ORDER
B.S.A. Swamy, J.
1. Questioning the action of the respondents in not considering the cases of the petitioners for promotion in the subject in which they are holding Post-Graduate qualification on the ground that they have no teaching experience of minimum two years in the subject in which they are having Post-Graduate qualification (hereinafter called cross promotions) Writ Petition No. 17560 of 1999 was filed.
2. It is not the case of the respondent herein that the petitioners are not working in the service of the Society as teachers for a minimum period of two years.
3. Though the relief sought for is covered by a judgment of this Court in
Giridhar Kishore ‘s case, the learned Government Pleader went on arguing that the relief sought for is not covered by that judgment. I heard him at length by giving him number of opportunities and ultimately by order dated 5th November, 1999 I declared the action of the respondents as illegal and gave a direction to consider the cases of the petitioners for promotion as Post-Graduate Teachers without insisting upon teaching experience in the subject in which they are holding Post-Graduate qualification, subject to their suitability and fulfilment of other criteria. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondents carried the matter in appeal by filing Writ Appeal No. 193 of 2000, which was disposed of by order dated 13.6.2002, in the following manner:
“Accordingly, we dispose of the writ appeal holding that the points raised and decided by judgment dated 29.16.2001 in the said Writ Appeal Nos. 993 of 2000 and 566 of 2001 shall govern the present appeal also.”
4. Since the contemnor failed to implement the orders of this Court within a reasonable time after disposal of the writ appeal, the petitioners filed this contempt case on 20.6.2002.
5. Writ Appeal Nos. 993 of 2000 and 566 of 2001 were disposed of by the same First Court by order dated 29.10.2001. After extracting various judgments of the Supreme Court, their Lordships passed the following order:
“For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the decision of the Division Bench in S. Nagendramma (supra) does not create any binding precedent, whereas the decision in Giridhar Kishore (supra) does. …..”
6. The other portion of the judgment need not be extracted, since it has no bearing on the issue.
7. In Writ Petition No. 20533 of 1995 filed by Giridhar Kishore and Batch the same rule was interpreted by a Division Bench of this Court headed by Justice P.Venkatarama Reddi, as he then was, and disposed of by order dated 24th October, 1997. The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows:
” … ‘Cross-Promotions’ can as well be understood in a limited sense of promotions of candidates not having the study qualification in the concerned subject. We are, therefore, of the view that the respondents were not justified in overlooking most of the petitioners for promotion on the ground that they did not possess teaching experience of 2 years in the relevant subject though they were otherwise qualified and senior enough to be promoted. The assertion of the respondent, that the rules provided for such requirement, is baseless. As observed by us, even under the amended rules, teaching experience in the relevant subject is not required. It is enough if the teaching experience of two years in any subject is possessed by the TGT seeking promotion. If Clause [c] was not understood to mean teaching experience in the concerned subject till 1995, there is no reason or logic in understanding it in a different way from 1996 onwards, taking shelter under the amendment which does not touch Clause (c) at all. Therefore, the denial of promotion to some of the petitioners on the ground that they did not possess the teaching experience of two years in the relevant subject is illegal and arbitrary…..”
8. From the above it is seen that a Division Bench of this Court ruled that one need not have teaching experience in the subject in which he holds Post-Graduate Degree for considering his case for promotion. It is suffice to say that he should have teaching experience in any other subject. In other words, one need not have teaching experience in the subject in which he is holding the Post-Graduate qualification for a period of two years for promotion, if
he puts in two years of service as a S.G.Teacher in any of the subjects that are taught in the institution. In fact, in my judgment though I did not refer the case specifically, in para two of the judgment I categorically stated that “in fact, the issue is squarely by a judgment of this Court. But, both the Counsel for the respondent Society Sri Chandraiah and his Junior Mr. Chandraiah stoutly opposed the relief sought for by the petitioners by contending that the Society has given cross promotions due to some exigencies in the administration till the year 1994 and thereafter they prepared seniority list subject-wise and the claims of no candidate as Post-Graduate Teacher in a subject other than the subject in which he was appointed were considered’
9. This fact clinchingly proves that I have in mind the judgment of this Court in Giridhar Kishore’s case while passing the order. Once again without being influenced by the judgment, I permitted the Counsel for the respondent to argue the matter at length to see whether a different conclusion can be reached in this case, more so, when the Counsel was contending that the rule was amended. Having seen that there is no change in the rule as it stood prior to the amendment and after amendment as is the case in Giridhar Kishore also I passed this order. Since the Division Bench disposed of the writ appeal filed by the respondents against my judgment in terms of Giridhar Kishore’s case, the respondents arc duty bound to consider the case of the petitioners for promotion in the subjects in which they are holding Post-Graduate degree subject to the fulfilment of other qualifications like getting minimum 50% of marks at Post-Graduate level, two years teaching experience etc. Even after the disposal of the writ appeal, when the respondents failed to implement the orders, the present contempt case is filed to punish the respondent for Contempt of Court’s Act
for wilfully and wantonly disobeying the orders of this Court.
10. After the respondent entered appearance, the matter came up for orders on 26.7.2002. Having seen the order in Giridhar Kishore ‘s case, I have given four weeks time to the respondents to implement the orders of this Court, failing which I directed the contemner to appeal before this Court on 16.8.2002. The case was listed before this Court on 23.8.1992 and 29.8.2002. On both the occasions, at the request of the Counsel for the respondent I adjourned the hearing in this case. Ultimately, when the case came up for hearing again on 13.9.2002, the learned Counsel for the respondent informed this Court that the respondent passed orders rejecting the claim of the petitioners and the contempt case would not survive. It is open to the petitioners to question the order, if they are so aggrieved.
11. Having not been satisfied with the explanation offered by the learned Counsel for the respondent, 1 directed the presence of the respondent before this Court. Accordingly, the contemner appeared before this Court today.
12. Perused the order passed by the respondent on 5.9.2002 in Pr.Rc.No.Z-VI/ 32324/2000. The respondent again started saying that the petitioners never taught the subject in which they are claiming promotions so on so forth which was rejected by a Division Bench of this Court, and which also received the approval of another Division Bench, leave apart the judgment of this Court, in the following words:
“The Respondents in WA No. 193 of 2000 were appointed in a different subjects and they are claiming the promotion in a different subject basing on their qualifications acquired in Post-Graduate at a later stage. They never taught the subject in which they are claiming promotion. They do not hare
experience of teaching the subject in which they sought for promotion. The reason for not allowing the cross promotion is to have expertisation by the qualifying teachers so as to teach the students in a particular subject, that is not possible unless they have the experience of teaching in the relevant subject in which they have originally appointed. The appointments have been made subject-wise. The provisional seniority list prepared subject-wise, objections called for objection considered and final seniority list has also communicated. Erasing on the subject wise seniority list eligible Trained Graduate Teachers have made representations for promotion to the of Post-Graduate Teachers and also filed writ petition which are pending on the file of the Hon’ble High Court.
The Hon’ble High Court in the order dated 5-11-1999 in WP No. 17560/99 directed the respondents therein to consider the case of the petition for promotion as Post-Graduate Teacher not only in the subject in which they were appointed as Trained Graduate Teacher but also in other subject if they are having Post-Graduate degree with a minimum of 50% marks at Post-Graduate level. Aggrieved by the same the APSWREI Society filed WA No 193 of 2000 the Hon’ble Division Bench in the order under reference 9th read above has disposed off the same in terms of the order dated 29-10-2001 in WA No. 993 of 2000 and 566 of 2001 wherein the Hon’ble Division Bench allowed the writ appeal and set aside the impugned judgment passed in the writ petitions wherein the petitioner therein claimed the relief which is similar to the relief sought for by the petitioners in WP No. 17560/99.
In the light of the Judgment passed by the Hon’ble High Court in W.A.No. 193 of 2000, after careful examination of the claim of the petitioner for promotion as Post-Graduate teacher from the post of Trained Graduate Teacher in the subject in which they acquired the Post-Graduate qualification is hereby rejected.
13. From the above it could be seen that the contemnor rejected the case of the
petitioners on the self-same ground on which the petitioners were denied promotion earlier, which was interdicted by this Court.
14. The contemnor seemed to have taken inspiration from the words of last paragraph of the order in the judgment in Writ Appeal No.993 of 2000, dated 29.10.2001, wherein it is stated that “for the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained and are set aside. The writ appeals are allowed and there will be no order as to costs” forgetting the fact that in the appeal filed by A.P.Residential Educational Institutions Society, the 1st Court having considered Rule 5 of the Rules prescribing qualifications for promotion from the post of Trained Graduate Teacher to the post of Post-Graduate Teacher (the same rule in this case also) held that the judgment of this Court in Giridhar Kishore applies to the facts of the cases of the petitioners and their cases have to be considered in terms of the said judgment. But the contemner without looking into facts of that case and the decision rendered by the Court, on merits of the case passed the order in question deliberately to deprive the petitioner of their promotion which are legitimately due to them since 1999 without, any justifiable or ostensible cause. Hence, I have no hesitation to hold that the order passed by the respondent is in utter violation of the orders of this Court and the law as declared by this Court. The conduct of the contemnor indicates that she has scant respect for the orders of this Court. Admittedly, the order passed by the respondent is in defiance of the orders of a competent Court where the lis was adjudicated following the dicta laid down by a Division Bench of this Court and the same is non est in law.
15. The next question to be considered is whether the petitioners are to be directed to question the correctness of the order, which is ex facie illegal on its face and
contrary to the law declared by this Court, by filing another writ petition as contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent, since the direction given in the case is only to consider their cases, but not to appoint them. It is useful to extract the direction given in W.P.No. 17560 of 1999.
‘In the result, the writ petition is allowed and a writ of mandamus shall issue to the respondents, to consider the cases of the petitioners for promotions as Post-Graduate Teachers not only in the subject in which they were appointed as Trained Graduate Teachers but also in other subjects, if they are having the Post-Graduate degree with a minimum of 50% marks at P.G level
The respondents are directed to implement the orders of this Court within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order,
Accordingly, with the above directions, the writ petition is allowed. But, in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.’
16. From the above, it is seen that this Court having rejected the contention of the contemner that cross-promotions are not permissible as per the rules in vogue, a direction was given to consider the cases of the petitioners for promotions as Post-Graduate Teachers not only in the subject in which they were appointed as Trained Graduate Teachers but also in other subjects and the contemnor was given four weeks time to implement the orders and the writ petition questioning the action of the contemner was allowed. Except using the words ‘consider their cases’ the rest of the direction is in mandatory language (i.e.,) the contemner is duty bound to consider the cases of the petitioners for cross-promotions subject to fulfilment of other qualifications prescribed. It is not the case of the respondent-contemnor that the petitioners have not fulfilled any of the other
qualifications prescribed for promotion. In fact, the word ‘consider the cases of the petitioners’ was used in the relief portion of the order since the Apex Court held that the Courts should not give a positive direction to promote or appoint an individual to a particular service or post. The Courts can only lay down the law and direct the authorities to consider the case of an individual in the light of the law declared by this Court. The effect of the order would be that the authorities concerned, are duty bound to consider the cases of the petitioners in the light of the law declared by this Court and it is not open to them to digress from the order and the word ‘consider’ does not and would not mean rejecting their cases without reference to the dicta laid down by the Court. If the relief portion of the order is read in toto, the meaning of the order is that if the petitioners fulfil the other qualifications, the contemner cannot reject cross-promotion to the petitioners. But, what happened in this case? The contemner without reference to the dicta laid down by the Court not only in the judgment from which the contempt has arisen, but at least the judgments of three Division Benches on the legal position, passed the impugned order by giving the reason which was rejected by this Court. Such an order cannot be termed as an order passed in good faith and lacks bona fides.
17. A concerted effort was made to disobey the orders passed by this Court to deny the benefits accrued under the orders of this Court to the petitioners.
18. A Division Bench of this Court in Mohd. Imthiazuddin v. E. Bala Veera Raghavaiah, 1996(1) ALD 1230 = 1996 (1) ALT 710 (DB), held that “Contempt proceedings are not criminal proceedings, but are summary proceedings and the High Court can evolve its own procedure. The power of the Court of Record under Article 215 of the Constitution of India is
not limited to imposing punishment upon the contemner but the main purpose of this power of the Court is to see mat the order of the Court is given effect to………”
19. From the above it is evident that a Court of Record is not only empowered to punish the contemnor for violating the order of the Court, but also is having power to see that the order of the Court is given effect to.
20. In Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Company (p) Limited, , Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows,
“The contemner should not be allowed to enjoy or retain the fruits of his contempt.”
The principal that a contemner ought not to be permitted to enjoy and/or keep the fruits of his contempt is well-settled. In Mohd. Idris v. R.J. Babuji, , this Court held clearly that undergoing the punishment for contempt does not mean that the Court is not entitled to give appropriate directions for remedying and rectifying the things done in violation of its orders.
Their Lordships further held that “no technicality can prevent the Court from doing justice in exercise of its inherent powers”. The Court further held “that the object of Rule 2-A of Order 39 will be fulfilled only where such mandatory direction is given for restoration of possession to the aggrieved party. This was necessary, it observed, to prevent the abuse of process of law”. Their Lordships concluded by observing “that there is no doubt that this salutary rule has to be applied and given effect to by this Court, if necessary, by overruling any procedural or other technical objections. Article 129 is a constitutional power and when exercised in tandem with Article 142, all such objections should give away. The Court must ensure full justice between the parties before it.”
21. A learned single Judge of this Court in G. Om Prakash v. V.R. Karanna, Chief Personal Manager Vazir Sultan Tobacco Company Limited Azamabad, Hyderabad, , held that nobody should be permitted to question the authority of the Court and disobey the orders in the guise of his own interpretation of law knowing fully well the consequences of his act, he has taken the defiant stand.
22. In the light of the law declared by this Court as well as the Supreme Court, I have no hesitation to hold that the conduct of the contemner is reprehensible and it is nothing but showing disrespect to the orders passed by this Court.
23. It is true in some cases, the Court has taken the view that when the Court passes an order to consider the relief sought for by the petitioner in a writ petition and if the respondent passes an order even if it is illegal, the contempt petition would not survive. As the Courts passing that type orders, the officers of today have become adamant and showing scant respect to the law of the land without scrupulously implementing the orders of the Court.
24. Let us test the principle laid down by the Courts? Suppose following the above principle I direct the petitioners to question the correctness of the order by filing a writ petition, that writ petition will be allowed. Then again the officer passes the same order. Again the petitioners have to be directed to approach the Court by filing another writ petition and the cycle will be repeated eternally. In this process the petitioners can never get his grievance redressed thought a Court of law. Is it the law of the land? Can it be said that majesty of law is being upheld by allowing the officers to pass orders without reference to the law laid down in the case. If this sort
of persistent defiance by the Officers of the State is permitted by the Courts, rule of law and administration of justice would be in jeopardy. If the above principle is to be followed, I am sure the Courts would not be administering justice, but perpetuating the injustice that is being done by the executive.
25. Be that as it may, the High Court being a Court of record and it is having inherent powers to punish the officials who flout the orders wilfully, wantonly and deliberately without any excuse to be offered and punish them for contempt of Court.
26. Hence, I find the respondent/ contemner guilty of committing contempt of Court and convict here under Article 215 of the Constitution read with Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act by sentencing her to stand up in the Court till the Court raises and to pay Rs. 2,000/- as fine within two weeks and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one week.
27. Since the power of the Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India is not limited to impose punishment upon the contemner and the main purpose of this power of the Court is to see that the order of the Court is given effect to, I direct the contemnor to promote the petitioners as Post-Graduate Teachers in the subjects in which they hold Post-Graduate Degrees within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, as I have already declared that the orders dated 5th September, 2002 is non est in law.