HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AT JAMMU SWP No. 90 of 2004 Agya Ram Petitioner Union of India and ors Respondents ! Mr Sudershan Sharma, Advocate for the Petitioner. ^ Mr Ajay Sharma,CGSC for the Respondents. Coram Hon'ble Mr Justice Nirmal Singh, Judge Dated : 03/05/2006 : JUDGMENT :
The facts in brief be noticed as under:-
Petitioner was enrolled in Border Security Force on 15th June’91, as a Cook. After
completion of training, he was remustered as Constable (GD) on 30th May’95. He
proceeded on one day’s casual leave on 1st March’99 with permission to avail one
day’s gazetted holiday on 2nd March’99. He was due to join his duties on 3rd March’99
but he did not join and instead sent an application on 18th March’99 for grant of 30
days earned leave due to the sickness of his wife without any medical document in
support of his claim. His request for grant of said leave was not accepted by the
competent authority due to exigency of service. The petitioner was informed at his
residential address on 5th March’99 vide letter No. Estt/41/Disc/AR/75BN/99/3938
directing him to join the duty.
(2)
After more than 30 days of absence of the petitioner, a one man Court of Inquiry was
ordered on 29th May’99 under Section 62 of the Border Security Force Act (here-in-
after referred to as the Act). After completion of the Court of Inquiry, a show cause
notice was issued to the petitioner through Registered letter dt. 2nd July’99, at his
home address but the show cause notice was received back un-delivered. Petitioner
reported for duty on 24th Aug’99 after overstaying for 174 days. Petitioner was
arrested as per Rule 36(1)(iii)(d) of BSF Rules, 1969 (here-in-after referred to as
rules), for disposal of disciplinary action under Section 19(B) of the rules.After
completion of Summary court proceedings, petitioner was dismissed from service.
Petitioner impugned order of dismissal in this court in SWP No. 2650/99. The said
writ petition was disposed of by observing as under:-
“In view of what has been stated above, the respondents are directed to
reconsider the issue as to whether the extreme penalty of dismissal was required to be
inflicted or the ends of justice would be served by reverting the petitioner to the post
which he was occupying earlier to whom he was remustered as a Constable. These are
matters on which decision has to be taken by the respondents. They are left free to take
a decision. This petition would be treated as a statutory appeal in terms of Section
117-A of the Border Security Force Act read with Section 168 of the Border Security
Force Act.
(3)
Let a decision be taken within a period of four months from the date, a copy of
the order passed by this Court is made available by the petitioner to the respondents
and also to the learned counsel (Mr Ajay Sharma, Additional Central Government
Standing Counsel), who has put in appearance on behalf of the respondents today.
The competent authority to see as to what relief the petitioner is found entitled.
Disposed of accordingly.”
In pursuance of order passed by this court, respondent No.2 considered the
appeal of the petitioner and rejected the same vide order dt. 7th Oct’02, impugned in
the present writ petition. Petitioner thus, is seeking quashing of order dt. 7th Sept’99
vide which the petitioner was dismissed from service and order dt. 7th Oct’02, vide
which the appeal of the petitioner has been rejected. Petitioner is also seeking
mandamus directing respondents to treat the petitioner on active duty and pay him all
consequential benefits.
Mr Sudershan Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
petitioner had not committed any such misconduct in discharge of his official duty
which deserved dismissal from service. He submitted that the punishment awarded is
not commensurate with the act of the petitioner. It was stated that while imposing the
punishment, the disciplinary authority must act reasonably and should impose the
penalty
(4)
which commensurates with the act of the delinquent official. He submitted that the
petitioner proceeded on one day’s casual leave but could not join his duty as the wife
of the petitioner fell ill and the petitioner had applied for earned leave, which was not
sanctioned and, in the meanwhile, the petitioner himself fell ill as a result of which the
petitioner could not join his duty. It is submitted that respondents in their reply have
admitted that the petitioner approached Commandant of the Battalion for grant of 30
days earned leave on the ground of sickness of wife but the said leave application was
rejected as there was no medical document attached with the application. He
contended that the Commandant should have directed the petitioner to produce the
medical evidence. It is stated that the petitioner has placed on record the medical
certificates issued by a Government doctor which would substantiate the claim of the
petitioner that his wife as also he himself fell ill.
On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for respondents submitted
that no error whatsoever has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner
in holding the Court of Inquiry or proceedings adopted by the respondents. He
submitted that the Court of Inquiry was conducted according to the rules and the
principles of natural justice were also followed. It is submitted that the petitioner is a
habitual absentee and he has now made a ground that firstly his wife fell and then he
himself fell ill. The learned counsel submitted that the writ courts are not to disturb the
punishment awarded by the competent authority under the Act as the
(5)
writ court is not a court of appeal. In support of his submission, reliance was placed on
AIR 1988 SC 705, Vidya Parkash v. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 577, Union of India
and ors v. Major A.Hussain and AIR 2003 SC 1437, Director General, RPF and ors v.
Ch. Sai Babu.
I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the
learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has not challenged the court of inquiry
proceedings conducted by respondents. The only contention raised by the learned
counsel for the petitioner is that the penalty imposed is not commensurate with the act
of the petitioner. It is admitted case that the petitioner absented himself from duty
earlier on two occasions and this was the third time when the petitioner has chosen to
remain absent. The petitioner when earlier filed the writ petition, referred to above, he
had taken a stand that no opportunity was given to the petitioner with regard to
explaining the previous absence which has been taken note of by the punishing
authority. Petitioner in the present writ petition has not given any explanation for
remaining absent on earlier two occasions. The petitioner has failed to point out any
error in holding the court of inquiry proceedings or that the principles of natural
justice have not been complied with. The writ court cannot reopen and appreciate the
evidence as to whether the evidence was sufficient for imposing a major penalty. This
is the domain of disciplinary authority to see as to what punishment
(6)
is to be awarded. The scope of judicial review has been considered by the Supreme
Court in the case of Major A.Hussain (supra). In para 22 of the judgment, it has been
observed as under:-
“Though court martial proceedings are subject to judicial review by the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the court martial is not subject to the
superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. If a court
martial has been properly convened and there is no challenge to its composition and
the proceedings are in accordance with the procedure prescribed, the High Court or
for that matter any court must stay its hands. Proceedings of a court martial are not to
be compared with the proceedings in a criminal Court under the Code of Criminal
Procedure where adjournments have become a matter of routine though that is also
against the provisions of law. It has been rightly said that court martial remains to a
significant degree, a specialized part of overall mechanism by which the military
discipline is preserved. It is for the special need for the armed forces that a person
subject to Army Act is tried by court martial for an act which is an offence under the
Act. Court martial discharges judicial function and to a great extent is a Court where
provisions of Evidence Act are applicable. A court martial has also the same
responsibility as any Court to protect the rights of the accused charged before it and
to follow the procedural safeguards. If one looks at the provisions of law relating to
court martial in the Army Act, the Army Rules, Defence Service Regulations and other
(7)
Administrative Instructions of the Army, it is manifestly clear that the procedure
prescribed is perhaps equally fair if not more than a criminal trial provides to the
accused. When there is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction, it is unnecessary to
examine if pre-trial investigation was adequate or not. Requirement of proper and
adequate investigation If not jurisdictional and any violation thereof does not
invalidate the court martial unless it is shown that accused has been prejudiced or a
mandatory provision has been violated. One may usefully refer to Rule 149 quoted
above. The High Court should not allow the challenge to the validity of conviction and
sentence of the accused when evidence is sufficient, court martial has jurisdiction over
the subject matter and has followed the prescribed procedure and is within its powers
to award punishment.”
In Ch. Sai Babu’s case ,referred to above, it was further interpreted as under:-
“Normally, the punishment imposed by disciplinary authority should not be
disturbed by the High Court or tribunal except in appropriate cases that too only after
reaching a conclusion that the punishment imposed is grossly or shockingly
disproportionate, after examining all the relevant factors including nature of charges
proved against the delinquent, the past conduct, penalty imposed earlier, the nature of
duties assigned having due regard to their sensitiveness,
(8)
exactness expected of an discipline required to be maintained, and the
department/establishment in which the concerned delinquent person works. Merely
because it is felt that the punishment imposed was extreme is not enough to disturb or
modify the punishment imposed on a delinquent officer. The Court has to record
reasons to say as to how the punishment imposed on the delinquent is shockingly or
grossly disproportionate to the gravity of charges held proved against him. It is not
that in every case of imposing a punishment or removal or dismissal from service a
High Court can modify such punishment merely saying that it is shockingly
disproportionate.”
Chapter III of the Act specifies the offences and also the punishments for such
offences. Section 19 specifies that ‘absence without leave’ constitutes an offence and
on conviction by the Security Force Court, the person concerned is liable to suffer
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or such less punishment as is
mentioned in this Act.
Chapter IV deals with the punishments. One of the punishment provided under
the Act is dismissal from service. In this case, the petitioner after availing the leave,
did not report back. He applied for earned leave after remaining absent for about
sixteen days on the ground that his wife is ill but during this period, he did not join his
duties even though, his wife was not admitted in any hospital and as per the certificate
(9)
placed on record (Anenxure A), she was advised home treatment. Same is the case of
the petitioner. These medical certificates seem to have been procured by the petitioner
to justify his absence. Petitioner is a member of disciplined force, and therefore, there
is no scope for taking a lenient view for a person who is habitual absentee.
For the reasons mentioned above, this petition is found to be without merit and
is dismissed along with connected CMP(s), if any.
(Nirmal Singh)
Judge
Jammu
3.5.06
SS/