JUDGMENT
Gurusharan Sharma, J.
1. Defendant is appellant. Plaintiffs suit for eviction against the defendant from the suit premises detailed in Schedule ‘A’ to the plaint, under the provisions of Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1977; (hereinafter to be referred to as ‘the Act’ for short) on the ground of personal necessity and default in payment of rent was decreed on 20.1.1991.
2. Defendant preferred appeal which was allowed in part. Trial Court’s finding on default in payment of rent was reversed and it was held that defendant was not a defaulter within the meaning of the Act. However, first appellate Court confirmed trial Court’s finding that plaintiff has reasonable and bona fide requirement of the suit house for being allotted to its employees.
Defendant has, therefore, filed the present Second Appeal.
3. Admittedly, Caiser Bungalows were constructed by appellant for the employees of M/s. Caiser Company, a Contracting Firm of United State of America (U.S.A.) and as soon as their contract work in the appellant Company was over, respondent allotted/let out those bungalows to different persons, including appellant, who was allotted suit bungalow, described in Schedule ‘A’ to the plaint temporarily vide House Permit No. 64233 dated 16.12.1988 (Exhibit 7) on monthly rental of Rs. 636.88 (paise) payable according to English calender month, besides electrical charges etc.
4. Respondent claimed that in order to meet the pressing demand of officers of the Company, who were eligible for such bungalows, but were not being provided with such accommodation, the suit bungalow was required bona fide and in good faith. The appellant had also not paid rent for two months, namely, October and November, 1979, till the date the suit was filed, i.e., 20.12.1979.
A claim for recovery of arrears of rent, detailed in Schedule ‘B’ to the plaint, was also made. Respondent sent notice to the appellant to vacate the suit bungalow by 31.8.1979.
5. Appellant contested the suit and denied the respondent’s alleged requirement of the suit bungalow. As a matter of fact, respondent’s employees were not willing to take such bungalows on exorbitant rent when M/s. Caiser Company vacated them. Those bungalows were never meant to be used by respondent by its employees. Respondent possessed enough vacant land where bungalows and quarters for its employees could have been constructed.
6. Admittedly, respondent-Company was owner of the suit bungalow, wherein appellant was tenant. Appellant also paid rent for the months October and November, 1979, immediately after filing of the suit, which was duly received by respondent. So far as question of personal requirement of the suit bungalow was concerned, appellant did not deny dearth of quarters and bungalows for accommodation of employees and officers of the Company. Respondents also produced documentary evidence that several officers were in queue for allotment of the bungalow in question.
There was shortage of accommodation. Company had more than 35,000 employees and only 16000 quarters and bungalows were available.
7. Appellant failed to prove that many Caiser bungalows were let out to different private individuals or private Companies.
8. Respondent-Company is a corporate Body and as such a legal person. Its duty is to provide accommodation to the employees and in order to discharge the said duty, it required the suit bungalow for its occupation by the employees and so it was a bona fide necessity.
9. Employees of the Company were like members of a family for whom head of the family was required to provide accommodation. Such accommodation, in my opinion, was necessary need of the Company in good faith. Respondent has, therefore, need of the suit bungalow for its own use and occupation and both the Courts below rightly considered the aforesaid aspects of the matter and held that respondent’s requirement was bona fide, reasonable and in good faith.
10. The suit bungalow in question was, admittedly, a compact residential one, which was sought to be allotted to employees of the Company. There was no question of any
division of the bungalow in two parts, as there was no evidence brought on record that two families could conveniently be accommodated therein.
11. It is well settled that once plaintiff succeeded in proving bona fide necessity for entire premises, onus shifted on the defendant to lead evidence and prove that plaintiffs requirement could have been satisfied by partial eviction only, and for that defendant was aggreable. In the present case, nothing has been brought to my notice in this regard.
12. Mr. N.K. Prasad, senior counsel for appellant, submitted that alleged personal necessity of the respondent for allotment of suit bungalow to one of his employees, who was a tenant within the meaning of Section 2(h)(ii) of the Act after evicting the defendant-tenant was not tenable, as induction of a new tenant cannot be termed as bona fide necessity within the meaning of the Act. I find no substance in this submission as it is respondent’s duty to provide residential accommodation to its employees and, in my opinion, it was not a case where after eviction of a tenant, the premises was to be let out to another tenant. In order to provide residential accommodation to its employees, respondent-Company was justified in asking for an eviction decree against appellant, who was, admittedly, a tenant in the suit premises.
13. There is no merit in this Second
Appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed, but
without costs.
14. Appeal dismissed.