ORDER
1. Constitutional validity of Regulation 31.04 of Karnataka Electricity Board (Supply) Regulations, 1988 has been called in question in these petitions- Also under challenge is the validity of Circular dated 22nd of April 1997 issued by the respondent K.E.B., whereunder it has revised the Meter Security Deposit for L.T. Electronic Trivector Meters wherever installed to Rs. 13,710/- less the amount already deposited.
2. The petitioners are small scale industrial Units and L.T. Consumers of electrical energy. They are also members of the Peenya Industries Association-petitioner in W.P. No. 3701 of 1998. They are aggrieved in these petitions of a Circular dated 22nd of April, 1997, whereunder the respondent has revised the Meter Security Deposit earlier prescribed for H.T. & L.T. Installations. According to the decision now taken in the case of L.T. Electronic Trivector Meters, the consumers are required to deposit Rs. 13,710/- less the amount already deposited towards the Meter Security Deposit. The decision to change the meters supplied to the consumers has its genesis in an earlier circular dated 31st of December. 1996 where under the Board had taken a decision to install Electronic Energy Meters in all high revenue yielding installations as such meters were considered to be more accurate, trouble-free, and tamper-proof. The Meter Security Deposit for Electronic Meters was accordingly revised to Rs. 1,300/- in the case of a single Phase connection and Rs. 3,000/- in the case of a III Phase L.T. Installation. The circular stipulated that the security Deposit fixed was subject to variation from time to time and that the deposit would earn interest at the rate of 10% p.a. in terms of Regulation 31.04 of the Regulations from the date the installation is serviced. The impugned Circular dated 22nd of April, 1997 is an improvement on the said decision in that instead of electronic meters, the Board proposes to provide electronic Trivector Meters and has accordingly revised the meter security Deposit for such Meters, to be deposited by the consumers in three equal interest free instalments. The Circular has come under challenge primarily on the ground that the
decision to replace the meters was not supported by the provisions of Section 26 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, and was in any case arbitrary and unreasonable. By an amendment application moved by the petitioners they have called in question the constitutional validity of Regulation 31.04 of the K.E.B. Electricity (Supply) Regulations, on the ground that the power to prescribe the meter Security Deposit from time to time was arbitrary and hence violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
3. I have heard Counsel for the parties.
4. Section 26 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 provides that the amount of energy supplied to a consumer or the electrical quantity contained in the supply shall be ascertained by means of a correct meter which shall be supplied to the consumer by the licensee provided that the licensee may require the consumer to give security for the price of the meter and enter into an agreement for the hire thereof unless the consumer elects to purchase a meter of his own. The provision further obliges the licensee to keep the meter correct in cases where the consumer has entered into an agreement for hire of such a meter and in default of the licensee doing so, the consumer shall cease to be liable to pay for the hire of the meter. Sub-section (3) of Section 26 provides that where the meter is the property of the consumer, he is required to keep the same correct and in default of his doing so, the licensee may after giving him seven days notice for so long as the default continues, cease to supply energy through the meter. Sub-section (4) of Section 26 entitles the licensee or any person authorised at any reasonable time to have access and be at liberty to inspect and test the meter and except where the meter is hired, all reasonable expenses of and incidental to such inspection and testing etc., shall if the meter is found to be otherwise than correct be recovered from the consumer. Sub-section (7) of Section 26 empowers the licensee to place on the premises of the consumer, a maximum demand indicator or other apparatus as it may think fit for purposes of ascertaining or regulating the amount of energy supplied or the number of hours during which the supply is given subject to the conditions stipulated in the provisions to the same. It would therefore appear that once the consumer decides to have a meter installed by the licensee, the obligation to keep the meter correct and to bear all expenses incidental to its inspection, testing etc., are to be borne by the licensee. The provision does not however suggest that the metering equipment which the licensee provides to the consumer if once installed cannot be replaced by another equipment more accurate, trouble-free and tamper-proof. On the contrary, Regulation 31.04 of the K.E.B. Electricity (Supply) Regulations, which deals with the furnishing of Meter Security Deposit empowers the Board to prescribe such deposit from time to time. Regulation 31.04 reads thus:
“Meter Security Deposit (MSD).–Meter Security Deposit is payable towards the metering equipment at the rates prescribed by the Board from time to time by Consumers of all installations except,–
(a) All consumers of non-commercial lighting;
(b) All consumers of non-commercial combined lighting and heating;
(c) Consumers of Commercial Lighting installations whose sanctioned load is 1 KW and less”.
On a conjoint reading of Section 26 and Regulation 31.04 supra, I have no difficulty in rejecting the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners that the Board does not have the power to replace a meter once provided to the consumer by a more sophisticated equipment which in the opinion of the Board, is better than what was installed earlier. The obligation to provide and maintain a correct meter would in my opinion carry with it the right to change the metering equipment also, not only in situations where the earlier installed meter is found to be working unsatisfactorily but also where the Board considers it necessary so to do with a view to improving the quality of the equipment and making the same more dependable and tamper-proof.
5. The question then is whether the power vested in the Board to replace the existing electronic mechanical meters by Electronic Trivector Meters has been exercised unfairly or arbitrarily. It was contended by the petitioners that even if the power to replace the metering equipment was vested in the Board, the same could not be arbitrarily exercised to the detriment of the consumers. There is and can be no dispute with that proposition. The mere availability of the power to do a particular act does not mean that the power can be exercised arbitrarily. The guarantee contained in Article 14 of the Constitution strikes at any thing that is arbitrary if the same affects the citizen adversely. The question however is whether the exercise of the power is in the present case in any way arbitrary so as to fall foul of Article 14. As noticed earlier, the Board appears to have deliberated upon the proposal of using only electronic meters in all LT and HT installations and Three phase electro mechanical installations in all I.P. set installations to be serviced on or after 1st of January, 1997. These meters, it is apparent from Circular dated 31st of December, 1996 were considered to be more accurate, trouble-free and tamper-proof. The decision was thus taken by reference to considerations that were relevant and aimed at increasing the efficiency of the metering equipment at the same time reducing the chances of tampering with the same. Electronic Trivector Meter which is now introduced by the Board, is apparently an improvement on the metering equipment earlier installed or proposed to be installed. So long as such metering equipment is an improvement on the existing meters, and so long as the decision to install the same is actuated by considerations which are relevant for the purpose which is otherwise legitimate, the petitioners cannot possibly grudge the same. It is not possible for a consumer to insist that the existing metering equipment should continue even when better equipment is available nor can a consumer claim that a metering equipment which is less efficient or more prone to tampering should not be replaced just because according to him, the equipment is serving the consumer well. It is common knowledge that theft of
electricity is a wide spread phenomenon. If the cases instituted against the back billing demands raised on account of, theft of energy is an indication, the practice of stealing energy is more than rampant. It is therefore necessary that the K.E.B. takes into account all such measures and updates its metering equipment suitably to prevent not only defective recording of the energy consumed but also any illegal drawl and theft of such energy. A decision to do so was in my opinion perfectly justified.
6. That apart, the prejudice which the petitioners claim does not really exist. That is because the security deposits made by the petitioners are entitled in terms of Regulation 31.05(e) to earn S.I. at the rate of 10% p.a. The revised security deposits also gives to the petitioners the benefit of the deposits already made as per the earlier rates prescribed by the Board. In the circumstances, it is difficult to see how the revision in the security deposit, really causes any prejudice of the kind that may warrant interference from this Court.
7. As regards the amount of deposit, the same is relatable to the price of the metering equipment. It was pointed out by Mr. Gupta, from the S.R. Rates of the K.E.B. for the year 1997-98, that the cost of Electronic Trivector Meter was Rs. 14,034/-. That being so, a security deposit of an equivalent amount can hardly be considered to be unfair or unreasonably high to justify any reduction or interference from this Court.
8. That leaves me with the only other submission urged on behalf of the petitioners and relating to the unconstitutionality of Regulation 31.04. It was contended that the power to prescribe the security deposit from time to time was arbitrary, hence unconstitutional. I see no merit in that submission either. The power to prescribe a security deposit is exercisable by a Statutory Board comprising experts in the field. The fact that the power to prescribe is conferred on the Board is in itself an effective safeguard against any arbitrary or illegal use of the same. It is fairly well-settled that the plenitude of the power does not by itself render the provision conferring the same unconstitutional. It is in any such case relevant to see as to who is entitled to exercise the power. If it is exercisable not by an individual but by the Government or a Board as in the instant case, the very fact that the power is wide does not render the provision conferring the same invalid. There is nothing before me to suggest that the Board has either in the instant case or previously exercised the power vested in it in an unfair or arbitrary manner to justify the apprehension that the same may be misused in future. It is indeed open to the petitioner to question the exercise of the power by the Board at any stage if it is found to have been exercised unfairly or arbitrarily.
9. In the result I see no reason to interfere. These petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.