JUDGMENT
Madan B. Lokur, J.
1. The Appellant is aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 1st November, 2001 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in Sessions Case No. 25/1999. By the impugned judgment and order, the Appellant was convicted of an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short IPC) as well as Section 380 of the IPC. By a subsequent order passed on the same date, the Appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for life and a fine in respect of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. He was also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and pay a fine in respect of the offence punishable under Section 380 of the IPC. Both the sentences were to run concurrently.
2. On 7th January, 1999, the dead body of Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal aged about 62 years was found in the bathroom attached to the bedroom in her flat. She had apparently been strangulated with a kurta belonging to her husband D.C. Aggarwal and the jewellery she was wearing, namely, her necklace, earrings, rings and bangles were missing. Cash lying in a wooden almirah in the flat was also missing. There were no witnesses to the murder, but based on circumstantial evidence, the Appellant was convicted for having murdered Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal (the deceased).
3. The broad facts of the case are that on 7th January, 1999, Anuj Goenka, a grandchild of D.C. Aggarwal and the deceased, went to their flat for some domestic work at about 4.50 pm. He rang the doorbell and a stranger wearing a black shawl opened the door. Anuj asked the whereabouts of his grandmother and was told that she had gone to visit somebody in the neighborhood. He asked the whereabouts of his grandfather and he was told that he had gone to work. Anuj then requested the stranger to allow him to enter the flat to make a phone call but he declined since he did not know Anuj. The stranger, on being asked by Anuj, claimed to be known to his grandparents. Thereupon, Anuj left the flat and went to a public call office (PCO). From the PCO, Anuj rang up his mother and told her what had transpired and she asked him to come back home. Soon thereafter, he saw the stranger going away but he was not covered with a shawl. Anuj then went back to his grandmother’s flat but found it locked. Since there was some function going on in a neighbour’s flat and some halwai was sitting outside, he asked the halwai about the stranger and was told that he had gone away after locking the flat.
4. Anuj then went back to his house and along with his maternal uncle Sunil Kumar went to his grandfather’s office but was told that his grandfather had already gone back home. Anuj and Sunil then went to D.C. Aggarwal’s flat. There they found his scooter but noticed that the flat was still locked. Anuj inquired from the neighbours about the whereabouts of his grandfather but to no avail. A little later, they met D.C. Aggarwal and Anuj and Sunil then broke open the lock of the flat and went inside, whereupon they discovered the body of Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal. The police was then informed. According to D.C. Aggarwal his wife was wearing some jewellery such as a necklace, some earrings, rings and bangles and they were missing from her person. Upon a search being carried out, it was found that cash of Rs. 4000/- lying in the cupboard was also missing. The black shawl worn by the stranger was lying on the bed.
5. Since Anuj was the only person who had seen the stranger, the police showed him some photographs (perhaps of some bad characters) but according to Anuj the stranger was not one of them. However, when Anuj described the stranger, it appeared to D.C. Aggarwal that the description fit the mason who had been working with them and who was expected to come in the morning for some miscellaneous work. It transpires that when D.C. Aggarwal left for work in the morning at about 10.30 am he was told by his wife that the mason would be coming for some work and to collect some homoeopathic medicines that D.C. Aggarwal was giving him.
6. The mason had been introduced to D.C. Aggarwal by his brother-in-law V.B. Gupta. On his part, V.B. Gupta knew a contractor by the name of Mahinder Singh and the mason was actually his nephew who had been living with him since he was a child of about 2 years. The police party along with Anuj went to the house of Mahinder Singh who produced a group photograph with the Appellant in it. On seeing the photograph, Anuj identified the Appellant as the person who had opened the door of the flat and who had gone away just when he had finished making the phone call from the PCO.
7. Further investigations revealed that on the night of 7th January, 1999, the Appellant had gone to the house of his brother-in-law Ramesh Kumar and over there he had persuaded his father Jagtar Singh to take his wife and children to their native village in Amritsar. The next morning, Jagtar Singh took the Appellant’s wife and children to Amritsar. That the Appellant had left his house along with his wife and children on the night of 7th January, 1999 was confirmed by his neighbour Dinesh Kumar, who stated that the Appellant had told him that he was going to leave his wife as her mother was not well.
8. On 10th January, 1999, the Appellant was arrested from the house of his brother-in-law Ramesh Kumar. On interrogation, the Appellant admitted that some gold jewellery that the deceased was wearing, that is, necklace, ring, earrings etc. were taken by him and kept in the bag of his wife who had gone to their village. Thereupon, the police party along with the Appellant went to Amritsar where they met the Appellant’s wife Smt. Kavita. When the Appellant’s wife opened her bag and went through the luggage, she discovered some gold jewellery, which was allegedly taken by the Appellant from the person of Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal.
9. The dead body of Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal was subjected to a post mortem examination and it was found that she was strangled to death. During investigations, a fingerprint expert was also called and he lifted fingerprints from the door of the cupboard from which cash belonging to Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal was stolen and also two fingerprints from the glass pane on the main door of the flat.
10. On these broad facts, the police filed a challan under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short CrPC). On 5th August, 1999 the following charges were framed:
That on 7.1.1999 at about 4.00 pm or 5.00 pm at H. No. SD-42, Pitampura, Delhi, within the jurisdiction of P.S. Saraswati Vihar, Delhi, you committed the murder of Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and within my cognizance.
Secondly, on the above said date, time and place you committed theft of gold chain, gold ring and gold ear rings belonging to the deceased Smt. Pushpa from her above said house used as human dwelling or for the custody of the property and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 380 IPC and within my cognizance.
The Appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
11. The learned Trial Judge noted that the prosecution had argued the case on the basis of certain circumstances, which were individually discussed by him. When the matter was argued before us, learned amices Curiae also argued on the basis of those circumstances. We propose to consider each of those circumstances.
12. Medical Evidence – The post mortem on the dead body was conducted on 8th January, 1999 by PW-4, Dr. Ashok Jaiswal. He found some abrasions and bruises on the body and some internal injuries. On the basis of his examination, he concluded that all the injuries were ante mortem in nature and that death was due to asphyxia consequent to Injury No.1, that is, due to ligature material found around the neck and that the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. According to the medical evidence, the death was homicidal and had taken place around 5.00 pm on 7th January, 1999. There is no serious contest to the medical evidence mentioned above.
13. Scientific evidence and recovery of fingerprints – As already mentioned, some fingerprints were lifted from the flat of D.C. Aggarwal. Two fingerprints marked Q-1 and Q-2 were lifted from the door of the cupboard from which the cash was stolen while fingerprint Q-3 was lifted from the glass pane of the main door. The fingerprints were examined by PW-33, ASI Subhash Chandra who compared them with the specimen fingerprints of the Appellant. He then gave his report which is Exhibit PW-33/A. As per his report, fingerprint Q-1 on the door of the cupboard was actually a partial print and was not identical with the fingerprint of the Appellant. It could not be matched with any in the records of the Fingerprint Bureau. As regards fingerprint Q-2, it was smudged and did not disclose sufficient number of ridge details and was unfit for comparison. Fingerprint Q-3 was a sequence of two fingers, that is, the right middle finger and the right ring finger and was found to be identical with the specimen fingerprints of the Appellants.
14. It was submitted by learned amices Curiae that since the fingerprints of the Appellant were not found on the door of the cupboard from which cash was stolen, it cannot be positively said that the Appellant had committed the crime. We are of the view that the absence of the fingerprints of the Appellant from the door of the cupboard does not lead to any such conclusion as canvassed by learned Counsel. At best, it can only be said that he may not have stolen the cash from the cupboard, but even that may not be correct as it appears to us that the murder of Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal and the theft are two parts of the same transaction.
15. That apart, the learned Trial Judge has noted, and we think rightly, that since fingerprint Q-2 was smudged, it cannot be said that that fingerprint was not of the Appellant. It was only unfit for comparison while fingerprint Q-1 was only a partial print and nothing conclusive could be said about it.
16. In our opinion, given the facts of the case, it must be held that the person who committed the murder of Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal would have also stolen the cash from the cupboard. It is extremely unlikely that the two crimes were committed at different times by different persons – they are a part of the same incident.
17. As regards fingerprints Q-3, learned Counsel submitted that admittedly the Appellant had worked in the flat of the deceased and he used to come there for obtaining some homeopathic medicines from D.C. Aggarwal. Therefore, if any fingerprints were found on the main door, it was quite natural, and no adverse conclusion could be drawn from this.
18. We are of the view that the existence of fingerprints Q-3 clearly shows that the Appellant had gone to the flat of D.C. Aggarwal and in fact this was the admitted case. The primary question is whether the Appellant had gone to the flat on that fateful day or not.
19. In this regard, it would be worthwhile to recall the testimony of PW-15, D.C. Aggarwal who stated that when he left his flat in the morning, he was told by Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal that the Appellant would be coming that day for some repair work and also to collect some homeopathic medicines. The witness was not cross-examined on this issue and it appears quite plausible, even otherwise, that the Appellant did visit the flat of Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal, as expected on 7th January, 1999. In fact, the evidence shows that he did.
20. Learned amices Curiae also submitted that D.C. Aggarwal had a part time maid servant who used to come for cleaning the utensils in the morning. No suggestion was given to the effect that the maid had come on that particular day nor was any case built up by the Appellant in his cross-examination or in his statement under Section 313 of the CrPC that the maid servant could have committed the crime.
21. Motive – It is not absolutely necessary to prove the existence of a motive for the commission of a crime. Sometimes, the evidence in this regard may not be available. Almost a century ago, it was said, in Emperor v. Balochkhan (1910) VII I.C. 601 that,
It is not always possible for the prosecution to prove the motive for a crime and the absence of any proof of motive is not in itself sufficient to justify the rejection of evidence which is otherwise reliable.
22. In Sahadevan alias Sagadevan v. State , the Supreme Court relied upon an earlier decision rendered in Mani Kumar Thapa v. State of Sikkim and held that in a case of circumstantial evidence, if the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are proved beyond doubt, then the absence of motive would not hamper a conviction.
23. Similarly, in Thaman Kumar v. State of Union Territory of Chandigarh , the Supreme Court relied upon State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jeet Singh and Nathuni Yadav v. State of Bihar and held as follows:
There is no such principle or rule of law that where the prosecution fails to prove the motive for commission of the crime, it must necessarily result in acquittal of the accused. Where the ocular evidence is found to be trustworthy and reliable and finds corroboration from the medical evidence, a finding of guilt can safely be recorded even if the motive for the commission of the crime has not been proved.
24. Finally, in Ranganayaki v. State , the Supreme Court explained that motive is the emotion which impels a man to do a particular act and such an impelling cause need not be proportionate to the gravity of the crime. Many a murder has been committed without any known or prominent motive and it is quite possible that the impelling factor may remain undiscoverable. Relying upon Red v. Palmer, Shorthand Report at page 308, May 1856 and Atley v. State of U.P. , the Supreme Court held as follows:
In some cases it may be difficult to establish motive through direct evidence, while in some other cases inferences from circumstances may help in discerning the mental propensity of the person concerned. There may also be cases in which it is not possible to disinter the mental transaction of the accused which would have impelled him to act. No proof can be expected in all cases as to how the mind of the accused worked in a particular situation. Sometimes it may appear that the motive established is a weak one. That by itself is insufficient to lead to an inference adverse to the prosecution. Absence of motive, even if it is accepted, does not come to the aid of the accused. These principles have to be tested on the background of factual scenario.
25. In a rather illuminating passage in Wills’ Principles of Circumstantial Evidence, 7th edition, it is said that,
It is always a satisfactory circumstance of corroboration when, in connection with convincing facts of conduct, an apparent motive can be assigned; but, as the operations of the mind are invisible and intangible, it is impossible to go further; and it must be remembered that there may be motives which no human being but the party himself can divine.
A little later (page 65) it is said that absence of an ascertainable motive comes to nothing, if the crime is proved to have been committed by a sane person. Concluding the discussion on the subject, it is then said,
It follows from the foregoing remarks, that evidence of collateral facts which may appear to have presented a motive for a particular action deserves per se no weight. With motives merely, the legislator and the judge have nothing to do; ACTIONS, AS THE OBJECTS OR RESULTS OF MOTIVES, are the only legitimately cognizable subjects of human laws.
26. In so far as the present case is concerned, the intention of committing crime is quite apparent in as much as the Appellant intended to take away the necklace, earrings and other jewellery and cash belonging to Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal. Quite clearly, the intention was one of theft, and whatever be the motive, it led to the death of Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal.
27. It was contended by learned amices Curiae that the Appellant had no past criminal record and there was nothing to suggest that he would commit a murder just to steal some jewellery, particularly because he had a wife and children to support and even otherwise led quite a stable life. While this may be so, as already discussed, the absence of a motive to kill does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the crime of murder was not committed.
28. Recovery of stolen articles – The recovery of the jewellery worn by the deceased, from the baggage of the Appellant’s wife, and her testimony in this regard is of considerable importance. PW-17, Smt. Kavita is the wife of the Appellant. She stated that the police and the Appellant had come to her parent’s house in Punjab. When asked to open her bag, she did so and found under her clothes a gold chain and a pair of earrings which she immediately gave to the police. She stated that the Appellant did not tell her anything about the chain or the earrings or from where he had got them. She denied any knowledge of these jewellery items. Her evidence against the Appellant confirms the theft of jewellery from the person of Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal.
29. In Wasim Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh , the Supreme Court considered the recent possession of the property of a deceased, in circumstances clearly indicating that he had been murdered and robbed, so as to suggest that not only the possessor of the property was a thief or a receiver of stolen property, but it also indicated that he was guilty of a more aggravated crime which had a connection with the theft. The Supreme Court referred to Emperor v. Neamatulla 17 Cal WN 1077 (A) and the following passage from Wills on Circumstantial Evidence:
the possession of stolen goods recently after the loss of them, may be indicative not merely of the offence of larceny, or of receiving with the guilty knowledge, but of any other more aggravated crime which has been connected with theft.
Reference was also made to Queen-Empress v. Sami 13 Mad 426 wherein it was observed
In cases in which murder and robbery have been shown to form parts of one transaction, it has been held that recent and unexplained possession of the stolen property while it would be presumptive evidence against a prisoner on the charge of robbery would similarly be evidence against him on the charge of murder.
A similar view was also taken in Emperor v. Chintamoni Shahu and In re Venkataswamy and Ramprashad Makundram v. The Crown .
30. Based on these decisions, the Supreme Court concluded, on the facts of the case that the offences of murder and robbery against the appellant were established and not merely the minor offence of robbery or theft.
31. In Baiju v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1978 SCC (Cri) 142, reliance was placed upon Wasim Khan and Alisher v. State of U.P. to conclude that recent and unexplained possession of stolen articles can well be taken to be presumptive evidence of the charge of murder as well.
32. Finally, in Ganesh Lal v. State of Rajasthan , the Supreme Court considered the entire case law on the subject including the decision in Baiju, Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka , Gulab Chand v. State of M.P. , Mukund v. State of M.P. and A. Devendran v. State of T.N. and stated the law in the following words:
Recovery of stolen property from the possession of the accused enables a presumption as to commission of offence other than theft or dacoity being drawn against the accused so as to hold him a perpetrator of such other offences on the following tests being satisfied : (i) the offence of criminal misappropriation, theft or dacoity relating to the articles recovered from the possession of the accused and such other offences can reasonably be held to have been committed as an integral part of the same transaction; (ii) the time-lag between the date of commission of the offence and the date of recovery of articles from the accused is not so wide as to snap the link between recovery and commission of the offence; (iii) availability of some piece of incriminating evidence or circumstance, other than mere recovery of the articles, connecting the accused with such other offence; (iv) caution on the part of the court to see that suspicion, howsoever strong, does not take the place of proof.
33. In Ganesh Lal, the Supreme Court also referred to the provisions of Section 313 of the CrPC and observed that when a case rests on circumstantial evidence, the failure of the accused to offer any satisfactory explanation for his possession of the stolen property, though not an incriminating circumstance by itself, would yet enable an inference being raised against him because the fact, being in the exclusive knowledge of the accused, was for him to explain.
34. In the present case, the following two questions were put to the Appellant and he did not given any worthwhile reply to any of them:
Ques.It is further in evidence against you that in pursuance of your disclosure statement you led the PWs to your house in village Khankot, P.S. Sultanbindh, District Amritsar where you had delivered the above said articles to you wife and their your wife Smt. Kavita had produced two gold earrings Ex. P-10/1-2, one gold chain Ex. P-9 one another gold chain Ex. P-8 and your wife stated that these articles were given to you on 7.1.99 in Delhi by you and these articles were sealed and taken into possession vide memo Ex. PW-17/A and deposited in the malkhana of P.S. Saraswati Vihar in intact condition. What have you to say?
Ans. It is incorrect.
Ques. It is further in evidence against you that Smt. Kavita had told that these articles were handed over to her by her husband on 7.1.99 in Delhi and you had stated that you had purchased these articles from the market for her on which your wife Smt. Kavita told that these articles appeared to be old one. On this you told her that you had purchased old ornaments and you had yet to pay the price and in case you are unable to make the payment, the same be returned. What have you to say?
Ans. It is incorrect.
35. Under the circumstances, it appears to us that the recovery of stolen articles from PW-17 Smt. Kavita who is the wife of the Appellant leads to a presumption that not only had the Appellant stolen the jewellery from Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal but that he had also murdered her.
36. Learned amices Curiae submitted that no public witness was involved when PW-17, Smt. Kavita was asked to open her baggage. Given the facts of the case, we are of the view that it was not at all necessary to involve a third person. PW-17, Smt. Kavita is the wife of the Appellant and in the ordinary course, there would be no reason for her to testify against her own husband. When the gold jewellery was recovered from her baggage, she frankly admitted that she had no knowledge about this. The only person who could have placed the jewellery in her baggage is her husband, that is, the Appellant. It is not as if she wanted to frame her husband, which may perhaps have necessitated the presence of some independent persons. Under these circumstances, the prosecution has not committed any error in the investigation as suggested by learned amices Curiae.
37. Identification of the stolen property – No submissions were made in this regard. In any case, we find that PW-15, D.C. Aggarwal identified the jewellery as belonging to his wife. PW-17, Smt. Kavita also identified the jewellery items taken out of her bag.
38. Last seen at the premises – The identification of the Appellant does not pose any serious problem. Anuj had seen him in the flat of D.C. Aggarwal wearing a black shawl, which shawl was later found on the bed in D.C. Aggarwal’s house. He had also seen him soon after he finished making the telephone call to his mother. No one else was seen near the flat of the deceased. A photograph of the Appellant was obtained from PW-9, Mahinder Singh and Anuj identified the Appellant as being the person whom he had seen in the flat of D.C. Aggarwal. We also find from the evidence on record, particularly the statement of PW-15, D.C. Aggarwal that the description of the person seen by Anuj in the flat matched with that of the Appellant. Moreover, after the Appellant was arrested on 10th January, 1999 and taken to the police station, Anuj identified him as the person present in the flat.
39. Learned amices Curiae submitted that during his examination in court, Anuj who appeared as PW-19, did not identify the Appellant. We are unable to read the testimony of Anuj in that manner. All that Anuj stated was that the accused present in court resembles the person whom he had seen but was not very sure because at that time the accused had kept a beard. Anuj also stated that due to the lapse of time he was not sure about the identity of the accused. All that can be made out from this is that due to some physical change and lapse of time, Anuj was unsure whether the accused was the same person whom he saw in the flat but he did not say with certainty that the accused was not the person whom he saw in the flat. It is quite possible that because of the two factors mentioned by him, Anuj was unable to form a definite recollection but coupled with the facts, which he stated in his testimony that he had identified the Appellant from the photograph produced by PW-9, Mahinder Singh and that he had also identified the Appellant in the police station on 10th January, 1999, we are of the view that Anuj had not denied that the accused and the person in the flat are one and the same person.
40. At this stage, the conduct of the Appellant also gains considerable importance. His neighbour PW-20, Dinesh Kumar stated that on 7th January, 1999, the Appellant left the flat at 10.00 am and came back at about 7.00 pm. On his return, he was tense and after some time he left his house with his family. He was carrying a bag containing some clothes. When PW-20, Dinesh Kumar inquired of him, the Appellant stated that he was going to leave his wife as her mother was not well. While leaving, he gave the key of his house to PW-20, Dinesh Kumar. The Appellant returned home the same night at about 10.00 pm when PW-20, Dinesh Kumar handed over the key to him. But after about five minutes, the Appellant locked his house and left. This witness was not cross-examined.
41. The brother-in-law of the Appellant, PW-16, Ramesh Kumar stated that around 7.30 or 7.45 pm, the Appellant came to his house along with his wife and son. He was carrying a bag with him. They purchased some liquor and the Appellant also purchased socks, a track suit, one shawl and one wrist watch. Thereafter, they consumed the liquor and took dinner after which the Appellant asked his father Jagtar Singh to take his wife and children to Amritsar. Jagtar Singh told him that it would be possible for him to leave only in the morning. The next morning, that is, on 8th January, 1999, Jagtar Singh took the Appellant’s wife Kavita and his son to Amritsar. According to this witness, the Appellant was behaving normally but he admitted it to be correct that the Appellant had insisted that Jagtar Singh take his wife and son to Amritsar. This witness also confirmed that the Appellant had left the house at about 9.00 pm and returned at about 10.00 pm and then went to sleep. The version given by PW-16, Ramesh Kumar is consistent with the version given by PW-20, Dinesh Kumar. Additionally, it may be noted that the Appellant had spent quite a sum of money in the presence of PW 16, Ramesh Kumar.
42. From the sequence of events and testimony of the witnesses, the following facts emerge:
(i) The Appellant was expected to come to D.C. Aggarwal’s flat on 7th January, 1999.
(ii) Some person, who was later identified as the Appellant, was seen in the flat of the deceased by PW-19, Anuj Goenka on the afternoon of 7th January, 1999.
(iii) About an hour or so later, the flat of the deceased was found locked and when the lock was broken open and PW-15, D.C. Aggarwal, PW-18, Sunil Kumar and PW-19, Anuj Goenka entered the flat, they found the dead body of Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal.
(iv) Gold jewellery and cash belonging to Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal was missing from her person and from the cupboard in the flat respectively.
(v) The Appellant tried to hurriedly send his wife and child to his in-laws’ house in Amritsar on the same day but they actually left the next morning.
(vi) Upon a disclosure statement made by the Appellant, the baggage of his wife PW-17, Smt. Kavita was opened at her in-laws’ house in Amritsar and some of the gold jewellery belonging to Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal was found inside the baggage.
(vii) On the evening of 7th January, 1999, the Appellant had spent quite a lot of money in the presence of his brother-in-law PW-16, Ramesh Kumar.
(viii) Other than the Appellant no one else was seen in the flat of the deceased on 7th January, 1999, a little before the murder of Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal or around the time of her death as determined in the post mortem examination.
43. All these facts go to show that after having committed the murder of Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal and taking her jewellery and money, the Appellant put the jewellery in his wife’s bag and sent her to Amritsar. He also spent a part of the amount on purchasing some items. The Appellant was the person last seen in the flat of Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal as disclosed by PW-19, Anuj Goenka.
44. In our opinion, it is quite clear that no one other than the Appellant caused the death of Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal. There is no other theory that has been or could be put forward. Even in his statement under Section 313 of the CrPC, the Appellant did not set up any case except to say that he was falsely implicated.
45. The Appellant produced one witness on his behalf who merely stated that he led a normal life and bore a good character.
46. We are of the view that under these circumstances, the prosecution has been able to conclusively demonstrate that it was only the Appellant who caused the murder of Smt. Pushpa Aggarwal. We do not find any error in the impugned judgment and order and, therefore, dismiss the appeal.
47. For the efforts put in by Ms. Charu Verma, learned amices Curiae, we direct the Delhi Legal Services Authority to pay her a sum of Rs.3,300/- within a period of six weeks from today.