High Court Patna High Court

Jagdish Tiwari vs State Of Bihar on 2 April, 2010

Patna High Court
Jagdish Tiwari vs State Of Bihar on 2 April, 2010
Author: Rakesh Kumar
                    Criminal Miscellaneous No.19657 OF 1998

                     In the matter of an application under
                     Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
                     Procedure
                                     --------

Jagdish Tiwari, Son of Late Kamta Nath
Tiwari, resident of Village-Atarwalia, Post
Office and Police Station-Mohania,
District-Kaimur(Bhabhua)

—–Petitioner
Versus

1 THE STATE OF BIHAR

2. Ram Bilas Paswan, Block Development
Officer, Mohania, District-Kaimur

— Opp.Parties.

For the petitioner :S/Sri.K.N.Choubey,
Sr.Advocate.

Nagendra Dubey,Adv.

For the State : Mr.A.M.P.Mehta, A.P.P.

————

P R E S E N T

THE HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE RAKESH KUMAR

Rakesh Kumar, J The sole petitioner, while invoking

inherent jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court under

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

has virtually prayed for quashing of the F.I.R.

i.e. Mohania P.S. Case No.53 of 1998.

2. Sri K.N.Choubey, learned Senior

counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner

submits that on same allegation, two F.I.Rs were

lodged as per the information given by one Ram

Bilas Paswan, Block Development Officer, Mohania,

District-Kaimur i.e. Mohania P.S. Case No.53 of

1998 and Mohania P.S. Case No.54 of 1998. Learned

Senior Counsel further submits that almost on
2

similar allegation a case vide Mohania P.S. Case

No.54 of 1998 was registered. In the second case,

i.e. Mohania P.S. Case No.54 of 1998, the police

after investigation submitted chargesheet under

Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code against co-

accused, namely, Dharmu Ram, who was Panchayat

Sewak at the relevant time showing him as an

absconder. So far the petitioner’s case is

concerned, the police had not find sufficient

evidence for forwarding him to face trial. The

final report was submitted by the police on

31.5.1999.Subsequently, by order dated 30.6.1999,

the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate took

cognizance of offence under Section 409 of the

Indian Penal Code against accused Dharmu Ram.

Learned Sr. Counsel submits that in view of

taking cognizance against accused Dharmu Ram by

necessary implication, it is evident that the

learned Chief Judicial Magistrate accepted the

final form submitted by the police in respect of

this petitioner. Of course, the order does speak

the same in the clear term.

3. Learned Senior counsel for the

petitioner has referred to column-4 of Annexure-

1, i.e. F.I.R. of Mohania P.S. Case No.53 of

1998. In Column-4, the name of the informant,i.e.

Ram Bilas Paswan was mentioned. The learned

counsel has also referred to Column-4 of
3

Annexure-2, i.e. F.I.R. of Mohania P.S. Case

No.54 of 1998. In column-4 of the two F.I.Rs.,

name of Ram Bilas Paswan appears as the

informant. Learned counsel for the petitioner

tried to impress upon the Court that since in

both cases informants are same, it can be assume

that for the same allegation two F.I.Rs were

lodged. Learned counsel further submits that

since in one case i.e. Mohania P.S. Case No.54 of

1998, the petitioner was exonerated by the police

after completion of the investigation, which was

also accepted by the learned Chief Judicial

Magistrate, the petitioner may not be compelled

to face prosecution in Mohania P.S. Case No.53 of

1998. He submits that in Mohania P.S. Case No.53

of 1998 there is same and similar allegation, as

alleged in Mohania P.S. Case No.54 of 1998. He

further submits that in view of Section 300 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as

Article-20(2) of the Constitution of India, the

petitioner can not be twice prosecuted for the

same offence. On these grounds, learned Senior

Counsel has virtually prayed that F.I.R. of

Mohania P.S. Case No.53 of 1998 be quashed and

the petitioner may not be compelled to face

prosecution in Mohania P.S. Case No.53 of 1998.

4. Sri A.M.P.Mehta, learned A.P.P.

for the State has opposed the prayer of the
4

petitioner. First of all, he submits that at the

initial stage of investigation that too only on

the basis of perusal of the F.I.R. it would be

difficult for this Court to examine as to whether

the petitioner was proceeded on same and similar

accusation in two cases or not. He further

submits that these things can be looked by the

concerned court and not by this Court while

exercising power under Section 482 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure.

5. I have also minutely examined two

F.I.Rs , which have been annexed as Annexures 1

and 2 to the petition. The first F.I.R.,i.e.

Mohania P.s. Case No.53 of 2998 was registered

against one accused , who was Panchayat Sewak of

the Gram Panchayat-Bhitty. The name of sole

accused in the said F.I.R. is Dharmu Ram. In the

said F.I.R. the specific allegation against

Dharmu Ram was regarding dereliction of duty and

non-production of official records despite

repeated direction. There was also an allegation

that Dharmu Ram had misappropriated the

Government fund relating to Jawahar Rojgar Yojna.

6. In the second F.I.R. i.e. Mohania

P.S. Case No.54 of 1998, of course, the informant

was the same, but in the said F.I.R. two persons

were named as accused. Those are Dharmu Ram,

Panchayat Sewak and this petitioner, who was at
5

the relevant time Mukhiya of the Gram Panchayat.

In the second F.I.R., i.e. Mohania P.S. Case

No.54 of 1998, there was specific allegation of

misappropriate of fund under the Jawahar Rojgar

Yojna. Specifically the amount of

misappropriation and dates of misappropriation

were mentioned in the said F.I.R.

7. On perusal of both the F.I.Rs.,

prima facie I am of the view that one cannot

come to the conclusion that in both the F.I.Rs

allegations are same and similar.Moreover, in the

second F.I.R.i.e. Mohania P.S. Case No.54 of 1998

after investigation the police did not find

sufficient materials for sending the petitioner

for trial . Only on the ground of non-sending of

the petitioner for facing the trial, this plea

cannot be taken that the petitioner cannot be

asked to face prosecution twice for such

allegation. It is evident that only after

investigation, final form was submitted by the

police and the petitioner was never put on trial.

Accordingly, I am of the view that in such a

situation, the petitioner may not be allowed to

take the protection under Section 300 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure. It would be appropriate to

quote the provisions contained in Section 300 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure , which is as

follows:

6

“300.Person once convicted or acquitted

not to be tried for same offence–

(1) A person who has once been tried by
a court of competent jurisdiction for an
offence and convicted or acquitted of
such offence shall, while such conviction
or acquittal remains in force, not be
liable to be tried again for the same
offence, nor on the same facts for any
other offence for which a different
charge from the one made against him
might have been made under sub-section
(1) of Section 221, or for which he might
have been convicted under sub-section (2)
thereof.

(2) (2) A person acquitted or convicted
of any offence may be afterwards tried,
with the consent of the State Government,
for any distinct offence for which a
separate charge might have been made
against him at the former trial under
sub-section (1) of section 220.

     (3)      A    person      convicted            of     any    offence
       constituted                  by        any        act      causing
       consequences            which, together                 with such
       act,    constituted                a    different          offence

from that of which he was convicted , may
be afterwards tried for such last
mentioned offence, if the consequences
had not happened , or were not known to
the Court to have happened , at the time
when he was convicted.

(4) A person acquitted or convicted of
any offence constituted by any acts may,
notwithstanding such acquittal or
conviction, be subsequently charged with,
7

and tried for, any other offence
constituted by the same acts which he may
have committed if the Court by which he
was first tried was not competent to try
the offence with which he is subsequently
charged.

(5) A person discharged under section
258 shall not be tried again for the same
offence except with the consent of the
Court by which he was discharged or of
any other Court to which the first
mentioned Court is subordinate.
(6) Nothing in this section shall affect
the provisions of Section 26 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897(10 of 1897) or
of section 188 of this Code.

8. So far as violation of fundamental

right in view of Article 20(2) of the

Constitution is concerned, merely on perusal of

definition of said Article, one can come to the

conclusion that this provision shows that one

cannot be prosecuted and punished twice for the

same offence. It is also necessary to quote the

provisions contained in Article-20 of the

Constitution of India.

“20. Protection in respect of conviction
for offences–(1) No person shall be convicted of
any offence except for violation of a law in
force at the time of the commission of the act as
an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater
than that which might have been inflicted under
the law in force at the time of the commission of
the offence.

8

(2) No person shall be prosecuted and
punished for the same offence more than once.

(3) No person accused of any offence
shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.”

             9.                    On    perusal          of    the    provision

contained         in    Clause           2     of    Article       20     of   the

Constitution of India, it is evident that this

protection is given to a citizen that he cannot

be prosecuted and punished for the same offence

more than once. In the present case, it is not a

case that the petitioner was prosecuted and

punished. Even in one case only police had

conducted investigation and thereafter he was

exonerated. The petitioner was neither prosecuted

nor punished for the same offence. Accordingly, I

am of the view that in the facts and

circumstances of the present case, both

provisions i.e. provision under Article 20(2) of

the Constitution of India or Section 300 Cr.P.C.

are not applicable.

10. So far as the allegation made in

the first F.I.R. i.e. Mohania P.s. Case No.53 of

1998 is concerned, on perusal of the F.I.R. it is

evident that the petitioner was not named in the

said F.I.R.This F.I.R. was lodged only against

Dharmu Ram, who was Panchayat Sewak. Moreover,

after lodging the F.I.R. while the case was at
9

the initial stage of the investigation, the

petitioner rushed to this Court while invoking

inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section

482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by filing

the present case. In this case, by the order

dated 16.9.1998 while admitting the case , this

Court had directed that during the pendency of

this application, further proceeding in Mohania

P.S. Case No.53 of 1998 appertaining to G.R.Case

No.361 of 1998 shall remain stayed. The order of

stay is still continuing.

11. In the facts and circumstances

of the case,I am of the view that at the initial

stage of investigation, it would not be

appropriate for this Court to interfere in such

cases. Unless a report is submitted by the police

before the Magistrate, it cannot be said that a

proceeding was pending. In absence of pendency of

a proceeding before the Court below, one has got

no right to invoke inherent jurisdiction under

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Accordingly, on the ground of maintainability

itself, the petition is liable to be rejected.

However, without recording my opinion on the

point of maintainability of the present case, in

the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,

I am of the view that only on perusal of two

F.I.Rs, it is difficult for this Court to come to
10

a definite conclusion that the petitioner was

made accused twice for the same and similar

allegation. Moreover, perusal of the F.I.R.

indicates that the allegations are not exactly

similar in two F.I.Rs.

12. Accordingly, I do not find any

merit in this petition and the petition stands

rejected.

13. In view of rejection of the

present petition the interim order of stay, which

was granted on 16.9.1998, stands automatically

vacated.

Let this order be communicated to the

court below forthwith.

( Rakesh Kumar, J)
Patna High Court,Patna
Dated : the 2nd April,2010
Nawal Kishore Singh/N.A.F.R.