ORDER
1. In these petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have challenged the validity of the resolution dated 11-8-1976 passed by the Regional Transport Authority, Bangalore, resolving that the quote of auto rickshaws raised from 6,000 to 6,500 should be utilised exclusively for granting permits to owner-cum-drivers, giving preference to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes applicants recommended by the Karnataka State Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Development Corporation and to the applicants jointly sponsored by the Scheduled Banks and the State Government to finance the owner-cum-drivers.
2. The petitioners and the Intervening respondents have made separate applications for grant of permit for running auto rickshaws within the Bangalore Corporation limits and also within 25 kilometers from and around the Corporation limits. The applications filed by the petitioners and the intervening respondents were pending on the date when the impugned resolution was passed. In pursuance of the aforesaid resolution, the applications of the petitioners and the intervening respondents have been returned for re-submission whenever the vacancies arise.
3. The contentions of Sri H. B. DATAR, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, are (i) that ‘autorickshaws’ falls within the definition of motor cab which falls within the category of ‘contract carriages’ as defined In the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and. a motor cab is excluded from the purview of the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976, as such there was no bar whatsoever for granting permits to the petitioners and intervening respondents; (ii) that there was no provision contained in the Act on the date of pawing of the impugned resolution enabling the, R.T.A. to reserve the permits in question to certain class and category of persons as shown in the impugned resolution and that even the Amendment Act 47 of 1978 which provides for certain percentage of reservation of stage carriage and public carrier permits to certain clan and category of persons, does (not?) provide for reservation of permits relating to motor cabs falling within the category of contract carriages to the persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and also to the other categories mentioned in the impugned resolution.
4. The definition of “contract carriage” as found in sub-see. (3) of S. 2 of the Act, reads as follows:
“Contract carriage” means a motor vehicle which carries a passenger or passengers for hire or reward under a contract expressed or implied for the use of the vehicle as a whole at or for a fixed or agreed rate or sum-
(i) on a time basis whether or not with reference to any route or distance, or
(ii) from one point to another, and in either case without stopping to Pick up or set down along the line of route passengers not included in the contract; and includes a motor cab notwithstanding that the passengers may pay separate fares;” (emphasis is supplied).
Thus, from the aforesaid definition of ‘contract carriage’ it is clear that it includes a motor cab. Sub-section (15) of Section 2 of the Act, defines ‘motor cab’ as follows:
“motor cab” means any motor vehicle constructed, adapted or used to carry riot more than six passengers excluding the driver, for hire or reward;”
From the aforesaid definition of ‘motor cab it is clear that an autorickshaws falls within the definition of “motor cab”, inasmuch as in the autorickshaws less than six passengers excluding the driver are carried either for hire or reward. The Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 excludes the motor cab from the definition of contract carriages for the purpose of that Act as per Section 3(9) of that Act. Thus, it is clear that even after the coming into force of the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976, one can have the permit for running a motor cab, which falls within the category of contract carriage. Therefore, it is necessary to find out whether the reservation made in the impugned resolution of the R.T.A. in respect of the permits falling in the category of contract carriage permits is supported by any of the provisions contained in the Act, as it stood either on the date of the resolution or after the coming into force of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1978 (Central Act, 47 of 1978).
5. The Act as it stood on the date of the resolution did not contain any provision enabling either the State Government or the R.T.A. to reserve the contract carriage permits for the owner-cum-driver applicants by giving priority to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes applicants jointly sponsored by the Scheduled Banks and the State Government. There being no provision contained in the Act, in this regard, it was not at all permissible, in law for the State Government much less for the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Development Corporation to direct or to recommend to the R.T.A. to reserve the contract carriage permits in question for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes applicants and also for other categories of applicants as mentioned in the impugned resolution. The authorities constituted under the Act, such as, R.T.A., State Transport Authority, and Karnataka State Transport Appellate Tribunal, function as quasi-judicial authorities. It is not at all permissible for the State Government to give any direction to the R.T.A. in the discharge of its quasi-judicial function. The Supreme Court, in the case of B. Rajagopala Naidu v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras, has observed thus:
“In interpreting S. 43A, we think, it would be legitimate to assume that the legislature intended to respect the basic and elementary postulate of the rule of law, that in, exercising their authority and in discharging their quasi-judicial functions the Tribunal constituted under the Act must be left absolutely free to deal with the matter according to their best judgment. It is of the essence of fair and objective administration of law that the decision of the Judge or the Tribunal must be absolutely unfettered by any extraneous guidance by the executive or administrative wing of the State. If the exercise of discretion conferred on a quasi-judicial Tribunal is controlled by any such direction, that forges fetters on the exercise of quasi-judicial authority and the presence of such fetters would make the exercise of such authority completely inconsistent with the well-accepted notion of judicial process. It is true that law can regulate the exercise of judicial powers. It may indicate by specific provisions on what matters the tribunals constituted by it should adjudicate. It may by specific provisions lay down the principles, which have to be followed by the Tribunals in dealing with the said matters. The scope of the jurisdiction of the tribunals constituted by statute and principles for guidance of the said tribunals may also be prescribed subject of course to the inevitable requirement that these provisions do not contravene the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. But, what law and the provisions of law may legitimately do cannot be permitted to be done by administrative or executive orders. This position is so well established that we are reluctant to hold that in enacting S. 43A of the Madras Legislature intended to confer power on the State Government to invade the domain of the exercise of judicial power.”
Thus, it is clear that the State Government acted without the authority of law in giving a direction to the R.T.A. to reserve certain permits for the persons jointly sponsored by the State Government, and the Scheduled Banks. Similarly, the R.T.A. was not justified in law in acting upon the letter written by the Chairman, Karnataka State Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Development Corporation and reserving the quota on the basis of that letter. The re- made for the owner-cum-drivers, is not supported by any of the provisions contained in the. Act. To put it shortly, the R.T.A. failed to realise that it was functioning as a quasi-judicial authority and it was required to act only in accordance with the provisions contained in the Act and the Rules framed there under. It acted without jurisdiction in reserving the permits in question to a particular class or category of persons pursuant to the direction given by the State Government or the other bodies. Therefore, the resolution passed by the R.T.A. in so far it relates to reservation of the permits in question to a particular class or category of persons, is on the face of it, without the authority of law.
6. It may be pertinent to notice that even the Amendment Act 47/78, which provides for reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and to other categories of persons in respect of stage carriages and public carriages, also does not contain any provision for reserving the permits relating to contract carriages. Therefore, even judged with reference to the provisions contained in the Amendment Act 47/78 also, the resolution passed by the R.T.A. to the extent it makes reservation of permits in question, cannot be sustained. That being so, the impugned resolution passed by the R.T.A. in so far it relates to the reservation of permits in question, is unsustainable Accordingly, these writ petitions are allowed. The impugned resolution of the R. T. A., Bangalore, dated 11-8-1976 passed in Subject Nos. 22/76-77, 23/76-77 and 44/76-77, in so far it directs the sanctioned 500 autorickshaws cab permits to be utilised by granting permits exclusively to owner-cum-drivers giving priority to the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes applicants recommended by the Karnataka State Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Development Corporation, Bangalore, and also to the applicants who are sponsored by the Scheduled Banks in pursuance of the Joint Scheme of the State Government and the Scheduled Banks, is hereby quashed and the R.T.A. is directed to receive the applications of the petitioners and the intervening respondents for grant of autorickshaws cab permits and to dispose of the same within three weeks from the date of receipt of such applications.
7. Let a copy of this order be dispatched to the R.T.A., Bangalore, forthwith.
8. Order accordingly.