High Court Kerala High Court

Biodigital (P) Limited vs State Of Kerala on 16 April, 2010

Kerala High Court
Biodigital (P) Limited vs State Of Kerala on 16 April, 2010
       

  

  

 
 
  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

WP(C).No. 11190 of 2010(W)


1. BIODIGITAL (P) LIMITED, R-731,
                      ...  Petitioner

                        Vs



1. STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY THE
                       ...       Respondent

2. THE DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF ANIMAL

3. HINDUSTAN LATES LIFE CARE LIMITED,

                For Petitioner  :DR.K.P.SATHEESAN

                For Respondent  :GOVERNMENT PLEADER

The Hon'ble MR. Justice T.R.RAMACHANDRAN NAIR

 Dated :16/04/2010

 O R D E R
                      T.R. Ramachandran Nair, J.
                  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
                     W.P.(C) No.11190 of 2010-W
                  - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
               Dated this the 16th day of April, 2010.

                                JUDGMENT

The petitioner, a tenderer, is aggrieved by Ext.P9 order issued by the

Government by which sanction has been granted to the second respondent

to accept the tender submitted by the third respondent.

2. The petitioner is a private limited company. The second

respondent invited tender for the supply, installation and commissioning of

Freeze Dryer (cGMP/FDA COMPLAINT) for the year 2009-2010 under

“Two Cover System”. The first cover should contain the technical bid and

the second cover should contain the financial bid.

3. There were three tenderers and one of the tenderers was not

qualified. Therefore, the petitioner and the third respondent were

remaining in the field. When the covers were opened, it was noted that the

petitioner has quoted lowest rate than the third respondent. The petitioner

had submitted three offers for the equipment, viz. Rs.3,09,08,451/-,

Rs.2,61,83,592/- and Rs.1,93,83,912/-.

4. The second respondent initiated the process of negotiation and the

petitioner was accordingly called, which is evident from Ext.P5

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communication. After participation in the price negotiation meeting, the

petitioner gave a reply to the second respondent as per Ext.P6. By Ext.P7

communication, the petitioner confirmed the special negotiated price to the

second respondent. By Ext.P8, the petitioner informed the time limit within

which the offered machineries will be delivered and also other conditions

attached to the said delivery. It is averred in the writ petition that thereafter

the second respondent informed the petitioner that the final order could be

issued only after getting concurrence from the Government.

5. On coming to know about the steps taken to award the contract to

the third respondent, the petitioner filed W.P.(C) No.9929/2010 before this

Court and the same was withdrawn with liberty to challenge the order

passed by the Government awarding the contract to the third respondent,

which was produced by the respondents therein.

6. Mainly, it is contended that the non acceptance of the tender

submitted by the petitioner is violative of the assurance given by the second

respondent that confirmation letter will be given to the petitioner after

getting concurrence from the Government. The proceedings Ext.P9 shows

that the third respondent, after negotiation, offered a lower rate than the

petitioner and the said negotiation was done behind the back of the

petitioner. It is pointed out that the petitioner ought to have been given a

wpc11190 /2010 3

further opportunity for negotiation. It is also pointed out that the acceptance

of the tender submitted by the third respondent is also on the ground that it

is a public limited company and no special preference has been provided in

the tender notification, to the said companies.

7. The second respondent has filed a statement in the matter

explaining various aspects. It is mainly contended that the petitioner was

the lowest tenderer and negotiations were initiated with the petitioner. In

the negotiation which was held on 16.12.2009, the petitioner informed that

negotiated rates will be informed at the earliest. It is stated that even

after six days, as there was no information, a latter by fax was issued to the

petitioner on 23.12.2009 and the petitioner furnished a reply on 26.12.2009

agreeing the various conditions including delivery period, warranty,

payment of AMC charges, etc. But therein also, no negotiated rate was

furnished. Only on 2.1.2010 vide letter dated 30.12.2009 the negotiated

rate was received in the Department and the amount thus informed is

Rs.2,33,65,990/-.

8. It is also pointed out that no further assurance was given to the

petitioner and it was only informed that various procedures are there to be

completed. It is pointed out that in the negotiation with the third

respondent, they have agreed to reduce the rates considerably to

wpc11190 /2010 4

Rs.2,27,00,000/-, i.e. Rs.5.6 lakhs lesser than the negotiated rate of the

petitioner. The third respondent is a Governmental agency also. Various

details were examined while accepting the offer of the third respondent.

Evidently, both the tenderers, viz. the petitioner and the third respondent are

suppliers and not manufacturers. Various advantages, if the work is

allotted to the third respondent, were considered. The stand taken by the

second respondent is that orders have already been placed for the supply for

the materials.

9. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, Govt. Pleader and learned

counsel for the third respondent.

10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that no fair

procedures have been adopted by the second respondent in awarding the

contract to the third respondent. It is submitted that the petitioner was the

lowest tenderer and in the negotiation also the petitioner had come down

with respect to the amount in question and the negotiation with the third

respondent was conducted behind the back of the petitioner. It was

vehemently argued that after the third respondent’s rate was offered, there

should have been a further negotiation with the petitioner and an

opportunity ought to have been allowed to the petitioner in the matter. It is

submitted that the non furnishing of the opportunity vitiates the entire

wpc11190 /2010 5

procedure. It is further pointed out that a preference to a Governmental

agency, being not part of the tender conditions, the same cannot be a

ground for acceptance of the tender of the third respondent and the award

of contract to them. The petitioner relied upon various decisions of the

Apex Court and this Court, viz. Rasbihari Pada etc. v. State of Orissa

(AIR 1969 SC 1081), Shri Harminder Singh Arora v. Union of India

and others (AIR 1986 SC 1527), Union of India and others v. Dinesh

Engineering corporation and another {(2001) 8 SCC 491), Asian Tech

Ltd. v. State of Kerala ( 2001 (3) KLT 357) and Den & Co. v. Mathai

(2006 (3) KLT SN 43, Case No.61).

11. True that the petitioner was the lowest tenderer and there were

only two valid tenderers also. Evidently, a negotiation was held with the

petitioner on 1.12.2009. Exts.P7 and P8 are letters submitted by the

petitioner pursuant to the negotiation thus held. Various aspects have been

pointed out therein. The question is whether merely because the petitioner

was the lowest tenderer, any right is conferred on the petitioner to contend

that the award of work ought to have been given to them. Plainly, such a

contention cannot be accepted as there is no procedure as such, that the

lowest tenderer should be awarded the contract as such. What is pointed out

wpc11190 /2010 6

by Shri K.P. Satheesan, the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the

negotiation with the other tenderer, viz. the third respondent was held

behind the back of the petitioner and the authorities never came back to the

petitioner to confirm whether the petitioner is prepared to put up any new

offer.

12. Evidently, the offer now made by the third respondent, which

was accepted, is lesser than that of the petitioner. What is involved is a

commercial transaction. It is up to the second respondent to decide, as to

which tender will suit their commercial and financial interest.

13. In such cases, it is well settled that there should be a fair

procedure to various tenderers. The question is whether merely because the

second respondent did not again negotiate with the petitioner and a non

communication of the offer made by the third respondent, will have an

impact on the fair procedure at all?

14. The principles in this regard are well known from various

decisions of the Apex Court. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India ( AIR

1996 SC 1), their Lordships laid down the various principles with regard to

the same. After referring to various decisions of the Apex Court it was held

thus in para 85:

“The right to refuse the lowest or any other tender is always available

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to the Government. But, the principles laid down in Article 14 of the

Constitution have to be kept in view while accepting or refusing a

tender. There can be no question of infringement of Article 14, if the

Government tries to get the best person or the best quotation. The

right to choose cannot be considered to be an arbitrary power. Of

course, if the said power is exercised for any collateral purpose the

exercise of that power will be struck down.”

It is therefore clear that as far as the award of contracts are concerned, this

Court cannot sit in appeal over the decision and the judicial review is only

confined to the decision making process. In fact, in Asian Techs Ltd.’s

case (2001 (3) KLT 357), the Division Bench, after relying upon the above

judgment and other judgments of the Apex Court, held that “for the only

reason that the financial offer made by the petitioner happened to be the

lowest, it cannot be said that the work should have been awarded to the

petitioner.”

15. Coming to the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for

the petitioner, the first is the decision of the Apex Court in Rasbihari

Panda’s case (AIR 1969 SC 1081). Therein, the question considered was

different. While inviting offers for advance purchase, the Government

limited it by calling offers only from purchasers during previous year, who

had carried out their obligation to the satisfaction of Government in

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preference to open competition. This was held to be in violation of Articles

14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. In the subsequent decision in Shri

Harminder Singh Arora’s case (AIR 1986 SC 1527), the tenders were

invited for supply of fresh buffalo and cow milk and the appellant

responded to the same. The appellant’s tender was the lowest. The

Government Milk Scheme also submitted tender for pasteurised milk which

was accepted. It was held that the same is illegal. It was also held that the

tenders were to be adjudged on their own intrinsic merits in accordance with

the terms and conditions of the tender notice. Herein, the situation is

different.

16. In Dinesh Engineering Corporation’s case {(2001) 8 SCC

491}, a policy decision to award contract to a particular party till

availability of alternate sources, was under challenge. It was held that the

policy decision is taken without considering the relevant facts.

17. The circumstances wherein the Apex Court considered various

aspects in the above cases are different from those that have emerged in the

present case. Herein, the only question is whether after the negotiation with

the third respondent, there was any obligation to come to the petitioner

again.

wpc11190 /2010 9

18. More or less a similar issue was considered by the Apex Court

in Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. {(2000) 2 SCC

617}. A similar contention was raised therein, in which case also the offer

made by the Air India Ltd. was considered, as it is a National agency. The

writ petitioner’s offer was initially recommended for award of work and in

later deliberations it was not accepted which was under challenge in this

writ petition. The writ petition was dismissed, but the Division Bench

reversed the same and it was also held that the award of contract to the Air

India Ltd. is arbitrary, illegal and oppose to the principles of natural justice.

The Apex Court laid down general principles regarding the award of

contract in the following words in para 7:

“The award of a contract, whether it is by a private party or by a

public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In

arriving at a commercial decision considerations which are

paramount are commercial considerations. The State can choose its

own method to arrive at a decision. It can fix its own terms of

invitation to tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. It can

enter into negotiations before finally deciding to accept tone of the

offers made to it. Price need not always be the sole criteria for

awarding a contract. It is free to grant any relaxation, for bona fide

reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It may not

accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the

wpc11190 /2010 10

lowest. But the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and

agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures

laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though

that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the court can

examine the decision-making process and interfere if it is found

vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The

State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the

public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is

found in the decision-making process the court must exercise its

discretionary power under Article 226 with great caution and should

exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on

the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the

larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its

intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion

that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court

should intervene.”

19. In paragraphs 10 and 12, the contention that the offer made by

the Air India Ltd. was not disclosed to the writ petitioner and that no

preference ought to have been made to Air India Ltd., was considered and

it was held that the authorities did not go wrong in considering an offer

made by a National Carrier. After analysing the various aspects, it was held

thus:

“We do not think that CIAL did any wrong in taking into

consideration the fact that Air India is an airline and being a national

wpc11190 /2010 11

carrier would be in a position to bring more traffic of Air India and

other domestic airlines if it was awarded the contract. As regards the

merits of the rival offers, we do not think it proper to look at only the

financial aspect and hold that CIAL did not accept Cambatta’s offer,

even though it was better, because it wanted to favour Air India or

that it had acted under the influence of Air India and the Ministry of

Civil Aviation. In a commercial transaction of a complex nature

what may appear to be better, on the face of it, may not be considered

so when an overall view is taken. In such matters the court cannot

substitute its decision for the decision of the party awarding the

contract. On the basis of the material placed on record we find that

CIAL bona fide believed that involving a public sector undertaking

and a national carrier would, in the long run, prove to be more

beneficial to CIAL. For all these reasons it is not possible to agree

with the finding of the High Court that CIAL had acted arbitrarily

and unreasonably and was also influenced by extraneous

considerations during its decision-making process.”

20. Herein also, I find that in Ext.P9 the Government took the view

that the the third respondent is a public sector enterprises and their offer is

at a lower rate than the negotiated rate of the petitioner and the AMC

offered is economical and justifiable. In the statement also it is mentioned

that the third respondent being a Governmental agency, their offer for

negotiation was considered and in the negotiation they have offered a rate

lesser than that was offered by the petitioner.

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21. It is not the law that after the initiation of negotiation at every

point of time, the authority should come back to various tenderers. Herein,

after the negotiation with the petitioner, the petitioner had given their final

offer as per Ext.P7. No confirmation was given to the said offer made by

the petitioner. The respondents have denied the averment in the writ

petition that the petitioner was given an assurance in the matter. There is no

written communication in that regard to support the plea raised by the

petitioner that there was an assurance that the petitioner’s offer will be

accepted. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the third

respondent, there is nothing in law to obliges the second respondent to

inform the petitioner about the amount offered by the third respondent, as

according to the learned counsel, otherwise it will not be termed as a

process of negotiation, but it will be termed only as an auction. I find force

in the said submission also. As held by the Apex Court in Air India Ltd.’s

case (supra), the second respondent can enter into negotiations before

finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. Herein, various

aspects including the price was considered for awarding the contract.

Being a commercial transaction, it cannot be said that the second respondent

had acted illegally in the matter. The Government is entrusted with the

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power to take a decision for sanctioning the offer for an amount which is

more beneficial to them.

For all these reasons, I do not find any reason to interfere with Ext.P9

and hence, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.

(T.R. Ramachandran Nair, Judge.)

kav/