ORDER
B.P. Jha, J.
1. I shall dispose of these six civil revision petitions by a common judgment as a common point of law arises for consideration in these petitions.
2. These petitions arise out of suits for declaring certain assessment orders passed by the Income-tax Officer as illegal and void. A Division Bench of this Court in Gauri Shankar Mansaria v. Union of India (AIR 1971 Pat 362) in a civil revision petition arising out of a similar matter as in these cases directed the petitioner to amend the valuation of the plaint. Earlier the plaintiff valued the suits on the basis of the amounts mentioned in the assessment orders, and he also valued the suit at Rs. 100 for the purpose of injunction. The Division Bench, in the abovementioned case, held that in view of Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, the plaintiff is required to mention one valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction of the court. It is relevant at this stage to quote Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act which reads as under :–
“Where in suits other than those referred to in the Court-Fees Act, 1870, Section 7, paragraphs V, VI, and IX, and paragraph X, clause (d), court-fees are payable ad valorem under the Court-fees Act, 1870, the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same.”
Since it is a case covered by Section 7 (iv) of the Court-fees Act, 1870 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), the value as determinable for the purpose of computation of court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. The plaintiff paid declaratory court-fees under Article 17 (iii) of the Second Schedule of the Act. It is a matter of common knowledge that when a plaintiff files a declaratory suit and pays declaratory court-fee, then he generally does not give the correct court valuation. In this connection, it will be useful to quote the observation of the Supreme Court in S. Rm. Sr, S.SP. Sathappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan (AIR 1958 SC 245) in paragraph No. 16 :
“The plaintiff’s failure to state the amount at which he values the relief sought is often due to the fact that in suits for partition the plaintiff attempts to obtain the benefit of Article 17-B of Schedule II in the matter of payment of court-fees. Where the plaintiff seeks to pay the fixed court-fee as required by the said article, he and his advisers are apt to take the view that it is unnecessary to state the amount for which relief is sought to be claimed for the purposes of court-fees and the valuation for jurisdiction purposes alone is, therefore, mentioned. Often enough, it turns out that the plaint does not strictly attract the provisions of Article 17-B of Schedule II and that the court-fee has to be paid either under Section 7 (iv) (b) or under Section 7 (v) of the Act. If the court comes to the conclusion that the case falls under Section 7 (iv) (b) or Section 7 (iv) (c) ordinarily liberty should be given to the plaintiff to amend his plaint and set out specifically the amount at which he seeks to value his claims for the payment of court-fees. It would not be reasonable or proper in such a case to hold the plaintiff bound by the valuation made by him for the purposes of jurisdiction and to infer that the said valuation should be also taken as the valuation for the payment of court-fees. In this connection we may point out that this is the view taken by the Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court in Karam Ilahi v. Muhammad Bashir (AIR 1949 Lah 116). As we have already indicated Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act postulates that the plaintiff should first value his claim for the purpose of court-fee and it provides for the determination of the value for jurisdiction on the basis of such claim. In our opinion, therefore, the learned Judges of the Madras High Court were in error in holding that the valuation for jurisdiction showed in the plaint should be taken to be the valuation for the payment of court-fees on the plaint as well as the memorandum of appeal. In view of their prior decision that the present case fell under Section 7 (iv) (b), they should have allowed the appellant to amend his valuation for the payment of court-fees not only on the memorandum of appeal but also on the plaint.”
In these circumstances, this Court directed the plaintiff to amend the plaint in respect of the valuation matter. On 4th September, 1974, the plaintiff filed applications to amend valuations in the suits for the purpose of jurisdiction at Rs. 5,100 only. The court below refused to allow the amendment.
3. In my opinion, the court erred in law as well as in jurisdiction in not allowing the plaintiff to amend the plaints. When this Court directed in the earlier civil revision petition reported in AIR 1971 Pat 362 to allow the plaintiff to amend the valuation of the plaint, the trial court had no jurisdiction to set aside the amendment of the plaint. The Division Bench of this High Court held that the plaintiff had to value the suit under Section 7 (iv) of the Act. At the end of Section 7 (iv) of the Act, it is mentioned as follows :
“In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought.”
A discretion had been given to the plain-tiff to state the amount at which he values the relief sought. In this connection, the Supreme Court held in Seth-appa Chettiar’s case (AIR 1958 SC 245) (supra) as follows in paragraph No. 15 of the decision :
“Once the plaintiff exercises his option and values his claim for the purpose of court-fees, that determine the value for jurisdiction. The value for court-fees and the value for jurisdiction must no doubt be the same in such cases; but it is the value for court-fees stated by the plaintiff that is of primary importance. It is from this value that the value for jurisdiction must be determined. The result is that it is the amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for the purposes of court-fee that determines the value for jurisdiction in the suit and not vice versa.”
4. In the Supreme Court case, the plaintiff had challenged a compromise decree passed in a partition suit and he had valued the plaint at Rs. 15,00,000 as the value of his share. The plaintiff paid the court-fee on the valuation given in the plaint before the trial court. In appeal, the High Court directed to amend the memorandum of appeal and he valued his share at Rs. 50,000 in the memorandum of appeal. The order of the Bench was challenged by the Registry. The objection of the Registry was that the plaintiff paid the court-fee on the valuation of Rs. 50,000 without amending the plaint. The plaintiff-appellant filed an amendment of the plaint before the High Court, and the Bench of the High Court was pleased to refuse the amendment of the valuation of the plaint. Ultimately, the matter went to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that it was the option of the plaintiff to value his claim for the purpose of court-fee as that determines the value for jurisdiction. The Supreme Court further held that once the plaintiff valued the claim for the purpose of jurisdiction, that valuation was final. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court upheld the valuation given by the plaintiff for the purpose of jurisdiction of the Court. In other words, the Supreme Court set aside the order of the Madras High Court and upheld the valuation given by the plaintiff at Rs. 50,000 for the plaint. Similarly, in the present case, the plaintiff is entitled to value the suit at Rs. 5,100 and he is entitled to make the amendment. It is well-known that a plaintiff does not care to value a declaratory suit ordinarily, as he is satisfied by paying the declaratory court-fee. Hence, a chance should always be given on the basis of the Supreme Court decision to the plaintiff to amend the valuation in the plaint. In this circumstance, I allow the amendment of the plaints and the court below is directed to accept the amendment of the plaint in respect of the valuation as such amendment is permissible in view of the decision of the Supreme Court. I am interfering with the orders as the court below had acted without jurisdiction in passing such orders. I further direct the court below to dispose of these suits as early as pos-sible.
5. In the result, all these six peti-itions are allowed and the impugned orders dated 16th September, 1974 are set aside. The cases are hereby remitted to the court below to dispose of the suits as expeditiously as possible.