High Court Kerala High Court

Satheesh Babu @ Kochumon vs Philip Koshy on 1 February, 2010

Kerala High Court
Satheesh Babu @ Kochumon vs Philip Koshy on 1 February, 2010
       

  

  

 
 
  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

RSA.No. 1354 of 2009()


1. SATHEESH BABU @ KOCHUMON, AGED ABOUT
                      ...  Petitioner
2. P.N.SURESH BABU, AGED 43 YEARS,

                        Vs



1. PHILIP KOSHY, VADAKKEMOOTTIL VEEDU,
                       ...       Respondent

                For Petitioner  :SRI.P.HARIDAS

                For Respondent  : No Appearance

The Hon'ble MR. Justice THOMAS P.JOSEPH

 Dated :01/02/2010

 O R D E R
                       THOMAS P.JOSEPH, J.
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                          R.S.A. NO.1354 of 2009
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                 Dated this the   1st   day of February, 2010


                              J U D G M E N T

———————

The Second Appeal is brought from judgment and decree of

learned Sub Judge, Thiruvalla in A.S. No.25 of 2006 granting decree

for eviction and recovery of possession of a shop room with

damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs.500/- per month

from January, 2000 till recovery of possession, reversing judgment

and decree of learned Munsiff dismissing the suit – O.S. No.37 of

2000. According to the original plaintiff (he died pending suit) suit

property belonged to him as per Ext.A3, partition deed

No.396/1992. He had executed Ext.A4, Will bequeathing the said

property in favour of his son, the respondent who after death of

original plaintiff was impleaded as supplemental plaintiff No.2. Case

of original plaintiff and respondent is that on 26.3.1999 appellants

trespassed into the schedule room and took forcible possession

thereof. It is the further case of original plaintiff and respondent

that appellants took forcible possession of the schedule room with

the help of daughter-in-law of deceased original plaintiff.

Appellants contended that shop room and the adjacent lean-to were

R.S.A. No.1354 of 2009

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taken on rent by appellant No.1 from the original plaintiff in the year

1992 for a monthly rent of Rs.250/- and rent was enhanced to

Rs.350/- per month in June, 1998. Tenancy is not terminated.

Hence the suit for recovery of possession is not maintainable. Trial

court on evidence found that the alleged trespass is not proved,

accepted the plea of appellants regarding tenancy and dismissed the

suit. Respondent took up the matter in appeal. First appellate

court reversed the finding of trial court, held that the plea of

appellants regarding tenancy is not proved and on the strength of

title granted recovery of possession in favour of the respondent with

damages for use and occupation as above stated. That is under

challenge in this Second Appeal at the instance of appellants urging

by way substantial questions of law whether when possession of

appellants is admitted, was it not the bounden duty of respondent

to prove that they are trespassers and not tenants, whether

evidence let in by the respondent revealed that appellant No.1 is

not tenant of the shop room and whether trial court ought to have

found that the suit is not properly instituted. It is contended by

learned counsel urging the above that the finding entered by the

first appellate court is erroneous.

2. I stated that suit was instituted by the original plaintiff in

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his capacity as the owner and title holder of the suit property on the

strength of Ext.A3, which is not disputed. On his death respondent,

his son was impleaded as supplemental plaintiff No.2 on the

strength of Ext.A4, Will No.66 of 1996. P.W.1 is claimed to be Power

of Attorney holder of respondent. He did not produce any Power of

Attorney as such but proved Ext.A1, Fax message received from the

respondent who is working abroad and authorising P.W1 to conduct

the case on his behalf. It has been held by this Court in

Narayanan Nair v. John Kurien (1988 [1] KLT 673) that

even for institution of the suit a written authority is not

indispensable. Even oral authorisation would be sufficient to

constitute due authorisation. In the present case suit was validly

instituted by the original plaintiff and so far as the respondent is

concerned by Ext.A1, Fax message he has authorised P.W1 to

conduct the case on his behalf. I do not find anything wrong in the

first appellate court accepting Ext.A1 as a valid authorisation for

P.W.1 to conduct the case on behalf of respondent.

3. What remained is whether finding of first appellate court

regarding alleged trespass pleaded by the original plaintiff and

respondent and the tenancy set up by the appellants is legal and

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correct. Exhibit B1 is the photocopy of a rent deed allegedly

executed by the original plaintiff in favour of appellant No.1.

Exhibits X1 and X2 are true extract of the account of appellant No.1

maintained in the State Bank of Travancore and a consent deed

executed by mother of appellant No.1, respectively. First appellate

court found that Exts.X1 and X2 and the evidence of D.W.2,

Manager of the State Bank of Travancore have no reference to the

shop room in question or the business allegedly carried on there.

So far as Ext.B1 is concerned, first appellate court observed that its

due execution is not proved and that there is material discrepancy

regarding its execution. When the date of execution in figure is

given in Ext.B1 as 13.4.1992 the recital in it is as if it was executed

on 13.2.1998. This discrepancy was not explained by the appellants

satisfactorily. In the circumstances first appellate court is justified in

rejecting Ext.B1.

4. What remained is the oral evidence. I stated that

authorised representative of the respondent gave evidence as P.W1.

P.Ws.2 and 3 are witnesses examined by the respondent to prove

the alleged trespass. But it has come out that they have no direct

information about the alleged trespass. Appellant No.1 gave

evidence as D.W.1 and stated about tenancy in his favour created

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by original plaintiff in the year 1992. But he was not able to

produce any document (except Exts.B1, X1 and X2 which I have

already adverted to) to prove the alleged tenancy. No single receipt

for payment of rent is produced. It was suggested to P.W.2 about

the rent deed between appellant No.1 and the original plaintiff but

he pleaded ignorance. He stated that his information about the

transaction between the parties is hearsay. There is nothing in the

evidence of P.W2 which would show that there was any tenancy as

pointed out by the appellants. P.W.3 though in chief examination

stated about the alleged trespass, in cross-examination he stated

that he has no direct information. He was told by the original plaintiff

that there was no entrustment in favour of the appellants but

original plaintiff told him that the monthly rent was Rs.750/-. He

also stated that his statement that original plaintiff had not received

the rent is the information he received. This statement was taken

note of by the trial court to hold in favour of the tenancy pleaded by

the appellants. But the trial court failed to note that what is stated

by P.W3 is not his direct information. Trial court also failed to note

that if as per the hearsay information of P.W3 rent payable was

Rs.750/- per month, appellants have no such case and according to

them rent originally fixed was Rs.250/- which was enhanced to

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Rs.350/- in June, 1998. Even the appellants have no case that rent

at any point of time was Rs.750/-. In the circumstances first

appellate court was not satisfied with the finding entered by the trial

court and reversed the same. Finding of first appellate court is

based on the evidence on record and its appreciation. I am not

persuaded to think that any substantial question of law is involved

requiring admission of this Second Appeal.

Resultantly Second Appeal fails and it is dismissed in limine.

Appellants are granted three months’ time from this day to vacate

the premises on condition that they will file an affidavit in the trial

court within a period of three weeks from this day undertaking to

vacate the premises within the above period of three months

without putting forth any claim or objection on any count.

Interlocutory Application Nos.3096 and 3097 of 2009 shall

stand closed.

THOMAS P.JOSEPH, JUDGE.

vsv