JUDGMENT
Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.
1. The petitioner, a Constable in the Haryana Police, prays that the order of his dismissal passed by the Superintendent of Police on December 4, 1992 and the order dated December 28, 1993 by which the Deputy Inspector General of Police rejected his appeal, be quashed. A few facts may be noticed.
2. On March 23, 1992, the petitioner was served with a summary of charges alleging that he had consumed alcohol on March 4, 1992 while he was on duty. An enquiry was held. The charge was proved. A show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on October 30, 1992. The petitioner submitted his explanation Vide order dated December 4, 1992, the Superintendent of Police held that the petitioner was guilty of ‘the gravest’ act of misconduct. He is ‘incorrigible’, is completely unfit for the police service. Accordingly, he ordered the petitioner’s dismissal from the service. The petitioner filed an appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Rohtak Range. He inter alia stated that he had “consumed medicine which contained alcohol…..” He also submitted that the Superintendent of Police had erred in taking into consideration the major penalties which had been awarded to him during the period from 1984 to 1989, He emphasised that he had about 20 years of Service to his credit and that the order of dismissal was not warranted. The appellate-authority after consideration of the, matter dismissed the appeal. -Thereafter, the petitioner claims to have sent an undated legal notice Under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure on February 4, 1996. Having not heard anything in reply, he has approached this court through the present writ petition. It has been inter alia alleged that the respondents had not complied with the provisions of Rule 16.2 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934. The petitioner further alleges that the order is vitiated as the punishing authority had taken into account his previous record of service against which he was not given an opportunity to show cause. Thus, the petitioner prays that the impugned orders of punishment be set aside.
3. A written statement has been filed on behalf of the respondents by the Superintendent of Police. It has been averred that the petitioner had been awarded punishment on five occasions. Vide order dated April 28, 1989, he had been dismissed from service on account of absence from duty for 75 days, later on, the punishment of dismissal was reduced to that of stoppage of five increments with permanent effect. The petitioner had consumed alcohol while on duty. He was given a charge-sheet. After proper enquiry, the order of dismissal was passed. The respondents maintain that the petitioner had been granted adequate opportunity and that the order is in conformity with the rules.
4. Counsel for the parties have been heard.
5. Mr. Rana, counsel for the petitioner has contended that the impugned orders do not conform to the provisions of Rule 16.2 of the Punjab Police Rules, 16, 34. It has also been submitted that the previous record of service having been taken into consideration without the grant of any opportunity to the petitioner, the impugned orders are vitiated. The claim made on behalf of the petitioner was controverted by the counsel for the respondents.
6. The two questions that arise for, consideration are:-
(i) Are the impugned orders violative of Rule 16.2. of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934?
(ii) Was the petitioner denied a reasonable opportunity to represent in respect of the previous record of service and are the impugned orders vitiated on this account ?
Reg: (i)
The relevant portion of Rule 16.2 reads as under:-
“16.2 Dismissal – Dismissal shall be awarded only for the gravest acts of misconduct or as the cumulative effect of misconduct or as the cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service. In making such an award regard shall be had to the length of service of the offender and his claim to pension.”
6. The rule emphasizes that the penalty of dismissal is harsh. It should be awarded only to a person who appears to be incorrigible or is found to be guilty of the gravest act of misconduct. While passing the order, the authority should keep in view the years of service put in by the employee and the consequential right to pension etc. In other words, the penalty of dismissal may not be awarded when an employee who has put in – say 20 years of service is merely absent from duty on account of reasons beyond his control. This, does not, however, mean that no penalty can ever be awarded for absence from duty for a short duration. In a given case, absence of five minutes may prove disastrous and may attract the extreme penalty. After all a member of the Police Force belongs to a disciplined service and has to abide by the rules as well as the orders issued to him. A person who is causal in his approach and does not show a sense of discipline may not be considered as fit to continue in service.
7. What is the position in the present case ? Admittedly, the petitioner had been awarded various penalties during his service. Later on, the Director General of Police had reduced the penalty to that of stoppage of five increments with permanent effect. Yet, the petitioner have not shown a sense of discipline. He was found to have consumed alcohol while on duty. After taking into consideration these facts, the authority found that the petitioner was incorrigible. He was guilty of the gravest act of misconduct. Thus, he was ordered-to be dismissed from service. This was in conformity with the rules.
8. Mr. Rana submits that the respondents did not take into account the fact that , the petitioner had put in 19 years of service. Is it so ?
9. A perusal of the order passed by the punishing authority clearly indicates that the petitioner’s record of service was considered by it. Still further, the petitioner was personally heard. The fact that he had put in 19 years of service was specifically mentioned in the reply to the show cause notice submitted by him. In this situation, it cannot be said that the authority was not aware of the long years of service put in by the petitioner. Merely because a specific reference was not made to the fact that the petitioner had put in 19 years of service, cannot, in the circumstances of this case, vitiate the order. It needs mention that the petitioner is a member of the police force. He is the symbol of State’s authority. He is armed with and authorised to use the gun. A person who consumes alcohol while on duty endangers the lives of others. He commits a serious misconduct which is in its very nature ‘grave’. If the authority has found him to be unfit to continue in service, it cannot be said to have acted illegally or arbitrarily.
10. Mr. Rana referred to the decision in Narinder Kumar v. State of Haryana and Ors., 1995(4) SCT 222. In this case, it was held that absence of a finding as envisaged in Rule 16.2 will “lead to a conclusion that the competent authority has not applied its mind to the nature of misconduct before passing the order of punishment”. There is no quarrel with this proposition. However, in the present case, the authority has specifically noticed the provisions of Rule 162 and recorded a specific finding.
11. Accordingly, the first question is answered against the petitioner.
Reg:(ii)
Mr. Rana submitted that the disciplinary authority had taken into consideration the petitioner’s record of service. He had been given no opportunity to represent in that behalf. Consequently, there was denial of a reasonable opportunity which vitiates the impugned action.
13. Admittedly, the evidence regarding the petitioner’s record of service was recorded during the enquiry proceedings. A perusal of the order passed by the disciplinary authority shows that Constable Narinder Kumar had been examined as P.W.1 during the enquiry proceedings. The authority has noticed that according to this witness, the petitioner had “earned twelve good reports and five bad reports during the period of service. The defaulter was awarded the punishments of 15 days (Punishment Drill) during the year 1984 for his wilful absence, 15 days P.D. and 5 days without pay for wilful absence and 15 days P.D. and 11 days without pay for his wilful absence in the year 1985. Again the defaulter was awarded the punishment of stoppage of one increment with temporary effect in the year 1987 for remaining wilfully absent…..” Thus, the evidence regarding the punishments etc. awarded to the petitioner had come on record during the enquiry proceedings. It was incorporated even in the enquiry report. The petitioner had been given an opportunity to explain the findings recorded against him. It was not as if the punishing authority considered the previous record without ever making the petitioner aware of the various orders of penalties passed against him. In fact, he had complete notice as the evidence had been recorded in his presence and he had the opportunity to even cross-examine the witness. In this situation, the petitioner cannot feign that he had no knowledge of the fact that the previous record would be taken into consideration. Accordingly, there was no failure of justice or prejudice caused to the petitioner.
14. Mr. Rana referred to the decision in State of Haryana v. Mohinder Partap, 1997(1) A.I.J. 176. In this case, it was found that the authority had taken into consideration the previous record of service without giving the employee an opportunity to represent. Such is not the position in the present case.
15. Accordingly, even the second question is answered against the petitioner.
16. Another fact which deserves mention here is that order of punishment had been passed against the petitioner on December 4, 1992. The appellate authority had dismissed his appeal on December 28, 1993. The writ petition had been filed by the petitioner on February 27, 1997. There is no explanation for a delay of more than three years. Resultantly, even on the ground of delay, the petitioner dis-entitles himself to the grant of any relief.
17. No other point has been raised.
18. In view of the above, there is no merit in this writ petition. It is, consequently, dismissed. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.