ORDER
1. The tenant is the revision petitioner. The respondent/landlady sought his eviction on the grounds of acts of waste, different user and demolition and reconstruction. Both the authorities below found against the landlady with regard to the first two grounds, namely, acts of waste and different user. However, with regard to demolition and reconstruction, the Rent Controller held that the respondent/landlady had not made out a case. The Appellate Authority differed and found that a case under Section 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) had been made out and ordered.
2. Before the Rent Controller the landlady filed a plan only for change of roof and the Rent Contoller found that no case under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act could be spelt out from the plan produced before him. Before the Appellate Authority the landlady sought to file a plan obtained from the Municipal Authorities for demolition and reconstruction. This application for reception of the plan as additional evidence was rejected by the Appellate Authority, but on the materials already on record, the Appellate Authority found that the building required demolition and reconstruction.
3. The learned Counsel for the tenant made the following submissions;
The Appellate Authority had cast the onus wrongly on the tenant with regard to the criteria for invoking Section 14(1)(b) of the Act. The plan filed before the Rent Controller was only for change of roof and when the application for reception of the plan for demolition and reconstruction had been rejected by the Appellate Authority, the only plan that was available on record was for change of roof and if at all it could be only a case for Section 14(1)(a). With regard to the condition of the building, the learned Counsel submitted that competent persons, had not been examined. The learned Counsel particularly submitted, that the conditions set down by the Supreme Court in Vijay Singh’s Case 1996 (II) CTC 585: 1997 (1) LW 218: 1977 (1) MLJ (SC) 98 were not satisfied and that the landlady totally lacked in bona fides and this, was particularly so when she came up with a case of acts of waste and different user and failed to substantiate the same.
4. Per contra, Mr. Elango, learned Counsel for the respondent/landlady, submitted that the Appellate Authority had found as a question of fact that the conditions required for invoking Section 14(1)(b) were satisfied that notwithstanding the rejection of the application for reception of additional evidence on the materials placed before him, the Appellate Authority found that the property required demolition and reconstruction. The learned Counsel
further submitted that the landlady had enough means as spoken to by her husband as P.W.1 to undertake the work of demolition and reconstruction, that the availability of necessary funds for putting up a new construction was not challenged by the tenant, that with regard to the condition of the building an Advocate Commissioner had found that the condition to be bad enough requiring demolition and reconstruction. The learned Counsel also relied on a number of decisions in support of his various contentions.
5. Before proceeding further it is necessary to bear in mind the present position in law with regard to Section 14(1)(b) of the Act. I had occasion to consider the question in C.R.P.No.975 of 1996 and after referring to a number of decisions, I had set out the criteria relating to invocation of Section 14(1)(b).
(1) There must be a bona fide intention of the landlord and the intention should be far from the sole object only to get rid of the tenants.
(2) The age and the condition of the building should be such as to warrant demolition and reconstruction, and
(3) The financial position of the landlord to demolish and erect a new building according to the statutory requirements of the Act may be satisfactory. The factor relating to the age and the condition of the building has to be taken into consideration along with the other factors and a conclusion has to be reached by the Rent Controller.
6. The complaint of the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant is that the requirement under Section 14(1)(b) is only a ruse to throw the tenant out and the landlady was lacking in bona fides. In support of tills contention, the learned Counsel refers to two other grounds under which eviction of the tenant was sought.
7. In the petition for, eviction it is stated as follows:
“5. The respondent took the premises on tenancy only for his residential purpose. But he started practising medicine in the premises and thereby allowed/the strangers to have free ingress in the premises and rendered the premises for tampering the electric wirings; floors etc. Thereby the respondent has rendered himself to be evicted under this ground.
6. Since the respondent allowed the public to have access to the premises, the walls and floors have been damaged substantially. The walls are soil-pitted and the floors were damaged and thereby the respondent committed waste in the property and the waste has impaired materially the value as well as the utility of the petition premises and under this ground also the respondent is liable to be evicted from the rented premises.”
8. These allegations are denied by the tenant in his counter and the denial is as follows:
It is true this respondent had taken the premises for residential purpose and he was using the said building for the said purpose. The respondent was not dispensing any medicines or not having any nursing home in the demised building. He was doing only consulting practice. The respondent being a
Government Servant is allowed to have only consulting practice. This has
been done in the front room of the building (drawing room) by the respondent
right from the inception of the tenancy to the knowledge of the petitioner’s
husband and the petitioner. That was never objected to by the petitioner all
these years. This is really surprising that the petitioner should find fault with
the consulting practice done by the respondent. As a matter of fact, the
premises was occupied by a tenant previously, who was having her nursing
home in the said building. No damage was ever caused to the building by
having consulting practice in the said building. There is no different user as
alleged by the petitioner and no ground made out for the eviction of the
respondent.
9. The Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority found that the landlady had not substantiated the case for eviction on these two grounds.
10. The question is whether from this it can be spelt out that the requirement under Section 14(1)(b) is not bona fide. It is open to the landlord or landlady who seeks eviction on any of the grounds set out in the Rent Control Act. She can combine any number of grounds and seek eviction merely because she is not successful in making out a case under one or two of the grounds, it does not necessarily follow that she is lacking in bona fides. At the same time, the grounds alleged may furnish some clue to the mindset of the landlady, in that if the grounds alleged are frivolous or merely grounds just for prejudicing the authorities, then it is always open to the tenant to contend that the landlady is lacking in bona fides.
11. Let us now turn our attention to the relevant allegations relating to
Section 14(1)(b) of the Act. In the petition for eviction in paragraph 7 the
landlady has said as follows:
“That the rear portion of the petition property is country tiled, and the same is in highly dilapidated condition which may collapse at any moment. It is unfit for human inhabitation. So it requires immediate, demolition in order to save the building materials from further damage and to safeguard the neighbouring occupants. The continued occupation of the said premises would result in disastrous and precarious. So the petitioner had decided to demolish the same to put up a pucca new modern building on the said site. He has obtained valid building licence and plan dated 8-1-1986 from the Commissioner, Vaniyambadi Municipality. He has got sufficient funds to execute the project of new construction and on this ground also the respondent. Is, liable to be evicted from the rented premises.”
In paragraph 8 she has given an undertaking requited under Section 14(1)(c) of the Act to commence the work of demolition not more than one month from the date of receiving possession of the building and complete the new construction before the expiry of three months therefrom.
12. From a reading of the relevant allegations it appears that the ground for demolition and reconstruction appears only to be an additional ground and the main grounds for eviction are acts of waste and different user.
13. In the counter in paragraph (5) the tenant has stated as follows:
“This respondent denies the rear portion property is country tiled and is in highly dilapidated condition. The rear portion of the building with tiled roofing is in a very good condition, and the question of collapsing does not arise nor is it unfit for human inhabitation. It does not require demolition and reconstruction. It is stated for the purpose of this petition and as a pretext for ejecting out this respondent at any cost. The petitioner has no sufficient funds to put up the new building. In fact, the rear portion of the building is in a very good condition and it does not require demolition.”
14. In the proceedings an Advocate Commissioner was appointed and he submitted a report and in the report he has mentioned about the rear portion in the following terms:
15. The tenant has filed his objection to the Commissioner’s report and in his objections it is stated as follows:
“2. It is not correct to state that there are certain crack in the walls of the second room. The walls in the second room and for that matter the entire building is in good condition.
3. It is not correct to state that the door in room 3 is in intolerable condition (……………). The door is in a very good condition. It is equally incorrect
to state that the walls are of mud when in fact they are brick walls with mud mortar. To state the walls are made of mud is rather misleading besides being untrue.
4. It is not true to state that some of the bamboos in room Nos.3 and 4 are worn out.
5. There are no cracks in any of the walls much less in the walls of room No.5
6. The door of the kitchen is in good condition. The contra stated by the Commissioner is not true. In fact, the kitchen does not have nay bamboo used for the roofing. It is only the reapers which are used. They had been there right from the inception of the tenancy. The way in which it is stated is misleading as if the respondent had done something to hide the facts.
7. Room No.9 is not in bad shape. The bamboos are not hanging as stated by the Commissioner.
8. It is incorrect to state that the front portion of the building is in satisfactory condition and the rear portion is in repairable condition. The entire building is in a very good condition and does not require either repairs or demolition as claimed by the petitioner/landlady.
16. The landlady’s husband was examined as P.W.1. He has stated that the building is 60 years old, that there was no record for the same that only lime mortar had been used for the building that after removing the tiles he planned to put RCC roofs that the expected expenditure is Rs. 3.5 lakhs for which there was money in his wife’s name. He has denied that the building was in a good shape and condition.
17. The Rent Controller rejected the first two grounds and as regards the third, ground on the basis of the plan produced, found that it was not a case for demolition and reconstruction. He also found that the landlady had not examined any Engineer and it had not been established that the building was in a dilapidated condition and required immediate demolition and reconstruction. The Rent Controller was also persuaded by the fact that since the tenant was In occupation of the property and was residing with his family would show that the building was In a good condition and did not require to be replaced. The Rent Controller did not go into the other questions. The Appellate Authority as already noticed, dismissed the application for reception of additional evidence in the shape of an approved plan and permit for demolition and reconstruction of the building. He had proceeded on the basis of the Commissioner’s report and plan. The Appellate Authority relied on the
decision of the Supreme Court in P. Pras Devi v. M/s Vijaya Auto Parts Represented By Proprietor Gulabchand, 1997 (1) MLJ 482 and held that merely because the landlady had not obtained plan from the Municipality It would not mean that the requirement was not bona fide. The Appellate Authority also referred to the judgment in Ramadass and others v. Syed Sahabudeen 1995 (2) LW 205. The Appellate Authority has been guided by the report and the plan of the Commissioner and accepted that the rear portion was in very bad shape and the front portion was not tolerably good and found that a case had been made out for demolition and reconstruction.
18. Let us now find out whether the order of the Appellate Authority
can be, sustained.
19. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioner relied on the judgment in A.G. Kannappa Nadar v. Krishnaswamy Pillai, 1981 (1) M.L.J. (SN) 19. where it has been held that,
“the proposal to remove the existing damaged tiled root; in the first floor and to convert it into a Madras terrace cannot be within the expression “demolition and reconstruction” as a change of the roof of the building from tiles into a Madras terrace would not amount to demolishing the building and putting up a new building on the site of the building. The renewal of the damaged staircase and the proposal to put up another staircase instead also cannot be included with the expression demolition and reconstruction.”
20. Indeed, the landlady had obtained only a permission for conversion
of the existing roof. That cannot by any stretch of imagination be said to be a
case for demolition and reconstruction.
20. Indeed, the landlady had obtained only a permission for conversion of the existing roof. That cannot be any stretch of imagination be said to be a case for demolition and reconstruction. There can be no quarrel over this.
21. The next decision relied on by the learned Counsel Is the one reported in C.R. Khaja Hussain v. R. Rajammal and others, 1984 (97) L.W. 375. An identical view has been expressed by Ramanujam, J. (as the learned Judge then was) that conversion of Madras terrace into concrete terrace and converting a verandah as part of a hall without structural alterations being made to the hall and verandah will not amount to demolition and reconstruction. In the same judgment, the learned Judge has said that
“for invoking section 14(1)(b) of the Act the entire building need not be demolished or reconstructed, but the demolition and reconstruction should at least comprise of a substantial portion of the building. The demolition and reconstruction should at least be a substantial portion of the building and not one room alone without affecting the other portions of the building.’
22. In T. Thiruppathi v. Maimoon Bibi and others
Sengottuvelan, J. (as the learned Judge then was) dealing with a claim under
section 14(1)(b) of the Act observed that,
“the demolition contemplated by it is one by which the building must come to an end so totally as to amount to substantially ceasing to exist as the expression “a new building” would indicate something different from what was in existence and the property or the site to be more accurate, must be brought into being after demolition. The demolition is therefore to obliterate substantially the old building and the construction must bring into being a new building.”
23. The learned Counsel also relied on the judgment in Vijay Singh’s Case, 1996 (II) CTC 585 : 1997 (1) MLJ (SC) 98 to show that the condition set down therein have not been satisfied. In particular, the learned Counsel submitted that no person competent to speak about it has been examined.
24. At this stage it must be mentioned that the Appellate Authority had dismissed the application for reception of additional evidence. But, it is open to the respondent/landlady to urge before this Court that such rejection by the Appellate Authority was not justified.
25. It has been held in M.R.M. Duraiappa Nadar v. P. Thirupurasundariammal, 1989 (1) MLJ 89 that,
“Where a final order in rent control proceedings is in favour of the landlord even though on certain grounds the claim for eviction has been rejected and it has been granted on some other grounds, it is permissible for the landlord to contend in a revision petition filed by the tenant that the order of eviction should be sustained on other grounds held against the landlord and that he is entitled to show that the finding recorded by the Appellate Authority against him was erroneous.”
26. By the same token, it can be stated that the rejection by the Appellate Authority of the additional evidence can be canvassed in the civil revision petition filed by either of the parties who had suffered an adverse order. In the instant case, the Appellate Authority chose to reject the additional evidence on the ground that the additional evidence was sought to be introduced to fill up the lacuna in the case. In my view, this is not correct. No doubt, before the Rent Controller what was produced was only the necessary things to make out a case for 14 (1) (a) and it is now settled law that mere non-production of the plan and permit from the Municipality concerned cannot be put against the case of the landlady if she otherwise makes but a case for demolition and reconstruction. In the instant case, by applying for sanction for a plan for demolition and reconstruction the landlady has only shown her bona fides. May be such application was made after the disposal of the eviction petition against her, but when the obtaining of the plan itself is not a condition precedent for invoking section 14(1)(b) the mere fact that the landlady applied for and obtained the plan and permit for demolition and reconstruction and bought to produce them before the Appellate Authority would not by itself show that she was lacking in bona fides. The refusal by the Appellate Authority to look into the documents produced and marked before him cannot therefore be supported and the landlady is entitled to urge the grounds against the refusal to look Into those documents filed as additional evidence before the
Appellate Authority. A look at the additional documents filed before the Appellate Authority clearly shows that the landlady desires to demolish the existing building and put up a new construction.
27. As regards the means of the landlady, there is also no dispute and the husband of the landlady as P.W.4 has spoken to the availability of the funds with the landlady. This is not seriously challenged by the tenant. It is not necessary to refer to the decisions laying down the proposition, that in ail cases of demolition and reconstruction it cannot be laid down, as a general rule that prior sanction should have been obtained. The Act also does not say anywhere that a petition for demolition and reconstruction should be made only after getting the sanction from the authorities concerned. This is a case of the landlady not merely replacing roof, but also reconstructing the whole structure. It is also now settled law that the building need not be in a dilapidated condition or in a dangerous stage to become eligible for demolition and reconstruction. The condition of the building is only a factor to be taken into consideration when it comes to decide about bona fides of the requirement. It is also now settled law that motive for demolition and reconstruction is irrelevant. It is always open to the landlady to demolish an admittedly old building and put up new construction with a view to augment her income.
28. If the intention of the landlady for demolition and reconstruction is proved to be genuine and not spurious or specious, the landlady would be entitled to obtain an order for eviction under section 14(1)(b) of the Act whether or not the condition of the building is such as to require immediate demolition, the age and dilapidated condition of the building not being sine qua non for such eviction.” 1995 (II) MLJ 178.
29. The Advocate Commissioner in the instant case has also found the condition of the building to be bad.
30. For all the reasons stated above, the conclusion reached by the Appellate Authority cannot be said to be erroneous and improper warranting interference under section 25 of the Act. The order is confirmed. The Civil revision petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Consequently, the miscellaneous petitions W.M.P.Nos.17165 of 1996 and 1630 of 1997 are also dismissed.
31. The revision petitioner will have six months time to quit and deliver vacant possession subject to his filing an affidavit of undertaking with the usual default clause within, a period of two weeks from today.