JUDGMENT
S.R. Nayak, J.
1. The Industrial Court while disposing of I.D. No. 70 of 1994 instituted by the workman directed his reinstatement into service with continuity of service while denying entire back-wages. The learned Judge having opined that the denial of back-wages in entirety is not justified in the fact situation of the case thought it just and reasonable to award 25% of back-wages and he accordingly directed in the order impugned in this writ appeal.
2. We have heard Sri K. Harinath, learned Standing Counsel for the APSRTC. Sri Harinath, placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Gulzar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1986 (Supp) SCC 738, would maintain that the learned Judge was not justified in granting 25% of back-wages and there was no mitigating circumstance to grant any better relief than the one granted by the industrial Court.
3. On the other hand, Sri V. Narasimha Goud, learned Counsel for the workman would maintain that the order of the learned single Judge in the fact situation of the case is quite just and reasonable and that could be sustained having regard to the provisions of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
4. We have perused the order of the learned single Judge. What weighed with the learned single Judge in granting 25% of the back-wages is the following:
It is true that the punishment should be proportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. In the instant case admittedly only one passenger was found to be without ticket and in the opinion of this Court denying complete back wages is wholly illegal and arbitrary and it is a case of non-exercise of power vested under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. Accordingly I hold that the award of 25% of the back wages would meet the ends of justice.
5. It needs to be noticed that a writ appeal is not an appeal in the strict sense of the term and comparable to first appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure and the appellate Court will have only a second look at the matter and that unless there are weighty and substantive grounds to interfere with the discretionary order made by the learned single Judges, the Division Bench normally would not interfere with each and every decision of the learned single Judges on any non-substantive ground where there is no failure of justice. It cannot be said that the reasons assigned by the learned single Judge to award 25% of the back-wages particularly in the fact situation of the case is perverse or unreasonable. The discretion exercised by the learned single Judge cannot lightly be interfered with by us. We are also of the considered opinion that since the petitioner is guilty of not collecting fare from only one passenger out of 61 passengers by inadvertance, such a lapse does not warrant denial of the entire back-wages. Therefore, the order made by the learned single Judge is just and reasonable. In the result, we dismiss the writ appeal with no order as to costs.