ORDER
B. Prakash Rao, J.
1. The petitioner, who is the Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Bhimadole, West Godavari District, filed this writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus challenging the orders of suspension dated 9.5.2002 passed by the District Collector, West Godavari, Eluru the respondent No. 2 herein in exercise of powers under Section 249(6) of the A.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (for short, the ‘Act’).
2. The brief facts which are necessary for the purpose of deciding this case are, that the petitioner was elected as the Sarpanch of Bhimadole in August, 2001 as an independent candidate, in the post reserved for Scheduled Caste and he has been discharging his functions to the satisfaction of one and all. However, by the impugned orders dated 9.5.2002, the respondent No.2, acting on the letter dated 30th April, 2002 from the Deputy Superintendent of Police, A.C.B., Eluru stating that he was caught in a trap while receiving bribe of Rs.300/- from one Krupanandam, husband of Smt. Dayamani, suspended him for a period of three months, by invoking the provisions of Section 249(6) of the Act. Subsequently the suspension was extended for further period of three months with effect from 9.8.2002 under Section 249(1) of the said Act, by the Government/the respondent No. 1, herein.
3. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that as per the 1st proviso to Sub-clause (6) of Section 249 of the Act, before passing the orders of suspension the person concerned has to be provided with an opportunity of being heard against the proposed action, but whereas. In this case no such opportunity or notice was given to explain or to submit any representation as contemplated therein.
The learned Government Pleader for Panchayat Raj appearing on behalf of the respondents who have filed counter-affidavit, sought to sustain the impugned orders on the ground that it is only in view of the serious allegation against the petitioner, especially having regard to the fact that he was caught accepting the bribe of Rs. 300/- on behalf of a lady, the suspension was inflicted on the petitioner, which is very much in the public interest and therefore the same is just and proper.
4. Having considered the submissions made on either side it is relevant to note the provision under Section 249(6), which reads as follows:
“If the District Collector is of the opinion that a Sarpanch or a Upa-Sarpanch or any member of a Gram Panchayat or the Government are of the opinion that any President or Vice-President or the Chairman or Vice-Chairman or any member of a Mandal Parishad or Zilla Parishad wilfully omitted or refused to carry out the orders of Government for the proper working of the concerned local body or abused his position or the powers vested in him, and that the further continuance of such person in office would be detrimental to the interests of the concerned local body or the inhabitants of the Village, Mandal or District, the District Collector or as the case may be, Government may, by order, suspend such Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch or President or Vice-President or as the case may be, the Chairman or Vice-Chairman or member from office for a period not exceeding three months, pending investigation into the said charges and action thereon under the foregoing provisions of this section:
Provided that no order under this subsection shall be passed unless the person concerned has had an opportunity of making a representation against the action proposed;
Provided further that it shall be competent for the Government to extend, from time to time, the period of suspension for such further period not exceeding three months, so however, that the total period of suspension shall not exceed six months;
Provided also that a person suspended under this sub-section shall not be entitled to exercise the powers and perform the functions attached to his office and shall not be entitled to attend the meetings of the concerned local body except a meeting held for the consideration of a no-confidence motion”.
5. Under the said proviso to Section 249(6) of the Act. It is contemplated specifically that no order of suspension can be passed without providing reasonable opportunity. In view of clear provision, there cannot be any dispute about the mandatory nature of the procedure contemplated. When the Legislature has made such specific provision to provide opportunity before taking an action, the same cannot be waived and suspension cannot be ordered. In support of the petitioner’s contention, reliance is placed on a decision of a Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Kashmiri Lal v. Dy. Commissioner, Sonepat, , wherein, considering in a similar circumstance of involvement in an A.C.B. case, the orders of suspension were held to be bad for not following the procedure of providing opportunity. I am entirely in agreement with the principles laid, in regard to the provision for opportunity. It is not necessary to delve into the detailed aspects or the merits of the case. However, it would suffice to note that in this case admittedly neither any notice nor any opportunity is provided to the petitioner. Hence, the impugned orders are directly in the teeth of the mandate under the 1st proviso to Section 249(6) of the Act. There is no distinction between a criminal action or other valid reasons, for invoking power of suspension. The proviso applies to all situations. Therefore, irrespective of the nature of involvement or allegation, it is made expedient to give an opportunity and thereupon, necessarily to consider the representation or explanation, before any orders of suspension are passed. Obviously, this is a solemn procedure intended to avoid any misuse of power on flimsy grounds, more so in view of the elected public post.
6. In view of the same, the impugned orders 9.5.2002 as extended by the Government with effect from 9.8.2002 are liable to be set aside and they are accordingly set aside. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No costs.