JUDGMENT
Surya Kant, J.
1. A suit for possession of a shop which is in the shape of a “Tavela” situated on the ground floor of building bearing Khana Shumari 956/V blue plate 688/V-7 black plate near Aggarwal Hospital, Bazar Lachhman Sar, Amritsar was filed by the petitioner under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), inter alia, pleading that he was a tenant under the defendant/respondent at a monthly rent of Rs. 50/- which had been paying regularly to the landlord, namely, the present respondent, however, no receipt was ever issued to him, defendant Bua Dass died during the pendency of the suit and his legal representatives were brought on record. It was alleged that the respondent started demanding increased rent, to which the petitioner did not agree and in the morning of November 7, 1978, the respondent-defendant threw out the medicines as well as other belongings of the plaintiff-petitioner from the aforementioned shop, the defendant-respondents were in the company of Yashpal, Subhash, Jagdish Kumar, Mehar Chand and others besides two/three women, they also took away the money as well as the ring and medical apparatus belonging to the petitioner (plaintiff) and took forcible possession of the shop to which a lock was put by the defendant-respondents. Since the property was situated in the urban area of Amritsar and was governed by the provisions of Punjab urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, the defendant-respondents could not have taken forcible possession from the petitioner without having recourse to law. On the basis of these averments, a decree for possession was sought.
2. The aforementioned suit was, however, contested by the legal representatives of Bua Dass, sole defendant, who died during the pendency of the suit. In their written statement filed on 1.1.1989, they disputed the tenancy of the petitioner in the shop in question, as well as the question of fixation of any rent, the payment of any rent to deceased Bua Dass was denied and it was alleged that one Mehar Chand was inducted as a licencee by their predecessor in part of the premises and his licence was revoked on November 4, 1978, Mehar Chand named above, was inducted as a licenpee in the shop as he used to administer injections to the defendant (Bua Dass) who remained under treatment for five years before his death, the plaintiff-petitioner was only assisting Mehar Chand in the medical profession, he was now trying to create some false evidence about his occupation of the premises, though he was never inducted as a tenant, the factum of electricity connection being in the name of the plaintiff-petitioner was also disputed. Similarly, allegations regarding forcible dispossession were denied and it was asserted that the occupation of the demised property stood delivered to the deceased defendant (Bua Dass) through his son Yashpal on 4.11.1978 as the licencee of Mehar Chand was revoked and he ceased to occupy the same.
3. On the basis of these pleadings, the learned Civil Court framed issues on 16.7.1989 including as to whether the petitioner had taken the disputed property on rent from late Shri Bua Dass and was dispossessed forcibly on 7.11.1978. On an appreciation of evidence, learned Civil Court decided the aforesaid issue against the plaintiff-petitioner holding that neither he was a tenant in the premises nor was he dispossessed forcibly as alleged by him. Consequently, the summary suit initiated under Section 6 of the Act was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 1.6.1981. Aggrieved by the aforementioned judgment that the plaintiff-petitioner has filed the present revision petition.
4. I have heard Shri Suvir Sehgal, learned counsel for the petitioner and have perused the record.
5. The scope of a suit filed under Section 6 of the Act is quite limited, inasmuch as, the Court is required to hold summary proceedings in relation to lawful possession of the aggrieved plaintiff and his dispossession therefrom in an unlawful manner. It is only when both the factors are established that the Court is competent to issue a decree in relation to restoration of possession in favour of the plaintiff. It is for this precise reason that no appeal or review is maintainable against such decree as provided under sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act. Equally, when the suit is dismissed no appeal is maintainable against the same, though the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure may interfere if a strong case within the parameters laid down for invoking powers under Section 115 of the Code is made out. In the case in hand, the findings recorded by the learned Civil Court on issue No. 1 are self-speaking. The issue in question was primarily required to be decided on appreciation of oral evidence available on record. The learned Civil Court has given a firm finding of fact that neither the petitioner was a tenant in the shop in question nor was he dispossessed forcibly by the respondent. Such a finding having been returned on appreciation of the oral evidence and there being no other material evidence to the contrary on record, I am of the view that no ground to interfere in such finding of facts in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court is made out.
6. My aforementioned view finds support from a recent judgment of the Apex Court in Sanjay Kumar Pandey and Ors. v. Gulbahar Sheikh and Ors., 2004(3) ALD 38 (SC). In paragraph 4 of the judgment, their Lordships have held that:-
“A suit under Section 6 of the Act is often called a summary suit inasmuch as the enquiry in the suit under Section 6 is confined to finding out the possession and dispossession within a period of six months from the date of the institution of the suit ignoring the question of title. Sub-section (3) of Section 6 provides that no appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section. No review of any such order or decree is permitted. The remedy of a person unsuccessful in a suit under Section 6 of the Act is to file a regular suit establishing his title to the suit property and in the event of his succeeding he will be entitled to recover possession of the property notwithstanding the adverse decision under Section 6 of the Act. Thus, as against a decision under Section 6 of the Act, the remedy of unsuccessful party is to file a suit based on title. The remedy of filing a revision is available but that is only within the well-settled parameters of the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code.”
7. Consequently, this revision petition is dismissed. However, the petitioner (plaintiff) is at liberty to institute a regular suit for declaration and/or possession in accordance with law, if so advised.