PETITIONER: DELHI ADMINISTRATION Vs. RESPONDENT: GURDIP SINGH UBAN AND ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/08/1999 BENCH: Sujata Manohar, M.Jagannadha Rao JUDGMENT:
M. JAGANNADHA RAO,J.
Leave granted.
These two Civil Appeals have been filed by the Delhi
administration against the judgment of the Delhi High Court
in C.W.P. No. 920 of 1986 dated 17.12.1996. The
respondents are the owners of an extent of about 2.50 acres
in Chattrapur village. The notifications, in fact, covered
land of an extent of about 50,000 Bighas in thirteen
villages. The Writ petition was allowed under the impugned
judgment and the notifications were quashed.
The brief facts of the case are follows: The
Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act
was issued on 25.11.1980 while the declaration under Section
6 was published on 7.6.1985. Initially, the declaration
under Section 6 was challenged in C.W.P. No.1639 of 1985
and 76 other writ petitions and were referred to a Full
Bench of the Delhi High Court on a certain legal issue. The
Full Bench decided the point and upheld the Section 6
declaration. The contention before the Full Bench was that
the declaration under Section 6 was issued more than 3 years
after the Section 4(1) notification and was, therefore, bad
in law. The submission was that even though there were
various stay orders in several Writ petitions by the High
Court in relation to the operation of the Section 6
declaration, they were all individual orders passed in the
cases of various Writ petitioners and hence these orders
could not be treated as amounting to a suspension of the
entire Section 6 declaration and hence the said declaration
must be struck down as time barred in respect of others who
did not obtain stay orders. The Full Bench of the High
Court rejected the above contention holding that the scheme
for which the land was acquired was an integrated one and
the stay orders even if obtained in individual cases
necessarily resulted in precluding any further proceedings
being taken under the Section 6 declaration. Excluding the
time covered by the stay orders, the Section 6 declaration
must, it was held, be deemed to have been issued in time.
On that reasoning, the notification under Section 4(1) and
Section 6 were declared valid by the Full Bench. The other
points raised by individual Writ petitioners, namely that
the inquiry under Section 5A was vitiated etc., were not
decided by the Full Bench and for that purpose the matters
were sent back to a Division Bench. The judgment of the
Full Bench dated 25.7.87 is reported in Balak Ram Gupta vs.
Union of India AIR 1987 Delhi 239. Thereafter, the 73
matters were listed before a Division Bench which finally
disposed of the writ petitions by a separate judgment
reported as B.R. Gupta Vs. Union of India on 18.11.1988 (
37 (1989) DLT 150). The Writ petitions were allowed and the
Section 6 declaration was quashed on the ground that the
Section 5A inquiry was vitiated etc. ( There is dispute as
to whether the declaration was wholly quashed). The said
judgment was not appealed against by the Delhi
Administration. The present Writ petition was filed on
23.4.1986 for quashing the same notification dated
25.11.1980 and 7.6.1985 issued under Sections 4(1) and 6.
It related to Khasra Nos. 704/1, 706/2, 706/3, 707/2, 714,
715/2, 909/2, 10/2 and 693.
When the present Writ petition came up for hearing
before a Division Bench on 17.12.1996, the writ petitioners
contended that by the judgment of the Division Bench
rendered in B.R. Gupta dated 18.11.88 – i.e. after the
Full Bench judgment dated 25.7.87 – the entire Section 6
declaration stood quashed and that even though these writ
petitioners ( respondents in these Civil Appeals) had not
filed any objections under Section 5A of the Act, they were
entitled to rely upon the earlier Division Bench judgment of
18.11.88 and contend that the entire Section 6 declaration
was quashed. This contention was accepted by the Division
Bench under the impugned judgment dated 17.12.1996. The
Division Bench held that the earlier judgment resulted in
the entirety of the Section 6 declaration being quashed and
was a judgment in rem and hence the writ petitioners could
rely on that judgment even though they had not filed any
objections under Section 5A. The result, according to the
appellants, of Section 6 declaration being quashed would be
that the Section 4(1) notification would also lapse. It is
against the above judgment that the Delhi Administration has
preferred these appeals.
In these appeals, the learned counsel for the
appellant Ms. Geeta Luthra contended before us that in a
similar appeal preferred to this Court decided by a three
Judge Bench in Abhey Ram and Ors. Vs. Union of India
(J.T.1997(5) SC 354), in respect of the same group of
notifications it was held that in the case of owners who had
not filed objections under Section 5A, they could not take
advantage of the judgment of the Division Bench in
B.R.Gupta’s case dated 18.11.1988. It was also held that
upon a proper understanding of the judgment of the Division
Bench dated 18.11.1988, it could not be held that the
entirety of the Section 6 notification stood quashed by the
said judgment. The above contention of the learned counsel
for the Delhi Administration was supported by the learned
senior counsel for the Delhi Development Authority, Sri
Ravinder Sethi.
On the other hand, it was contended by Sri P.N.
Lekhi, learned senior counsel for the respondents (Writ
petitioners ) that the Division Bench of the High Court in
its impugned judgment was right in holding that the Division
Bench in B.R.Gupta’ case, in its judgment dated 18.11.1988,
had quashed the entire Section 6 declaration and this was
clear from the language employed in that judgment. The
appellant could not be permitted to blow hot and cold for,
in order to say that the Section 6 declaration was not time
barred, the appellant had contended before the Full Bench in
B.R.Gupta’s case that stay orders obtained by some would
amount to stay of the entire Section 6 declaration and that
on the same parity of reasoning, the subsequent judgment of
the Division Bench in B.R. Gupta’s case must be deemed to
have quashed the entirety of the Section 6 declaration. A
passage in the Full Bench judgment that the notification
could not remain partially stayed or partially suspended was
also relied upon. Reference was also made to another
judgment of this Court in Delhi Development Authority Vs.
Sudan Singh ( 1991 D.L.T. 602 (SC) = 1997(50 SCC 430) dated
20.9.91 where a two Judge Bench of this Court upheld another
judgment of the High Court. In that case, as in the present
case before us, the High Court had allowed the Writ petition
filed by Sudan Singh who had contended that the entire
Section 6 declaration was quashed by the Division Bench in
B.R. Gupta’s case in the judgment dated 18.11.88. Sudan
Singh did not also file objection under Section 5A. It was
argued that in Abhey Ram’s case decided by the three Judge
Bench on 22.4.97, though Sudan Singh’s case was referred to,
the appropriate paragraphs were not noticed. The
appropriate paragraphs in the Division Bench judgment in
B.R. Gupta’s case dated 18.11.88 were also not noticed. In
yet another case relating to one B.L. Sharma, another writ
petition, C.W.P. 2365/90 was allowed on 6.12.90 and special
leave petition (C) 3604/92 was dismissed by this Court
following the judgment in Sudan Singh’s case. It is also
contended that in the letter of the Joint Secretary dated
31.3.1989, the legal opinion obtained by the department was
that the judgment of the Division Bench dated 18.11.88 would
cover cases where land was not taken possession of – as in
the present case. It is accepted that the respondent did
not file objections under Section 5A but it is said that
this was because he was an Army Officer who at that time was
working in the forward areas.
We may state that it is true that in Sudan Singh’s
case a two Judge Bench of this Court confirmed another
judgment of the Delhi High Court wherein the High Court had
allowed the writ petition on the basis that the judgment of
the Division Bench dated 18.11.1988 had quashed the Section
6 declaration wholly. It is also true that in Sudan Singh’s
case too no objections were filed by the owners under
section 5A. But, we are governed by the judgment of the
three Judge Bench in Abhey Ram’s case where the said Bench
not only referred to the effect of the Division Bench
judgment of the High Court dated 18.11.88 but also referred
to the judgment of the two Judge Bench of this Court in
Sudan Singh’s case. The three Judge Bench in Abhey Ram is
binding on us in preference to the judgment of two Judges in
Sudan Singh.
In connection with owners or persons interested who
have not filed objections under Section 5A, in principle, it
must be accepted that they had no objection to Section 4
notification operating in respect of their property. On the
other hand, in respect of those who filed objections, they
might have locus standi to contend that Section 5A inquiry
was not conducted properly. We, therefore, agree in
principle with the view of the three Judge Bench in Abhey
Ram’s case that whose who have not filed objections under
Section 5A, could not be allowed to contend that the Section
5A inquiry was bad and that consequently Section 6
declaration must be struck down and that then the section 4
notification would lapse. If, therefore, no objections were
filed by the respondents, logically the Section 6
declaration must be deemed to be in force so far as they are
concerned.
But learned senior counsel for the respondents
contends that the judgment of the Division Bench dated
18.11.1988 in B.R. Gupta’s case had quashed the entire
Section 5A proceedings and that even in case the respondents
had filed objections, the position would not have been
different. We cannot accept this contention. We are of the
view that in respect of those who did not object to the
Section 4(1) notification by filing objections under Section
5A, the said notification must be treated as being in force.
The writ petitioners cannot be permitted to contend that in
some other cases, the notification was quashed and that such
quashing would also enure to their benefit.
Then coming to the effect of the judgment of the
Division Bench dated 18.11.88 of the High Court, we are of
the view that the three Judge Bench judgment in Abhey Ram’s
case has interpreted or declared the effect of the said High
Court judgment dated 18.11.88. That judgment is binding on
us. We cannot go by the two Judge Bench judgment in Sudan
Singh’s case because we are bound by the judgment of the
three Judge Bench in Abhey Ram’s case. Further, the
judgment in Abhey Ram’s case takes notice of Sudan Singh’s
case and it cannot be contended that they have not looked
fully into the judgment in Sudan Singh’s case or fully into
the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court dated
18.11.88 in B.R.Gupta’s case. Nor is the dismissal of the
special leave petition in B.L.Sharma’s case a precedent
which can outweigh Abhey Ram. The opinion of the legal
department of Government or the Delhi Development Authority
which is relied upon – apart from not having binding force,
cannot override Abhey Ram’s case.
Reliance was then placed by the learned senior counsel
for the respondents on Oxford English School Vs. Govt. of
Tamil Nadu ( 1995 (5) SCC 206) but it has no relevance to
the question before us viz whether a notification under
Section 6 can be upheld in respect of only some of the lands
covered by it. Also a three Judge Bench in N. Narasimhaiah
Vs. State of Karnataka (1996 (3) SCC 88 ) has held that the
said judgment has been rendered per incuriam. So far as the
other contention that the Government cannot blow hot and
cold, we are of the view that the reasoning given by the
Full Bench in its judgment dated 25.7.87 was confined to the
question whether Section 6 declaration was time barred. The
Court held that as the scheme was an integrated one, stay of
parts of it precluded the authorities from going ahead with
the entire section 6 declaration. That reasoning cannot
help the respondents to contend that the same thing would
apply to the quashing of the declaration by the Division
Bench in its judgment dated 18.11.1988. Quashing the
notification in the cases of individual writ petitions
cannot be treated as quashing the whole of it. That was
what was held in Abhey Ram’s case. The main points raised
before us are fully covered by the judgment of the three
Judge Bench in Abhey Ram’s case.
For the aforesaid reasons, these Civil Appeals are
allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside and
the Writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as
to costs.