ORDER
1. This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ of mandamus for bearing respondents 1 to 3 and their men from awarding the items Al to A6 of Schedule-A and items Cl and C2 of Schedule C of the tender for the interior design of M.M.D.A. office at M.M.D.A. Towers, Madras-8 to the contractors who quoted higher rate than that of the petitioner and direct respondents 1 to 3 to award the above items in favour of the petitioner. It is further prayed to grant the relief of compensation in addition to the above relief for the portion of work already compleged at the rate of 20% of the quotation value submitted by the petitioner and such other reeliefs as the court may deem fit.
2. The brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of the writ petition can be stated as follows: The Madras Metropolitan Development Authority (2nd respondent) is constructing a building called M.M.D.A. towers situated at Gandhi Irwin Road, Egmore, Madras-8. The construction work was completed and the building was sold to various Government organisations, such as, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Housing and Urban Development Corporation, and the second respondent (Madras Metropolitan Development Corporation) has retained some portion for its office purposes, in which the interior decoration work was entrusted to the 3rd respondent, namely, Tamil Nadu Handicrafts Development Corporation Ltd. The third respondent called for tenders from the interior contract decorators in respect of 11 items of various interior decorations which consist of schedules A to D, out of which A schedule consists of six items; C schedule consists of three items and B and D schedule, each one item. The petitioner was one of the persons who bid for the tender and he submitted his tender on 9.1.1989. The tenders were opened on the same day at 11.30 A.M. before the tenderers. According to the petitioner, among 13 participants, the petitioner’s quotation in respect of items A-l to A-6 of schedule A and items Cl and C2 of schedule C was the lowest. However, the petitioner was informed that his tender was not accepted, on 3.2.1989 and that the rejection of his tender is arbitrary and unreasonable. It is further stated by the petitioner that he was one of the short listed members considered as qualified for the work of interior decoration by the third respondent in his proceedings dated 28.11.1988. The petitioner submitted that he is a reputed contractor in interior design and that he did work of contracts for famous companies. In the very same M.M.DA.Towers, for the third and fourth floors, the petitioner completed the interior decorations for Messrs.Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner, Clause 5 of the tender notice is invalid and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, inasmuch as respondents 2 and 3 cannot discriminate one contractor from others without assigning any reasons.
3. The contention of the second respondent is that he entrusted the work to the third respondent and that the third respondent while deciding to award the tender had taken much care in awarding the contract to the suitable persons to complete the work in the time schedule and also with sufficient labourers with high standard of specification which were prescribed by the third respondent. It is further stated that the petitioner had already carried out similar work in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation premises, in which the third respondent found that there are lot of irregulatities in the work. The authorities of the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation also informed that the work of the petitioner was not satisfactory and that there was unreasonable delay in completing the work.
4. The third respondent in his counter-affidavit would state that he engaged the fourth respondent-Firm to provide consultancy for interior design of the said building and the fourth respondent gave a report to the third respondent regarding his evaluation of the tender. The recommendation of the fourth respondent has been arrived at after several consideration, like (i) workability of the rate based on specification given, and (ii) ability of the agency to handle the kind of work involved. Based on the recommendation of the fourth respondent and on the evaluation of the third respondent, the third respondent recommended the tenderer for interior design work on 30.1.1989 for M.M.DA.’s approval and on 1.2.1989 the recommendations were accepted. The details of the work, the contractor to whom they were entrusted and the amount, etc. were set out in paragraph 6. According to the third respondent, there is no condition that the lower tender alone should be accepted and that under Clause 5 of the tender- notice, the third respondent reserves his right to reject any or all the tender or accept the lowest or any other tender in full or part without assigning any reason therefor. It is further stated that the rates quoted by the petitioner is very much less than the cost of materials and it is unworkable. If the tender of the petitioner is accepted, it may amount to substandard work in view of the cost of materials, labour cost, etc. and that the rejection of the petitioner’s tender was just and reasonable and without any discrimination or arbitrariness.
5. The fourth respondent stated that he took into account all the applicable costs, such as, material, labour, transport, handling, painting, finishing, hardware as well as profits which were calculated at 15%. The basis for such estimates were the prevalent market rates for all the abovementioned items. Further, the fourth respondent has extensive interior design work having performed concultancy services for interior design for various projects in Government as well as private undertaking companies as set out in paragraph 5 of the counter. According to the fourth respondent, the decision of distributing the work was taken so as to ensure completion of all the work within the prescribed time to minimise the risk involved in the case of default especially since large amounts of advance were going to be paid to the contractors and also taking into account the fact that it was not feasible to award all schedules to one contractor having regard to the magnitude of work involved and the time schedule. According to him, the estimated cost of the items of work in respect of the various schedules is fair and reasonable and had been determined with regard to the prevalent market rates following proper norms. The petitioner also furnished in his additional affidavit a break up of items relating to some of the items of work in Schedules A and C. The deficiencies noted in the cost working furnished by the petitioner are catelogued in paragraph 10 of the counter of the fourth respondent and also the details of the labour involved for the contract. It is stated that the labour cost taken into account by the petitioner is clearly unrealistic, as the petitioner’s labour cost of Rs. 8 per sq.ft. is opposed to the labour cost quoted by other contractors in the area which works out to Rs. 23 to Rs. 30 per sq.ft. The petitioner’s arithmetical work out itself is faulty. Further, the petitioner failed to take into account certain essential items of hardware, such as, screws, stoppers, handles etc. After giving all the details in respect of each work, it is submitted that the consequences of awarding the contracts to a tenderer like the petitioner who has submitted unrealistic and grossly deflated rates are serious and damaging and it would result in shabby and low quality of work, failure to execute the contract on account of unremunerative prices, possible delays in execution, failure to complete contract, possible substitution of law quality materials in place of the required high quality materials, poor finish etc. He submitted that taking into consideration of the above factors, he is justified in recommending the aware of the contract to other tenders while rejecting that of the petitioner’s.
6. The contractors, who were successful in the work, were subsequently impleaded as party respondents 5 to 8. They filed separate counter-affidavits.
7. The fifth respondent would state that he was allotted Al schedule in a sum of Rs. 4,56,578.25; A6 in a sum of Rs. 3,55,751.56 and Schedule B in a sum of Rs. 3,18,775, aggregating to Rs. 11,31,104.75. The fifth respondent has completed over 70% of the work when he received notice from this Court on 18.2.1989.
8. The sixth respondent wouldstate that he was granted schedules A2 and A.5 work on 3.2.1989 for Rs. 3,70,598 and Rs. 3,16,031.50, aggregating in all to Rs. 6,86,629.50. In pursuance of the contract, he has completed 70 to 75% when he received communication from the advocate of the petitioner on 20.2.1989.
9. The seventh respondent would state that he was granted schedules A3 and A4 in a sum of Rs. 3,53,323.00 and Rs. 3,19,359 aggregating in all to Rs. 6,72,682. He has completed 70 to 75% of the work.
10. The eighth respondent would state that he was awarded Schedule C2 contract (furniture) and the cost of contract is Rs. 6,05,280. He has completed 80% of the work.
11. All these respondents have uniformly contended that since the relief prayed for in the writ petition is for forbearing respondents 1 to 3 from awarding the contracts to others other than the petitioner and as they have alreadzy completed more than 70 to 75% of the contract work, the prayer for writ of mandamus has become infructuous. They also submitted that they are reputed contractors. The petitioner is not a person capable of doing such a big work, as gathered from their enquiries. In other respects, they reiterate the allegations stated in the counters of respondents 1 to 5.
12. The petitioner filed a reply-affidavit to the counter affidavit filed by the third respondent reiterating his earlier stand that the rates quoted by him are reasonable.
13. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioner mainly submitted that tyhe quotations of the petitioner are the lowest, that he is one of the short listed members considered as eligible to submit tender and execute the work, and that hence respondents 1 to 3 ought to have accepted his tender and allotted the contract to him and the rejection is arbitrary. Further, condition No. 5, which gives power to reject the tender without assigning reason is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is also contended by the learned Counsel that even though the writ petition is for the relief of mandamus, there is no bar in granting a writ of declaration and a consequential relief of compensation even if it is found that the work had already been completed. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondents would contend the condition No. 5 which empowers the third respondent to reject tender without assigning reasons is certainly a valid one and not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Further, the third respondent has not exercised his power either arbitrarily or on any mala fide reason; but, only on the advice and the expert opinion given by the fourth respondent. It was also submitted that the tender of the petitioner was rejected on sufficient good and valid reasons. Since the rejection was on valid and good reasons in the circumstances of the case, it cannot be said to be arbitrary and the court cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction and grant the relief in favour of the petitioner. The tender submitted by the successful bidder is only in accordance with Clause 12 of the tender notice and there is absolutely no merit in the contention that the quotations submitted by the successful bidders are not in accordance with Clause 12. It is also submitted that since there is no concluded contract, the question of granting damage does not come. In this connection, both the parties drew the attention of this Court to various decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court. The main question to be decided in the writ petition is whether the rejection of the tender submitted by the petitioner without assigning any reason is arbitrary and unreasonable; whether the condition empowering the third respondenjt to reject the lowest tender is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and whether the petitioner is entitled to any relief in the writ petition.
14. Condition No. 5 of the tender notice reads as follows:
M/s. Tamil Nadu Handicrafts Development Corporation Limited reserve the right to reject any or all the tenders or accept the lowest or any other tender in full or part without assigning any reason therefor.
The abovesaid condition in the tender notice did not contain a condition that the lowest tender alone would be accepted. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reportred in Harminder Singh v. Union of India and pointed out para. 27 at page 1534. It was observed therein:
In the instant case, the instrumentalities of the state invited tenders for the supply of fresh buffaloes and cows milk and, therefore, this case has to be decided on the basis of bid by the tenderers. There was no question of any policy in this case. It is open to the State to adopt a policy different from the one in question. But if the authority or the State Government chooses to invite tenders then it must abide by the result of the tender and cannot arbitrarily and capriciously accept the bid of the Milk Scheme although it was much higher and to the detriment of the State.
On the other hand, the learned Advocate-General appearing for respondents 1 and 2 drew my attention to a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Chokhani International Ltd. v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Madras 1987 W.L.R. 529. This Court considered the said decision in the light of the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court. In para. 128 it was held:
Reservation of such power and rejection of all the offers in exercise of this reservation does not automatically become arbitrary and such a clause is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It has been so expressly held by the Supreme Court in Quenim’s case in which the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal was quoted with approval. In Harinarayan Jaiswal’s case one of the contentions taken on behalf of the writ petitionjer was that the power retained by the Government “to accept or to reject any bid without assigning any reason therefor” was an arbitrary power and therefore violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court held that when accepting or rejecting a bid the Government merely performs an executive function and the correctness of its conclusion is not open to judicial review; and it was pointed out that there was no basis for contending that the owner of the privileges in question who had offered to sell them cannot decline to accept the highest bid if he thinks that the price offered is inadequate. Referring to the legal position in case where bids are given at an auction, it was pointed out that there was no concluded contract till the bid was accepted and before there was a concluded contract it was open to the bidders to withdraw their bids; by merely giving the bids, the bidders had not acquired any vested right, and the fact that the Government was the seller does not change the legal position once its exclusive right to deal with this privilege is conceded. It was pointed out in this case that if the Government was the exclusive owner of the privilages, reliance on Article 19(1)(g) or Article 14 becomes irrelevant. In Quenim’s case the Supreme Court also pointed out that an invitation to tender is a mere attempt to ascertain whether an offer can be obtained within such margin as the building owner or employer is willing to adopt, or, in other words, is an offer to negptiate, an offer to receive officers, an offer to chaffer, as stated in Halsubury’s Laws of England, Third Edition, P.422. We have referred to this decision in some detail because it was vehemently contended on behalf of the appellants that an invitation to tender does not crystallize any rights and therefore the tenderer cannot approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
In Para 20 it was held:
Undoubtedly, Quenim’s case and Ramana Shetty’s case laid down that reservation of the power to reject any or all tenders without assigning any reasons is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is, however, difficult to see how merely because there is the reservation of the power to reject tenders without assigning any reasons, that will prevent a tenderer who has a grievance that his claim has been arbitrarily rejected, from approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. When a public authority like the Port Trusts rejects all tenders and consequently the tender of such tenderer is rejected, if it is possible for the tenderer to show that his tender has been arbitrarily rejected or that it has been rejected on extraneous considerations, or that the rejection is mala fide, such rejection will clearly be violative of the guarantee of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Even though a particular power may be valid, as in the instant case the power to reject all tenders, the exercise of that power in a given case can become arbitrary.
It is the exercise of the power which becomes open to challenge in such a case, and if it is shown that the exercise of the power is arbitrary, it would be no answer for the State,or the public Authority to say that since while considering the “tenders the State or the Public Authority is acting in the field of ‘ Private law’, that acting is excluded from judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Every administrative decision by a Public Authority must have reasons to support that decision and if these reasons disclose that they are either wholly unsustainable in law or that the public Authority was acting mala fide, a judicial review of the administrative decision cannot be ruled out on the spacious excuse that till the time of selection of the person to whom the contract is given, the field of ‘public law’ does not commence and that the Public Authority being in the ‘private law’ field is not answerable to the court.
15. While considering the decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in this case Harminder Singh v. Union of India , a Division Bench of this Court in Chokhani International Ltd. v. Board of Trustees of the port of Madras 1987 W.L.R.529 (above quoted) has observed as follows at page 544.
This decision has been referred to in the latest decision of the Supreme Court in –Harminder Singh Arora v. Union of India (1983) 3 S.C.C. 247. In that decision the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that though the Government may enter into a contract with any person, in so doing the State or its instrumentalities cannot act arbitrarily.
It was laid down that in the absence of any specific policy of the Government it is open to the State to adopt any policy, but if the authority or the State chooses to invite tenders then it must abide by the conditions laid down in the tender notice and the result of the tender and cannot arbitrarily and capriciously accept a much higher tender to the detriment of the State. In paragraph 13, the Supreme Court observed as follows:
Even in the matter of contract, the Government has tyo act fairly and justly and the failure of the government to do so gives a right to the citizen to approach the court for justice.
Again, in Para 31, it was considered:
In that case Harminder Singh Arora v. Union of India tenders were invited for the supply of fresh buffalo or cow milk at the Military Farms Pimpri, Pune. The appellant who was already on the approved list of respondents 2 and 3 submitted a tender for supply of fresh buffalo milk as per the requirements stated in the tender notice. Respondent No. 4, General Manager, Government Milk Scheme, Pune, also submitted a tender, but the tender did not relate to supply of fresh buffalo milk or cow milk but related to the supply of pasteurized milk. When the tenders were opened the appellant was the lowest bidder. The authorities, however, accepted the tender given by respondent No. 4 and rejected the tender of the appellant even though it was lower than that of respondent No. 4. The facts had shown that by accepting the tender of respondent No. 4, respondents 2 and 3 were put to a substantial loss to the tune of about Rs. 10 lacs. But even then, the tender of respondent No. 4 was accepted in preference to that of the appellant. Felling aggrieved by the rejection of the tender, the appellant challenged the order of the authority concerned by a writ petition in the Bombay High Court. The writ petition in the Bombay High Court. The writ petition was dismissed on the view that it involved questions relating to contractual obligations and even otherwise the Court did not find that there was anything wrong or unfair in accepting the milk from the Government Milk Scheme. The Bombay High Court held that the policy decision cannot be termed as unfair or arbitrary and rejected the petition. In appeal before the Supreme Court, the main contention was that the authorities concerned had acted contrary to the principles of law, unfairly, arbitrarily and discriminately, because the appellant being the lowest bidder, his tender ought to have been accepted by the Panel Officers and there was absolutely no reason or justification for respondents 2 and 3 to reject the same. It was also argued that the tender submitted by respondent No. 4 was not in consonance with the requirements of the tender form and therefore should have been ignored.In any case, according to the appellant, if respondents 2 and 3 wished to alter the invitation of the tender it was obligatory and mandatory for them to call for negotiations before rejecting his tender and accepting the tender of respondent No. 4 as there was a clear provision for negotiation in the tender notice and the appellant could have been asked to tender for the supply of pasteurized milk, The argument was that even in the matter of contract, the Government has to act fairly and justly and the failure of the Government to do so gives a right to the citizen to approach the Court for justice and that respondents 2 and 3 had made a wrongful exercise of their power in rejecting the tender of the appellant. It was also argued that the appellant being the lowest bidder, the authorities concerned had acted arbitrarily in accepting the bid of respondent No. 4 which was higher than that of the appellant. This argument was accepted by the Supreme Court and respondents 2 and 3 were directed to accept the tender of the appellant.
After referring to Para.29 of the judgment of the Supreme Court, the Division Bench of this Court observed:
This decision of the Supreme Court is, therefore, an authority for the proposition that if under the terms of the tender notice a right accrues to the lowest bidder or highest bidder, as the case may be, then, if the rejection of such tender is found to be arbitrary, a direction can be issued to the authorities to accept the lowest or the highest bid, as the case may be. This decision thus turned mainly on the fact that under the terms of the tender notice the contract had to be granted to the lowest bidder. It would not therefore be correct to say that merely because a person whose tender had been rejected could not have sought any relief in the Civil Court, a direction to accept his tender, if the rejection is found to be arbitrary and if under the terms of the tender, he was entitled to have his tender accepted, cannot be given.
The ratio laid down in the above Division Bench decision clearly enunciates the principle that it is a settled law that in the case of an auction or in the case of a tender, the Government, and therefore also a public authority, has the right to reject the highest bid or tender unless the conditions of auction or tender specifically provide that the highest bid or tender shall be accepted. Undoubtedly, rejection of the highest tender being permissible on good and sufficient grounds may become arbitrary if it is based on irrelevant considerations or if it is found that the authority has not acted fairly and justly. It is needless to multiply decisions in view of the proposition of law settled in the latest decision of this Court quoted above.
16. Now the question to be considered is, could it be said that the decision of the third respondent is not a fair decision or a decision which is not based on good ground and has therefore become arbitrary so as to warrant this Court to invoke the writ jurisdiction. In this case, the third respondent engaged the services of the fourth respondent fdrexpert opinion and he on the basis of the recommendation made by the fourth respondent in turn submitted the recommendation to respondents 1 and 2 and consequently the tender submitted by the petitioner was rejected. It is seen that the fourth respondent submitted estimated cost in respect of each item and the working sheets in respect of the same are produced before this Court for reference. The various reasons which were set out in the counter filed by the fourth respondent and which have been accepted by the third respondent would show that the petitioner submitted a deflated rates and on accepting his tender, it would cause inevitably a shabby and low quality work, failure to execute the contract on account of unremunerative prices, possible delays in execution and also failure to complete contract, possible substitution of law quality materials in the place of the required high quality materials, poor finish, etc. It is also stated that the petitioner’s tendered amounts were, without good reason, far lower than the estimated amounts arrived at by the fourth respondent and the tendered amounts of the other tenderers. The fourth respondent submitted that having regard to the various factors the fourth respondent is fully justified in recommending the award of the contract to other tenderers. According to the fourth respondent, he was responsible for ensuring the execution, the quality and adherance to the time schedule and that he was accountable to the third respondent for the entire project of interior design as a total concept. The fourth respondent pointed out various deficiencies in the cost working given by the petitioner and also his failure to take into account certain essential items of hardware. The fourth respondent also pointed out some arithmatical mistakes in working out the cost and also omitting the liability to pay the Excise Duty. There is absolutely nothing to show that the above recommendations of the fourth respondent are either unreasonable or unjust in the circumstances of the case or there is any mala fides on the part of respondents 3 and 4. No doubt, the second respondent in his counter-affidavit would state that the petitioner had already carried out similar work in the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation premises in the same building with a lot of irregularities in the work and that the authorities of the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation has informed that the work of the petitioner Was not satisfactory and there was unreasonable delay in completing the. work. The second respondent has also stated that the petitioner’s back records show that the petitioner used to quote very low rate and could not complete the work in the time schedule. The second respondent also verified from the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation that the work of the petitioner was unsatisfactory, irregular and inordinate delay in completing the work. Certain correspondence between the said Hindustan Petroleum Corporation and the petitioner were also produced. They were disputed by the petitioner who tried to explain them by giving some reasons for the said communication. The learned Counsel for the petitioner drew the attention of this Court to the decision reported in Mohinder Singh v. Chief Election Commissioner wherein it was held:
When a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise.
The Supreme Court has pointed out that otherwise an order bad in the beginning may by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. A Division Bench of this Court in Chokhani International Ltd. v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Madras 1987 W.L.R. 529 considered the above ruling of the Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh v. Chief Election Commissioner and observed:
It is necessary to remember that the Supreme Court was dealing with anb order made in the exercise of a statutory power. In Mohinder Singh’s case the Supreme Court followed the earlier decision in Gordhandas Banji Case and the following observations were quoted: “Public Orders publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public Orders made by public authorities are meant to haVe public effect and are in- tended to effect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself.” “This, however, is not the law in so far as an administrative order is concerned. There is no principle of natural justice which requires an administrative order to be a speaking order and unless the statute specifically enjoins that reasons should be given an administrative order need not contain reasons.
In view of the abvove decision of the Division Bench of this Court that contention also does not hold good. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Vijay Bahadur Singh . Their Lordships held that the Government has the right for good and sufficient cause not to accept the highest bid but even to prefer a tenderer other than the highest bidder. In Trilochan Mishra v. State of Orissa . Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the Government is not bound to accept the highest tender but may accept a lower one in case it thinks that the person offering the lower tender is on an overall consideration to be preferred to the higher tenderer. Now the question to be considered is whether the decision taken by the third respondent rejecting the tender of the petitioner and accepting the tender of respondents 5 to 8 could be considered to be so unreasonable and arbitrary. It is seen from the estimate of cost given by the fourth respondent and the counter-affidavits of respondents 3 and 4, which are supported by materials produced by them, that the tender submitted by the petitioner was found unworkable and very low rates have been quoted and it may not be possible to complete the work within the time schedule with good materials which are contemplated under the tender. In the instant case, no mala fide on the part of the respondents has been alleged except stating that the petitioner’s tender was not accepted.
17. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that no excise duty is leviable for these items of work, while the contesting respondents submitted that those items are also liable for excise duty and both of them relied on the Central Excise Tariff 1986-87. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner Section IX deals with wood and articles of wood and they were exempted from excise duty while the learned Counsel for the second respondent submitted that only certain items of steel furniture and special items have been excluded and not these items, relying on other exemption portion, Similarly, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that as per Clause 12 of the tender notice ‘all the items in a schedule shall be tendered for’. But in the instant case the successful bidder has not done it and azs such he is disqualified. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the contesting respondents submitted that Cl, C2 and C3 are separate schedules by themselves and in the instant case the tenderer is not obliged to quote each and every items, but all the items in a particular schedule has been shown and as such there is no question of disqualification. I find much force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents in this regard. On a careful and anxious consideration of the entire materials placed before this Court, it cannot be said that the rejection of the tender submitted by the petitioner is either unreasonable or arbitrary. On the other hand, it is supported by good and sufficient reason.
18. It is also to be noted that the relief prayed for in the petition is for issue of a writ of mandamus for bearing respondents 1 to 3 from awarding the items quoted by the petitioner in the tender to others. But in the instant case it is seen that the successful bidders have started the work even from 4.2.1989 and that they completed nearly 70 to 75% of the work on the dates when they received notices of this writ petition and that they have now completed 90% of the work. As rightly contended by the learned Counsel for respondents 5 to 8 who are the successful tenderers, the relief prayed for in the petition has practically become infructuous as they are successful bidders and theyhave almost completed the work. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that this Court can in the circumstances of the case, even if it comes to the conclusion that a major portion was completed already, grant the alternative relief of compensation. This Court has taken the view that the rejection of the petitioner’s tender is not unreasonable and arbitrary so as to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. As rightly observed by the Division Bench in Chokhani International Limtied v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Madras 1987 W.L.R. 529 when a tenders given, it is merely an offer and unless accepted, no contract can come into force; no rights flow from such offer unless, of course, it is held out at the time of inviting the offers, that the highest or the lowest offer would be accepted. But, in the instant case, admittedly, the conditions of tender did not contain a condition that the lowest tender would be accepted. On the other hand, it is provided that it is open to the authority to reject the tender without assigning any reason. Hence the petitioner cannot claim any right by virtue of the said offer in the circumstances of the case and as such the question of granting compensation also does not arise. For all these reasons, I am of the view that the petitioner has not made out a case for the issue of a writ of mandamus as prayed for and that the petition is liable to be dismissed.
19. In the result, the writ petition fails and stands dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.