government also considered it just and fair to regularise the services of those who had been in continuous service for two years prior to the cut-off date. The spirit underlying this treatment clearly shows that the Government did not consider it just, fair or reasonable to terminate the services of those who were in employment for a period of two or more years prior to the cut-off date. This approach is quite consistent with the spirit of the rule which was intended to be invoked to serve emergent situations which could not brook delay. Such appointments were intended to be stop-gap temporary appointments to serve the stated purpose and not long term ones. The rule was not intended to fill a large number of posts in the service but only those which could not be kept vacant till regular appointments were made in accordance with the rules. But once the appointments continued for long, the services had to be regularised in the
incumbent possessed the requisite qualifications as was done by sub-rule (e). Such an approach alone would be consistent, with the constitutional philosophy adverted to earlier. Even otherwise, the rule must be so interpreted, if the language of the rule permits, as will advance this philosophy of the Constitution. If the rule is so interpreted it seems clear to us that employees who have been working on the establishment since long, and who possess the requisite qualifications for the job as obtaining on the date of their employment must be allowed to continue on their jobs and their services should be regularised. It is unfair and unreasonable to remove people who have been rendering service since sometime as such removal has serious consequences. The family of the employee which has settled down and accommodated its needs to the emoluments received by the bread winner will face economic ruination of the job is suddenly taken away. Besides, the precious period of early life devoted in the service of the establishment will be wholly wasted and the incumbent may be rendered ‘age barred’ for securing a job elsewhere. It is indeed unfair to use him, generate hope and a feeling of security in him, attune his family to live within his earnings and then suddenly to throw him out of job. Such behaviour would be an affront to the concept of job security and would run counter to the constitutional philosophy, particularly the concept of right to work in Article 41 of the Constitution. Therefore, if we interpret Rule 9(a)(i) consistently with the spirit and philosophy of the Constitution, which it is permissible to do without doing violence to the said rule, it follows that employees who are serving on the establishment for long spells and have the requisite qualifications for the job should not be thrown out but their services should be regularised as far as possible. Since workers belonging to this batch have worked on their posts for reasonably long spells they are entitled to regularisation in service.”
18. A perusal of the said judgment reflects that it has no application to the contextual facts of the instant case.
19. He also relies on a judgment of the Supreme Court in O.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries, , wherein their Lordships in paragraphs 12 and 14 have held as under :
Paragraph 12 : “Therefore, fair play in action requires that the procedure adopted must be just, fair and reasonable. The manner of exercise of the power and its impact on the rights of the person affected would be in conformity with the principles of natural justice. Article 21 clubs life with liberty, dignity of person with means of livelihood without which the glorious content of dignity of person would be reduced to animal existence. When it is interpreted that the colour and content of procedure established by law must be in conformity with the minimum fairness and processual justice, it would relieve legislative callousness despising opportunity of being heard and fair opportunities of defence. Article 14 has a pervasive processual potency and versatile quality, equalitarian in its soul and allergic to discriminatory dictates. Equality is the antithesis of arbitrariness. It is, thereby, conclusively held by this Court that the principles of natural justice are part of Article 14 and the procedure prescribed by law must be just, feir and reasonable.”
Paragraph 14: “It is thus well-settled law that right to life enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution would include right to livelihood. The order of termination of the service of an employee/workman visits with civil consequences of jeopardising not only his/her livelihood but also career and livelihood of dependants. Therefore, before taking any action putting an end to the tenure of an employee/workman fair play requires that a reasonable opportunity to put forth his case is given and domestic inquiry conducted complying with the principles of natural justice.”
20. The above judgment has no application to the facts of the instant case.
21. He also relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in H.D. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India, .
22. The above judgment has no relevance to the facts of the instant case.
23. He also relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Punjab and Sind Bank, , wherein their Lordships in paragraph 13 of the judgment have held as under :
“It appears from the averments made in the counter-affidavit on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that in the relevant year 290 candidates were directly recruited to the Junior Management Grade (Scale I) and 318 candidates were promoted from the cadre to the said scale. There is no dispute that in accordance with the order of this Court dated February 10, 1986 in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 13708 of 1984, the vacancies in the Junior Management Grade (Scale I) have to be filled in by the promotees and direct recruits in the proportion of 75% and 25% respectively. So when 290 candidates have been recruited directly to the said post of Junior Management Grade (Scale 1), three times of that number i.e. 870 has to be filled up by promotion but only about 318 candidates were promoted. As such it is incumbent on the respondent Bank to fill up the remaining quota by promotion in the vacancies that are at present available and also vacancies which will occur hereafter. Unless and until the said panel of 603 candidates is exhausted by promoting them to the post of Junior Management Grade (Scale I), the Bank cannot be permitted to hold fresh tests and interview for selecting candidates for empanelling them for filling up the available vacancies. The ends of justice and fair play in the facts and circumstances of the case demand that the Bank is under an obligation to comply with the terms of the
settlement as per order of this Court and to promote the employees of the Bank whose names are included in the panel. Unless and until all the employees in the panel are promoted in terms of the settlement referred to hereinbefore the Bank is not entitled to hold fresh tests or make fresh panel for the post of Junior Management Grade (Scale I).”
24. This case also has no application to the facts of the instant case for in this case there was a clause in the settlement itself. In the above case, their Lordships nave held that Bank is under an obligation to comply with the terms of the settlements as per the order of this Court and to promote the employees of the Banks whose names arc included in the panel. But, in the instant case neither there is an order of any Court nor there is a term in the settlement. As such, it has no application.
25. He also relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. M.P. Sharma, .
26. The ratio of this case has no application to the facts of the present case. It deals only with the ad hoc appointments. After the select list-candidates in waiting list are exhausted and there is no question of settlement between the parties.
27. The issue involves in this case pertains to the power of this Court to interfere and find out whether the Bank has implemented the settlements entered into with the Federation and has absorbed all the temporary employees/daily wage casual workers/empanelled workers/subordinate staff.
28. It is contended by Mr. Salve that the Court would not embark upon an enquiry with regard to the implementation or otherwise of the settlements, which depends upon the facts to be adduced on the basis of oral and documentary evidence placed before it and not on the basis of affidavits in writ proceedings. When there is an effective
alternative remedy under the provisions of the ID Act, and the dispute between the parties is within the ambit and scope of the Act and provisions which are intended for investigation and settlements of industrial disputes between the parties, the writ proceedings are not maintainable.
29. It has been strenuously contended
by Mr. Salve, that the learned single Judge
clearly fell into an error and came to an
erroneous conclusion by reason or factum,
by assessment of the merits of the matter and
that issued directions criticising the officials
of the Bank, and also to initiate contempt
proceedings against the respondent officials
of the Bank which is unwarranted.
30. We concur with above submission and we hold that the learned single Judge, in our view, completely fell in error in going into the matter in such a detail which is not otherwise within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the writ Court.
31. It has been contended that the writ Court ought not to embark upon an enquiry into the factual matrix of the situation. The authority of the law Court which is vested in the power of judicial review, in such matters entertaining writ petition is very restricted and limited and the law Court ought not to usurp the function of the statutory functionaries under the Industrial Disputes Act.
32. In the contextual facts and relying on the decision in R.K. Panda v. Steel Authority of India, (supra), we are very clear in our view that the matter does not fall within the sphere of judicial reviewability. Following the above decision of the Supreme Court, we hold that writ is not maintainable, and respondents-petitioners have to seek relief for their grievances in the appropriate forum under the provisions of the ID Act and not by invoking the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
33. We refrain from expressing any opinion of the various contentions advanced by Mr. Salve and Mr. S. Ramachandra Rao,
which are involved in this case, for we are very clear in our mind that the matter has to be dealt with and settled by the parties under the provisions of the ID Act and not by resorting to the writ jurisdiction of this Court.
34. In this view of the matter, these writ appeals succeeds. The writ petitions are dismissed and the order of the learned single Judge in WP No.9206 of 1997 and batch, dated 1-1-1998 stands set aside. No order as to costs.