JUDGMENT
Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.
1. The challenge is to the award of the Labour Court by which it has set aside the order of termination and ordered the reinstatement of the workman with 75 percent back wages. A few facts.
2. The respondent-workmen was appointed as Secretary by the petitioner-bank on November 26, 1986 for a period of 89 days on a consolidated salary of Rs. 500/- per month. On the expiry of this period, the workman made another application for employment. Vide order dated February 23, 1987, he was again appointed for a period of 89 days, whereupon he submitted his joining report on February 24, 1987. On the expiry of the stipulated period of 89 days, the respondent again submitted an application. Vide order dated May 25, 1987, he was appointed for a period of 89 days. A copy of this letter of appointment has been produced on record as Annexure P-4. A perusal of this order shows that as on earlier occassions, the appointment had been made on a contract basis and the services of the workman could be “terminated at ‘any time’ without notice before the expiry of above period.” On June 24,1987, the petitioner terminated his services. The workman, according to the petitioner joined service of another Cooperative Society viz. the Muradgarh Cooperative Credit and Service Society Ltd. Muradgarh. It is alleged that while serving with this Society, he embezzled a sum of Rs. 1,26,172.00 and a charge-sheet was served on him.
3. After the lapse of more than three years, on July 5, 1990, the workman served a notice of demand of the petitioner. Vide order dated December 12, 1990, the appropriate Govt. refused to make a ‘reference’ on the ground that the workman had raised the dispute after three years from the date of termination. However, the workman persisted and vide order dated August 5, 1991, the matter was referred to the Labour Court. Vide its award dated December 10,1993, the Labour Court has held that the provisions of Section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act having not been complied with, the termination order is illegal and consequently set it aside. It has ordered the reinstatement of the workman with 75 per cent back wages. Aggrieved by this Award, the management has approached this Court through the present writ petition. It has challenged the order of reference dated August 5, 1991 (Annexure P-9 to the writ petition) as also the award of the Labour Court on various grounds.
4. In response to the notice of motion issued by this Court, the respondent-workman has filed a written statement. It has been interalia averred that the appointment having been made for 89 days would have expired on August 23, 1987 by which time he would have completed 240 days in service. The action of management in not allowing the workman to complete his full term amounted to an unfair labour practice. It has been further stated that the Govt. had wrongly refused to make a reference to the Labour Court. He had submitted a representation dated December 17, 1990 whereupon, the reference had been made after giving opportunity to the petitioner. The averment in the writ petition that the respondent had jointed the Muradgarh Cooperative Credit and Service Society Ltd. Muradgarh has not been denied. It has, however, been averred that he had resigned from the service of the Society on February 28, 1994 and his resignation had been accepted. It has been further averred that the charge of embezzlement had not been proved against him. The respondent claims that the delay has been rightly condoned by the Labour Court and that the award is legal and valid.
5. We have heard Mr. C.B. Goel, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. R.K. Malik, for respondent-workman at the stage of preliminary hearing of the case.
6. It is the admitted position that the respondent-workman had been appointed for a fixed term of 89 days’ on contract’. His services could be terminated at any time without notice before the expiry of the said period of 89 days. It is thus clear that the appointment was for a fixed term and could be terminated at any time without assigning any reason. The respondent’s services were actually terminated in strict conformity with the terms of appointment. Still further, even if the respondent is deemed to have remained in continuous employment of the petitioner from November 26, 1986 to June 24, 1987, it is clear that he had worked for a period of only 210 days. In such a situation, it cannot be said that the respondent had been retrenched or that the provisions of section 25F were attracted. Furthermore, there is nothing on record to indicate that the petitioner-management was guilty of adopting an unfair labour practice. A perusal of the notice of demand given by the respondent on July 5,1990 (Copy of Annexure P-7 with the writ petition) shows that even an allegation in this behalf has not been made by the workman. On behalf of the management, it has been pointed out that the post of Secretary was borne on the common cadre and had to be filled up in accordance with the rules. In order to carry on day to day work, the respondent-workman had been appointed on adhoc basis. By the very order of termination, it had been directed that a regular Secretary of the nearest society should take over charge from the respondent-workman. This plea is borne out from the order dated June 24, 1987. In this view of the matter, we are unable to uphold the finding of the Labour Court that the termination of the services of the respondent-workman was illegal or violative of section 25 of the Act.
7. Before parting with the case, we may also observe that the fact that the respondent-workman had joined the service of the Society at Muradgarh was clearly brought on record by the petitioner-management vide its application dated November 8, 1993. Even a reply to this application had been filed by the respondent wherein he had not specifically denied this statement. In spite of this, the Labour Court has glossed over the delay in the issue of the notice of Demand and granted back wages to the extent of 75 per cent to the respondent-workman. This was clearly wrong.
8. In view of our finding that the termination was not in violation of the provisions of section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is not necessary for us to go into the other questions raised in this petition.
9. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. The impugned award of the Labour Court is set aside. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.