ORDER
Dalveer Bhandari, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment of Shri Bhola Dutt, learned Sub-Judge, Delhi. The respondent, the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company Limited (in short DCM) filed a suit for possession and recovery of damages before Shri Bhola Dutt, learned Sub-Judge, Delhi. The learned Sub-Judge by his judgment decreed the plaintiff’s suit.
The appellant aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Sub-Judge, Delhi, has preferred this appeal. Brief facts which are necessary to dispose off this appeal are recapitulated in succeeding paragraphs.
2. According to the appellant, he joined the respondent company on 2.2.1942 and continued with the respondent company until his retirement, i.e., on 30.10.1985. According to the appellant, he had taken a residential quarter No. 36, Lalkot, Kanisht Lane, Municipal House, 9173 Ward No. 16-E, Gaushala Marg, Kishan Ganj, Delhi initially at a monthly rent of Rs.10/- which was later on increased to Rs.42.70 per month. It is further mentioned that this amount used to be deducted from the salary of the appellant. In January, 1986, immediately after the retirement of the appellant, the respondent company served a notice upon the appellant calling upon him to vacate and hand over the possession of the quarter in question. The respondent company further required the appellant to pay the damages at the rate of Rs.400/- per month with effect from 16.1.1986. The suit of the respondent company was decreed on 14.2.1989. The judgment and the decree of the learned Sub-Judge have been assailed before this Court. It is mentioned that the residential quarter given to the appellant was not on a licence but on a lease basis. The judgment of the trial court was also challenged on the ground that the trial court erred in holding that mere writing the word ‘Tenant’ over the document does not mean that there was a tenancy and the appellant was a tenant. It is further mentioned that in absence of any written agreement between the parties, the learned trial court ought to have relied upon the documents as produced by the appellant.
3. According to the appellant, the trial court also erred in holding that mere use of word in any receipt or writing will not make any person tenant or the landlord. The various receipts placed on record show that the appellant was paying rent of the premises.
4. The judgment of the trial court was assailed on the ground that the trial court erred in awarding the damages at the rate of Rs.400/- per month in favour of the respondent company particularly when the respondent company nowhere on record proved that Rs.400/- per month was just and equitable rate of damages of the premises in question. The onus to prove that the prevailing rate of rent in the market was Rs.400/- had to be discharged by the respondent company, which the respondent failed to discharge.
5. The appellant also submitted that in absence of any evidence produced by the respondent company, no decree could be passed in favour of the respondent company for the damages at the rate of Rs.400/- per month for the premises in dispute. The judgment of the trial court was also challenged on the ground that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit.
6. The case of the respondent company is that the appellant was employed in the respondent company on 2.2.1942 and during the course of his employment, the respondent company gave the premises in question to the appellant on licence on 16.4.1963. According to the respondent, the appellant was allowed to use the premises as a licensee on the condition that he could use it so long as he remained as an employee of the respondent company. The appellant retired from the service on 30.10.1985 and the allotment of the quarter in his favour stood terminated from that date. The appellant became liable to hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the quarter in question to the respondent company after his retirement. When the possession of quarter was not handed over then on 11.1.1986, a notice was served upon the appellant calling upon him to vacate and hand over the possession of the premises to the respondent company. Since the appellant failed and neglected to hand over the possession of the premises, the suit for possession and damages was filed against the appellant.
7. The appellant expired on 6.3.1991 and his legal heirs were brought on record. The trial court framed the following issues :
1. Whether the suit is barred under Section 50 of DRC Act? OPD.
2. Whether the plaintiff has no right or title to file the present suit? OPD.
3. Whether the plaint is signed by a duly authorised person? OPP.
4. Whether the defendant is a tenant? OPD.
5. Whether the plaintiff has any right to claim damages? OPP.
6. Whether any cause of action has ever arisen? OPP.
7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for possession? OPP.
8. Whether the defendant was a licensee? OPP.
9. Relief.
8. Issue No. ‘4’ and ‘8’ relate to the fact whether the appellant was a tenant or a licensee and these issues have been decided together. The trial court referred to the statement of Jagat Singh, PW-3 working in the establishment of the respondent company, appeared on behalf of the respondent company. He had deposed that the appellant was allotted the quarter in dispute as a licensee and after his retirement, his licence to use the quarter stood terminated. He also mentioned in the cross-examination that the licence fee was increased from time to time. PW-3 also mentioned that the appellant was informed that in case he failed to vacate the quarter, he would be required to pay damages for wrongful use and occupation of the quarter at the rate of Rs.400/- per month with effect from 16.1.1986. Despite notice the appellant failed to vacate the quarter in question. The respondent also examined B.L. Batra, PW-1, Rajbir Singh, PW-2, P.S. Jain, PW-4, Anil Aggarwal, PW-5 apart from Jagat Singh P.W.3to prove its case.
9. On behalf of the appellant other than himself Narender Pratap DW-2 and Moti Lal, DW-3 were also examined. The appellant admitted that he had joined the respondent company in 1942 and retired in 1985. He also mentioned that he was living in the quarter since 1963 in the capacity of a tenant. He also admitted that he had received a notice of termination of licence from the respondent company. He also mentioned that there were 1,200 quarters of respondent company and there were 5,000 employees. The appellant admitted that the colony was surrounded by a boundary wall. DW-3 Moti Lal mentioned in his evidence that it is correct that the respondent company gave the houses to its employees for their residential purposes. The learned trial court gave categoric finding that the quarter in question was allotted to the appellant only on licence and the appellant was a licensee and not a tenant. The issue No. ‘1’ relates to whether the appellant was entitled to possession? The issue Nos. 6 and 7 relate to whether any cause of action had arisen and the plaintiff respondent was entitled to possession. The trial court gave categoric finding that after retirement of the appellant from the service of the respondent company he had to vacate the quarter and hand over peaceful possession to the respondent which he had not done.
10. In this view of the matter, the respondent is entitled to possession as well as damages. The trial court while giving finding on issue No. ‘5’, had mentioned that Jagat Singh, PW-3 had deposed that the defendant is also liable to pay damages for wrongful use and occupation of the quarter at the rate of Rs.400/- per month from 16.1.1986. As a matter of fact, the appellant was given notice to this effect immediately after his superannuation from the service.
11. The learned counsel for the appellant reiterated the same arguments before this Court and submitted that the appellant was not a licensee but a tenant and could not be evicted from the quarter in question even after his superannuation from the respondent company. The appellant also submitted that he was put in possession exclusively in the quarter, therefore, he was given the premises as a tenant and not as a licensee.
12. The respondent also submitted that the controversy involved in this suit is no longer res-integra. It is submitted that the respondent company had 1200 quarters and these quarters were allotted to their employees on licence basis and after their superannuation these quarters had to revert to the company. For allotment of the quarter a small licence fee used to be charged by the respondent company. This court in a number of exactly similar suits and appeals had occasions to examine the same controversy. This Court unanimously in a large number of proceedings came to a categoric conclusion that the quarters in question were allotted to the employees as long as they were in service and after their superannuation, the quarters had to revert to the company. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that except for the appellant’s legal heirs/representatives all other quarters have been vacated.
13. The issue whether the quarter allotted to the appellant was on a lease or a licence basis, has also been examined in a number of cases of the respondent company (concerning its various employees at various stages). Single Benches, Division Benches, and Full Benches of this Court and even the Hon’ble Supreme Court also on various occasions had examined this very
issue concerning the similarly placed other former employees of the respondent company in a number of cases. It may be pertinent to reproduce the findings which were arrived at by the various courts.
13.1 In R.S.A. No. 62/86, Shri Kedari Singh Vs. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd., Usha Mehra, J., learned Single Judge of this Court observed as under:
“the quarter was allotted as a personal privilege to stay in the quarter of the company for greater convenience of his work. The intention of the parties become clear that the allotment was only a licence and not lease. As soon as the services were dispensed with on account of retirement the employee was required to hand back the quarter to the employer. No right vested in the land separate and distinct from the contract of service”.
13.2 M.S.A. Siddiqui, J. of this Court in the matter of Arun Mudgil & Another Vs. D.C.M. Ltd. R.S.A. No. 17/96 observed as under:
“the licensee by virtue of his employment in the respondent company was permitted to occupy the suit accommodation for the greater convenience of his work. It appears that primary object of the allotment of the suit accommodation was to secure the service of the defendant and the accommodation was a subsidiary object. Thus, the licensee’s employment in the respondent company was a circumstance justifying the creation of a licence. From the facts and circumstances surrounding and appertaining the transaction, it is clear that it was a licence and not a lease.”
13.3 In R.S.A. No. 60/97, Mohd. Shamim, J. of this Court observed that
“Hence the appellants have no right, title or interest to retain the possession over the disputed property”
13.4 Thereafter, the matter has been dealt by the Full Bench of this Court and by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and some of their findings are reproduced hereunder and in the following paragraphs:
“In the present case we find that the terms of the licence, which we have reproduced above, clearly show that this document does not create a relationship of landlord and tenant between the company and its workmen.”
This order has been upheld by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in a special leave petition preferred against this order.
14. This Court had also taken the same view in the judgment dated 27.3.1989 delivered by this Division Bench in a large number of applications which came up for consideration in C.W.P. No. 2476/88. This order has also been upheld by the Supreme Court in a special leave petition filed against the said judgment. In view of the findings of a number of courts including the Hon’ble Supreme Court in respect of similarly placed other employees of the respondent company, no infirmity can be found in the findings arrived at in the impugned judgment and the findings are accordingly affirmed.
15. The findings of trial court are based mostly on appreciation of oral evidence. Whether the appellant is a tenant or licencee depended on appreciation of the statement of appellant (DW.1) and Jagat Singh (PW1). It is a case of oath against oath. Jagat Singh has been believed as against the appellant. Such a case is hardly open for interference in appeal more so in
view of the several judicial findings referred to in previous paragraphs.
16. The appeal filed by the appellant is totally devoid of any merit and is dismissed accordingly. Ordinarily this appeal ought to have been dismissed with costs but in view of the fact that the appellant was an ex workman, now survived by his legal representatives therefore, we refrain from imposing any costs and direct the parties to bear their own costs. The appellant’s legal representatives are directed to hand over the vacant possession of the quarter in question by 30.9.1998.