JUDGMENT
B.P. Singh, J.
1. The petitioner has filed the instant writ application challenging the award made by the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Bokaro Steel City in reference Case No. 24 of 1975 dated 9-5-1983 (Annexure-18) whereby it has answered the reference in favour of the Management and against the petitioner holding that stopping of next two increments of the petitioner cannot be said to be illegal. The petitioner has also challenged the orders earlier passed by the Labour Court, Annexure-12, the order dated 26-12-1978 holding that the domestic enquiry held against the petitioner was fair and proper; Annexure-13 the order dated 3-1-1980 whereby the Labour Court refused to decide as a preliminary issue the question as to whether the appointment of Enquiry Committee was unauthorised and incompetent.
2. The facts not in dispute are that the petitioner was appointed vide letter dated 15/16-9-1967 as a Dresser in the General Hospital of the Bokaro Steel Plant. The letter of appointment is Annexure-1 to the writ application. By the aforesaid letter, the Bokaro Steel Limited offered the petitioner appointment to a post of Dresser in the Bokaro Steel Limited. The terms and conditions of service are also mentioned in the letter of appointment. The letter has been signed by the Personnel Officer “for Bokaro Steel Limited”.) he petitioner worked in the Hospital for some time, but vide letter dated 19/20-7-1973 (Annexure-2), the Chief Medical Officer issued a charge-sheet against the petitioner enclosing the statement of allegations against him. The petitioner replied to the said allegations. Since his explanation was not found satisfactory, by order dated 31-8-1973 Annexure-3 the Chief Medical Officer constituted an Enquiry Committee to enquire into the charge levelled against the petitioner. The Enquiry Committee submitted its report on 2-4-1974 finding the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. On the basis of the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Committee, the Personner Manager of Bokaro Steel Limited by his order dated 2-5-1947 (Annexure-5) imposed the punishment of stoppage of two increments of the petitioner with cumulative effect. The petitioner was aggrieved by the aforesaid order and raised a dispute. Ultimately, the Government of Bihar was pleased to refer the dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court, Bokaro Steel City. The dispute referred to the Labour Court was whether the stoppage of increments from 2nd May, 1972 with cumulative effect was proper and justified. If not, whether the petitioner was entitled to any relief.
3. The petitioner as well as the Management of Bokaro Steel Limited filed their respective written statements before the Labour Court and after considering the respective cases of the parties, the Labour Court by its impugned order dated 9-5-1983 upheld the action of the Management. The Labour Court earlier held by its order dated 26-12-1978 (Annexure-l2) that the domestic enquiry held by the Management into the charge of misconduct levelled against the petitioner was fair and proper.
4. Mr. K.K. Jha ‘Kamal’ learned Counsel for the petitioner urged before me two submissions. He firstly submitted that the charge-sheet had not been issued by the competent authority, and, therefore, the constitution of the Enquiry Committee and the report of such Committee was illegal. He relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Steel Authority of India v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bokaro Steel City . Having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, Mr. M.M. Banerjee learned Counsel for the Management fairly conceded that the Chief Medical Officer was incompetent under the Rules to frame charges against the petitioner and to constitute an Enquiry Committee. Consequently, domestic enquiry was invalid. But he submitted that as was done in Steel Authority of India (supra) the matter may be remanded to the Labour Court on the basis that the Management had not conducted any domestic enquiry before inflicting the punishment upon the petitioner, and give an opportunity to the Management to adduce evidence in support of the action which had been taken against the petitioner. This was opposed by the counsel for the petitioner in view of the second submission urged by him.
5. The second submission urged on behalf of the petitioner was that not only was the charge-sheet not submitted by the competent authority, even the punishment inflicted upon the petitioner which was a major punishment, was not infected by the Appointing Authority who was the only authority under the Rules who could have passed an order imposing a major punishment. Referring to Annexure-1, the letter of appointment, the petitioner submitted that the Personnel Officer of the Company had not signed the letter as the Appointing Authority, but he had only signed it on behalf of the Company which had appointed the petitioner as Dresser. The opening words of the letter are “we hereby offer you the appointment of Dresser inthe Bokaro Steel Limited….” At the end the words used are:
Yours faithfully
For Bokaro Steel Ltd.
Sd/-….
Personnel Officer.
From bare reading of the letter of appointment (Annexure-1), I have no doubt in my mind that the petitioner was appointed by the Company, and the Personnel Officer had signed the letter only on behalf of the Company, and not as the Appointing Authority. It was, therefore, submitted that since the Appointing Authority of the petitioner was the Company itself, only the Company could have imposed a major punishment. In this connection, learned Counsel referred the Rules known as Discipline and Appeal Rules. Under the aforesaid Rules, appointing Authority and Disciplinary Authority have been defined as follows:
2. (a) ‘Appointing Authority’ in relation to an employee means the authority empowered to make appointments to the class or grade in which the employee is for the time being included, or the post which the employee for the time being holds.
(f) ‘Disciplinary Authority means the Authority competent to impose any penalty under these rules as specified in the Schedule.
Under Rule 4, stoppage of increment is a major penalty. Rule 6 provides that the appointing authority may impose any of the penalties specified in Rule 4 on any employee. Likewise, the Board of Directors may impose any of the penalties specified in Rule 4 on any employee except an employee appointed by the president. Sub-rule (ii) of Rule 6 provides that without prejudice to the provisions of Sub-rule (i), the Disciplinary Authority may impose any of the penalties specified in column (4) upon the classes of employees shown in column (1) of the Schedule. The post to which the petitioner belonged falls in column (4). The Appointing Authority under the schedule is the authority empowered to make appointment. The Disciplinary Authority under the Schedule are of the two types, firstly the “appointing authority” and secondly the ’empowered authority’ meaning thereby the authority to whom powers may be delegated by the appointing authority. However, the power to impose major penalties is vested only in the appointing authority and not in the Empowered Authority. Under Rule 10 the Disciplinary Authority is authorised to impose a major penalty, which in the instant case means the appointing authority. Since the appointing authority in the instant case was the Company itself, the Board of Directors must be considered to be the appointing authority, and hence only the Board of Directors of the Company could have imposed a major penalty. So construed, it must Be held that the order passed by the Personnel Manager imposing a major penalty upon the petitioner was invalid.
6. Mr. Banerjee learned Counsel, however, urged that the definition of the “appointing authority” under the rules conceived not only the authority actually making the appointment but also the authority empowered to make appointments to the class or grade to which the employee is for the time being included, or the post which the employee for the time being holds He, therefore, submitted that even if an employee is appointed by a particular authority, who actually appoints him, the rule conceived of another appointing authority, though he may not have actually appointed an employee but who is empowered to make appointments to the class or grade in which the concerned employee is for the time being included. He, therefore, submitted that any Officer of the Company may be empowered to make appointments to a class or grade. In his submission the order was passed in the instant case by the Personnel Manager and it may be that he was authorised or empowered to appoint a Dresser. He fairly submitted that it was not possible to go into this factual aspect of the matter since according to him, there was nothing on record to show whether the Personnel Manager had or had not been so empowered. He, therefore, submitted that the matter may be remanded to the Labour Court which may decide this question as well.
7. It is not possible to concede to this submission of learned Counsel for the Management. The petitioner has filed a copy of the application filed by him before the Labour Court on 8-1-1983 which is Annexure-17 to the writ application In the said application, the petitioner had clearly raised the question that his appointing authority was the Company and the order passed by the Personnel Manager imposing a major punishment was illegal, since he was neither the appointing authority nor the disciplinary authority. The award of the Labour Court was signed on 9th May, 1983 and pronounced on 18th July, 1983 From the award, I find that the Management never raised the plea that the Personnel Manager of the Company, who had issued the order imposing a major punishment, was the appointing authority since he had been empowered by the Company to appoint Dressers, and was therefore “appointing authority” within the meaning of the rules. Not only that there is no material on record to support this plea, such a plea was not even urged before the Labour Court. Whether the Company has or has not empowered the Personnel Manager to appoint Dressers in the Hospital is a question of fact. Even if such a plea, was raised and some material brought on record in support of the plea, I may have considered remanding the matter to the Labour Court. But I find that there is neither any factual basis for the submission, nor was the plea ever raised before the Labour Court despite a clear objection raised by the petitioner that the Personnel Manager was neither his appointing authority nor his disciplinary authority, and therefore, could not pass the order inflicting a major punishment. The Labour Court proceeded on the erroneous assumption that since the letter of appointment was signed by the Personnel Officer, he was the appointing authority, and not the Company, The Labour Court has further failed to notice that the appointment letter was signed by the Personnel Officer but the order imposing a major punishment has been signed by the Personal Manager and not Personnel Officer. The Labour Court also laboured under the impression that even if the Personnel Manager did not, while signing the letter imposing punishment, mention that he was signing on behalf of the Company, it must be held that he was only acting as an agent of the Company. In my view, there is no justification for the conclusions reached by the Labour Court. Having regard to the letter of appointment (Annexure-1) and having regard to the fact that there is nothing to show that the Personnel Manager was the appointing authority of the petitioner, it must be held that the order imposing major punishment by the Personnel Manager was illegal, since under the rules, such an order could be passed only by the disciplinary authority which in the instant case was the appointing authority,
8. In this view of the matter, this writ application must be allowed. The award of the Labour Court (Annexure-18) is set aside and it must be held that the order imposing a major punishment upon the petitioner passed by the Personnel Manager dated 2-5-1974 (Annexure-5) was not justified. The petitioner shall be entitled to his usual increments in accordance with the relevant rules as if the order (Annexure-5) had- never been passed. There will be no order as to costs.