JUDGMENT
Amitava Lala, J.
1. Since common question is involved in all the aforesaid first appeals, the same have been heard analogously and are decided by this judgement, which will have binding effect upon all the appeals.
First Appeal No. 157 of 1987 has been filed by the State of UP. against the Judgment and award dated 05th November, 1986 passed by the Additional District Judge, Bijnor, as a Reference Court, in L.A.R. No. 98 of 1981. Similarly, First Appeal No. 155 of 1987 filed by the State of U.P. arises out of L.A.R. No. 94 of 1981, whereas First Appeal Nos. 158 of 1987 and 228 of 1987 have been filed by the State of U.P. and claimant respectively against the Judgment and award of such Court of the same date arising out of L.A.R. No. 97 of 1981. A Notification No. 5068/12-8-36/79 dated 07th February, 1980 under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was published in the Official Gazette dated 08th February, 1980 and the Notification No. 5069(2)/12-8-36/79 dated 08th February, 1980 under Section 6(1) of the said Act was published in the Official Gazette dated 08th February, 1980 itself. By such acquisition total land measuring 12-558 acre situated in Village Kiratpur, Pargana Kiratpur, Tehsil Nazibabad, District Bijnor was acquired for the purpose of construction of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Kiratpur, Bijnor. The District Land Acquisition Officer, Bijnor by its order dated 28th July, 1981 awarded the compensation at the rate of Rs. 13,579.05 per acre. Against the said award reference proceedings under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act were initiated in 1981 itself. According to Court of reference, such awarded amount of compensation is inadequate. The Reference Court by its respective orders dated 05th November, 1986 allowed the references with cost and awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 10/- and Rs. 12/- per square yard respectively, by which per acre have been increased to approximately Rs. 48,000/- and Rs. 58,080/- respectively. Against such awards the present first appeals as well as the cross objection have been filed. The cross objection is not separately numbered. The Court of reference has differentiated the rate of compensation on the basis of the position of the locale. It has been held by the Court of reference that the acquired land which situates in the populous locality and frontage is on the highway, its rate of compensation would be Rs. 12/- per square yard, wherein for such acquired land not connected with the main road and away from Kiratpur-Najibabad road of the locale only connected with a pavement and also away from the railway station being different from the land as above, the rate of compensation has been fixed at Rs. 10/- per square yard. According to us, this intelligible differentia should not be interfered with.
2. Mr. B.D. Mandhyan, learned Counsel appearing in support of the Mandi Samiti, contended before this Court that the proceeding is faulty on account of non-making requiring body a party to the proceedings. However, since the State of U.P. being acquiring body was always party to the proceeding and the Mandi Samiti being requiring body impleaded themselves as party appellants and all the appeals are analogously heard being connected with each other and whereas such requiring body is the main contesting appellants herein, we are of the view that no body is seen to be unheard, therefore, attempt on the part of Mr. Mandhyan to raise this issue is a futile attempt. However, following Judgment in this respect is to be understood in this respect. In a Five Judges Bench Judgment of the Supreme Court [U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi (Dead) by L.Rs. And Anr. etc. etc.] per majority formulated several points interpreting Section 50(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Points 6 and 8 are relevant for due consideration. However, Section 50(2) of the Act is quoted hereunder:
50 (2). In any proceeding held before a Collector or Court in such cases the local authority or Company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation:
Provided that no such local authority or Company shall be entitled to demand a reference under Section 18.
In the aforesaid Judgment it was held that the local authority is a proper party in the proceedings before the reference Court and is entitled to be impleaded as a party in those proceedings wherein it can defend the determination of the amount of compensation by the Collector and oppose enhancement of the said amount and also adduce evidence in that regard. It is also held by the Supreme Court that in an appeal by the person having an interest in land seeking enhancement of the amount of compensation awarded by the reference Court the local authority should be impleaded as a party and is entitled to be served notice of the said appeal. This would apply to an appeal in the High Court as well as in the Supreme Court. However, Mandi Samiti is not the local authority but requiring body. Even if from the conjoint reading of the majority view of the Supreme Court it appears that requiring body is a proper party to speak out for determination and enhancement of amount of compensation, it has been impleaded herein as appellants who made their respective submissions on merit. However, the impleadment application/s was/were filed by the Mandi Samiti as a requiring body before this Court in April, 1987. In such applications, the main contention of the Mandi Samiti was that total awarded amount has been deposited. At the time of acquisition Mandi Samiti had business of Rs. 2.50 lacs per annum and if the compensation is enhanced, it will be near about Rs. 13.00 lacs. Such submission, as made by the requiring body in April, 1987, can not have any face value in the year 2007 or 2008 due to various developments. Long 21 years have elapsed by the passage of time. This Court heard the extensive submissions made by such requiring body in respect of enhancement of the amount of compensation. In effect, Mandi Samiti is the prime contendor of the proceedings in spite of existence of the State also as appellants. Therefore, we do not find any cogent reason to remand the matter to the Court of reference on appreciation of such aspect unless we find any genuine cause of redetermination or enhancement of the award already passed by the Court of reference.
3. So far as the merit is concerned, the dispute amongst the parties is that a the time of fixing the rate of compensation, the Court of reference ignored the nearer exemplar sale-deed. But we find from the Judgment and award of the Court of reference that the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer was set aside being inadequate and refixed the rate of compensation relying upon appropriate exemplar sale-deed dated 22nd October, 1979 in the place and instead of other sale-deeds dated 11th August, 1978,16th November, 1979 and 26th June, 1980. It has been categorically observed by the Court of reference that one Satyendra Kumar executed a sale-deed on 03rd July, 1978 in favour of Bali Ram, which was registered on 11th August, 1978 but existence of a cold storage on the said land was suppressed in the sale-deed. Therefore, such sale deed can not be considered as an exemplar sale-deed. It was also held that one Sri Salekh Chand sold plotwise small area of land to many other persons. So far as exemplar sale-deed dated 16th November, 1979 is concerned, the same is for small area of 300 square yard when the land in question is with regard to 12.558 acre = 60780.72 square yard approximately, therefore, such sale-deed may not be considered as exemplar sale-deed. So far as other sale-deed, by which Salekh Chand sold the land in favour of Parvez Kumar, the same was executed on 26th June, 1980 i.e. after four months from the date of notification and taking possession of the land in question by the Mandi Samiti. However, the Court of reference did not totally ignore nearer exemplar sale-deed dated 16th November, 1979 on the basis of its smallness alone but wanted to determine the price making via media but in the lower side taking into account two exemplar sale-deeds based on the price of Rs. 6/- per square yard and Rs. 60/- per square yard, and came to a conclusion by enhancing the rate of compensation to Rs. 10/- and Rs. 12/- per square yard (i.e. Rs. 48,400/- and Rs. 58,080/- per acre) respectively. Although the land of exemplar sale-deed of Sri Salekh Chand appears to be small in nature but due to peculiar facts and circumstances of this case that the land was sold small plotwise, which only occur in developed or developing area, we can not hold to say that the Court of reference has wrongly determined the quantum of compensation.
4. Mr. Mandhyan relied upon a Division Bench Judgment of this Court reported in 2004 (2) AWC 1305 (Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Baraut, District Meerut v. Khushi Ram and Ors.) to establish that in view of the reference of the Supreme Court Judgment in paragraph-10 therein the sale price in respect of a smaller piece of land can not be the basis for determination of the market value of a vast stretch of land. The Division Bench of this High Court held that the Court below should not have relied upon such exemplar sale-deed and ultimately, the matter was remanded back to the Court below for the purpose of fresh determination of the market value in accordance with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and this High Court. Mr. Anil Sharma, learned Counsel appearing for the claimants, relied upon a Judgment of the Supreme Court (Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona and Anr.) to establish that while determining the market value of the land following factors are to be borne in mind:
(1) Determined as on the crucial date of publication of the modification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (dates of Notifications under Sections 6 and 9 are irrelevant).
(2) The determination has to be made standing on the date line of valuation (date of publication of notification under Section 4) as if the valuer is a hypothetical purchaser willing to purchase land from the open market and is prepared to pay a reasonable price as on that day. It has also to be assumed that the vendor is willing to sell the land at a reasonable price.
(3) In doing so by the instances method, the Court has to correlate the market value reflected in the most comparable instance which provides the index of market value.
(4) Only genuine instances have to be taken into account. (Sometimes instances are rigged up in anticipation of Acquisition of Land.)
(5) Even post notification instances can be taken into account (1) if they are very proximate. (2) genuine and (3) the acquisition itself has not motivated the purchaser to pay a higher price on account of the resultant improvement in development prospects.
(6) The most comparable instances out of the genuine instances have to be identified on the following considerations:
(i) proximity from time angle.
(ii) proximity from situation angle.
(7) Having identified the instances which provide the index of market value the price reflected therein may be taken as the norm and the market value of the land under acquisition may be deducted by making suitable adjustments for the plus and minus factors vis-a-vis land under acquisition by placing the two in juxtaposition.
(8) A balance-sheet of plus and minus factors may be drawn for this purpose and the relevant factors evaluated in terms of price variation as a prudent purchaser would do.
(9) The market value of the land under acquisition has thereafter to be deduced by loading the price reflected in the instance taken as norm for plus factors and unloading it for minus factors.
The exercise indicated in Clauses (1) to (10) has to be undertaken in a common sense manner as a prudent man of the world of business would do. We may illustrate some such illustrative (not exhaustive) factors:
Plus factors
1. Smallness of size.
2. proximity to a road.
3. frontage on a road.
4. nearness to developed area.
5. regular shape.
6. level vis-a-vis land under acquisition.
7. special value for an owner of an adjoining property to whom it may have some very special advantage.
5. It was further held by the Supreme Court that the evaluation of these factors of course depends on the facts of each case. There can not be any hard and fast or rigid rule. Common sense is the best and most reliable guide. He further relied upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 2003 (8) Supreme 734 [V. Hanumantha Reddy (Dead) by Lrs. v. The Land Acquisition Officer and Mandal R. Officer]. In this case the Supreme Court relied upon the sale instances prior to four months of the draft notification. Some of the plots are adjacent and/or nearer to the national highway, some are not. In (Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Sahaswan District Badaunn through its Secretary v. Bipin Kumar and Anr. etc.) it was held by the Supreme Court that for the purpose of the Land Acquisition Act the market value must be determined on the basis of the sale-deeds of comparable lands. He has further relied upon a Division Bench Judgment of this High Court reported in 2006 (1) ALJ 26 (DB) : 2005 (61) ALR 577 (Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Etawah v. Bishan Dass and Ors.), wherein it has been held that in case of fixation of market value of the acquired land if no suitable sale-deed of large area of land is available, reliance can be given on the sale-deeds of smaller piece of land. In [Union of India v. Mangat (Dead) by L. Rs. and Ors.] it was held that a land abutted on the national highway can not be similar with the land which is land-locked and which is farther away from national highway. Factually, in all the cases where the land situates towards national highway, the amount of compensation is fixed at the rate of Rs. 12/-per square yard, whereas, in the rear side it has been fixed at the rate of Rs. 10/- per square yard.)
6. Therefore, we do not find any reason to interfere with any of the appeals made either by the claimants or by the State or by the Mandi Samiti being requiring body, added party appellants herein. As a result whereof, neither the amount of compensation can be increased nor decreased. Hence, all the appeals and cross objection stand dismissed without imposing any cost. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
Let the lower Court records of the aforesaid cases be returned to the Court concerned.