JUDGMENT
Vikramaditya Prasad, J.
1. As these two writ applications arise out of the same impugned award, in two References of the Labour Court and the points in issue involved in both of them are same, these have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. The petitioner has filed these writ applications for quashing the award of Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Annexure-1, by which respondents-employees were directed to be reinstated with back wages.
3. The respondents-employees were appointed as peons under the petitioner and they were posted as Night Guards. They were in continuous service till they were removed. They received letter issued by the Managing Director of the petitioner-Corporation whereby they had been directed to show cause as to why they should not be stopped from working in view of the financial position and strength of Peons. The respondents-employees requested the management not to terminate them, rather to regularize them because they have been working continuously since 1987. But without considering the points raised by them, they and many others were terminated from service with effect from 15.7.1994. Thereafter, it appears that the respondents-employees had raised disputes and the matter was forwarded to the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Ranchi, and the Labour Commissioner, Patna. Reconciliation failed. Thereafter, references (2/96 and 5/96) were made to the Labour Court. References were made on the point. Whether the termination of services of the respondents-workmen of M/s. Bihar State Financial Corporation, Main Road, Ranchi, is proper? If not, what relief the workmen are entitled to? The award went in favour of the workmen and so the Management invoked the writ jurisdiction.
4. The respondents in paragraph 9 of the counter-affidavit have averred that along with the respondents, the services of as many as 13 persons were terminated, vide order dated 11,7.1994, of whom Miss. Prasanna Kumari Amma was one of them and she had filed a writ application being CWJC No. 2112 of 1994(R) which was dismissed and against which LPA No. 237/ 1995{R) was filed and this Court, vide judgment dated 20.8.1996, set aside the judgment rendered in CWJC No. 2112/ 94(R) and also set aside the order dated
11.7.1994. The only difference between the cases of Miss Prasanna Kumari Amma and the respondents employees herein is that Miss Prasanna Kumari Amma filed writ application directly in the High Court and the respondents–employees herein had chal-
lenged the same by raising industrial dispute.
5. I have carefully gone through the judgment passed in LPA No. 237 of 1995(R). I find that LPA No. 237 of 1995(R) also arose out of the same facts and out of a termination order (Annexure- C/2) by which the respondents-employees were also terminated. The only difference in the cases of the respondents and the appellant of the LPA–Miss Prasanna Kumari Amma is that the respondents-employees instead of filing the writ application had raised an industrial dispute.
6. Even if it is presumed that the Corporation is not an industry, therefore, labour court has no jurisdiction to pass the award, then also in view of the appellate court judgment (supra), the finding so far as reinstatement is concerned does not appear to be perverse.
7. The petitioner has relied on Annexure-3, which is a Division Bench decision of the Court and is of the year, 1994 whereas the appellate court judgment (supra) is of the year, 1996 and that appellate court judgment is based on a decision of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 10274 of 1995 arising out of SLP No. 10488/1994, in which these petitioners was one of the parties and other respondents were different persons.
8. On the question whether the Corporation is an industry or not though I feel that it is not an industry for the reason that the reasons given by the labour court for treating the petitioner as an industry is not based on legal findings, rather it is based on admission and non-denial of the witnesses. The admission or non-denial to this effect is not sufficient to come to a finding like that. If it is admitted that since the Corporation petitioner advances loan to the industries helps in establishing the industries, it became industry, then any financer who provides loan to any person who seeks to establish and establishes industries will have to be treated/declared an industry. If a father or friend provides financial assistance to his son or friend to establish an industry of his own, then merely because they have provided the fund/finance accommodative or otherwise
will bring them in the category of industry. I do not agree with such reasoning. But I do not want to express any final view of mine. Even if it is said that the labour court had no jurisdiction than also even after rejecting the award on the ground of jurisdiction, this Court in this writ application can pass an order in the light of the judgment of LPA No. 237/95(R) (supra) reinstating the respondents-employees of both the writs to the job with effect from the date of their termination with back wages, which is hereby ordered.
9. With the aforesaid observations/ directions, this application is dismissed.